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i. Abstract 
This thesis records an action research-based inquiry into the potential of sail technology as an 
adaptation intervention for sea-transport that would assist Oceanic communities (at local and 
national levels) (re)claim resilience in the face of growing threats from climate change and 
extreme fossil-fuel dependency.  The issue is explored at micro, meso, and macro geographic 
levels and temporally across past heritage, the current situation and looking to a future 
horizon.  A case study approach is employed, where possible focussed through a Fijian lens.  
The thesis finds that while there are grounds for expanded research into and priority of 
sustainable sea-transport, this central issue facing most Oceania communities remains 
invisible within the policy space at all levels and has been hitherto ignored by regional and 
development agencies.  Barriers are identified as being as much perceptual as actual, and lack 
of technology is not the primary issue but rather more deep-seated factors including 
ownership, operation, and management spread across multiple ‘well-beings’ including culture 
and socio-economic concerns.  There are multiple lessons to learn from interrogation of the 
past.   
The process of inquiry was initiated within existing talanoa of key partner communities in 
Fiji and has, in turn, proved catalytic in initiating both fresh research into Fijian seafaring 
heritage – particularly that concerning the Waqa Tabu or Drua and its related culture in Fiji 
and central Oceania - and a growing network of interest in an agenda of sustainable sea-
transport for this region.  The former proved elemental to a programme of art and 
performance undertaken by the Oceania Centre for Arts, Culture and Pacific Studies leading 
up to the Festival of Pacific Arts in the Solomons 2012 and both strands were brought 
together in the region’s first international ‘Sustainable Sea-Transport Talanoa’ hosted by the 
University of the South Pacific in November 2012.  It now appears there is sufficient critical 
mass generated to ensure a sustained programme of both action and research will ensue and it 
is suggested critical learning of collaboration and partnership as well as measures for 
assessing the sustainability of such a programme can be gleaned from other Oceanic 
Participatory Learning and Action experiences, in particular the Fiji Local Marine 
Management Area programme. 
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iii. Acronyms and Abbreviations 
ADB Asian Development Bank 
AusAID Australian Agency for International Development 
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CCIP Climate Change Implementation Plan 
dwt deadweight ton 
EU European Union 
FDB Fiji Development Bank 
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MDG Millennium Development Goals 
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mmt million metric tonnes 
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MSAF Maritime Safety Authority of Fiji (previously Fiji Islands 
Maritime Safety Authority – FIMSA) 
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SPREP Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme 
SSL Samoa Shipping Line 
SSTT 2012 Sustainable Sea-Transport Talanoa 2012, USP, Suva. 
STI Sustainable Transport Initiative 
SV Sailing Vessel 
SVV Sustainable Village Vessel 
TEU Twenty-foot Container Equivalent 
TK Traditional Knowledge 
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UN United Nations 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
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iv. Glossary of Fijian Terms 
bati teeth; edge; a social group which traditionally was the land 
border defender to another group to which it owed special 
allegiance 
bosenikoro village council 
bure traditional Fijian house/meeting house 
camakau outrigger sailing vessels; outrigger version of drua 
dalo Colocasia esculenta; taro; a staple starchy Fijian root crop 
dina right; true 
drua Fijian double hulled sailing vessel 
kai prefix denoting the place that people come “from”; e.g. kai 
Kadavu are people from Kadavu 
kailoma of mixed Fijian/European parentage 
kaivalagi visitor/tourist/European 
kaivanua person of the land 
kaiwai person of the sea; sailor 
kerekere request 
koro village 
laca sail 
lotu church; religion 
magimagi sinnet rope made from coconut husk fibre 
mai come 
mana power; power to effect 
masi tapa, bark cloth made from the paper mulberry plant 
mataisau craftsman; builder; shipwright clan 
mataitoga Tongan shipwright; carpenter 
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matanivanua spokesperson 
mataqali an agnatically-related social unit; a primary division of the 
village; clan 
qase elder; old person 
qoliqoli communally owned fishing ground 
saucoko construction style of drua and camakau using a single large 
hollowed log as the hull basal component 
solevu kinship-related gathering and ritualised exchanges.  Major 
solevu involved large parties on fleets of vessels carrying 
enormous quantities of goods 
soli contribution 
tabetebete construction style of drua and camakau where multiple 
planks are sewn to a scarfed keel 
tabu taboo; sacred; prohibition 
tanoa a large round wooden bowl for mixing yagona 
taukei indigenous person 
tikina district; administrative sub-unit of a Province 
turanganikoro administrative head of a village; village spokesperson 
vanua land, people and way of life; largest founding social unit 
voivoi Pandanus thurstoni, used for mat and sail making 
waqa boat, ship, vessel 
yagona kava (Piper methysticum); ceremonial drink in Fiji 
yavusa second largest social unit 
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v. Glossary of Terminology 
bunker n. The propulsion fuel loaded onto a ship, vessel, or 
aircraft; fuel used for transportation.  v. to load propulsion 
fuel onto a craft. 
Central Oceania After Hau`ofa (2008:77).  Includes: Nauru, Kiribati, 
Tuvalu, Tonga, Fiji, Samoa, Rotuma, Futuna, Uvea, 
Tokelau, and Niue. 
Cultural knowledge All forms of culturally held understanding, including oral 
history and story. 
Drua catchment The geographical spread in which drua, kalia, and ‘alia 
vessels operated; including Tonga, Fiji, Samoa, Rotuma, 
Futuna, Uvea, and New Caledonia. 
Lemaki Samoan specialist craftsman brought to the Lau by 
Tongans in the late eighteenth century; hereditary 
descendants of Lemaki 
Oceania The largest ocean and all it contains; (re-)created by Epeli 
Hau`ofa in response to the ill-conceived rebranding by 
successive waves of European re-namers over the past ½ 
millennia.  Other names include Te Moananui o 
Kiva/Kiwa, Pacific, etc.  Hau’ofa further divided into 
Eastern, Central, Western, and Northern Oceania. 
 
	  
Chapter 1. Overview 
In the Pacific, the next few decades will see climate change of unprecedented rapidity 
taking place ... Our understanding of what is likely to happen in the future allows 
humanity an excellent opportunity to plan ahead, to anticipate the probable changes 
and to take action to minimise their undesirable effects (Nunn, 2010b). 
The maritime history of the Pacific peoples is recognised as part of the shaping of 
Pacific societies but is also a basis for comparison in making changes for the future.  
Not least is the possibility of a renaissance of commercial sail under changing 
economic relationships between distance, rising cost of fuel, environmental concerns, 
and the always available Pacific wind systems for assistance in ship propulsion 
(Couper, 2009:208). 
1.1. Statement of Intent: Toward Verstehen (Illumination/Understanding) 
This thesis records the result of a four year inquiry1, specifically an interrogation and 
evaluation, of the potential that sail technology offers as a sustainable adaptation tool in face 
of challenges posed to the communities of Oceania.  It concludes that such adaptation will 
assist communities at local, national, and regional level build resilience.  The adaptation is 
available, or at least emergent, but unrealised and the primary barriers are perceptual. 
Sails are to Oceania as wheels are to continents.  The capability to colonise one-third of the 
globe under sail and without metal is arguably the greatest technological intellectual property 
right of Oceanic peoples.  Historic maritime analyses (e.g. Couper, 2009; D’Arcy, 2006, 
2008; Finney, 1994, 2003; Howe et al, 2006; Irwin, 1992) concur on a common picture at the 
time of European contact of an ocean heavily populated with indigenous sailing vessels of 
size and capacity comparable with or greater than that of the arriving Europeans.  Such 
technology was highly developed and functional, diverse in type, readily available and an 
essential facet to all aspects of life – from artisanal fishing and local village transport to inter-
island/inter-archipelago warfare, trade, and diplomacy.  All was indigenously designed, built, 
owned, operated, and island-centred.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Inquiry, evaluand, evaluation, foci, verstehen are used here in the context of Naturalistic Inquiry (after 
Lincoln and Guba, 1985) and discussed further in Section 3.3.  A ‘geographical interrogation’ (after Lewis, 
2009) of the focus would be an alternative descriptive.  
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Yet, within decades this supremacy was displaced with first, European sailing technology and 
ultimately by carbon-fuelled, mechanically-propelled vessels.  In Fiji, the field research base 
for this inquiry, only isolated examples of sail remain either in a recreational, tourism-related 
capacity or small, remnant pockets of indigenous and displaced native sailing knowledge.   
Sea-transport in Oceania is far broader than just movement of goods and people from one 
location to another.  It is central to Oceanic culture and epistemology.  This thesis contends 
that there is a strong case for investigating and prioritising a revitalisation of sail technology 
and sailing culture as an industrial sea-transport solution to (re)building resilience in the face 
of climate change and fossil-fuel dependence/supply issues in Oceania.  The reality of any 
sail-powered future use needs to be carefully considered.  Industrial, small-scale sea-transport 
ventures in this part of the world are, at best, only marginally profitable and always high-risk, 
regardless of the technology employed. 
There has been considerable examination by historians, ethnographers, sociologists, and 
anthropologists of the past role of both the pure-sail technology and the trade/social 
interaction it facilitated in the history and development of the region (e.g. Couper, 2009; 
D’Arcy, 2006; Hage and Harary, 1996; Kirch, 2002; Sahlins, 1962, Thompson, 1940; Tippet, 
1968).  To date no study has sought to assess what role it might play now in enabling Oceanic 
island and coastal communities toward more ‘sustainable’ futures.  This thesis is offered as 
my sevusevu to the talanoa on sustainable futures for Oceania to begin to fill that gap.  The 
findings are neither comprehensive nor complete; such a claim will require significantly more 
work across several disciplines.  But they are sufficient to provide verstehen or illuminated 
knowledge of the subject, provide a sound basis for continued inquiry and are sufficient to 
justify further prioritised attention. 
This inquiry focus began at the micro level, a single, coastal island village in Fiji where no-
one owns a wheeled vehicle and whose life is dominated by the sea (Sections 1.3.1 and 4.1).  
It arrives at its current juncture with multiple foci from village to globe, temporally spread 
across past millennia and looking toward a future horizon.  It finds that issues of sea-transport 
remain universal and primary, a basic human need of Oceanic peoples today and tomorrow as 
throughout all human interaction with this Ocean, the largest natural feature in the world.  
Oceania’s sea-transport scenario is unique, a region of remote and minute transport nodes of 
minimal economic significance spread over some of the longest communications lines in the 
world.  The regional scenario is summarised in Section 4.2, narrowing back to a Fijian centre.  
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Current transport, especially domestic, is increasingly unsustainable and owes nothing to the 
Pacific’s rich indigenous, historic, and arguably sustainable legacy of vessel/sail technology 
development.  It is also almost exclusively fossil-fuel powered, largely owned in urban and 
external centres outside of the village/outer-island margins.  Reliance on such technologies 
makes Oceanian communities (at village, province, and country levels) extremely vulnerable 
to changes in transport availability and fluctuations in fuel price and security.  
There is little evidence that global initiatives will supply alternatives to current sea-transport 
options, and this holds true especially for Oceania.  Few reports mention any future potential 
for sail technology, do so only briefly, and most are sceptical of its viability (see Section 4.3).  
There is a modern revolution in shipping technology emerging globally, albeit at low scale 
and impact, as sufficient popular consciousness rises of both the global merchant navy’s 
contribution to GHG emissions and the industry’s reluctance to take meaningful steps to 
mitigate the same.  A range of potential alternative-propulsion technologies is becoming 
available to reduce or replace the current monopoly of fossil-fuel powered options.  While 
there are grounds for confidence that this trend will increase, it will not necessarily do so with 
a focus and understanding of the unique sea-transport issues pertaining to Oceania.  They will 
need guidance and amplification if they are to be applied in a timely and beneficial manner 
here.  The global scenario and the related emerging technology is summarised in Section 4.3. 
A Fiji-centred focal point has been taken for this study, although cognisant of its Oceanic and 
global setting.  Historically, Fiji was an integral part of an extensive and complex political 
and trade network encompassing most of central Oceania2, facilitated at the contact era by 
large fleets of Fijian-sourced sailing vessels.  The inquiry began with the assumption that Fiji 
was the most logical Pacific starting point for initiating a technological revolution and 
remains firmly of that view at the end of this phase of research as discussed in Section 5.4.  
The resultant verstehen provided by this research should prove of benefit to more Oceanic 
communities and situations than the narrow range considered here.  Given the universality of 
sea–transport to Oceanic communities, while acknowledging the wide diversity of Oceanic 
cultures and operating environments, it has relevance across the region, and many of the 
lessons for Fijian communities will be of interest to other Pacific locales. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Central Oceania is used in this thesis in the sense used by Hau`ofa (2008:77) and discussed further in Section 
2.1. 
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This thesis focuses primarily on the example of sail or wind-powered technology, although 
other potentially valid alternatives are also possible and emergent (Section 4.3.3).  It suggests 
that industrial application of sails and sail technology offers strong promise as an accessible, 
cost-effective, low-carbon, renewable, low-impact technology as rooted (anchored) in the 
Pacific as kava and coconuts.  Re-association, if it can be proved attainable and sustainable, 
would be a practical Oceanic response to issues of climate change adaptation and the region’s 
extreme dependence on imported fossil-fuel, as well as a much deeper reclamation/re-
invigoration of a central iconic pillar of Oceanic identity and culture. 
There are numerous challenges apparent to further investigation and practical trialling of sail 
in order to fully prove its validity.  These are complex and previously poorly characterized or 
understood.  Several are illuminated in this thesis (see in particular Chapter 5).  They range 
from the practical (what technology, what ownership and management models, what policy 
frameworks, etc.) to the perceptual (bigger and faster motors are seen as a step toward 
‘development’ while sails are seen as part of a quaint past, a step back not forward).  
Not least of the challenges is the minimal visibility the issue has at all levels.  All findings 
reached in this inquiry are tentative, as expected under a Naturalistic Inquiry process3, but it 
is suggested that the global preference for a terrestrial-based, or continental-centred, 
epistemology is a causal reason.  Sea-transport underpins all global security issues and is 
central to all global economies, industries, commerce, and trade.  Shipping is the handmaiden 
of consumerism.  It is the absolute lifeline of the Pacific region.  Yet, as global debate on 
climate change intensifies, sea-transport rates a lesser priority and mention in policy than 
other matters.  For example, IPCC reports on transport give greater attention to two-wheeled 
vehicles than shipping (Ribeiro, 2007).  This is discussed in greater detail in Section 4.3. 
In this thesis the discussion on future sea-transport options is couched within the context of 
climate change adaption (see in particular Section 2.2), not because it is the only pressing 
threat to Oceania’s communities but because the size and immediacy of the problem out-
shadows all others.  But I advocate for the introduction of alternative-energy propelled 
shipping regardless of climate change, provided it proves cost-effective, and hence describe it 
as a “no regret” or “soft technology” adaption response.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See Section 3.3. 
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Globally, in the context of climate change, sea-transport issues are considered under the 
heading of “mitigation” and this categorisation overflows into an Oceanic setting, masking 
and skewing the real nature of the problem and severely limiting the ability to tackle the 
issues and seek realistic solutions.  The association with mitigation has resulted in the 
paradox where Oceanic states are likely to pay greatly increased costs for sea-transport due to 
global mitigation regulations in the immediate future, while a failure regionally to correctly 
recognise it as an adaptation priority restricts access to climate financing to resource the 
necessary technological revolution.  Prosecution of global-scale mitigation measures 
currently in train under IMO leadership are likely to lead only to increased costs and barriers 
for Oceania, whose contribution to the global issue is so minute as to be irrelevant, resulting 
in a double penalty for no visible benefit (see Section 4.3). 
This thesis finds that alternative-energy vessels could potentially be a major fuel and cost-
saving adaptation, whilst simultaneously providing additional benefits measured across a 
range of well-beings, for minimal research investment.  If the subject is poorly recognised 
globally, in Oceania the issue is almost completely invisible.  It is notable by its absence in 
any policy framework at any level (see Section 4.2).  It certainly receives none of the 
attention currently focussed by donors and development agencies on other adaptation 
measures, including widespread renewable energy programmes (Section 2.2), particularly 
electricity generation projects.  As the example of Tokelau shows, this can save only a 
fraction of the energy cost of sea-transport and does so at questionable economic benefit 
(Section 5.3).  Continuing to ignore the position of transport generally, and sea-transport in 
particular, in regional energy budgets, plans, programmes and policy frameworks risks other 
interventions as being righty criticised for “playing around the edges” (Mayhew, 2011b). 
There are numerous lessons available through interrogation of past case examples, 
knowledge, and learnings.  The case for employing such an approach is set out in Section 2.1.  
Lessons are sought in both indigenous past, through examination of Central Oceania’s drua 
culture4 (Chapter 6), and in the experiences arising from previous alternative sea-transport 
experiments, in particular those resulting from the 1970's oil crisis (Chapter 5).  
It was wrongly assumed at the outset of the research process that drua culture had been 
previously comprehensively explored and established in the literature.  The research took a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Section 6.1 for a more detailed description of the meaning of this phrase as used throughout this thesis. 
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lengthy tangent in its middle phases as I sought to bring together the scattered record and to 
understand the tensions within the written accounts (Sections 6.2 and 6.3).  This culminated 
in my participation in a process to search out the unwritten culturally held record (Section 
6.4).  As drua type vessels and their related associations have been heavily overshadowed 
within the region by Eastern Polynesian voyaging culture (e.g. see Goetzfridt, 1992 and 
discussion in Chapter 6), I considered the findings important enough to devote a large section 
of their own as a sevusevu to the mataisau, mataitoga and Lemaki; the descendants of the 
builders of arguably one of the finest bluewater sailing vessels of the pure-sail era.  
For sea-transport options to change a shift in paradigm is required; it will need more than just 
an exchange of vehicle type or technology.  It means adopting a new (or evolved) kind of 
transport scenario and that means overcoming a perceptual barrier that sail belongs to the past 
and bigger motors belong to a better, more ‘developed’ future.  The iconic nature of drua and 
its place in Fiji, as with all such vessels to seafaring cultures in Oceania, offers an entry point 
to changing perception.  I consider it to be one of the largest single factors likely to affect 
popular consciousness on the subject of sustainable shipping in Fiji.  Consequently 
considerable energy and space has been devoted to this aspect of the inquiry.  Retaining and 
re-invigorating this heritage is an essential priority for today’s mataisau and strong support 
for the research approach was provided at the time by OCACPS and USP academics. 
This thesis attempts to collate as broad an evidential base to support such a cultural 
reinvigoration/association as possible.  My colleagues and I found at the end of this phase of 
research that knowledge, technology, and heritage of drua are still living, albeit in a highly 
fragile and vulnerable state.  Our research results signal the need for a new journey of 
historical, cultural, and archaeological rediscovery for Fiji and central Oceania if this status is 
to change positively and this thesis contributes to setting a platform for that. 
In prosecuting this inquiry, an Action Research approach has been adopted from the outset.  
The approach taken to methodology is set out in Chapter 3.  By starting from a Naturalistic 
Inquiry focus-based approach, I have not set out to solve a question nor sought to provide 
exhaustive or conclusive findings.  In keeping with Naturalistic Inquiry precepts it has 
generated more questions than it provides answers to.  The research has also taken a number 
of turns in direction and focus, an expected, even desired, outcome of a reiterative analytic 
process.  The resultant thesis is not seamless.  I prefer to think of it as a collage of 
understandings and supporting information. 
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A case study approach has been taken to reporting, again consistent with a Naturalistic 
Inquiry framework.  Talanoa (see Section 3.5), and literature and internet searches (Section 
3.7) have been employed as the primary data acquisition and investigative tools.  In the 
course of the research I have attempted to immerse myself as much as possible in both the 
subject and the location, sailing to Fiji for at least six months of each of the last four years.  In 
that time I have embedded myself (and my family) in three distinct Fiji communities (to the 
extent it is possible for a kaivalagi to gain temporary entry to such) described in Section 1.3; 
the koro of Solodamu in Kadavu; the re-located Moce community of Na Korova, a squatter 
camp on the edge of Suva; and also in the family of the Fiji Islands Voyaging Society and the 
crew of Uto ni Yalo, Fiji’s first voyaging ‘canoe’ in the modern age.  Each relationship was 
facilitated entirely serendipitously.  I have taken the position throughout of an active 
participant/observer and my intervention has resulted in some small ways to the connecting of 
the fates of all three communities (and of course with that of my own family).  
I have also situated myself throughout this research process within the technology being 
explored and advocated for, using alternative energy and low-carbon technologies exclusively 
for home and office, and sail-power for the vast majority of my transport across more than 
15,000nm5 of ocean over four years.  My eight-year old son has calculated our carbon 
footprint to be less than one litre of fuel used (transport, electricity, cooking, and heating) per 
day for a family of four-six people or less than 2% of the New Zealand household average 
over the lifetime of this research6.  With the exception of one season I have not used 
terrestrial private transport and in that instance I bought a small car to travel from Northland 
to Wellington and back to attend university.  That single trip used more fossil-fuel than my 
family consumed in the rest of the entire year.  While employment of these measures has 
required a total rethink of my and my family’s lifestyle and priorities, we have not suffered 
any reduction in ‘wellness’ (a term I greatly preference to ‘sustainability’).  Almost all the 
technology we employ is old, proven, readily available, and not overly difficult to acquire or 
master.  It is definitely available to Oceanic communities.  
While our low-carbon and low-consumption choices are personal ones, I firmly believe that 
the evidence of the increasing costs of global GHG emissions is now overwhelming and that 
unless the global community, and those of us from the developed world in particular, do not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  Nautical miles (nm) are used throughout for measurement of distances at sea. 
6 Newell, J., 2012, unpublished. 
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immediately change our current behaviours and consumptive patterns drastically, all our 
children’s’ futures are grim indeed.  The priority afforded this matter by world leaders, 
especially in the ‘developed’ and continental world is pathetic and inexcusable.  The 
inspiration is from Gandhi – to lead by example is not an option; it is the only option. 
And so I come to a tension in the presentation of this thesis.  While I understand my academic 
responsibility is to demonstrate that defendable processes have been employed to provide a 
contribution of originality of thought to the greater debate, I also consider I have an equal 
responsibility to provide research findings of practical or demonstrable application back to 
Oceania, especially given the immediacy and urgency of the situation.  That the “Pacific 
Way”7 revolves on reciprocity is one of the prominent learnings I have gained in my Oceanic 
voyaging to date.  To attempt to honour that I have used this thesis as a chart to leave as many 
soundings of the reefs I have encountered for the benefit of any wayfinder that follows. 
If alternatives such as those discussed are to be introduced, then this needs to be assessed 
against the benefit it contributes.  Determining sustainability requires a far-wider assessment 
than just considering vessel technology and application.  Critical understanding of social and 
cultural interfaces of sea-transport and its multiple stakeholders is essential.  Such 
understanding must start with acknowledgement that the context for these communities is 
Oceanic not continental.  And so the inquiry commences by situating it in current writings on 
Oceanic epistemology (Section 2.1) and the issues considered within this inquiry are viewed 
through the lens of ocean throughout. 
The inquiry was initially focussed on the potential for micro-scale, sail-powered, multi-hulled 
vessels based in coastal villages in Fijian waters.  Over the course of the inquiry the focus 
expanded in several directions; spatially to examining shipping at a national, regional, and 
global level; temporally to look at heritage and lessons for sea-transport in Fiji’s past and 
toward the horizon to ask what options might be offered in the near future.  No conclusion is 
reached as to at what level alternative energy vessels should be centred; there are issues and 
roles to consider for all of them.  The conclusion is drawn that issues of policy, ownership, 
and management, not the technology itself, are the central ones to now grapple with.  It is 
essential to recognise that the industrial application needs to occur within a wider setting than 
just an economic or commercial sphere; especially in Oceania where traditional culture and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See Crocombe (1976) and Mara (1997) for further discussion on this description. 
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society continue to play essential roles.  
The canvas presented in this thesis is a broad one.  At several stages in the research process I 
was encouraged by supervisors and mentors to narrow the focus to a single aspect of the 
inquiry.  Such advice is sage and several times I was sorely tempted.  The research into the 
great Fijian drua or waqa tabu culture is a prime example.  Personally I would have been 
more than happy to have concentrated all my efforts on this one subject; there is certainly 
enough scope in this field alone for several dissertations and the subject is a fascinating and 
absorbing one for any true ‘salt’ or ‘kaiwai’.  Ultimately I determined that the paucity of 
information or even starting points for debate across the breadth of the inquiry combined with 
the lack of focus on the broad issue in the current development industry left me as researcher 
with a responsibility to provide as wide an ambit as possible.  In taking this approach, I 
acknowledge the potential for critical areas not being covered in the detail they deserve.  
There are a number of aspects of inquiry that have not broached here.  Three key omissions 
are especially worthy of note.  While I consider that the review of the heritage record of drua 
culture provides an adequate coverage of the vessels and their operation, the related literature 
on the trading networks and culture/social interactions that these vessels supported and 
facilitated is not analyzed here in as great a detail.  Fortunately, this aspect has been well-
addressed by other commentators, in particular Laura Thompson (1938, 1940) who 
characterized the islands of southern Lau as a naturally balanced self-sufficient trade area (see 
also Hage and Harary, 1996; Reid, 1977; Sahlins, 1962; Tippet, 1968). 
A second omission is any consideration of, and comparison with, local initiatives in sail 
powered sea-transport in other oceans of the world.  The scuttlebutt amongst the international 
cruising fraternity is that there are pockets of local sailing renaissance occurring in Indonesia, 
Africa, and the Persian Gulf that would be well-worth interrogation and evaluation for 
applicable lessons for an Oceania context.   
Thirdly, sufficient emphasis has not been placed on quantitative analysis of both costs and 
benefits at micro and macro-economic levels, nor have the economics of any alternative 
technologies been fully considered here.  This is an emergent field in most alternative energy 
areas, in particular the use of alternative technologies for electricity generation8.  As the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See for example Syngellakis, K (2011) Renewable Energy Options for the Pacific, PPT presented at the 
Climate Parliament: Climate Change and Energy Access for All, 1-3 October, Lautoka for a broad discussion 
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Tokelau renewable energy project (Section 5.3.3) demonstrates, it is easy to portray any 
introduction of renewable energy for Small Island States as a benefit and a priority.  But 
agencies leading these initiatives have a responsibility to make widely available both accurate 
information on such attempts, and to robustly demonstrate their overall viability.  
In its narrowest interpretation, this inquiry has remained primarily an industrial one, although 
it strays across disciplinary boundaries in doing so.  The more closely a lens is held to the 
focus of this inquiry, the more facets of the subject are exposed as requiring further scrutiny 
and assessment.  It is entirely unrealistic to expect all of these to be covered in a single study.  
It does underscore the need for the subject to be considered from a multi-disciplinary (or 
trans-disciplinary) platform.  As D’Arcy (2006) has already argued, historically seafaring in 
this ocean is about more than technology and seafaring skills and must be viewed in its wider 
social context.  The inquiry must be situated within a field of knowledge broader than 
assessment of vessel and technology type and technical operation.  Such an approach to 
research has previously been summarized by Wesley-Smith (1995:128).  “Interdisciplinary 
work is distinguished first, and most obviously, by defining its objects of inquiry without 
reference to established disciplinary boundaries.  It acknowledges that societies do not fall 
neatly into segments or compartments with labels coinciding with the names of university 
departments.  It sees the connections between political, cultural, economic, social, linguistic, 
or spiritual phenomena, rather than emphasizing their separateness”. 
My view has firmed throughout my research that a village (embayment/island) which controls 
its own sea-transport is a village with options and opportunity - its capacity to be the master 
(mistress) of its own decision-making/governance/option selection enhanced, although at 
what resource or opportunity cost we don’t yet know.  Conversely, a village that is reliant on 
externally-controlled sea-transport is truly captive; dependent on decisions outside the 
immediate watershed.  Alternative energy technologies offer an opportunity to allow such 
local control to be regained, and, this thesis argues, increase social and cultural resilience. 
At the village level, as typified in the Solodamu case study, and at the national or regional, 
the barriers to successful introduction of such technology are as much (or more) politically, 
culturally and socially rooted as technological.  And the technology cannot be considered in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
on the current lack of and need for comprehensive cost benefit analysis on all aspects of renewable energy 
interventions across the Pacific. 
http://www.climateparl.net/cpcontent/pdfs/KSyngellakis%20RE%20Options.pdf accessed 20/11/2012 
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isolation to the economic or operational issues.  Re-invigoration of a sailing culture in a 
country such as Fiji requires an understanding of the role such technology played in the past – 
where it was prominent not only as a means of transport, a facilitator of trade but as the 
subject of exchange itself.  If these learnings are correct then all these aspects now require 
contribution from, amongst others, economics, geography, sociology, political science, 
development studies, engineering, business management, history, and anthropology. 
The concluding Chapter 7 begins an open-ended discussion on how best to now move this 
agenda forward.  I am confident it will move forward, although how and by whom is unclear.  
The process of conducting this inquiry itself has raised an interesting discourse and has been 
responsible for initiating an ongoing process for continued inquiry.  Given the large scale (by 
Oceanic standards) and immediacy of the problem, the emergent nature of the technology and 
related knowledge, the small critical mass of the Oceanic communities and the convoluted 
nature of the myriad agencies and organisations potentially involved, I suggest a collaborative 
approach between stakeholders is desirable, albeit difficult.  Important lessons can be learnt 
by evaluating and learning from past endeavours in other fields.  The action research 
approach employed throughout this inquiry culminated in catalyzing a number of key 
stakeholders to collaboratively organise a three-day talanoa at USP in November 2012.  This 
brought together presenters and participants from across the globe and the breadth of the 
subject broached in this thesis.  The talanoa confirmed, congealed, and advanced the 
verstehen I had set out to achieve.  It provided an appropriate port of safe haven to mark the 
end of this particular stage of the inquiry. 
1.2. The Research Process 
This section introduces the initial focal point of the inquiry, a chance meeting in a rural, 
coastal, Fiji island village.  The four reiterations of focus that have marked the waypoints on 
the research voyage are outlined.  The following section 1.3 introduces and discusses three 
critical relationships formed with differing Fiji communities that have influenced the 
progression of the inquiry.  
 
1.2.1. Port of Departure – Solodamu 2008-2010 
I am a New Zealander who lives by choice at sea on the Pacific Ocean.  In 2006, while sailing 
in Fijian waters with my family on our wind-powered home, I responded to the kerekere of an 
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old friend, the late Alifereti Bogiva, to transport him and his family to his wife’s ancestral 
village Solodamu, on the island of Kadavu, and participate in a talanoa he was facilitating on 
governance and sustainability planning for the koro.  The consequential events of making a 
serendipitous decision to accept the village’s invitation to participate are described in Section 
4.1.  Although not the original focus of that talanoa sea-transport was identified as a critical 
limiting factor and a potential option for both reducing future village expenditure and 
dependency while simultaneously offering sustainable income generation and employment.  
Between 2008 and 2010 we returned periodically with Bogiva and with various family and 
sailing friends on a variety of wind-powered vessels to examine this issue further.  The 
starting assumption was a simple one.  With our sail-powered vessels we are capable of 
roaming this ocean and its islands at will and modest cost and with a minimal carbon 
footprint.  As sailors we have collectively learnt the basic skills necessary to build, maintain, 
and operate small but robust and sea-worthy craft.  Could this knowledge be transferred to the 
village sufficiently to enable it to operate sail-powered transport options that provided real 
benefits to the village, measurable across a range of well-beings?  
We conducted rudimentary but sufficient research into the operating market to determine that 
the technology to construct or obtain a suitable vessel was available and that if sufficient 
expertise and capacity could be achieved, a small-scale transport enterprise could be operated 
economically.  The procurement cost, although a large investment for a village, was not 
excessive.  The capacity level of the village to undertake such a venture was minimal.  We 
proceeded to assist the village to develop a basic business case, and then a detailed business 
plan.  But the further we progressed, the more apparent it became that although such an 
option presents as logical, feasible, and practical in an economic sense seen through external 
lenses, there were innumerable challenges and barriers to its successful implementation. 
By 2010 it was apparent that an isolated single-village, single-vessel intervention was 
impractical at that time for a range of reasons, which are explored in more detail in Section 
4.1.  While technologically and economically achievable, there were a number of ‘game-
breakers’, critical issues that could not be resolved satisfactory - such as the impossibility of 
getting commercial insurance for a village-operated asset.  The skill bases needed to be built 
for all facets of such an operation would require significant external intervention, certainly 
beyond the scope of a small team of part-time volunteers.  It was also becoming increasingly 
apparent that the political and social structure of the village could be adversely impacted by 
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the scale and stress of the project, an effect that could negate any positive benefits.  However, 
I remained convinced of both the centrality of sea-transport in the village context to almost all 
facets of daily life and increasingly aware of the limitations, burden, and unsustainability of 
current options available to the village.  
During this period I had also begun to look around for other examples and then any literature 
at all in this field.  It was surprisingly sparse.  Globally and regionally there is an enormous 
increase in research, development, and delivery of alternative energy technologies, for 
electricity generation in particular.  Despite the extreme degree of dependence of Pacific 
peoples on fossil-fuel generally and fossil-fuel powered sea-transport in particular; and 
despite the central place of sail-powered vessels in Fijian and wider Oceanic history, the issue 
is virtually invisible in any discussion on sustainable development or adaptation, whether at 
policy, agency, industry or academic level.  
I remained convinced that my initial assumptions (that alternative propulsion technologies, 
wind-power in particular, potentially offer options to future Oceania communities that are 
available, accessible, affordable, adaptable, and appropriate) needed to be examined more 
closely and rigorously.  If these assumptions were found to be valid, then this needed to be 
examined to tease out what barriers exist to further consideration of the options and what 
opportunities this might make available.  Such an inquiry became the focus of my research 
proposal for PhD candidature.  
1.2.2. Following the Seasons: Four Phases of Reiterative Reflection 
The methodical approach, including Naturalistic Inquiry, is discussed in Chapter 3.  A priori 
of that method is that it is emergent and employs reiterative analyses of accumulating data, 
with the lines of inquiry being refocused accordingly each time.  In essence the inquiry 
covered four phases, each following the two traditional Oceanic seasons of relatively 
predictable trade winds interspersed with boliwaqa (passing low pressure systems with 
revolving winds) and the more violent ‘cyclone season’ or what Tom Davis (1999:64) called 
“the season of calms and storms”.  As I was using a bluewater vessel as a research platform, it 
needed to be moved out of the cyclone belt for insurance purposes during the season.  And so 
a pattern of broad data collection (the ‘thick descriptive’ of Naturalistic Inquiry – Guba and 
Lincoln, 1985) in Fiji waters over the winter alternating with campus and boatyard reflection 
and assessment (of both data and ship) in NZ during our summer.   
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The first season was spent considering the lessons learnt from the Solodamu ‘experiment’ to 
date.  Focus was strictly on the village level, on its political issues in a period of some 
transition and stress; on energy budgets measured in 1, 20 and 200 litre ‘drums’ and daily 
household incomes of $0-$20; on micro-technology (catamarans of 4-10dwt) and routes of 
less than 60nm.  Culturally the focus was kai Kadavu and then kai Viti.  Suva was a long trip 
away for villagers, Oceania was known largely through sport (particularly rugby) and church 
connections, and the world was literally a world away9.  At the village level, issues of policy 
concerning sea-transport are vague and entirely practically orientated.  There is cognisance of 
survey and licensing regulations concerning capacities, loadings, safety equipment, 
qualifications and licensing which have recently been the subject of government attention but 
are still very much considered as guidelines at best in Kadavu.  Regional policy frameworks, 
international carbon reduction regulations, and the like are vague, vacuous, external 
abstractions in the village lexicon.  
Although the greatest need for affordable and sustainable sea-transport is obviously at village 
and domestic level, and this increases the more remote the village/island is from the centre, 
there were too many ‘game-breakers’ outside of the village’s decision-making and control to 
overcome.  As the season ended in 2009 I had formed a relationship with the Fiji Islands 
Voyaging Society (Section 1.3.3) to kerekere for crew placements for some of the Solodamu 
youth to give them experience and sea-time on Uto ni Yalo.  This led to the start of a 
reiterative talanoa on the potential for continuing to investigate the same technology but 
considering both ownership and management frameworks at a higher, even national level.  
This shift meant a need to widen the research to include understanding of Fiji’s sea-transport 
context, including its history and current approaches to policy and service delivery of 
shipping.  Again, the supporting literature proved thin (e.g. Bayliss-Smith et. al., 1988; 
Couper 1968, 1973, 2009; D’Arcy 2006, 2008) and additional data difficult to access.  
The focus of inquiry had shifted.  The potential for the same village objective to be served 
remained but now I was looking at the delivery mechanism being via a centrally-managed, 
cooperatively-owned fleet rather than an individual ‘single vessel/single village’ model.  
Most of the same issues that had been identified at village level remained albeit at an 
expanded scale.  This phase is considered further in Section 5.4.  Research moved from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 I recognise these are broad generalisations, for example every Solodamu household has family members 
spread across the globe. 
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village micro to the sub-national/national meso that in turn required increasing cognisance of 
the regional and global macros.  At the same time I began to collect information and lessons 
from previous experiments in alternative propulsion technologies, initially small-scale Pacific 
based sailing vessels and ultimately much broader.  
In the third season, the focus again changed and splintered.  Interest in the national level 
scenario continued, but with a focus on identifying the precursors for a sail vessel heritage 
revitalisation.  A paper had been presented (Nuttall, 2012) by this time at the 2010 USP 
conference ‘”Future Challenges, Ancient Solutions” which set out the initial case in favour of 
both a sail technology investment for the region and a Fiji-led approach.  The inquiry changed 
course and set off into the past to learn more of drua, egged on initially in a very Pacific, 
deferential manner by our friends at Korova (see Section 1.3.2) and, as the research gained 
momentum, friends, and colleagues at USP, OCACPS, FIVS, and elsewhere.  Simultaneously 
I sought to place the broader research learnings into a regional and global context and to 
begin a study of the global shipping scenario.  The search for solutions veered from a 
technological and practically-situated course to more theoretical and policy headings.  The 
2011 research season culminated in the field research trip to the Southern Lau and the talanoa 
of mataisau held in Suva on 30 November (Section 6.4). 
In the final season, the inquiry has come back to a regional and forward-looking focus, this 
time considering matters of policy, both framework and implementation and direction.  I have 
also sought to cement this sea-transport agenda within its climate change adaptation setting.  
The learnings to date are summarised in the comparison of two case examples; Rotuma and 
Tokelau in Section 5.3.  As the verstehen began to coagulate, I started to consider the issues 
to be fronted as technology options continue to emerge.  What relationships amongst key 
stakeholders will be needed if emergent opportunities are to be seized and maximized?  What 
lessons can be deduced and adapted from other Oceanian models in other fields?  A 
participatory action research approach has been maintained throughout, with research results 
and findings regularly reported throughout the growing network of stakeholders and 
participants.  The USP-hosted international talanoa on sustainable sea-transport (summarized 
in Section 7.1) marked the end of the final season’s research. 
1.3. Presenting Sevusevu: A Tale of Three Communities and Reciprocity 
Ravuvu (1983:120) defines sevusevu as “a ceremonial offering of yagona by the host to the 
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guest, or the guest to his host and done in respect of recognition and acceptance of one 
another”.  It is an essential exchange that starts and permeates all ceremonial and social 
behaviour, and underpins Fijian concepts of respect, mana, reciprocity, and social cohesion.  
It has correlates in all Oceanic cultures (Lebot, et al, 1992).  Sevusevu marks the beginning 
and nature of a relationship (Katz, 1999; Ravuvu, 1987; Tomlinson, 2002, 2004).  It has been 
used throughout the field research for this thesis as the starting place for building 
relationships and establishing trust with participants.   
Sevusevu is generally associated with yagona (kava; Piper methysticum), presentation, and 
sharing of which is integral to Fijian culture and identity (Katz, 1999; Toren, 1989) reflecting 
both spiritual and human hierarchical structures (Katz, 1999; Tomlinson, 2002), cultural 
unity, and reciprocity (Ravuvu, 1976, 1987).  Yaqona is also called wai ni vanua (water of the 
land) and deemed by many Fijians to be an ingestible manifestation of their vanua, a drinkable 
representation of the people, the land, culture and cultural practice (Tomlinson, 2002, 2004). 
This section acknowledges three communities with whom this research has been bound, who 
have been intimate research partners and, over the course of the research, have shared and 
fuelled my passion, processes, and outcomes.  To a large extent the relationship forged with 
each has been the genus for the various foci of this thesis: Solodamu led to inquiry of what 
options exist for sustainable village sea-transport; Korova led to drua and its related culture; 
and FIVS brought a group of passionate and inspirational Fijians and Rotumans of all ages 
and walks of life desperate to revive their history and take it practically into the future.  
Before introducing my hosts, guides, and fellow voyagers, I want to highlight the concept of 
reciprocity, a central tenant of a Fijian (and Oceanic) ‘way of being’ that Hau’ofa (2008:36) 
describes as the “core of all oceanic cultures”.  This discussion requires some cognisance of 
concepts such as vakavanua, vakarokoroko, and loloma, as well as the central role of yagona 
in Fijian society; all of which have their duplicates in other Pacific cultures.  Such essential 
elements of Fijian culture and epistemology have been well characterised and discussed, 
initially by external observers such as Williams (1858), Henderson (1931), Thompson (1938) 
and Tippet (1968) and more recently by indigenous researchers, for example Nayacakalou 
(1975,1978), Ravuvu (1976, 1983, 1987), Tuwere (2002), Halapua (2003) and Nabobo-Baba 
(2006).  Batibasaga et al (1999), Katz (1999), and Farrelly (2009) add to this discourse. 
Vakavanua comes from the term vanua and means “the way of the Fijian people or in the 
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nature of the land, people, and customs” (Ravuvu, 1983:122).  Huffer and Qalo (2004:95) 
consider understanding the concept of vanua is crucial “for all institutions, decision makers, 
and citizens of Fiji, and for all those who interact with Fiji (donors, non-governmental 
organizations, multilateral institutions, etc)”.  Halapua (2003:83) describes vanua as not only 
linking the ancestors to the present situation but offering a way of life with a sense of 
belonging and security for the future and providing a strong bond that connects people with 
deep emotional links to one another and to the environment.  Fijians do not treat their land as 
a commodity that can be ‘owned’ in the capitalist sense of the word.   
Vakavanua is an epistemological framework where culture and nature are bound; where to act 
in tune not in dominance with the environment is sought; where to be a willing contributor is 
valued; where the needs of the vanua and its communities are esteemed and self-interest 
subordinated.  A central tenet in living vakavanua is that “individualism for its own sake is 
abhorred” (Nabobo-Baba, 2005:193).  All decisions made should first and foremost concern 
the maintenance of social harmony in the community.  The kinship system is vital for social, 
cultural, environmental, and economic sustainability and security and therefore must be 
nurtured (Farrelly, 2009). 
Vakavanua is supported by preferencing of a range of complementary social constructs such 
as vakarokoroko, acts of respect and deference.  Conflict and discord are avoided or resolved 
as a priority.  Confrontation within a group or community certainly occurs, but when it does 
the visceral reaction is to dampen it, to quieten and dissipate it, not to stamp it out 
(Nayacakalou, 1978).  Loloma is simply love, kindness, and compassion in its broadest terms.   
Fiji, as with many cultures in Oceania, is very much a living culture.  Successive waves of 
external influence (Samoan, Tongan and then European), followed by phases of colonialism, 
post-colonialism and today’s globalisation have all impacted a traditional Fijian culture and 
worldview (Farrelly 2009; Nabobo-Baba, 2006).  But language, daily life, cultural practices, 
beliefs, and epistemology are still distinctly and proudly Fijian.  Tradition is used here in the 
sense described by Clifford (2003), not as a resistance to or a binary opposite of modernity, 
but a term bound with the evolving cultural practice and a way of raising essential questions 
about the ways culture is transmitted inter-generationally (Phillips, 2003).  In Solodamu, for 
example, there are no traditional bures; the houses are of timber, block, and iron, but they are 
laid out in traditional Fijian fashion and the parts of the dwelling are respected in the 
traditional way.  Despite being made of new materials, the bure fulfils a similar societal 
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function it always has; the same cultural mores govern its use today.  Despite lures and 
influences of modernity and the changes wrought by urban drift and introduced constructs 
such as capitalism and consumerism, vakavanua is still the dominant mode of life.  
Adaptation (see Section 2.2) in the future needs to be fully cognisant of the cultural and social 
context.  The Pacific is littered with the wreckage of projects that have not done so. 
It is generally held that Pacific countries such as Fiji have developed enormous resilience that 
derives from their access to communal land, strong cultural identity, and systems of 
community governance and such resilience is supported today through strength of kinship 
ties, sharing of communal resources, and cultural obligations of reciprocity (Coates, 2009:30; 
also Aalbersberg et al, 2005; Bayliss-Smith et al, 1988; Veitayaki et al, 2011)10.  Helu (1999) 
joins the dots between the concept of reciprocity between seafarers and a long evolving 
habitation on remote islands subject to intense and irregular pressures (cyclones, invasions, 
tsunami) and its inherent underpinning of Pacific culture today.  Reciprocity is a survival 
mechanism, the Oceanic equivalent of an insurance policy against the future.  In my own 
culture any sailor is required to respond to a mayday call; it is a code I believe all true sailors 
follow regardless of whether it is required under maritime law.  We respond willingly, but not 
totally altruistically, in the knowledge we never know when it will be our turn to make the 
call.  Tsunami, cyclone, drought, invasion, and rogue waves are indiscriminate and largely 
unpredictable.  They can be swift and absolutely devastating in effect.  At this point survival 
is often beyond the capacity of the community affected. 
In iTaukei society today, maintenance of the traditional kinship system provides ‘a safety net’ 
that enables societal needs to be met in uncertain circumstances (Veitayaki et al, 2003, 2011).  
The incentive to work is driven by reciprocity rather than monetary reward, financial payment 
is secondary to kinship obligations (Batibasaga et al, 1999; Nayacakalou, 1978).  Fijians 
know that if they foster the ties that bind the vanua by assisting those who need help, this will 
be reciprocated at a time when they too require the assistance of their kin.  Those who 
maintain strong relationships with one’s people are considered ‘wealthy’ (Farrelly, 2009). 
Reciprocity as it occurs from deep within Oceanic cultures, in my view, comes from the 
unique cultural cauldron of being firstly sea people, of voyaging in small craft and living on 
exposed islands with often minimal resource bases.  In this sense, the inhabitants of Oceania 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10  The concept of cultural resilience is discussed further in Section 2.2.3. 
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have been addressing issues of sustainability long before most continental and terrestrial 
cultures.  When a resource base is overrun, the continental option of raising an army and 
heading over the hills to expand the base is not so readily available to an island community 
and even less so for a sea-borne community.  I also assume that concepts most akin to 
reciprocity are amongst the Oceanic cultural traits Diaz (2001) would see retained in an 
evolving ethos of hypo-modernity (see Section 2.1). 
The Fijian kerekere system11 as it is known ubiquitously today, where one can ask for almost 
anything to be given through kinship ties, is regularly chastised by development proponents 
as a negative cultural attribute in today’s increasingly globalised, consummerised and 
individualised society.  For example the Fiji Times (1/6/2012) reported that the 
Commissioner Northern had challenged the Cakaudrove Provincial Council meeting to do 
away with the ‘kerekere syndrome’ in villages because it was impeding the people from 
becoming self-reliant.  It is seen as “a handicap to successful commercial and economic 
development”.  Modernity and development are arguably the antithesis of a communally-
based system based on sharing, humility, conflict avoidance, and respect.  And in the case of 
Cakaudrove the Commissioner’s call was met by letters to the editor questioning the wisdom 
of letting go culture so quickly when “this exchange or reciprocity is an age old relationship 
or culture that strengthens the village unity and has withstood the test of time” (Fiji Times, 
4/6/2012). 
The tension between vakavanua and modern commercial imperatives is real, a lesson 
reinforced in this thesis when we sought to identify the barriers to Solodamu becoming sea-
transport operators.  In true Pacific fashion, the tension was best resolvable by avoidance.  It 
was better to forego the opportunity offered (although all bets were hedged as always) than to 
sacrifice erosion of chiefly mana and village cohesion. 
Reciprocity is important to understanding the human context that inhabits and is bound to this 
Ocean.  It is also important for understanding this thesis.  Only part of the story told is 
documented here in written form.  Talanoa, an oral orientated process, has been used 
extensively (see Section 3.5).  It does not translate neatly or completely into an academic 
format.  Talanoa, as with other aspects of the methodological approach employed, is a two-
way process; it is not an extraction of data or knowledge but a mutually rewarding means of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See Sahlins (1962) and Nicolas (1992) for a more in-depth discussion on the attributes of kerekere. 
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‘making’ learning.  This thesis has become a sub-set of the talanoa on sea-transport and 
shipping; not the other way round.  It has been submitted to enhance and add to the talanoa 
and it is fully expected the talanoa will continue beyond and outside of this thesis.  I (and my 
family and friends) have been offered much over the course of this inquiry; knowledge, data, 
analysis, and insight certainly but deeper gifts of understanding, empathy, trust, and 
acceptance.  I have been forgiven much as well.  This thesis gives an opportunity to 
reciprocate the knowledge and understanding gained back to that talanoa and its participants.  
As an active participant I have not pretended to take an objective position to the inquiry or to 
be a detached and impotent observer.  I have acted from a privileged and engaged position as 
agent de change, possibly agent provocateur.   
1.3.1. Solodamu 
The koro Solodamu is one of six villages in the tikina of Tavuki, the chiefly village on the 
island of Kadavu, the fourth biggest of Fiji’s islands to the south of the main island of Viti 
Levu.  Despite a sea barrier of only some 60nm, Kadavu is a rural outpost, regularly 
described on tourism sites as still very traditional in setting.  There are 75 registered villages 
and only one small town and administration centre, Vunisea.  A small number of tourist 
resorts, generally dedicated to surfing, diving, and fishing, are dotted around that offer some 
limited local employment opportunities but subsistence agriculture and fishing are the 
mainstays of Kadavu life.  There are limited economic opportunities. Yagona is the primary 
cash export for which the island has a national and international reputation (Sofer, 2009).  
ITaukei are dominant, the 2007 census showed just eight Indo-Fijians amongst the 
approximately 10,000 residents (Fiji Department of Statistics, 2010). 
Solodamu is a small village of some 20 odd households.  It is a historic village.  None of the 
inhabitants appear quite sure how old it is: “always”; “forever” and blank faces are common 
responses to asking how long it has been there.  It certainly shows clearly on the first known 
map of Kadavu published by the Scottish Geographic Society in 1889 (Thompson, 1889). 
There are three land-owning mataqali12 resident.  The village is maintained on traditional 
cultural lines, mataqali roles, boundaries, and responsibilities to the koro collective and from 
there to the tikina and yavusa, are jealously guarded, Kadavu dialect is the dominant 
conversation, and cultural process and protocol imbue all facets of daily life. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Mataqali have been referred to as ‘clans’ (Deane, 1921); ‘an agnatically related social unit, usually a lineage 
of the larger clan’ (Ravuvu, 1983); ‘local group’, ‘patrilineal group’, and ‘sub-clan’ (Nayacakalou, 1985). 
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When we first arrived in Solodamu in 2006 the village was displaying the classic hollowed 
population pyramid of rural remote villages under the impact of urban drift and migration.  
Young single men heavily outnumbered women; the very old and very young were prevalent 
and young married families in decline.  The roll of the Tavuki primary school, which services 
the six villages, fell from 121 to 87 students between 2006 and 2010.  However, in Solodamu 
resurgence in married youth returning has seen this trend reversing in the past two years. 
Economic opportunities are few; the village generally has poor soil and steep hinterland.  
Various individuals have attempted over time to establish small businesses but, with the 
exception of a beekeeping initiative, have not been successfully sustained.  While this can in 
part be ascribed to a lack of capacity, skills, and support, there is also a common element that 
the strain placed on any budding or successful entrepreneur by the proportionally increased 
demands on those individuals to contribute to the vanua and the pressures of kerekere make 
successful commerce a stressful and ultimately unrewarding business for many villagers.  
Sofer (1985, 2007) has described how the marginal returns for shipping service providers to 
Kadavu, predominately Suva-based, sets up a vicious circle where shippers will not provide 
service unless assured of economic return but the lack of service means crops and other 
products for market are not produced.  Yagona is the major exception due to the long keeping 
qualities of the product. 
The modernist and current development literature would describe Solodamu as 
‘impoverished’ and ‘developing’ or ‘underdeveloped’.  It certainly doesn’t have much 
disposable income13 and finding the weekly $5 for the village diesel generator bill is a matter 
of repeated stress to most households.  Yet, I have regularly sat at a Sunday feast where the 
mat groaned with more food, all organic and preservative free, than we could ever eat.  
Usually only three ingredients were procured outside of the village catchment – noodles, rice, 
and canned tomato sauce.  Such Fijian village economy has been described as “subsistence 
affluence” to distinguish it from the abject poverty that is prevalent in many other developing 
countries (Fisk, 1970; Knapman, 1987). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Sofer (2007:241) found the average annual household cash income for Nalotu (a comparable village to 
Solodamu) to be FJ$3014.1, 42.3% coming from yagona sales. 
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Figure 1 Solodamu Community Forest Reserve and MPA 
 
Figure 2 Solodamu 
The village is a coastal one and its relationship with the sea dominates all facets of life and is 
essential to food security.  Its qoliqoli is shared with neighbouring villages.  The current site 
of the village is relocated a few hundred metres inland from the ‘old’ village which sits on the 
shoreline and was regularly inundated by storm surges in the 1980’s, exacerbated by the 
removal of the coastal mangrove screen.  A rutted dirt track provides the only terrestrial 
access, there are no vehicles owned in the village, and most transport is by sea in ‘fibres’14 
powered by outboards of various sizes up to 60 hp. 
In the 1980’s significant mineral deposits (principally gold and copper) were confirmed under 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Fibreglass punts between 23-28’ long and capable of carrying a payload of around 800 kg. 
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the 300m high bluffs15 bordering the village, creating interest from multinationals such as 
RioTinto.  Initial drillings confirmed that extraction would require enormous environmental 
damage.  The bluffs are one of the last remaining intact coastal limestone forests once 
prevalent in Fiji (pers. com. Bogiva, A, 2006) and a breeding stronghold of the endangered 
Kadavu kaka (parrot).  After intense community debate in the late 1980’s/early 1990’s the 
village decided to forego the potential benefits from a mining operation and established the 
first community forest reserve in Fiji (pers. com. Bogiva, 2006).  Selected chiefs have the 
power to call vonu (turtles) from the reef from the cliff tops, a phenomenon witnessed by 
several of the international guests we have introduced to the village over recent years.  An 
adjourning MPA has subsequently been established at the foot of the cliffs as part of the Fiji 
Locally Managed Marine Areas (FLMMA) programme.   
In the period 2008-2010 I returned to Solodamu repeatedly, often with members of 
Solodamu’s ‘Suva division’ on board, anchoring there for months at a time.  During this 
period we were joined by a number of other international cruising vessels of varying 
descriptions as well as a number of international visiting friends.  We regularly acted as the 
village ‘bus’ transporting villagers around Kadavu and to Suva.  Largely we lived alongside 
the village, growing gardens on land the chief allocated us and participating in all aspects of 
village life, including births, weddings, and deaths.  We have continued to visit the village 
repeatedly since.  I return to the Solodamu case study in Section 4.1 to look specifically at 
their sea-transport scenario. 
1.3.2. Korova 
In 2009 we were anchored in Laucala Bay, Suva just off the USP campus on a beautiful 
tropical evening.  I had spent a frustrating month on-line and in the USP library and Fiji 
Museum learning that there was no consolidated history of drua available and large sections 
of what records I had found appeared heavily disputed (see Section 6.3).  By all accounts, 
except possibly on the remote islands of southern Lau, all indicators were that drua culture 
was now consigned to history and museum artefact.  In two decades of sailing around the 
main islands of Fiji I had never encountered a traditional vessel at sea.  The closest I had 
come was a small, derelict example in one Kadavu village.  I had sailed on a small drua in 
1994, then operating as a tourist attraction in Suva but apparently short-lived and now 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  Solodamu means literally rocks red. 
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abandoned.  I had seen a fleet of four camakau built hurriedly for the Melanesian Arts 
Festival in Suva in 2006 but these had all ‘vanished’ shortly after the event and no-one was 
able or willing to tell me their fate.    
 
Figure 3 …in the fading twilight, the classic silhouette of an oceanic lateen laca… 
As I looked out to the horizon where the surf could be seen breaking along the reef in the 
fading twilight, the classic silhouette of an oceanic lateen laca (sail) broke the line of the reef, 
sailing fast before a strong southeast breeze and heading toward us.  My young sons and I 
leapt into our sailing dinghy and sped to intercept it.  As we met, my sons were plucked from 
our dinghy and swept onto a large camakau with a ragged patchwork sail by a laughing and 
obviously Lauan crew.  “Mai, mai, lakomai – come, kaiwai, we go to drink kava,” they 
taunted as they raced ahead of me and disappeared into a muddy mangrove-shrouded creek in 
what I had always assumed was an uninhabited piece of city shoreline.  
And thus began our relationship with the people of Na Korova (the fourth village), a Moce 
‘outlier’ village literally squatting on the high-tide mark in the heart of Fiji’s capital.  That 
night I sat to talanoa until dawn amongst a village of sailors, who proudly claim they have 
never owned an outboard motor and still maintain a fleet of camakau, and talked sails and 
ships and storms and wrecks and felt completely ‘at home’.  These are kaiwai dina, true 
sailors brought up from birth at home on the deck of the drua and camakau as on land.  Bera 
(nickname Angel), the turaganikoro, described his house as “a chicken shack to rest in when 
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the sea is too rough”.  Our talanoa has continued now for four years, ranging from religion to 
myth, from dugout to space travel, while my sons troop through the village hunting crabs.  On 
behalf of his elders, Bera has continually pressed me to write “the book of our story, the story 
of drua”.  In 2011 we sailed Korova members to Solodamu so the men from Moce could 
offer to teach the Solodamu youth to build a camakau. 
Because of their proximity to USP and Suva and their acknowledged expertise in 
boatbuilding, sailing, and other traditional Lauan arts and crafts (especially masi), Korova, 
their home in Moce, and their sailing has received significant academic study (e.g. Geraghty, 
1994; Holbrook, 2002; Katz, 1999; Leota-ete, 2007).  During the week-long 2012 ‘Drua 
Festival’, the story of Korova was told in a two-page Fiji Times article (12/6/2012).  The late 
Simione Paki was a renowned drua sailor in the southern Lau in the last half of the twentieth 
century, sailing regularly between the islands of the Lau and to Tonga.  In 1992 he sailed with 
some of his sons to Suva in a drua and a camakau in search of income opportunities to 
provide education for his large family and they ended up camped on a small slither of 
foreshore at Laucala Bay where the Tui Suva granted them permission to reside.  In 1993 one 
of the sons, Metuisela Biuvakaloloma, attempted to sail a second drua that never arrived.  
The family attributes the loss to the drua breaking a tabu on travelling on the sea while the 
body of the late Ratu Penaia Ganilau was being carried on the water.  The village of Korova 
continues in Simione’s wake, and still build and maintain a small fleet of camakau today.  
1.3.3. Fiji Islands Voyaging Society16 
At the 2008 Festival of Pacific Arts in Pago Pago, the veteran Maori actor Rawiri Paretene 
unveiled plans to assemble a fleet of traditional Pacific sailing craft so that collectively the 
representatives of Pacific peoples could sail to Hawaii in 2010 and protest the growing threat 
noise pollution from shipping, particularly military craft, poses to whales.  It was announced 
that a sponsor, the German registered Okeanos Foundation, had agreed to fund both a fleet of 
seven vaka, to be distributed amongst both existing and yet to be formed Voyaging Societies 
in the main island groups, and a commercial-scale documentary directed by Paretene.  
The Ministry of Culture and the Fiji Arts Council applied on behalf of Fiji and Rotuma to be 
one of the communities represented and in 2009 established FIVS.  Initially it was hoped that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See the Fiji Voyaging Website (http://www.fijivoyaging.com/) for details of their vessel Uto ni Yalo and its 
historic inaugural voyages of the past 3 years.   
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the new vessels would be representative of the diversity of Pacific traditional designs but 
ultimately the sponsor decided to have a New Zealand boatyard build a mould for a fleet 
based on the design of Te Ao o Tonga built by the late Sir Tom Davis in Rarotonga, in turn a 
modern representation of a Tahitian ‘tipaeri’ class long-distance voyaging vessel.  The 
designated Fijian vessel, Uto ni Yalo, a 22m high-tech fibreglass catamaran duly arrived in 
Suva from Auckland in 2010.  
It marked a watershed in Fijian sailing.  Up until this point, there had been no Fijian 
representation in the Pacific ‘voyaging renaissance’ sparked in Hawaii in the 1970’s (Finney, 
1976, 1984, 1993).  Although there was a willing pool of recruits, the inaugural crew of 16 
had only two experienced bluewater Fijian sailors to guide it.  It left on what turned out to be 
a gruelling, storm-wracked voyage virtually unnoticed and returned to a hero’s welcome.  
The crew has since been elevated in Fiji to the status of an international sports team.  Uto ni 
Yalo has just returned from participating in the two-year, seven vaka ‘Te Mana o Te Moana’  
voyage across the Pacific to the US and home via the Solomon’s Festival of Pacific Arts17.  
Over 50 Fijian crew have sailed on Uto and there have now been Fijian crew representatives 
sailing on all the participating vaka. 
While a little ironic, not to say totally historically inaccurate, a Fijian crew on a 
professionally-built, fibreglass replica of a Tahitian vessel type never seen in these waters 
previously, (designed by a Cook Islander, built by NZ boat builders and owned by a German 
‘philanthropist’), it has achieved the purpose of getting Fijians sailing again.  The local 
success of initiatives such as Uto ni Yalo can only be positive in leveraging cultural history, 
pride, and achievement toward greater acceptance of the technology and acting as iconic 
sustainability flagships.  The next step of course must be to turn to revive drua and all its 
related culture (see Chapter 6). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 It is not entirely clear what happened to Paretene and the objective of protesting shipping noise pollution.  It 
would appear in this project, as with the Solodamu pilot boat (Section 5.1), that the role of sponsor quickly 
became synonymous with decision-maker and arbiter. 
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Figure 4 Uto ni Yalo 
Shortly after FIVS’s inception I literally bumped into its President, Colin Philp, while landing 
from my dingy in Suva early one morning.  The conversation led to me making a kerekere for 
FIVS to take on some of the Solodamu youth, a request that was favourably met.  Today Sisi 
and her nephew Peni are old hands on the Uto crew, each serving as watch captains.  
Similarly we have been responsible for introducing FIVS and Korova.  While the kaiwai of 
Moce have been initially suspicious of the new, strange, expensive, and modern ‘foreigner’ to 
their foreshore, they have also agreed to their youth sailing with FIVS.  At the time of writing 
Jim Fuluna is in the Cook Islands as crew on Marumaru Atea learning traditional navigation 
from acknowledged Cook Island masters.  His ambition is to sail a drua using only traditional 
means from Suva back to his home on Moce.  Simione Paki’s eldest son, Semiti Cama, an 
acknowledged master builder and sailor himself, also joined us as expert adviser on the FIVS 
drua research voyage to the Lau in 2011 (see Section 6.4). 
FIVS is not a traditional community.  Its members and crew come from all walks and all parts 
of Fiji and Rotuma.  But as sailors, it is more than just a society; the bond formed by 
thousands of sea-miles is greater than that.  As a community, it has been instrumental in this 
research agenda.  Since the early stages of my research, FIVS and its network of supporters 
and allies have been integral to my programme.  As with a more traditional Fijian 
community, they have woven vakavanua and Fijian protocol into all their activities and 
processes.  
	  
Chapter 2. Theoretical Perspective 
This chapter situates the research within the context of current literature across three themes.  
The ocean is positioned as the lens through which the inquiry is focussed.  The lessons and 
knowledge gleaned from an Oceanic past are positioned as the masthead from which to 
search the horizon for clues for a course to the future.  The radar screen shows climate change 
as a developing tropical cyclone of unprecedented magnitude that is unavoidable on this 
passage regardless of the course set and so the third theme embeds this discourse on sea-
transport within the general discourse on responses to climate change.  
Chapter 2.1 considers the first two of these; the recent writings on an emerging indigenous 
Oceanic epistemology and the repeated reference from Pacific writers on the need for future 
actions to be centred on lessons from the past.  The two are obviously and eternally 
intertwined here, where the ocean has always been the dominant feature, shaping all things 
physical, cultural, spiritual, political, throughout millennia of evolution, adaptation, and 
development.  The research agenda presented here is loaded toward industrial application of 
sea-transport technology and renewable energies.  Such future evolution, if it occurs, will 
happen in a context where both ocean and vessels have been historically and, to varying 
extents, remain today of wider importance to the inhabitants of this ocean than just industrial 
or economic, incorporating dimensions of extreme cultural and spiritual significance.  
It is argued throughout this thesis that issues of sea-transport, while a key priority and 
absolute need for many Oceanic communities, are currently marginalised under a global post-
colonial mind-set that greatly preferences the terrestrial and continental at the expense and 
masking of any Oceanic lens.  For sea-transport, and alternatives to current unsustainable 
options, to be addressed this perceptual positioning needs to be re-examined and re-centred.  
This section revisits Diaz’s (2001) call for Oceania to now re-empower its traditional and 
customary attributes to provide a current and future platform from which to combat and adapt 
to the increasing pressures and threats of globalisation and consumerism.  Diaz asks for a 
new/evolved Oceanic epistemology of ‘hypo-modernity’ as shield against the rising global 
tide, even tsunami, of hyper-modernity.  
Section 2.2 examines the current literature on climate change adaption and mitigation as well 
as the related theme of cultural resilience.  This thesis builds an argument that sustainable 
sea-transport should be prioritised and developed as an adaption response by Oceanic 
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communities in the face of increasing pressures from fossil-fuel dependency and climate 
change.  But globally (see Section 4.3) sea-transport is gargantuan, fiercely commercially 
competitive, international, and resistant to external control.  Intervention responses to the 
industry’s emissions profiles, the preserve of a slow-moving and cumbersome IMO, are 
categorised as mitigation.  Such classification masks and skews the real nature of the issue to 
Oceanic communities and greatly restricts prioritisation of the subject through lack of 
appropriate policy formulation and downstream access to climate financing to underpin 
research and development of Oceanic-centred solutions.  As discussed in Section 4.3, current 
global mitigation regulation initiatives are likely to significantly increase the costs of sea-
transport in the region under a BAU scenario for no measurable regional benefit.  
It is argued throughout that measures to introduce sustainable sea-transport, especially for 
remote island/village communities, can contribute positively to retention/revitalisation of 
local and national resilience.  While such measures should be pursued regardless of these 
threats, they should, in the context of this research, be more correctly included, and prioritised 
as “no-regrets” or “soft-technology” adaptation interventions.  Currently the subject is 
invisible within either development agency priorities or the related literature.  Gaining any 
real traction in this area will be difficult while this situation remains.  In particular, external 
resourcing for the essential initial research and development in this field is difficult to access. 
2.1. Ocean as Lens, Past as Future 
Oceania is vast, Oceania is expanding, Oceania is hospitable and generous, 
Oceania is humanity rising from the depths of brine and regions of fire deeper 
still, Oceania is us.  We are the sea, we are the ocean, we must wake up to this 
ancient truth.  Hau’ofa, 1993:16  
 
We carry the cultural and historical inheritance of ocean navigators of peerless 
skill and their courageous kin who crossed vast distances before the tribes of 
Europe had ventured forth from their small part of the earth. Mara, 199918  
Oceanic perspectives are rarely to be seen in the general literature on sustainability and 
development issues.  The total dominance of the sea and the absence of continent make 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 http://dev.iwise.com/pVvWv accessed 2 July 2013. 
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Oceania unique among the world’s regions.  The differences are elemental.  Continental 
approach, priority, process, solution, and thinking often simply do not fit (Barnett, 2001).  
The far greater part of the history of cultural evolution and interaction within the region has 
occurred in their absence.  The research agenda pursued in this thesis has been premised on 
the assumption that Oceanic-centred paradigmal lenses are required for consideration of 
context and approach and should form the basis of research.  An understanding of indigenous 
epistemologies may contribute to models of development that empower rather than reinforce 
neo-colonial attitudes through the application of unsuitable Western models of development 
(Gegeo, 2000; Hau’ofa, 2000; Hereniko, 2001; Huffer and Qalo, 2004 Quanchi, 2004). 
SPREP’s 2012 draft ‘Framework for a Pacific Oceanscape’ commences with this description: 
“In our Pacific Islands Ocean Region the ocean unites and divides, connects and separates, 
sustains and threatens our very survival.  For all those who venture within this, the world’s 
largest ocean, and who have made it their home the ocean influences every aspect of life.  It 
has done so for millennia”19.  Vessels and seafaring are handmaidens, the conduit to these 
relationships.  Oceanians developed the world’s first bluewater technology.  With highly 
advanced understanding of sail and hull form and function Oceanians created sophisticated 
ocean-going vessels and did so thousands of years before humans anywhere else (e.g. Howe 
et al, 2006).  Centuries before continental peoples tentatively and fearfully set out to cross 
their first ocean, Oceanians had explored, colonised and inhabited all of theirs. 
Within traditional Oceania ontology the ocean is deity, in many Oceanic epistemologies the 
principal deity, and the vessels used and their means of use sacred in every sense.  In Fiji the 
great tabetebete style drua were called Waqa Tabu, literally sacred ships (Thompson, 1940; 
Tippet, 1968).  Musu Waqa were living memorials to deceased leaders, the tribute given to 
reaffirm alliances and allegiances (Tippet, 1968).  Kirch and Green (2001:247) discuss ocean-
going vessels as “vehicles through which mortals can commune with God, embodiments or 
spiritual homes for the divine”.  In Fiji today, statutes, regulations, regional frameworks, and 
government agencies govern commercial domestic sea-transport.  Not so long ago, it was 
governed by powerful gods such as Dakuwaqa, visualised as a giant shark.  Costs of transport 
were not reckoned in dollars to purchase or operate an industrial asset but in lives sacrificed 
for sacred icons to inveigle success.  Sea passages were not feared barriers but exploited 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Draft Framework for a Pacific Oceanscape http://www.sprep.org/att/irc/ecopies/pacificregion/615.pdf 
accessed 1 Nov 2012 
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highways.  Gaining cutting-edge marine technology was highly pursued, an ultimate goal of 
collective communities not an economic and logistical problem without visible solution.  
Such worldviews have been eroded and depressed through the historic processes of 
colonisation and post-colonisation, surpassed by a western and continental imposed lens of 
the region as small, vulnerable, isolated, and dependent.  But, as Hau’ofa (1993:7) chides “if 
we look at the myths, legends and oral traditions, and the cosmologies of the peoples of 
Oceania, it will become evident that they did not conceive of their world in such microscopic 
proportions. … their world was anything but tiny”.  Writings, led by Wendt (1976, 1982, 
Hau’ofa (1993, 2000, 2008), and Helu (1999) among others, have called for a sea-change in 
the way such relationships with both Oceania and its communities are conceptualised at the 
level of paradigm and such calls are now being echoed by the region’s political leadership.  
The development literature of Oceania, since European contact, has largely viewed the region 
and its issues from a terrestrial base using academic lenses that have evolved in continental 
societies.  Until recently, such views have greatly preferenced a mindset of small, vulnerable, 
resource poor, underdeveloped and scattered communities, impotent economically and 
politically on a global stage, situated in an idyllic tropic maybe, but above all, dependent.  
The continued survival of these island states, let alone their enhanced communal well-being, 
is seen as only achievable with external patronage and aid.  The historian Moorehead’s 
(1966) The Fatal Impact typified a Pacific seen as a paradisiacal space fatally wounded by 
the incursion of Europeans.  According to this paradigm islanders were the passive victims of 
an inevitable fate; bystanders, mute witnesses but not dominant actors.  In this worldview the 
ocean is alien and negative: barrier, obstacle, restriction, impediment, threat. 
In 1993 Hau’ofa’s now oft quoted paper ‘Our Sea of Islands’ challenged this view in favour 
of a paradigmatic shift by Oceanians themselves to recast as big people at home on a big 
ocean with a big history.  Islanders, he argued, were connected rather than separated by the 
sea.  Far from being sea-locked peoples marooned on coral or volcanic tips of land, islanders 
formed an oceanic community based on vessels and voyaging.  
Hau’ofa, whose writing over the past three decades consistently challenged prevailing notions 
about Oceania and prescriptions for its development, argued that Pacific Islanders’ collective 
cultures and heritages and their identification as children of sea before land, facilitated 
movement, and connection.  He called for a reclaiming and re-valorising of cultural traits 
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such as reciprocity, a re-owning of Pacific thinking and process under the rebranding of 
‘Oceania’ and “proposes that students of the Pacific might yet claim alternative futures, 
presents, and pasts by reimagining the space they inhabit” (Teaiwa, 1996: 214). 
‘Our Sea of Islands’ was not the first of such calls.  In 1976, Wendt delivered, ‘Towards a 
New Oceania’, which he described as “a revolt against the hypocritical/exploitative aspects of 
our traditional/commercial and religious hierarchies, colonialism and neo-colonialism and the 
degrading values being imposed from outside and by some elements in our societies” (p.59).  
He was speaking to a new generation of Pacific writers and thinkers, the creative and critical 
voice and conscience of a region of island nations that made up “a multiplicity of social, 
economic, and political systems all in different stages of decolonisation” (Wendt, 1980: xiii).  
What was critical about Hau’ofa’s 1993 work, as with those of his peers and protégés that 
followed, has been the level of reaction provoked and the degree of penetration sustained 
since, not only evident throughout Hau’ofa’s other writings but across disciplines and 
agendas within the region.  Not all have been accolades, Teaiwa (1996:214) grouped early 
responses into “the celebratory, the cautionary, and the critical”.  Inspirational, catalytic even, 
though his call may be, it has been questioned and cautioned for its lack of practicability and 
romantic unreality.  Veitayaki, for example, accused Hau'ofa of pandering to his students 
after years of telling them “the painful truth” (they're small, underdeveloped, and dependent) 
he tries to please them with a new perspective that is “mostly superficial and unrealistic, 
certainly severed from the situation in the Pacific” (Teaiwa, 1996:214). 
How realistic was/is it to think that the enormous physical, practical, and economic 
challenges faced by the region can be resisted, even resolved, by something as simplistic as a 
change in thinking, in perception?  Globalisation is, after all, the dynamic process of 
increasing interactions and interdependencies among people and systems, particularly 
economic systems (Sassen, 1998).  Ellwood (2001) points out that this process has been one 
of entanglement, that it has been in existence for centuries, and that it has rapidly accelerated 
over recent decades.  The result is a shrinking and all-persuasive world in which, surely, the 
tiny Oceanian enclaves must be subsumed by this tsunami.   
But Oceania is no stranger to tsunami or cyclone or invasion.  In opposition to this, Hau’ofa’s 
theoretical intervention is an expression of metaphorical and literal decolonization: the refusal 
to think of continents as the mainland (Hall, 2009).  Ultimately Hau’ofa concluded that it was 
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the maintaining of cultural identity and connection through expression of art in its broadest 
sense that provided the greatest fertility for a future Oceania and hence his great focus in his 
later years at the Oceanic Centre for Art, Culture, and Pacific Studies. 
The debate continues to mature, even if slowly amongst external commentators.  Confronted 
with this pervasive globalisation, Borofsky (2000:454) found responses from Gegeo, 
Hereniko, Teaiwa, Qalo, and Teaero and non-indigenous researchers Watson-Gegeo, Huffer 
and others, in applying indigenous epistemologies to social and economic development.  
Wanting to combat Eurocentric hegemony, they assert indigenous wisdom and acknowledge 
Oceanic ways of addressing problems, imagining solutions, resolving conflicts and 
contemplating future directions.  “Research on locally valued ways of thinking, learning, and 
organising knowledge in Oceania has emerged over the last two decades led by Pacific Island 
scholars keen to affirm not only that indigenous epistemologies are alive and well, but also 
that they are relevant and useful to the societies and peoples to whom they belong” (Huffer 
and Qalo, 2004: 88).  This is affirmation of the long tenure of Oceanic peoples and their 
continuing to flourish despite Oceania becoming an arena for superpower rivalry and 
posturing in the colonial and post-colonial era (Huffer and Qalo, 2004). 
The academic and artist-voiced rebellion of consciousness led by Wendt, Hau’ofa, et al, is 
echoed today even at the political.  At the 2012 Pacific Forum Cook Island’s Prime Minster 
Henry Puna challenged other PIC leaders to consider a rethink of shared identity within the 
Pacific saying: “it is time that we break the mould that defines us too narrowly and limits us 
in any way”.  Puna called for a recasting of the current regional identity of SIDS to ‘Large 
Ocean Island States’.  “Our large ocean island states should demonstrate – now more than 
ever – renewed commitment to define our future, on our own terms.  Our intimate and 
connected relationship is built from a deep spiritual bond and translated across an expanse of 
ocean in unique and traditional ways” (Fiji Times, 31/10/2012). 
Inherent in this shift at the level of paradigm and epistemology is the re-assigning of labels.  
Plenitude and connection, not emptiness and distance; wide-spread instead of isolated; 
resilient and interconnected replace vulnerable; resourceful, adaptive, culturally-diverse and 
centred are alternates to dependent.  Hau’ofa replaces a small-island ‘Pacific’ with a big 
ocean ‘Oceania’.  Pasifika was an earlier attempt to shrug off colonial and externally imposed 
categorization, first used internationally in 1970 by then Fiji PM Sir Ratu Kamasese Mara 
(Crocombe, 1976).  Crocombe (1976:1) asserted that the phrase was accepted and well-used 
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because “it satisfies both psychological and political needs, in that it helps to fulfil a growing 
demand for respected Pacific-wide identifying symbols and for Pacific unity”.  He was 
careful to point out that the phrase has never been used to imply homogeneity, the Pacific is 
home to enormous cultural diversity; rather, it has been developed and used when “the 
common interests of all island peoples can be served by collaboration”. 
Within Oceanic ontology, sea-transport was always central, certainly prior to modern aviation 
and electronic communications it was ‘the’ connection, the interface, the facilitator between 
people and god, people and environment and of culture to culture.  Sea-going vessels were 
the pinnacle of societal achievement.  They were the ultimate line of defence.  Their design 
and functionality was radically different from that produced from any continental paradigm, 
almost Zen-like in its approach to finding ultimate form in simplicity and from a minimal 
resource base.  Terrestrial design and construction was not the primary role of craftsmen but 
what naval architects and shipwrights did in their downtime.  Their vessels were the products 
of cultures where metals were not an available option, where swimming and walking were 
equally important, where survival at sea, more so than on land, was primary.  And they were 
tested and refined through a process of attrition and natural selection.  For every successful 
landfall and subsequent ‘story’ and culture that survived, it is unknown how many countless 
perished beneath the waves and have been left untold (Helu, 1999:114). 
Concepts of centre and margin change radically when viewed from sea-level and not alpine 
peak or skyscraper.  Size and space take on new and fluid definition.  In Oceania the 
continents are peripheral, ascribed to the rim.  If Hau’ofa brought islanders and island 
cultures to the centre of his analysis, Diaz sheets home that centre to the canoe at sea.  
“Grounding oneself in a canoe and an oceanic culture that survives the generative and 
transformative histories of colonialism, as well as the politics they beget, offers a particularly 
deep, substantive, and compelling vantage point with which to map and move what are after 
all the mobile coordinates of indigenous cultural and political consciousness” (Diaz, 2011:21-
22).  
In ‘Moving Islands of Sovereignty’ (2005) and related papers, Diaz questions whether 
conventional usages of scale are relevant to Oceania debate.  Working from voyaging-based 
Carolinian cultural constructs of etak and pookof, islands are shown to be flexible, enormous 
simultaneously with being minute, sometimes temporary, or impermanent.  Always mobile, 
islands, clouds, and even oceans can be moved relative to the stationary canoe.  Land is 
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brought to the sailor not the canoe to the land.  Such an Oceanic-based perspective “allows 
the concept that what appears physical and fixed can be made malleable – spatially and 
temporally” (Diaz, 2001:2).  Distances in a sailing culture vary dramatically; an island that is 
10nm away downwind can be far closer than one only a mile away but to windward.  If such 
geographies and physicalities are ambiguous to a continental eye, then so too are the cultural 
and societal constructs that have followed since first colonisation of this ocean.  In the same 
manner that an independent and unique discourse on vessels and seafaring has developed here 
over millennia, so have understandings and knowledge about community, culture, 
relationship, and development.  
These traits, especially reciprocity, are reflected in the prosecution of the current Oceania 
debate itself.  Prime Minister Puna, above, offers a Pacific approach as “our major 
contribution to the wellbeing of humanity”.  Diaz similarly offers that the lessons of survival 
and adaption from Oceanic voyaging may have elements of value to the wider global society 
in the same generosity of spirit that the Halapua brothers offer the ‘gifts’ of talanoa to the 
world’s need for more civilised, measured, and inclusive conversation with the same humility 
that any Fijian villager will plead to serve you food and hospitality whenever you pass their 
open door.  There is a love in Pacific conversation of the double entendre and such deference, 
such humility, should not be read down as subjugation.  As Huffer and Qalo (2004:87) have 
coyly observed: “Pacific thought is like a dormant volcano: as long as it does not erupt, no-
one notices it.  When it does boil to the surface, it comes, to the many who would rather 
dismiss it, as an unpleasant reminder of its persistent existence”.  
In a world where modernity and post-modernity have mutated into hyper-modernity, a 
globalism fuelled according to critics such as Lettwak (2000) and Holloway (2010) by 
‘Turbo’, even ‘Crack’ Capitalism, Diaz (2001) offers ‘hypo-modernity’ as an Oceanic 
survival strategy and suggests adaptation pathways may best be identified by looking through 
an Oceanic lens and positioning them within age-old Oceanic values.   
In the hyper-modern world, Thomas L. Friedman (2000) argues for traditional social safety 
nets “to catch those who simply will never be fast enough or educated enough to deal with the 
Fast World,” “trampolines - programs that can catch workers who fall behind in this rapidly 
changing environment and retrain them so they can bounce back into the economy” and 
“trapezes” that allow risk-taking entrepreneurs “to swing free and take crazy leaps”.  In this 
world, modern western free-market ideology is void of any moral anchor other than 
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Gekko’s20 commandment, ‘Greed is Good’.  “What is problematic about globalism is that it 
serves to empower the already powerful; perpetuates and even accentuates power 
asymmetries and social injustices rather than mitigates or alleviates them; raises up 
competition as the noblest human activity to the disparagement of cooperation; elevates 
machine-like efficiency as a deity to the detriment of human compassion; prizes the pursuit of 
personal wealth over the promotion of the common good” (Steger in Gangale, 2003:14). 
In stark contrast Winston Halapua (2003:83) describes the epistemological underpinning of 
the hypo-modern world.   
“Waves express the rhythm of the moana.  Waves embrace the diversity and differences 
of sizes and contours.  In the eyes of Oceanic peoples the waves are linked to other 
waves.  The waves, which dance to the generous rhythm of the moana, dance in 
company with waves over the horizon.  Waves follow one after another.  Unceasing, 
relentless, embracing, they give and give and give.  Energy that is the result of constant 
interaction with the wind and the heavens is released freely.  As metaphor the waves of 
the moana speak of immense generosity and reciprocity”. 
Diaz clarifies “the difference between hypo and hyper modernity – hinging on tempo – is not 
merely one of essential opposition but of context and situation, for both are forms of engaging 
modernity with materiality outside of it ... I dwell instead on those aspects of indigenity that 
not only precede, and exceed, but more importantly, choose ferociously to engage modernity, 
but on native epistemological and cosmological terms that privilege a steady, slow, deliberate 
pace” (Diaz 2001:1). 
As Hau’ofa (2000:454) has already argued “in order for us to gain greater autonomy than we 
have today and maintain it within the global system we must … be able to define and 
construct our pasts and present in our own ways”.  This does not mean that all Oceanic 
heritage, traits, and characteristics are positive or empowering or of future value.  But all need 
to be considered and given cognisance.  Huffer and Qalo (2004:98) caution the wastage of 
past ‘development’ and aid programmes that failed to heed this basic advice of allowing 
recipient societies to take “the time and opportunity to articulate their own approaches to the 
world and its multitude of developments”.  Unaisi Nabobo (2002:45) found similarly within 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Gordon Gekko is a character in the 1987 film Wall Street and its 2010 sequel of the same name, both directed 
by Oliver Stone. 
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the field of education, suggesting that Pacific educators must “redefine paradigms of thoughts 
and explore Pacific worldviews and then take cognizance of these”.  She concluded, “The 
coconut tree must be allowed to live with the computer tiger”, that is, the knowledge 
symbolized by the coconut tree with its multitude of uses, which considerably enrich the 
community, must not be discarded in favour of technological, economics-driven, and 
individualized or commoditised knowledge”. 
Oceanic temporal relationships also bear little relationship to western models of measured, 
steady, remorseless progression from historic but dead past to ever developing and more 
knowing future.  Blaut (1993) has argued that such progressive, Eurocentric world-views are 
based on a diffusionist myth where only a very limited number of communities are inventive, 
and over the past millennium, the inventions that have counted historically have originated 
from Europe: medieval technologies, the state, capitalism, world discovery, the first industrial 
revolution.  In this ‘tunnel history,’ everything dynamic comes from ‘inside’ Europe and the 
West.  The ‘outside’ is passive and inert (Clifford, 2003). 
In contrast, Oceanic knowledge of the past is continually used to adjust to cultural and natural 
changes (Liston, et al, 2011).  Many Pacific cultures echo the Hawaiian view of time where 
the past is referred to as Ka wa mamua, or ‘the time in front or before’ whereas the future, 
when thought of at all, is Ka wa mahope, or ‘the time which comes after or behind’.  Such 
orientation is eminently practical, for the future is always unknown, whereas the past is rich 
in glory and knowledge (Kame'eleihiwa, 1992).  Oceanic time has no single, violent 
direction, but loops resourcefully between present dilemmas and remembered answers 
(Clifford, 2003). 
The suggestion that valuable lessons for the future can be learned through examination of 
traditional past Oceanic practice is not new to development literature, for example Clarke 
(1990), Overton (1994), and Couper (1973:247) who offered specifically in relation to sea-
faring: “It is in turn essential for those who wish to help Pacific island communities, to 
acknowledge that they will achieve far more by seeking first an understanding of the social 
organization and social geography of Pacific seafaring than by continuing with policies based 
on Eurocentric ideas of the sea business, and virtually ignoring the wealth of the maritime 
heritage of the Pacific islanders”.  
More recently there has been a wealth of work exploring the role of traditional knowledge 
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across various disciplines.  For example, Randy Thaman, whose lifetime work on 
relationships between western and oceanic ecological knowledge is legend, considers that 
“we need the knowledge of the past in order to see how things have really changed”.  
Speaking in regard to current fisheries knowledge Thaman goes further than suggesting that 
traditional knowledge may be a useful adjunct to science.  “Current scientific surveys are 
useful but cannot give accurate long-term data on what marine ecosystems and fisheries used 
to be and what they could become and traditional knowledge maybe the key to such 
understanding” (Wansolwara, October 2012).  
Sea-transport, traditional knowledge, cultural pride, and understanding seem inextricably 
linked and are viewed as such within the context of this research.  Every attempt has been 
made to explore and build on these linkages.  None of the above should be read as an un-
blinkered glorification of a perfect past record.  And it is freely acknowledged that tradition 
and culture are undergoing change and modification at an unprecedented rate.  Customary 
roles and duties are less clear and effective in Fiji today.  The traditional tenure system and 
resource management strategies, for example, have experienced gradual erosion due to the 
impact of 20th century colonisation (Govan, 2009:25).  While traditional roles and resource-
use systems within the communities are still well-defined, leadership structures, protocol, 
respect, practices, and beliefs are changing and are increasingly questioned by the people 
(Vunisea, 2002).  As the research reported in Section 6.4 demonstrates in regard to current 
Fijian cultural knowledge of drua, the status of traditional knowledge held culturally is fragile 
and highly vulnerable.  Desperate urgency is needed if this knowledge base is not to be 
submersed forever beneath the growing tide of modernity and globalisation.  
2.2. Adaptation as Priority, Resilience as Focus 
“Adaptation and mitigation are among the processes that have underwritten the 
survival of societies of mid-Ocean islands like these for generations (Johannes 1981, 
Nunn 2007).  They are not new” (Nunn, 2010a:242) 
“Pacific communities face no option but to adapt if they are to build a resilient future” 
(Maclellan, 2012:6) 
Responses to climate change are commonly grouped under two headings: mitigation, either 
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by sequestration of emitted material21 or reduction of emission quantity or effect; and 
adaptation, measures to allow change to the effects of emissions.  Both are considered in this 
section in the context of sea-transport, as is the related concept of social resilience, the ability 
of community (however defined) to maintain well-being in the face of change.  Regionally 
relevant climate change approaches and programmes are discussed, highlighting the 
invisibility of sustainable sea-transport, and the Asian Development Bank’s programmes used 
as a case study, given its prominent profile in resourcing regional infrastructure initiatives.  
Sea-transport is central to most aspects and most levels of Oceanic society.  Current options 
are increasingly unsustainable at all levels of sea-transport service but particularly at domestic 
and local levels (see Section 4.2).  Sustainable sea-transport is currently invisible in the 
development literature of the region generally and in mitigation/adaptation strategies for 
climate change in particular.  Despite the current profile (or lack of it), measures to 
encourage, provide or otherwise empower alternative sea-transport options for Oceanic 
communities, where these result in more effective and efficient service provision and 
especially if they result in community-based systems, are likely to have measurable positive 
effects on enhancing local resilience (see Sections 4.1 and 5.4). 
This section embeds sea-transport within the climate change debate and argues that 
sustainable shipping initiatives, in the context of Oceania climate change response, should be 
viewed as adaptation measures as opposed to mitigation, the compartment to which they are 
generically consigned globally, if considered at all, by donor and development agencies.  
Labelling it in this manner obscures the real nature of sea-transport in this region and restricts 
the potential for effecting change in the industry.  Rather than being considered a priority for 
attention, it is currently marginalised at best.  
Others disagree with this view.  Several recent reports consider mitigation of emissions 
should be pursued as an objective by Oceania countries.  By way of example, UNISDR, 
UNDP (2012:iii) states: “while climate change mitigation initiatives undertaken by Pacific 
Island Countries will have insignificant consequences climatologically, they should 
nevertheless be pursued because of their valuable contributions to sustainable development” 
(see also ADB, 2010a; Burson et al, 2010).  This approach is discussed later in this chapter. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Sequestration is not considered further in this thesis. 
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This thesis contends that sea-transport is a ‘cross-cutting issue’ across regional development 
and climate change agendas.  Increased sustainability of sea-transport is a key, albeit a poorly 
recognised one, to building community and national resilience.  Consideration, followed by 
adoption if proved viable, of alternative technology options should be pursued as ‘soft 
technology’ or ‘no regrets’ adaptation interventions (as discussed in Barnett and Campbell, 
2011:179; Elliot and Fagan, 2010:80; USAID, 2010:32).  Reliable data with which to 
calculate the proportion of the region’s fuel budget that is maritime bunker is not available; 
the best reference is that it is a ‘significant’ contributor to the 48% of the region’s imported 
fossil-fuel used for transport (Mayhew, 2011a).  For some Pacific countries it can be as high 
as 75% of all fuel used (Mayhew, 2011b).  Regional and national fuel dependency and 
footprints are discussed in more detail in Sections 4.2 and 5.3. 
It is argued in Sections 4.2 and 5.4 that external resourcing of an evolution in shipping 
technology for Fiji/Oceania will be necessary, initially at least until its economic viability can 
be practically demonstrated.  In an Oceania context such viability requires cognisance of the 
current fleet being comprised largely of old, second-hand assets.  A calculated risk 
investment in prototype models of new vessels and operational structures will be needed.  It 
unlikely that either PIC governments or commercial interests will invest in the necessary 
research and development, let alone new asset purchase, without external assistance; at least 
until the technology and its application is proven and even then there will be hesitation22.  
International adaptation pledges to support a ‘no regrets’ adaptation presents as the most 
appropriate source of resourcing for this sector, although as described below, is difficult to 
access as such.  
For evolution to sustainable sea-transport to be fully effected to greatest potential, a best case 
scenario, a region-wide, cross-sector, and cradle-to-cradle approach is required, incorporating 
all aspects of at least domestic shipping with sectors and assets supplied internally within the 
region wherever possible.  This extends not only to the vessels and their trading enterprises, 
but construction, maintenance, training, shore services, support services and research.  
Ideally the research programme needs to be across all shipping sectors (including freight, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 However, if they did this would be an example of ‘autonomous adaptation’ (see Table below).  While there is 
recognition generally that most adaptation to date is ‘autonomous adaptation’ undertaken by individuals, 
households, communities, and businesses (USAID, 2010:33), there are unique barriers for any investment in 
shipping in this region (see Section 4.2). 
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ferry, and fishing) and involve aspects of economics, carbon balance, and marine/atmospheric 
pollution, sociology, governance, engineering, history, etc. Consideration of policy and 
regulatory frameworks at all levels will also be necessary.  It is an ambitious agenda and one 
that is unlikely to be addressed through one-off or short-term pilot projects.  A long-term 
coordinated programme involving multiple and diverse stakeholders is called for and this will 
continue to be difficult to achieve while local sea-transport continues to be ignored, viewed in 
isolation, or viewed only in terms of its contribution to global emission profiles. 
Given the global inertia in sustainable shipping development, especially for SIS or 
developing world application (Section 4.3), there appears no reason at a conceptual level why 
Oceania should not be the first region to attempt to provide leadership, although numerous 
practical barriers exist.  It can be argued that it is the region of greatest need even if 
quantitatively, relative to a global scale, that need is small.  The case for why Fiji presents as 
the prime option to centre such an initiative is set out in Section 5.4.  
Both the cost of and need for sea-transport are unlikely to diminish in the region; the greater 
the extent that both can be internally met sustainably, the greater the resilience built.  The 
contention of this thesis is that sea-transport should be a priority target for adaptation funding 
in local, national, and regional responses.  That it has not thus far been identified by Pacific 
decision-makers appears largely because it has never been fully researched and advocated for 
as an attainable option, and not because it has been demonstrated to be too high a risk or too 
low a priority.  The failure to adequately characterise and prioritise it to date makes it 
increasingly difficult to do so retrospectively, as many donors, agencies, and governments 
have already determined their overall operating frameworks and priorities for intervention.  
A short section is included below on the current trends in climate change adaptation funding 
in this region.  Literature is thin but increasing and supports a picture of much of the 
dedicated funding now coming on stream as difficult to access for direct community and 
practical application for a range of rationale; including the complexity and range of the 
various institutions and related bureaucracies charged with both allocating and administrating 
or receiving such funding, the complex problem of matching regional needs and priorities 
with externally dictated objectives, and the difficulties with distinguishing between climate 
change prompted funding and more conventional assistance delivery. Despite being 
increasingly documented and identified, however, whether such illumination will translate 
into concrete actions is not so clear.  Sustainable transport generally and sea-transport in 
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particular, has yet to make the cut.  
2.2.1. Global Warming/Climate Change 
This section is prefaced by clarifying the assumptions made with regard to climate change.  
Climate change is a generic term commonly adopted globally23 as shorthand to describe the 
multitude of changes likely to eventuate as a result of the emissions of GHGs to the 
atmosphere, including sea-level rise, global warming, and ocean acidification.  The 
overwhelming global evidence and consensus from scientists, researchers, and policy makers 
is compelling; climate change is real and happening now, is anthropocentric, and current 
IPCC projections of effect are likely to be conservative and understated.  Climate change is 
current, cumulative, and increasing.   
Extrapolating from the paleontological and biological record, Barnosky et al (2011:51) have 
well summarised the now apocalyptic potential of GHG emissions and global warming which 
combined with “habitat fragmentation, pollution, overfishing and overhunting, invasive 
species and pathogens (like chytrid fungus), and expanding human biomass are all more 
extreme ecological stressors than most living species have previously experienced.  Without 
concerted mitigation efforts, such stressors will accelerate in the future”. 
Global warming is a symptom not a source.  GHG emissions are simply the fumes from the 
exhaust pipe of the global ‘development’ engine that originates with European-led 
colonisation and industrialisation and has now culminated in our addiction to a resource-
hungry and increasingly destructive consumption-driven and fossil-fuel powered global 
society which greatly privileges the wealthy and ‘developed’ over all others (see for example 
Sachs, 1992).  Global warming and global inequity are linked, as global warming exacerbates 
poverty.  As the Stern review (2006) noted, global warming is the historic responsibility of a 
few rich countries who have produced 70% of all carbon dioxide emissions since 1850. 
The following four statements accurately summarise the current global situation: 
a) “The basic matter, however, is not one of economics.  It is a matter of morality – a matter 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Oreskes and Conway (2010) have detailed how the global signifier ‘climate change’ replaced ‘global 
warming’ as a softer label at the behest of a US neo-conservative agenda.  I considered universally reverting 
to the early signifier throughout this thesis but like the term ‘canoe’ it is now such a universally embedded 
misnomer as to defy deletion. 
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of intergenerational justice.  The blame, if we fail to stand up and demand a change of 
course, will fall on us, the current generation of adults.  Our parents honestly did not 
know that their actions could harm future generations.  We, the current generation, can 
only pretend that we did not know” (Hansen, 2011: 22).  
b) “We have, at best, this decade to make critical decisions about decisive action” (Merson, 
2010).   
c) “Passionate corporate and conservative foes of curbs on greenhouse gases are right in 
asserting that a meaningful response to global warming would be a fatal blow to free 
markets and capitalism” (Klein, 201124). 
d) "The blunt truth about the politics of climate change is that no country will want to 
sacrifice its economy in order to meet this challenge" (Tony Blair, 200525). 
The issues are immediate and the global literature on climate change is broad and well-
established and is not debated further here.  Climate change is already having, and will 
increasingly have, severe and unique impacts on PICs.  The people of these nations are 
among the world’s most vulnerable to changes in ocean characteristics (especially levels and 
acidity), rainfall, and extreme weather events (Barnett, 2001; Barnett and Campbell, 2011; 
Burson et al, 2010).  Maclellan (2012:12) advises that communities are already feeling the 
effects of climate change across Oceania in “food supply, nutrition, health, education, 
livelihoods, and social cohesion”.  
Whether one agrees with this pessimistic view of the global capacity to respond, even if 
global GHG emissions can be reduced, sequestered, or otherwise mitigated in the future, the 
effects of past emissions are unavoidable and therefore require adaptation to be taken now.  I 
concur with Hansen, it is a moral argument, and the region of Oceania holds the moral high 
ground26.  Oceania should not have to ask for a sustainable and locally affordable sea-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Naomi Klein quoted by Revkin, Andrew ‘Naomi Klein’s Inconvenient Climate Change Conclusions’, New 
York Times, 7 December 2011. 
25 Tony Blair quoted by Revkin, Andrew ‘On Climate Change, a Change of Thinking’, New York Times, 4 
December 2005. 
26 Especially when physical ground is only 3-5 metres above sea-level as is the case for countries such as 
Tuvalu and Tokelau. 
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transport future; the industrial and emitting world should offer whatever support is necessary.  
“In small island developing countries with very low emissions, such as those in Pacific, 
developed countries should provide all funding for mitigation actions” (Elliot and Fagan, 
2010:69) and, it is argued in this thesis, adaptation.  
The terms ‘mitigation’, ‘adaptation’ and ‘resilience’ have entered the climate change 
discourse over the past decade, as ‘sustainability’ emerged after the Brundtland Report in 
1987 and the labelling as ‘developed/undeveloped’ following Harry Truman’s coining in 
1949 (see Sachs, 1992).  As with those terms, these new signifiers have been borrowed from 
other theatres, are commonly used, but are often poorly characterised or agreed.  
2.2.2. Mitigation and Adaptation 
The IPCC considers ‘climate change mitigation’ as an anthropocentric action to decrease the 
intensity of radiative forcing in order to reduce the effects of global warming, generally by 
reducing GHG emissions and enhancing sinks through technological change and substitution.  
Adaptation to global warming, conversely, involves acting to tolerate the effects by reducing 
vulnerability of natural and human systems (Verbruggen et al, 2007).  In broad terms, 
mitigation tackles the causes of climate change, adaptation the effects of the phenomenon.  
From this broad base mitigation can be further dissected or categorised and each new report 
seems to have developed or adapted a new framework for doing so, but all are broadly 
similar.  For example the OECD (Corfee-Morlot, 2009:6), break down mitigation support for 
developing countries to encompass both “mitigation specific” and “mitigation relevant”, as 
well as private and public pathways of assistance.  “Mitigation specific support” aims to 
achieve GHG mitigation in developing countries as its main objective whereas “mitigation 
relevant support” is defined to include funding for development in key sectors that will shape 
emissions in developing countries and thus mitigation potential.  The IPCC also note that 
“regional differentiation is important when addressing climate change mitigation – economic 
development needs, resource endowments and mitigative and adaptive capacities- are too 
diverse across regions for a ‘one-size fits all’ approach” (Rogner et al, 2007:97)27.  Because 
transportation and electricity energy networks are the two big global contributors to climate 
change, sea-transport, when considered at all, tends to be viewed as a ‘mitigation issue’.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 This should be borne in mind when considering the ADB case study below.  In a ‘region’ that includes much 
of continental Asia alongside all of Oceania, the only focus on shipping is in regards to inland waterways. 
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Other organisations have developed shorter working definitions of adaptation.  For example, 
ADB defines adaptation as “adjustments to reduce costs and vulnerabilities, based on 
anticipated climate change impacts” while the World Bank defines adaptation as “efforts to 
protect against climate change impacts” (USAID, 2010:31).  Adaptation can also be, and is, 
further categorized.  By 2001 the IPCC was already distinguishing between anticipatory and 
reactive adaptation, private and public adaptation, and autonomous and planned adaptation.  
Adaptation strategies can be diverse in range and scope.  At the extreme edge is the potential 
for migrations of entire Pacific nations to new (and potentially radically different) homelands 
(e.g. Burson et al, 2010).  Barnett and Chamberlain (2010:54) raise the bar by defining 
adaptation to mean “a response to avoid or adjust to an undesirable outcome such that people 
are not worse off”.  To suggest that for adaptation to be successful or warranted it should 
achieve zero decrease in well-being appears a lofty but desirable ambition.  And yes, global 
warning looks increasingly to lead to the loss of entire homelands, potentially within short 
timeframes.  Such victims need and deserve priority attention and uninhibited support for 
what must be the greatest challenge for any culture short of genocide.  But in the interim, and 
for non-atoll communities where the inability to maintain occupancy is unlikely to be as 
extreme, the need for reliable and affordable sea-transport can only be predicted to increase.  
While this thesis anticipates that successful adaptation intervention for shipping will lead to 
an overall increase in well-being and resilience at multiple levels, continuing to commit 
Oceanic communities to a BAU fossil-fuel propelled future can only lead to a rapidly 
decreasing trend. 
The paradox of arguing for adaptation was well summarised by Sean Batten, Director Climate 
Change Policy for AusAID: “working with PICs, it is clear that climate change adaptation – if 
it is to be considered – must be integrated into concerns in priority sectors and development 
issues, which are rarely identified as climate related” (Lebel, 2011:2528).  
Long-term integrated programmes of change for many critical sectors have yet to materialise.  
Some senior commentators have been blunt in laying the blame for this with the conservative 
nature of the powerful regional development agencies.  The following by Nunn (2010a:233-
234) is typical: “There has been a failure on the part of most regional agencies serving the 
Pacific Islands to develop proactive plans independent of either international or national 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Ironically but predictably, sea-transport is not mentioned in Lebel (2011). 
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agendas that take into account either the special needs of Pacific Island nations or the 
importance of developing adaptive solutions that acknowledge their singular cultural and 
environmental contexts.  Instead such agencies have been largely reactive, uncritically 
imposing the priorities of international organizations on Pacific Island nations and focusing 
on short-term pilot studies rather than mainstreaming the lessons learned from these”.  I 
contend this trend includes sea-transport. 
One of the traps of short-term projects is that there is seldom room for error or for learning 
from mistakes.  A pilot project that set out to prove, for example, a particular vessel type or a 
particular situation or scenario – as we initially proposed for Solodamu – that then did not 
perform to expectations or failed outright runs a high risk of ‘poisoning the well’ for other 
related initiatives.  The potential for learning by doing is highly restricted, if not lost, under a 
pilot project-by-pilot project approach. 
Several key agencies have now developed adaptation strategies for the region. USAID 
(2010:32) provides a summary of the various nomenclature now in common use (Table 1). 
Table 1 Adaptation Concepts (adapted from USAID 2010:32) 
Planned 
adaptation 
Adaptation that is the result of a deliberate policy decision, based on an 
awareness that conditions have changed or are about to change and that 
action is required to return to, maintain, or achieve a desired state. 
Autonomous 
adaptation 
Spontaneous adaptation to address a specific vulnerability element, taken by 
the individuals or private entities uniquely impacted by the element. 
No regrets 
adaptation 
Adaptation options (or measures) that would be justified under all plausible 
future scenarios, including the absence of man-made climate change. 
Maladaptation An adaptive response, made without consideration for interdependent 
systems that may inadvertently increase risks to other systems sensitive to 
climate change (and important to social well-being). 
Climate-
proofing 
Enhancing resilience to and reducing the risks posed by climate change; e.g, 
improving the ability of infrastructure to withstand floods and cyclones. 
Climate 
resilience 
The capacity of a system, community, or society potentially exposed to 
hazards to adapt by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an 
acceptable level of functioning and structure 
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The 2010 USAID report considers that adaptations can be divided into measures to reduce 
exposure and/or sensitivity and measures to increase adaptive capacity.  They call for 
emphasis in the near term on ‘no regrets’ interventions which can be justified in terms of 
meeting development objectives and responding to climate risks.  They are referred to as ‘no 
regrets’ because implementation is beneficial even if magnitude and timing of future climate 
change is different to that expected.  I concur with both the approach and the emphasis. 
2.2.3. Resilience 
The term resilience is used to describe the capacity of a social-ecological system to deal with 
fluctuations or perturbations before shifting to an alternate state (Hughes et al, 2005) and has 
come to us from ecology.  Resilience is discussed primarily in association with ecological 
resilience by related scientists and in regard to social resilience in terms of concepts such as 
adaptive management (see particularly Berkes et al, 2000).  In ecology, resilient systems are 
adaptable, flexible, and prepared for change and uncertainty (Gunderson, 1999; Hughes et al, 
2005).  Despite the apparent appeal of resilience as a framework for sustaining human-
environment relations and the theoretical advancements in the field (Gunderson and Holling, 
2002; Holling, 1973; Olsson et al, 2004) natural resource managers do not explicitly apply 
this concept very often (Adger, 2000; Colding et al, 2004; Folke, 2003; Olsson et al, 2005), 
although it is gaining greater traction through climate change literature.  Resilience is often 
complex, context specific, and highly dynamic, qualities that make it hard to develop general 
tools and methods of application (Berkes and Folke, 1998; Kallstrom and Ljung, 2005; 
Walker et al, 2002; as discussed in Burson (ed), 2010). 
The Pacific’s successful human history; millennia of colonization, founding and 
entrenchment and expansion of numerous cultures, and an extreme ability to survive and 
adapt (all in the face of sometimes minimal natural resources and regular environmental 
change) appears to challenge the widely-held view of islanders as dependent and passive.  
This history of adaptability and resilience has much to do with a common Oceanic attribute of 
not seeing culture divorced from nature or environment divorced from economics or politics.  
“In Europe the Nature-Culture distinction is an academic one.  In Tonga the two aren't 
opposed.  Rather there is an emphasis on their connection.  Culture is a selection and a 
manipulation of Nature on a variety of levels, e.g. at the physical/natural level and at the 
behavioural/mental level.  Considered at the second level, Culture is a transformation of 
natural elements to fit them to human needs, especially for economic and political human 
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interests” (Helu, 1991).29 
Resilience has been used in relation to describing inherent cultural capacities of Oceanic 
communities now for some time.  For example, from Bayliss-Smith (1988:283); “when 
viewed as societies rather than as ecosystems, the small islands of eastern Fiji have shown 
themselves to be exceptionally resilient”.  As Barnett and Campbell (2011:165) point out, that 
study reached the critically important supposition that “social and economic processes on 
islands are not distinctively different”.   
A generation later I came to the same conclusion in Solodamu (Section 4.1).  While such 
communities are undergoing increasing change, matters of commerce and politics are still 
strongly culturally bound and all are intertwined.  Various observers strongly suggest that 
maintenance of traditional knowledge and cultural structures are powerful resilience 
strategies that should be harnessed in light of the climate change challenge (e.g. Barnett, 
2001; Barnett and Campbell, 2011; Maclellan, 2012).  Nonetheless, the inability to 
adequately distinguish between or adequately accommodate both vakavanua and business 
imperatives, places such communities, for all their cultural and traditional strengths, at 
distinct disadvantages when it come to establishing commercially-viable transport services at 
a community level in a modern operating environment.  While the greatest community of 
need can be identified as being at village level, the logic that intervention and solutions 
should therefore also be centred at this level, as commentators such as Barnett, Campbell and 
Maclellan strongly argue for, is not clear (see Sections 4.1 and 5.4).  
2.2.4. Adaptation and Mitigation in an Oceanic and Sea-transport Context 
Adaptation as the priority for Oceania has been clearly marked by commentators for at least 
the past decade.  Barnett (2002:31) argued: “ultimately, environmental security for Pacific 
people requires human and institutional development policies that increase and complement 
the existing abilities of those people to do what they have always done with considerable 
success — adapt to change”.  There has since been the contribution of global voices such as 
the Stern Review (2006) that adaptation policy is crucial, under-emphasized and the only 
response available for the impacts that will occur over the next several decades.  Delivery in 
Oceania is proving slow to arrive, difficult to implement and inadequate.  The comprehensive 
Oxfam study of Pacific responses (Maclellan, 2012) confirms that there is only partial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Helu, F, 1991, Lecture to Catholic University of Nijmegen on 1 November 1991. 
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coverage of the issues necessary to address, though paradoxically sea-transport again fails to 
rate mention in that study, even in the excluded response category. 
In Oceania, Pacific leaders have identified climate change as the priority threat facing the 
region (see Section 4.2).  “Pacific country leaders have long called for coordinated and 
concerted support by development partners.  However, to date, the response has been limited 
and fragmented” (ADB, 2010b:v).  Within the context of climate change debate (as with most 
other global contexts) Oceanic states are usually portrayed as small (minute), isolated, 
vulnerable, fragile and relatively powerless.  Alternative perspectives, as discussed in the 
previous section, have largely yet to percolate outside of the region. 
Much of the global concern about the climate change impacts in Oceania is based on the 
potential plight of atoll dwellers, a view that is often expanded as representative of the whole 
region.  While such concerns are real and pressing, this narrow definition of the region 
ignores the wide diversity of Pacific islands and the nature of related effects, although it has 
proved useful as a means of leveraging global visibility and attention.  Barnett and Campbell 
(2011) use a ‘Davids and Goliaths’ analogy and point out that any resultant support gained 
has yet to result in either global action to reduce emissions or large-scale action to provide 
effective adaptation strategies in Oceania.  They further suggest that “representations of the 
Pacific Islands as extremely vulnerable may have created the illusion that adaptation is 
pointless, and have denied the resilience, agency, capacity, and potential that Pacific Island 
communities have and which could be useful elements of an adaptation response” (Barnett 
and Campbell, 2011:155). 
Climate change is but one of a long list of environmental challenges facing the region (a list 
which includes a wide ambit of environmental degradation, invasive species, over-fishing, 
pollution of freshwater sources, etc), and effects of these are also large and priorities.  Randy 
Thaman (2002, 2004, 2007, 2008) is currently at the forefront of a large choir of those who 
have regularly documented the region’s environmental decline and increasing vulnerability 
and stridently called for action.  But it is the scale and irreversibility of the effects of GHG 
emissions, combined with the total inability of any local measures to mitigate or reduce the 
problem that makes climate change a threat over and above all others.  Whereas it can be 
argued that Pacific Islanders have historically shown strong resilience and adaptability traits 
in the face of environmental threat and change, the immensity and immediacy of the threats 
posed by climate change suggest these attributes will be insufficient to adapt (Barnett, 2002).  
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The impacts of climate change diminish human security by undermining rights to a secure life 
and livelihood, food, water, health, and shelter.  Culture and traditional ways of life are also 
threatened.  By failing to tackle climate change with urgency, developed countries are 
violating the human rights of millions of the world’s poorest people, including people in the 
Pacific (HREOC, 2008; Elliot and Fagan, 2010:61).  The uniqueness of the Pacific (ocean-
centred, non-continental, scattered landmasses, village-dominated, culturally rich but 
economically poor) would suggest that such adaptations will need to be tailored to Oceanic 
needs and conditions to prove effective and durable.  Barnett (2001) cautioned more than a 
decade ago that continental-centred or focussed solutions may prove inadequate or highly 
inappropriate here.  The same failure is still causal today in Oceanic priorities, such as sea-
transport, failing to be registered or addressed.  
Some representatives of the SIDS in the Alliance of Small Island States have been critical of 
the increasing focus on adaptation in international negotiations, arguing that this downplays 
the need for urgent mitigation action by industrialised states to cut their GHG emissions and 
take responsibility for avoiding further, more extreme climate impacts (Elliot and Fagan, 
2010:68). 
I take a counter position.  Mitigation surely is not a responsibility or a sacrifice that Oceania 
should bear, no matter its considerable propaganda appeal on the global stage.  Speaking to 
the December 2008 global climate change conference in Poland, Tuvalu’s Prime Minister 
Apisai Ielemia stated: “We need a new arrangement for least developed countries and Small 
Island Developing States to pursue a low carbon future.  We need strong international 
assistance to allow us to develop and deploy renewable energy and energy efficiency 
technologies so that we are guaranteed energy security.  We cannot afford to be held hostage 
to continual leaps in the price of imported fuels”30 (see also Maclellan, 2009 for more detailed 
discussion).  Ielemia makes no mention of requiring such assistance to reduce Oceania’s 
minimalist GHG emissions; his concern is much more practically orientated.  “Every PIC has 
an interest in the use of renewable energy to reduce the costs for government revenue and 
assist household budgets for rural villagers” (Maclellan, 2007:16) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30  Quoted in Island Business, 
http://www.islandsbusiness.com/islands_business/index_dynamic/containerNameToReplace=MiddleMiddle/
focusModuleID=19703/overideSkinName=issueArticle-full.tpl   retrieved 22/11/2012. 
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Oceania’s contribution to GHG has been estimated by SPREP (Hay, 2012) at 0.03% of global 
totals, others claim 0.06% (Elliot and Fagan, 2010).  Any steps taken by PICs to reduce their 
meagre emissions as mitigation to a global problem will be at best symbolic, not matter how 
successful.  This may be a valid strategy in terms of highlighting and galvanising response, 
especially given that Oceania is likely to be more greatly and soonest affected.  Although 
mitigation initiatives undertaken by PICs will have no impact globally, it allows full moral 
leverage to be gained when negotiating for either priority or financing.   While PICs’ access 
to resourcing proffered as mitigation assistance may be the most practical means of accessing 
climate financing, it is a roundabout and dishonest route.  In an Oceanic context, and 
particularly when this is applied to domestic capacities, the rapid and priority introduction of 
alternative options for sea-transport to the current fossil-fuel ones should be correctly 
identified and addressed as adaptation measures. 
Even if the above analysis is shown to be incorrect, sea-transport clearly fits within agency 
versions of mitigation strategies in any regard.  The ADB (2010:3) consider three types of 
mitigation activities and investments can be targeted for PICs: (i) mitigation activities that 
have strong synergy with adaptation, or in which both adaptation and mitigation objectives 
are simultaneously advanced; (ii) those that contribute to the sustainable development of the 
country (particularly in energy and transport development) and mitigate GHG emissions, but 
which would not be financially viable unless proactively supported (for example, through 
facilitating access to carbon financing); and (iii) those that are capable of producing 
significant net benefits on their own, over and above any potential benefits to the climate, and 
thus are considered ‘no-regrets’ investments.  Sea-transport clearly fits within all three. 
It is the level of dependency on imported fossil-fuels, and related issues of price and security 
of supply (see Section 4.2), that make the region’s use of fossil-fuels critical, not the 
consequences of their incineration on the environment. Paradoxically, reducing this 
dependency in the area of sea-transport, where all current options are fossil-fuel based, by 
adopting alternatives as a cost/dependency cutting measure appears likely best achieved 
through adoption of low-carbon vessels and technologies. Currently, globally sanctioned 
mitigation pressures to reduce sea-transport emissions are likely to ultimately penalise PICs.  
As seen in Section 4.3, IMO-led regulatory processes to reduce SOX in bunker fuels will lead 
directly to greatly increased costs to PICs for no significantly measurable reduction in global 
emissions.  While there have been commitments made by IMO at a policy level to develop a 
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compensation mechanism, it has yet to be designed or agreed and successful delivery is by no 
means guaranteed.  
Furthermore, if sea-transport is a central need of many Oceanic communities and at all levels, 
almost any adaptation strategy that seeks to enhance local resilience or increase adaptive 
capacity of communities is going to be affected by the effectiveness, availability, and cost of 
sea-transport.  There are few examples of adaptation related projects (or any aid, 
development, or conservation project for that matter) in any of the current agency strategies 
that do not include some aspect of sea-transport.  For many, sea-transport costs are significant 
budget lines.  There is a fatalistic nihilism and contradiction inherent in the suggestion that 
adding to global emissions is a necessary evil to implement programmes that will in turn 
allow communities to avoid or resist the worst consequences of increasing emissions.  
2.2.5. Current Climate Change Adaptation Programmes 
The remainder of this section examines briefly various relevant funding agency programmes.  
In addition to the mainstream bodies, such as ADB, UNDP, AusAID, EU, etc., most 
prominent NGOs also have climate change programmes of varying size.  The literature is 
again thin; there is more written on identifying vulnerability concepts for islands than 
addressing the issues.  The recent history of climate change response across the Pacific by 
governments, regional organisations, and the principal funders, including a synoptic summary 
of the various regional and country programmes is given in Barnett and Campbell (2010).  
The major regional development agencies have all commentated recently through various 
reports although their texts need to be read against the grain (see Nicole, 2006), given their 
associated institutional and political filters.   
In summary, despite some rhetoric, the concept of adaptation-focussed programmes did not 
appear here in practice until around 2008 and have now gained traction to be the priority of 
regional programmes.  SPREP, USAID, and ADB have all produced regional plans for 
addressing climate change that are then criticised for being top down and insufficiently 
community/recipient focussed.  While all reference the Pacific Plan, the overarching regional 
blueprint adopted by the Pacific Forum leaders, no work has yet been done to demonstrate 
whether integration under this framework has been achieved by the various agency strategies.  
Sea-transport is unmentioned in any, except in passing within a broad context of transport or 
infrastructure more generally.  In recent funding rounds AusAID have considered transport in 
a climate change related context to be mitigation and therefore largely unworthy of funding in 
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the Pacific.  USAID and ADB both see adaptation measures as being concerned only with 
future-proofing existing and future transport-related infrastructure (specifically roads, ports, 
and airports).  As processes for these agencies to prioritise expected climate change related 
funding are now largely framed, the potential for accessing resourcing for additional areas of 
activity (such as sea-transport) is severely reduced.  
There are major issues to address.  PICs are frustrated by their perception that processes are 
agency and donor driven and that there are high degrees of overlap and insufficient 
collaboration between them.  Nunn’s concerns were cited above.  Maclellan et al’s authored 
Oxfam (2012) report is strident, citing World Bank reports on climate and disaster resilience 
in the Pacific, that openly acknowledge the problems of institutional rigidity of donor 
organisations hindering cooperation and making partnership more difficult and the general 
lack of interagency collaboration.  A 2012 AusAID-authored assessment of multilateral 
agencies agrees there is a need to reduce the duplication of programmes particularly in regard 
to climate change.  The 2012 Pacific Forum in Rarotonga saw increasing rhetoric amongst 
donor nations on the desirability of cross-country/cross-agency programme delivery but, 
again, this has yet to translate into on the ground demonstrations.  Conversely, donor 
organisations point to the lack of capacity of recipients to absorb available funding, lack of 
capacity to extend into new areas, lack of flexibility to expand programmes, and a lack of 
transparency and accountability by PIC based recipients (Barnett and Campbell, 2010). 
2.2.6. ADB: a Case Example 
ADB has long been the principal loan source for infrastructure in the Pacific.  Its Asia-Pacific 
region encompasses a multitude of diverse countries with a catchment of 1.8 billion people 
(ADB, 2010a), many with differing priorities and objectives to Oceania.  Transport is one of 
the main sectors ADB supports, comprising 27% of all projected loans in 2010-2012, mainly 
for roads and railways.  Water transport attracts less than 1% of this US$3.4 billion (ADB, 
2010b:2). 
In ADB’s definitions, adaptation options are divided narrowly into “measures to reduce 
exposure (such as climate proofing of infrastructure, land use zoning, sector-level best 
practices such as selection of climate-resilient crops) and measures to increase adaptive 
capacity (e.g. strengthening disaster risk management capabilities, implementation of early 
warning systems, and maintaining healthy ecosystems” (ADB, 2010b:2).  This falls short of 
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any notion of adaptation as a mechanism for PICs to build resilience through using low-
carbon alternatives to current options or strengthening of internal resilience (be it at regional 
or local levels) through decreased dependency on external resources such as fuel. 
During 2008–2009, ADB developed the ‘Climate Change Implementation Plan for the 
Pacific’ (CCIP) to address PIC identified adaptation and mitigation needs “in close 
consultation with Pacific Island country leaders”.  The key recommendation of the CCIP is to 
mainstream climate change issues into ADB operations in the Pacific region and individual 
PICs, by ensuring that (i) climate-related risks and vulnerabilities are adequately reflected in 
the country partnership strategies of PICs, (ii) all projects in the ADB pipeline are screened in 
relation to climate-related risks, and (iii) all infrastructure and other relevant projects are 
climate-proofed.  The Pacific Climate Change Program (PCCP) will serve as the main vehicle 
to implement the CCIP in the Pacific. 
The principal objective of the PCCP is to ensure the continued economic growth of PICs in 
the face of global climate change, by reducing their vulnerability to its risks and impacts and 
comprises a three-pronged strategy, the first two of which are: (1) immediate attention to fast 
tracking and scaling up climate change adaptation and mitigation investment; and (2) 
promoting renewable energy through new technology, and research and development.  Both 
might be considered inclusive of alternative-energy sea-transport issues.  But when one drills 
further into the PCCP, transport is a subset of ‘energy’, the last of six priority sectors.  Under 
this heading ADB will consider investment in transport, “consisting primarily of (i) climate 
proofing of roads, ports, and airports; (ii) reduction of GHG emissions from transport through 
the use of clean energy in vehicles; and (iii) limited investments in alternative and cleaner 
fuels (for example, biofuels development)” (ADB, 2010a:7).  Sea-transport per se is never 
mentioned; in fact the use of the descriptive ‘vehicles’ does not strictly include ‘vessels’ as a 
subset and so could be read to exclude sea-transport.  At best it has not been considered.  A 
case could be made to the Bank that it would qualify under “limited investments in 
alternative/cleaner fuels” but this is a long bow and in any regards, is again couched in terms 
of mitigation, i.e. reduction of GHG emissions, not as an alternative to fuel dependency or 
cost.  In a competitive funding environment with multiple demands and priorities, sustainable 
sea-transport is by default placed in a heavily penalized position under the PCCP. 
In 2007, prior to producing the PCCP, ADB released a regional study on Pacific shipping, a 
broad overview that included a Fiji case study.  In general terms, its findings are compatible 
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with the summary provided in Section 4.2.  It found that international level shipping is 
reasonably well catered for but there are large issues to resolve at domestic and local levels, 
complicated by the region’s unique maritime profile.  The concept of low-carbon or 
alternative-energy shipping is not considered throughout.  The regionally collaborative 
successes through the Pacific Forum Line and the Regional Maritime Programme run under 
SPC are highlighted.  There is as much or more attention given to shore-side infrastructure 
and administration as to ships and shipping.  No solutions are suggested for the domestic 
shipping crisis, except to recommend greater privatisation of services. 
After release of the PCCP, ADB produced its Asia-Pacific region Sustainable Transport 
Initiative (STI) in 2010.  In the next decade ADB estimate the countries of Asia and the 
Pacific will need to invest US$8 trillion in infrastructure by 2020, with much of this being for 
transport.  The STI will guide ADB transport investment and is a cross-sector strategy spread 
across economic growth, sustainable development, and climate change.  The STI defines a 
sustainable transport system as one that is accessible, safe, environment-friendly, and 
affordable and one that incorporates multiple overlapping dimensions of sustainability.  
While the situation varies from country to country, ADB’s support for transport modes other 
than roads and railways has been very limited historically.  Urban transport is the major 
future focus of the STI.  It is acknowledged that air and sea-transport and ports have grown 
rapidly in the region.  However, in the early 1990’s, ADB largely phased out its support 
claiming the private sector was already performing effectively in these areas.  ADB did 
continue to support a small number of members, including PICs “where aviation and ocean 
transport have a unique role due to limitations in land transport, generally linked to factors 
such as geography and low population density”.  Overall, bicycles and pedestrian 
infrastructure get more attention than sea-transport in the STI.  
2.2.7. Who Pays and to Whom? 
“The challenge to the region is to adapt to sustain their needs and rights and values, and the 
challenge to the international community is to reduce emissions to the extent that such 
adaptation is able to be effective, and to support communities in the Pacific to adapt in ways 
that they see fit.  This is possible, and anything less is unacceptable” (Barnett and Campbell, 
2010:184, emphasis added).  The worm turns on the ill-defined use of the term ‘they see’ in 
this quote.  If it is referring to Pacific communities then, as argued above, it is questionable 
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that they have ever been provided advice that alternative options in sea-transport scenarios 
are potentially available and, if so, at what cost and effort.  If the ‘they see’ refers to the 
international community, then it is also clear that when viewed through the lens of proxies 
such as the major development agencies, ‘they’ have not seen fit to invest in even exploring 
alternative approaches to sea-transport as a regional priority thus far.  
At the Copenhagen summit in 2009, there were initial but naive calls for OECD countries to 
pledge US$30 billion ‘fast start’ climate finance from 2010-2012, and long-term finance of 
US$100 billion a year by 2020, to assist developing countries with mitigation and adaptation 
(Maclellan, 2012:12).  It was strongly argued that such climate finance should be a different 
form of funding to aid and that it needs to be additional to the 0.7% of GNI already pledged 
for ODA identified as necessary to meet the MDGs (Maclellan, 2012:6).  Most international 
appropriations to date have been for climate change mitigation and it is not clear what 
proportion will be available for adaptation (Maclellan, 2012:45).  
It has been estimated that between US$290 million and US$530 million is required in the 
Pacific just to complete the most urgent and immediate adaptation actions identified thus far 
(McGoldrick, 2007).  The A$35 million Australia was due to spend in 2008/09 in the Pacific 
would not even cover the most pressing adaptation needs of three of the region’s most 
vulnerable and least developed countries – Kiribati, Tuvalu, and the Solomon Islands.  
Accessing this climate finance poses major challenges for Pacific countries (along with other 
developing countries), not least of which is agreeing that it is actually there to be accessed.  
The 2008 economic recession through much of the developed world has had a strong knock-
on effect to ODA funding commitments generally.  Climate change pledges from 
international conventions will also suffer.  With austerity comes greater demand from cheque 
writers for cost savings, often paralleled by increased calls for transparency and 
accountability.  Finance providers must address the complex array of funding mechanisms 
and their lack of coordination and also want to see good practice in the effective use of 
existing resources before they guarantee further significant funds, including contributions to 
the newly created Green Climate Fund.  The recent Oxfam report (Maclellan, 2012) found a 
major focus of government officials is meeting the complex array of reporting and 
accountability procedures to donors, as opposed to their own government and communities.  
It is increasingly important to document what climate funding is drawn from ODA budgets, 
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and what is considered ‘new and additional’ funding.  Adaptation financing is distinct from 
ODA because of the origin of the responsibility – the funding required for adaptation is owed 
as compensatory finance from polluting countries to those most vulnerable to the effects of 
that pollution.  It is not a generous donation from a well-endowed benefactor.  Treaties such 
as the 1992 UN Framework Convention and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, state climate finance 
for developing countries will be “new and additional”.  This distinction between climate 
finance and aid is crucial to avoid reduction in funding available for poverty reduction and 
development.  However the term “new and additional” has never been properly defined and 
the uncertainty is becoming a major sticking point in global negotiations. 
And of course, all of the above must ultimately result in real change for communities if it is to 
have any real meaning.  NGO representation, such as Oxfam, regularly argues for resourcing 
of basic resilience programmes at the community level and points to the large percentages 
soaked up in administrating and reporting on such funds.  Elliot and Fagan (2010:82) 
consider a “central principle must be that adaptation programmes must be consistent with the 
values, needs, and rights of affected communities.  It is vital local communities are asked 
what support they need, rather than being told what they should receive”. 
Barnett and Campbell (2010:178) consider that adaptation “to be successful, needs to operate 
at the scale at which most of the important decisions about social organization are made.  In 
the Pacific, this most often means at the level of villages”.  They go on to conclude “that 
community-based approaches are likely to offer the most effective approach to adaptation, as 
these can avoid the pitfalls of externally imposed and top-down projects which underestimate 
local capacities and ignore local particularities” (Barnett and Campbell, 2010:178).  
Such sentiment is laudable and this rationale was a large driver for the initial focus of this 
research programme at the village level.  In terms of sea-transport, constructing an argument 
that village communities, particularly rural and remote island ones, are obviously the greatest 
community of need is straightforward.  But the corollary advocated by Barnett and Campbell 
and others, that they are therefore the obvious target level for effecting intervention is not so 
easily demonstrated.  A vessel, whether a 30m tabetebete constructed drua of 1850, an island 
50 tonne cutter in 1920, or a small freighter in 2010, is a large asset for any village to acquire, 
manage, and maintain.  Not anyone could own a drua; they were the preserve of chiefs with 
resources and a skilled labour force to command.  That has not changed today.  As seen in 
Sections 4.1 and 5.4 we concluded that encouraging or coercing Solodamu to attain 
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ownership of such an asset would probably come at an unacceptable social and political cost 
to village decision-making and structures, unless accompanied by considerable external 
support.  Intervention in this area needs to come, initially at least, at a level of community 
above that of village.  If a provincially or nationally led revolution leads to village benefit, 
surely that is benefit to community at each of those levels. 
The broad themes explored throughout this section are reiterated throughout this thesis.  The 
next chapter addresses the methodological basis used for the research and reporting phases. 
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Chapter 3. Action as Method 
This inquiry has been action-research based, specifically centred on a Naturalistic Inquiry 
framework (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) influenced by Pacific derivatives of Participatory 
Learning and Research (e.g. Tawake et al, 2001; Veitayaki, 2003) and employing talanoa 
(e.g. Halapua, S., 2003; Halapua, W., 2008; Vaioleti, 2003, 2006) and literature/internet 
searches as the primary field research tools.  This chapter provides an overview and summary 
of each component.  
Naturalistic Inquiry sits within the ‘house’ or ‘family’ of action research.  It is entirely a 
western construct.  It is a methodology I was trained in prior to setting sail on this ocean and 
is one I have familiarity with and am comfortable with.  It shares commonalities with an 
Oceanic epistemological approach, a connection that has been made previously by Vaioleti 
(2006) and Farrelly (2009).  As with my Master’s thesis (Nuttall, 1998), I have attempted to 
marry Naturalistic Inquiry with a second action research approach, Participatory Learning and 
Action (PLA) which has been successively adapted by USP-led teams for use here in the 
Pacific (e.g. Aalbersberg et al, 2005; Tawake et al, 2001; Thaman, 2002; Veitayaki and 
South, 2001; Veitayaki et al, 2003).  PLA, in this context, is an Oceanic method that has 
evolved since the 1980’s from applied geography/resource management in reaction to the 
shortcomings of more conventional Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) and Participatory Rural 
Appraisal (PRA) methodologies commonly used throughout development sectors.  It stresses 
a grounded/practical learning through rigorous analysis of actions taken, underpinned by an 
emphasis on locally-led collaboration of multiple stakeholders and a bottom-up, village-by-
village approach with ‘experts on tap not on top’.  PLA has been used in Fiji, as throughout 
Oceania, to underpin the community action-based FLMMA programme of community-based 
marine management (see Section 7.2).  It is an approach many local communities have been 
exposed to including Solodamu, the starting point for this inquiry. 
Talanoa is literally ‘to talk about nothing’ (Vaioleti, 2006) and in doing so, in an inclusive 
and metered manner, culturally moderated and refined over millennia of ocean rhythms, 
everything. Talanoa is an Oceanic method of exchanging information, 
considering/assessing/analysing issues and informing decision-making.  Although the word 
may not exisit, it is used extensively, formally and informally, at most levels of Oceania 
community.  I claim no specialist knowledge of talanoa, bar the impressions gained by 
osmosis and immersion over the past two decades.  Like Naturalistic Inquiry it is non-
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positivist, emergent, reiterative, and flexible.  In my opinion, mana regulates talanoa in like 
manner to the trustworthiness stressed by Naturalistic Inquiry.  Talanoa is a culturally-based 
oral instrument in contrast to the academic and written core of Naturalistic Inquiry.  PLA can 
be thought of as a hybrid, seeking to marry the best traits of both to provide a workable and 
contemporary approach. 
3.1. Methodological Approach to the Inquiry 
Naturalistic Inquiry allows for research to be ‘inquiry’ based.  Lincoln and Guba (1985:226) 
state “no inquiry, regardless of which paradigm may guide it, can be conducted in the absence 
of a focus”.  The initial focus of this inquiry was to explore and understand the opportunities 
and challenges to commercially-applied sail technology becoming a reality.  Section 1.2 
discussed the reiterative phases of refocusing that occurred during the research. 
At its centre, the inquiry is primarily industrial – what is the future practical application of a 
technology31 and does it meet any criteria of sustainable adaptation in the face of changing 
environmental, social, economic, and political environs?  Dick advises that in the Pacific “sail 
technologies must be commercially viable if they are to be any more useful than wings for 
flying pigs” (in Couper (ed), 1989:168).  I contend that we must go further than just economic 
considerations.  For an alternative approach to current fossil-fuel powered options to be 
successfully explored, the full scope of potential constraints and barriers needs to be assessed.  
For this to happen cross-sectoral analysis is required, and this thesis advocates for use of a 
quadruple bottom-line reporting framework (see Sections 5.4 and 7.2). 
Our experience at the village level in Solodamu was sufficient to demonstrate that, while the 
concept might be economically rational and environmentally obvious, it was exposed to risk 
of failure because of other factors.  At the meso level the economics, even at the basic level 
explored in this study, also seem to bear at least sufficient logic to warrant serious 
investigation.  Yet implementation has not been seriously explored or even suggested to date.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 I have distinguished between commercial sea-transport and water-based recreation/sport using sail 
technology and not considered the latter.  The global use of sail within the recreation/sport industry is 
enormous, both in terms of scale of use, advancements, literature, and capital investment.  There are various 
linkages between the two that warrant further inquiry.  For example the sail technology being developed for 
the largest alternative power commercial designs by Dykstra are evolutions of the superyacht Maltese Falcon 
rig, in turn inspired by the Schetner rig developed for commercial sail 40 years previously (see Section 
4.3.3). 
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This suggests that the barriers are more than economic or commercial, and, although 
alternative vessel design work is still barely emergent, I have come to conclude that 
technological issues are not a primary barrier and are sufficiently proven to progress. 
There are few markers in this research field.  I started with some initial assumptions but little 
hard evidence.  Even the initial direction was unclear; should it prioritise the technology, the 
economic analysis and modelling, or the socio-cultural or political setting, or the institutional 
frameworks and paradigms?  I was starting from the micro and committed to the concept that 
ultimate benefit of intervention needs to be measured with this as the denominator, but I was 
not wedded to that being the only, primary or necessary focus.  In all fields the literature was 
thin and often obscured.  From the outset it was a case of finding often only a single source 
and then tracing the references and linkages exposed.   
The methodologies favoured, Naturalistic Inquiry, PLA and talanoa, all allow for such an 
‘emergent’ form of research and are, I contend, the most appropriate for application in an 
Oceanic setting.  NZ university trained I was birthed in the former; as a professional I have 
worked extensively with practitioners of the next; as a Pacific sailor I have come to love and 
esteem the latter.  I have always had difficulty with the perceived need to categorise, even 
rank such approaches, or place them on some sort of evolving continuum of learning.  
Naturalistic Inquiry has been described as a ‘post-positivist’ approach, talanoa might be 
described as ‘oceanic’ or ‘indigenous’, and PLA potentially as a ‘hypo-modern’ hybrid. 
3.2. Action Research 
I consider that research must have both demonstrated need and application to be morally 
justifiable.  Action Research has wide acceptance within social research disciplines and 
within the Pacific research community.  The literature is extensive.  The following is a typical 
description: “action research is known by many other names, including participatory research, 
collaborative inquiry, emancipatory research, action learning, and contextual action research, 
but all are variations on a theme.  Put simply, action research is ‘learning by doing’ - a group 
of people identify a problem, do something to resolve it, see how successful their efforts 
were, and if not satisfied, try again” O’Brien (2001:ii).   
Considered initially an experimental, almost fringe, departure from mainstream reductionist 
and positivist methodologies, various guises of Action Research have come to dominate in 
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the social disciplines.  A variant broad description from Gilmore et al (1986:161) describes 
action research as contributing “both to the practical concerns of people in an immediate 
problematic situation and to further the goals of social science simultaneously.  Thus, there is 
a dual commitment in action research to study a system and concurrently to collaborate with 
members of the system in changing it in what is together regarded as a desirable direction.  
Accomplishing this twin goal requires the active collaboration of researcher and client, and 
thus it stresses the importance of co-learning as a primary aspect of the research process".  
I prefer to conceive of O’Brien’s ‘problems’ as ‘issues’ or ‘challenges’ and I find Gilmore’s 
‘researcher/client’ descriptive of the relationship an austere, clinical one but, in the main, the 
boot fits.  The agenda on sustainable sea-transport being explored in this thesis arrives from 
identification of a need, followed by reiterative interventions by a growing collective of 
research partners and collaborators.  This thesis research, employing appropriate and tested 
methods of analysis and reflection, has acted as a catalyst to provide an umbrella of 
framework and monitoring which in turn fed back into the advancing/expanding talanoa.  
3.3. Naturalistic Inquiry 
Naturalistic Inquiry is emergent-design based.  In contrast to the conventional inquirer, who 
usually approaches a study ‘knowing what is not known’; the naturalist adopts the posture of 
‘not knowing what is not known’.  It is in its outputs that Naturalistic Inquiry causes most 
difficulty for positivist or conventional methodologies.  Naturalistic process does not set out 
to produce a ‘finding’, but to “resolve the problem in the sense of accumulating sufficient 
knowledge to lead to understanding or explanation” (Lincoln and Guba, 1985:227).  “It is to 
be expected at the commencement of the research that end products are difficult to specify … 
probably all that can be promised is advance in that understanding will be increased”. 
In this thesis I do not consider I am presenting ‘findings’ or ‘resolution’.  I consider I have 
played a spotlight of sufficient intensity on a central and hitherto largely invisible issue of 
priority to Oceania to warrant further and future prioritised inquiry.  I have left sufficient 
soundings of the various reefs I have charted to enable a little surety of safe passage for the 
next wayfinder.  In this era of hyper-modernity, of changeable environmental and economic 
weather, and of unpredictable political and cultural sea-states, I trust this is sufficient. 
Naturalistic Inquiry as method was developed by educational psychologists working in 
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depressed, multi-cultural, urban USA 25 years ago.  However, its central tenets hold across 
disciplines and time.  The process of Naturalistic Inquiry builds, in turn, on the works of 
(among others) Schwartz and Ogilvy (1979) as well as previous works of both authors (Guba, 
1978, 1981; Guba and Lincoln, 1982; Lincoln, 1981) and the grounded theory methods 
developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967), later refined by Strauss and Corbin (1990).   
Naturalistic Inquiry recognises at the outset that inquirer and inquiry are distinct but 
interdependent.  It suggests “that the inquirer and the object of inquiry interact to influence 
one another; known and knower are inseparable” and “all entities are in a state of mutual 
simultaneous shaping so that it is impossible to distinguish causes from effects” (Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985:36).   
Naturalistic Inquiry claims to be more than an alternative social science research framework; 
rather a paradigm shift from positivist approaches to research and understanding.  It has close 
association with, for example, the post-positive, ethnographic, phenomological, subjective, 
case-study, qualitative, hermeneutic, humanistic doctrines, all of which it contends are 
separate doctrines of the same discipline in the same way that Catholic, Baptist and Lutheran 
are all subsets of Christianity. 
Naturalistic Inquiry considers there are five central axioms of the post-positivist paradigm 
that separate it from positivist processes as follows32: 
Axiom 1: the nature of reality (ontology).  There are multiple constructed realities that can be 
studied only holistically; inquiry into these multiple realities will inevitably diverge (each 
inquiry raises more questions than it answers) so that prediction and control are unlikely 
outcomes although some level of understanding (verstehen) can be achieved. 
Axiom 2: the relationship of the knower to known (epistemology).  The inquirer and the object 
of inquiry interact to influence one another; known and knower are inseparable. 
Axiom 3: the possibility of generalization.  The aim of the inquiry is to develop an idiographic 
body of knowledge in the form of ‘working hypotheses’ that describe the individual case. 
Axiom 4: the possibility of causal linkages.  All entities are in a state of mutual simultaneous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 This list has been summarised from the methodology section of my Master’s thesis (Nuttall, 1998), in turn 
adapted from Lincoln and Guba (1985).   
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shaping so that it is impossible to distinguish causes from effects. 
Axiom 5: The roles of values in inquiry (axiology).  Inquiry is value-bound in at least five 
ways, captured in the following corollaries: (1) inquiries are influenced by the inquirer values 
as expressed in the choice of problem, evaluand or policy option and in the framing, 
bounding and focusing of that problem, evaluand, or policy option; (2) inquiry is influenced 
by the choice of paradigm that guides the investigation of the problem; (3) inquiry is 
influenced by the choice of the substantive theory utilised to guide the collection and analysis 
of data and in the interpretation of findings; (4) inquiry is by the values that inhere in the 
context, and (5), with respect to the first four corollaries above, inquiry is either value-
resonant (reinforcing or congruent) or value-dissonant (conflicting).  Problem, evaluand, or 
policy option, paradigm, theory, and context must exhibit congruence (value-resonance) if 
the inquiry is to produce meaningful results. 
Lincoln and Guba then supported these naturalist axioms with 14 characteristics of 
operational naturalist inquiry, justified firstly by their logical dependence on the axioms that 
underpin the paradigm and, secondly, their coherence and independence.  They are: 
1. Natural Setting: The inquirer (N) elects to carry out research in the natural setting and in a 
holistic manner. 
2. Human Instrument: N uses himself, as well as other humans, as the primary data-
gathering instruments due to the superior adaptability of the human instrument over 
others.  All instruments are value-based, but only the human is capable of identifying and 
taking into account (to some extent) those resulting biases.  
3. Utilisation of Tacit Knowledge.  N claims the legitimisation of tacit knowledge in 
addition to propositional knowledge. 
4. Qualitative Methods.  N elects qualitative methods over quantitative (although not 
exclusively). 
5. Purposive Sampling.  N favours purposive or theoretic sampling over random or 
representative sampling. 
6. Inductive Data Analysis.  Inductive rather than deductive data analysis is preferred. 
	  	   	   	  
77	  
7. Grounded Theory.  N prefers to have the guiding substantive theory emerge from (be 
grounded in) the data. 
8. Emergent Design.  N elects to allow the research design to emerge (flow, cascade, unfold) 
rather than construct it preordinately (a priori). 
9. Negotiated Outcomes.  N prefers to negotiate meanings and interpretations with the 
human sources from which the data has been chiefly drawn. 
10. Case Study Reporting Mode.  N is likely to prefer the case study reporting mode (over the 
scientific or technical report). 
11. Idiographic Interpretation.  N is inclined to interpret data (including the drawing of 
conclusions and identification of lessons learned) idiographically rather than 
nomothetically. 
12. Tentative Application.  N is likely to be tentative (hesitant) about making broad 
application of the findings. 
13. Focus-determined Boundaries.  N is likely to set boundaries to the inquiry on the basis of 
the emergent focus. 
14. Special Criteria for Trustworthiness.  N is likely to find the conventional trustworthiness 
criteria (internal/external validity, reliability, objectivity) inconsistent with the axioms and 
procedures of naturalistic inquiry.  They are likely to define new, but analogous, criteria 
(credibility, transferability, dependability, confirmability) and devise operational 
procedures for applying them. 
The issue of trustworthiness is crucial to the execution of the inquiry.  Lincoln and Guba 
prescribe a thorough process where ‘trustworthiness’ is tested against the criteria of 
‘credibility’, ‘transferability’, ‘dependability’, and ‘confirmability’.  In the case of my own 
programme, I have attempted to meet these criteria in several ways.  I have lived, worked, 
and visited Fiji intermittently for nearly two decades and sailed much of its waters.  I have 
existing networks of Pacific academics, resource management, and cultural experts who have 
provided introduction, guidance, tuition, and friendship.  My family has spent many months 
at a time anchored off villages, including Solodamu.  We had been invited into Solodamu to 
assist them in their planning for the future.  We have shared joy and sadness.  We have tried 
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to be honest and transparent about our activities, thoughts, fears, and plans at all times.  We 
have never taken money, a factor that always complicates trust.  We have tried to the extent 
possible to revisit the same subjects in multiple talanoa with a variety of 
stakeholders/participants in order to look at issues in a multi-facetted manner, the equivalent 
if you will of the historians’ or navigators’ use of triangulation. 
Having established trust in one place, as the talanoa on sailing spread and took us to other 
communities, we took that trust with us.  We have taken every opportunity to report back to 
all who have shared with us.  We have also encouraged participation throughout the process 
of local participants as partners, preferably dominant ones. 
To summarise; Naturalistic Inquiry is defined, not at the level of method but at the level of 
paradigm.  Heavy reliance is placed on the human as instrument.  Conventional positivist 
research tends to begin with a defined objective, follow a predetermined research strategy and 
analysis, and terminate either in reaching an intended objective, or explaining why it did not.  
The concept of a Naturalistic Inquiry, on the other hand, anticipates a paradox.  While a focus 
is the starting point, the inquirer fully expects this focus to change as the research unfolds.  At 
its heart, theory and method emerge from Naturalistic Inquiry; they are not a priori. 
Similarly sampling and other data collection is not undertaken to achieve representation but 
in a contingent and serial manner, the objective being to maximise the scope and range of 
information gathered.  Data analysis is open-ended and inductive: “what is at issue is the best 
means to ‘make sense’ of the data in ways that will, first facilitate the continuing unfolding of 
the inquiry, and second, lead to a maximal understanding (verstehen) of the phenomenon 
being studied in its context” (Lincoln and Guba, 1985:224-225).  It is assumed that the 
inquirer has accepted the stance suggested in the axioms listed above and it is strongly 
recommended that the inquirer engage in prior ethnography to provide a springboard and 
benchmark for the more formal study.   
3.4. Participatory Learning and Action  
A successful example of action research adapted and adopted in Oceania is Participatory 
Learning and Action (PLA).  PLA is widely used in development programmes and projects, 
primarily in the ‘developing world’ where the method has been championed by IIED since 
the late 1990’s (where it has become synonymous with the extensive work of Robert 
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Chambers et al).  PLA is primarily concerned with providing tools that allow communities to 
develop their own practices and processes for effective management of resources and 
environment.  As discussed above, the methodology was picked up at the outset by Pacific 
geography/natural resource management academics and researchers.  PLA as used here was a 
distinctly Oceanic adaptation to action research and underpins the FLMMA programme.  
There are multiple strengths that combine to create the PLA recipe, several, I suspect, 
inherent to the individual and collective cultural and intellectual skill of its designers and 
practitioners.  While LMMA is its current flagship, the PLA process is rooted in early USP 
physical geography and resource management fieldwork across the Pacific, in particular 
programmes led by Thaman, Aalbersberg, South, and Veitayaki.  At its core PLA is a 
geography-based analytical process that evolved from the RRA/PRA methods of assessment, 
in reaction to the heavy emphasis in each on a top-down, external expert-led process that did 
not gel well in Oceanic operating environments.  “The need to learn from our mistakes and to 
improve participatory methods results in the ‘birth’ of PLA” (Tawake et al, 2001:4).   
Central to the focus on PLA in this inquiry is the underlying principles that make up the 
“Social Contract”, the flexible ‘glue’ used to bind the various FLMMA partners together 
collaboratively rather than competitively in their emergent and infancy stages.  If, as initial 
findings indicate, further consideration of implementation of sail-based trading craft is worthy 
of now being prioritised, collaboration between a range of stakeholders with various, and 
potentially competing, interests is likely to be required.  The FLMMA learning portfolio 
model is a locally known and proven vehicle for such collaboration.  I discuss the lessons that 
might be applied from this to a sustainable shipping agenda further in Section 7.2. 
I have been guided by Ravuvu and Tabunakawai (2002) on the lessons they drew from their 
participation33 in Fiji and regional community management and planning programmes and 
projects and that offer sound advice and salient warnings.  Ravuvu and Tabunakawai 
(2002:67) conclude that the “process of empowerment is effective if communities recognise 
the worth of their social and natural capital, and have the ability to deal with the demands 
placed on these in a balanced and sustainable way.  Each step of the intervention process 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Both are highly experienced and leading Pacific practitioners of Action Research at community level, 
particularly in regard to resource management matters, Ravuvu with UNDP and Tabunakawai as Regional 
Programme Manager of WWF-SPP.  Nabobo-Baba (2004, 2006) also provides further relevant examples of 
lessons and analysis from Pacific project experiences. 
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must recognise the characteristics outlined earlier, and every step must be not only be walked 
through, but talked through.  The supportive role of outside players as catalysts and 
facilitators is important, but those in these roles must build into the project design strategic 
exits from the community from the beginning”.  
3.5. Talanoa 
Fofola e fala ka tau talanga (Let us spread out the mat so we can start the process of 
conversation) Halapua, 2007:9. 
In this thesis talanoa was increasingly adopted as a primary field research and data exchange 
tool; as the most appropriate method of contextualizing, gathering, filtering, transmitting, and 
analysing information/data.  Talanoa was used extensively and at all levels in this inquiry, 
from informal serendipitous meetings with individuals to regional workshops; on remote 
islands with full cultural protocol and in inner-city conference rooms in a Western setting.  
Talanoa is now well documented (e.g. Halapua, S., 2003, 2007; Halapua, W., 2008; Helu, 
1999; Helu-Thaman, 1998; Nabobo-Baba, 2006, 2007; Vaioleti, 2003, 2006) and increasingly 
used in various social science research processes (e.g. Farrelly, 2009; Nicole, 2006; Tawake, 
2001).  Talanoa is “a derivative of oral traditions.  Under the control of appropriate 
researchers, it allows contextual interaction with Pacific participants to occur that creates a 
more authentic knowledge, which may lead to solutions for Pacific issues” (Vaioleti, 
2006:23).  It is an ocean-wide practice but each culture claims its own variations.  In Fiji, it is 
a method proposed to disseminate information by local government departments, NGOs, 
village representatives, business representatives, and local agencies.  It is also recommended 
for collecting information from villages, leaders, and different government agencies 
(Morrison, Vaioleti and Veramu, 2002).  
Talanoa is far more than a research methodology or tool.  “Talanoa is a heritage and part of 
Oceanic culture today.  Talanoa is an Oceanic gift and contribution to the whole quest for 
more listening and dialogue.  In the very word itself is the notion of giving grace and space to 
each another and one another.  When people share they are not isolated.  To engage in 
Talanoa is to recognise the breadth of a community.  Above all, Talanoa honours and 
celebrates belonging and diversity” (Halapua, W., 2008:54).  Sitiveni Halapua (2007:9) 
contends it has many facets, including that “talanoa does not have a preconceived agenda.  
Talanoa is an activity that is oceanic, communal, and oral in nature.  It requires face to face 
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encounter”.   
Superficially, talanoa can be referred to as a conversation.  “Tala means to inform, tell, 
relate, and command, as well as to ask or apply.  Noa means of any kind, ordinary, nothing in 
particular, purely imaginary or void” (Vaioleti, 2006:23).  “Talanoa allows more mo'oni 
(pure, real, authentic) information to be available for Pacific research than data derived from 
other research methods and requires researchers to partake deeply in the research experience 
rather than stand back and analyse. Talanoa, then, is subjective, mostly oral and 
collaborative, and is resistant to rigid, institutional, hegemonic control” (Vaioleti, 2006:24). 
Winston Halapua (2008:64-67), considering talanoa from a theological plane, considers there 
are four gifts talanoa offers to the wider world.  In so doing he situates talanoa centrally 
within a voyaging ethos: 
“Space – the space provided is not for some to seize or dominate, rather that space is a 
creative space set aside to enable the welfare of all. 
Justice – No one story has more space and value than any others.  Every story, long or 
short, individual or collective, important for some and perhaps irrelevant for others, should 
be accepted.  No storyteller [tasitala] should leave feeling excluded or unheard.  Diversity 
enriches.  
Listening – Talanoa is about the sacredness of listening.  Talanoa is about sensitive and 
intentional listening.  In listening there is room for silence ... the profound contribution of 
silence, beauty, and serenity.  Powerful interaction happens at a time of silence.  The 
ability to listen is an art.  In order to be able to function together in the vaka (canoe) on the 
voyage, the honouring of space of each other was vital.  The vaka would not arrive if some 
of the waves were heard seriously while others were suppressed or undermined. 
Dialogue – Talanoa is a sacred space for dialogue in which all are valued and have 
profound contribution to make.  There is hospitality given – hospitality is at the very root 
of the formation of community.  Dialogue is a sacred process through which we uncover 
and reveal our human grandeur.  Dialogue withers when our hearts are closed to the 
infinite possibilities of the other and we assume we already know all we need to know.  
Dialogue flourishes when it is conducted in an open-minded spirit of discovery based on 
compassion, on the desire to build on what we have in common and transform our 
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differences into resources of value”. 
Talanoa then shares its origins in the unique social cauldron created by voyaging, in the need 
for communication methods between relatively small crews/communities and between 
independent but related fleets of vessels.  Such methods needed to be able to maintain 
effective information transmission amongst the complement while still allowing for an 
unencumbered chain of command.  Helu (1999:117) found similarly for the origins of 
concepts of reciprocity, another central pillar of Oceanic cultures.  Times of abundance are 
the time for hoarding, times of want, for example when food supplies run low and land is not 
in sight, are the time to ensure everything is shared communally to avoid conflict and 
individualism usurping the wider needs of sea-borne communities. 
Talanoa does not cover all knowledge, only that available to the ‘ordinary’ or ‘common’.  
According to Helu-Thaman (1998), there were two types of knowledge: communal 
knowledge necessary for day-to-day living and the specialist and often tapu knowledge.  
Special knowledge was koloa (taonga, treasure), belonging to specific groupings and kept 
fakamolumalu (sacred) by tufunga (tohunga/learned people).  My research has been 
concerned with the former.  Where it had broached the realm of the latter, I have employed 
measures to ensure that this research and my learning is insulated from such knowing (see 
Section 6.4). 
Farrelly also used talanoa extensively throughout her research into Bouma National Park 
(Farrelly, 2009) following the research approach prescribed by Unaisi Nabobo-Baba’s (2007) 
‘Vanua Research Framework’.  She considers the talanoa processes presented in her thesis as 
a potential tool for political agency.  “Talanoa became my primary methodology because it is 
synonymous with the phenomenological approaches that I had set out to use in the field: it 
requires an emotional engagement between all parties; it necessitates a space where all parties 
can speak freely; and it requires shared knowledge” (Farrelly, 2009:42).  Likewise Vaioleti 
finds parallels with talanoa and the phenomenological research family.  “Talanoa's 
philosophical base is collective, orientated towards defining and acknowledging Pacific 
aspirations while developing and implementing Pacific theoretical and methodological 
preferences for research.  Talanoa removes the distance between researcher and participant, 
and provides research participants with a human face they can relate to” (Vaioleti, 2006:25). 
Talanoa differs from a conventional or positivist approach with its reliance on preconceived 
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hypotheses and using pre-formulated questionnaires and leading questions.  Talanoa requires 
a personal relationship between the researcher and the participant.  “The interactions are 
guided by approved ethics, but these are based on different thinking from that of Pacific 
peoples.  The disparity between the objectivity base of much traditional research and the 
subjectivity of the participants is often not recognised in Pacific research contexts” (Vaioleti, 
2006:22).  “Researchers whose knowing is derived from Western origins are unlikely to have 
values and lived realities that allow understanding of issues pertaining to knowledge and 
ways of being that originated from the nga waima (spirits) and whenua of Samoa, Tonga, Fiji, 
Tuvalu or the other Pacific nations” (Vaioleti, 2006:22). 
Talanoa is an open-ended process.  While, as the researcher, I might request to talanoa on a 
given subject, the pursuant conversation, should the request be accepted, cannot be controlled 
in the way a structured or semi-structured interview is.  Outcome will depend on who is 
present, usually also undeterminable prior to the talanoa, and on what each brings to the 
conversation and the manner of exchange.  “The Talanoa will end when it loses its malie or 
starts to revisit areas covered already, since then it is probable that no more new points will 
be added to those that have been co-constructed.  It is a respectful, reciprocating interaction” 
(Vaioleti, 2006:26).  It is a shared space.  And what is not said is usually as important.  
Nabobo-Baba (2006:94) echoes Halapua above in stressing that silence is not empty.  “There 
is eloquence in silence … a pedagogy of deep engagement between participants”.  Again, 
such cultural assets are at the core of Diaz’s (2001) analysis of hypo-modernity. 
Talanoa has a strong compatibility with Naturalistic Inquiry, in particular the notions of 
trustworthiness as regulator and mutually shaped learning for both researcher and informer.  
Both Vaioleti and Farrelly found a similar connection.  “Perhaps what Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) suggest; that is, to replace validity and reliability with trustworthiness and its 
components, is more fitting” (Farrelly, 2009:32).  Vaioleti (2006:26) stresses the “reciprocity 
embedded in Talanoa will raise the expectations that researchers and participants have of 
each other, promoting mutual accountability, which adds to the trustworthiness and quality of 
the research.  The effect of reciprocity is such that when people give koloa (in this case, time, 
and knowledge) they will expect it to be respected and honoured, and to be used well.  
Developments will be followed with interest” (Vaioleti, 2006:26). 
Trustworthiness becomes central, especially in my own case as a kaivalagi, an external agent, 
seeking to interact in an Oceanic cultural setting.  Credibility must be built and maintained.  
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“It is vital, then, for researchers and their sponsors to fully appreciate the essential cultural 
underpinning for the context in which special knowledge is gifted to them.  That is, the 
knowledge is given on the age-old premise that it is to be used for the betterment of the fanau 
and not only for personal gain, such as a degree qualification or for building intellectual 
capacity or commercial interest.  Pacific research must advance Pacific peoples directly” 
(Vaioleti, 2006:29).  
My research focus and status as a sailor, a seaman, a ‘kaiwai’, gave me an affinity with many 
of those I sought knowledge or learning from.  For those of us who have saltwater running in 
our veins the sea provides an empathy that transcends many cultural boundaries.  I believe 
there is a natural mutual respect between all those who have ever stood a storm at sea that is 
not easily explained to a ‘lubber’ or ‘kai vanua’.  There is an unspoken empathy in which we 
each know we have at least once stared deeply into our own souls.  
Talanoa requires more than just following a prescription.  “Researchers are encouraged to be 
cautious, respectful and to see, not just look; to hear, not just listen, and to observe; to know 
the culture and context they are engaged in and then behave accordingly.  Requirements 
include not dominating” (Vaioleti, 2006:30).  I have tried to follow such advice as broadly as 
possible.  Because it was not known in advance the direction the research would take, I 
sought to not only search out information in talanoa but to seek guidance as to what 
information I should be looking for and where and how to look for it.  Often a talanoa with 
one community would result in being guided to another tanoa and the talanoa would 
recommence to be reordered and reshaped by new participants.  Over time, I ended up 
revisiting various tanoa repeatedly – especially within the three communities introduced in 
Section 1.3.  These became my equivalent of a compass and log on a ship, a means of 
knowing and reflecting on course and distance covered.  
I think now that talanoa is as important as a means of ‘making learning’ as a means to finding 
or uncovering knowledge.  Talanoa is not a process of determining what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ 
in the positivist sense.  It is one concerned with allowing understanding to accompany 
knowledge and for such learning to be mutually attained.  Talanoa as a research method is 
unlikely to yield similar results over time.  Learning from talanoa means that people's reasons 
and ideas about an issue or topic will change.  Reliability as it is understood in experimental 
research is not appropriate (Vaioleti, 2006).  Talanoa is not a universal method, it has 
limitations, and I have attempted to engage with it in full cognisance of these.   
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“Talanoa research methodology is a challenge.  The use of disempowering traditional 
research on Pacific peoples has not yielded significant advancements for them.  
Talanoa can be just as rigorous as existing research approaches, although in a different 
way.  It will allow Pacific peoples to help identify issues, and then co-create knowledge 
and solutions for themselves.  Implementation of findings based on Talanoa research 
methodology should be more trustworthy, relevant and widely supported by Pacific 
peoples, because they will feel that they have had meaningful engagement in the 
research processes” (Vaioleti, 2006:33). 
3.6. Research Participants 
In addition to the three communities introduced in Section 1.3, I have, largely informally, 
targeted a number of ‘clusters’ of human datasets.  A ripple effect has led over the course of 
the research to an ever-widening collective of informants (or more correctly co-participants).  
This included, in the first season of field work, staff from provincial councils, the KYMST 
(the district support team to the Kadavu FLMMA network); agencies involved in Fijian sea-
transport (e.g. MSAF, FNU Marine Division); the range of organisations that make up the 
FLMMA network (Ministry of Fisheries, WWF-SPP, USP Marine Studies and Institute of 
Applied Science, etc.); groups with an interest in or knowledge of traditional and modern 
sailing technology in Fiji, Fiji Museum staff, Fijian boat builders; those coordinating research 
and policy initiatives in regard to climate change, adaption strategies and renewable energy at 
USP, FNU, SPC, and Ministry of Environment.   
Preparations and reporting for the Lau drua research programme in 2011 (see Section 6.4) 
saw the net widen to include, for example, various Lauan communities, the Lau Provincial 
Council, Fiji Arts Council and iTaukei Affairs as well as staff at the Oceanic Centre for Art, 
Culture and Pacific Studies and the History Department of USP.  At the time of writing, that 
particular piece of research and the on-going research agenda being pursued by FIVS has lead 
to us being contacted by ANU offering to provide all possible assistance for an extended 
archaeological and cultural history research programme on drua and related culture. 
In similar vein the research programme, and in particular preparations for the USP-hosted 
2012 ‘Sustainable Sea-Transport Talanoa’ (SSTT) (see Section 7.1), has led to contact with 
organisations involved in alternative shipping technology in Japan, UK and Europe (e.g. 
Greenheart, B9 Shipping, Modern Merchant Sailing Ships, Fair Transport, Germanischer 
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Lloyd).  A number of international universities are now peripherally involved.  In Fiji, the 
community of interest includes various government departments, development agencies, 
consulates, regional authorities, and industry participants.  What started as a small discreet 
conversation in one small remote village has certainly spread and blossomed.  With this thesis 
I hope I have discharged my responsibilities to report back faithfully on what I have learned 
to the community to which it is of most relevance.  
3.7. Literature and Internet Searches 
The fieldwork, a largely organic oral process, has been supported throughout with a more 
conventional process of literature search and review.  While time has been spent prowling the 
library shelves, increasingly this part of the programme has been electronically based. 
Other data collection processes used to collect data for the ‘thick descriptive’ prescribed for 
Naturalistic Inquiry data collection (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) included maintaining a standard 
ship’s logbook (the equivalent of the terrestrial journal), scrapbooks of newspaper articles, 
etc.  A ship as a research platform has inherent constraints, space and electronic reception 
being limited and we are increasingly adopting a ‘paperless where possible’ modus.  
As well as web-searching for known and individual sources, I have maintained a watching 
brief on a variety of websites covering a diverse range of subjects from proa design 
(http://www.proafile.com; http://proadesign.com) to Polish based sailing-eco-anarchists 
(http://sailingforsustainability.net) to Richard Branson’s Carbon War Room 
(http://www.carbonwarroom.com) to the official site of the IMO (http://www.imo.org) and 
leading industry commentators (http://shippingefficiency.org).  Email and Skype have 
increasingly been used to maintain and expand a virtual talanoa with participants and 
collaborators now spread across the globe. 
3.8. A Note on Gender 
Seafaring, sailing, and ship-building are, and historically have been, an almost entirely male-
dominated and testosterone-ruled industry.  Oceania is not alone in this regard, it is a global 
phenomenon.  My skipper’s father is the caricature of a retired Welsh Chief Engineer with 
most of his working career bluewater on large vessels.  He served with only three signed 
female crew in that time, all of them stewardesses.  In regards to Oceanic sea-faring, the 
issues of sacredness, of tabu, associated with all aspects of historical relationship with sailors 
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and Oceania have reinforced this trend and it spills over today to dominate the modern age.  
The most recent Oceanic voyaging re-creation, the ‘Waka Tapu’ voyage of two New Zealand 
Maori sailing waka to Rapanui has seen Te Aurere only ‘manned’ by a male crew in 
deference to the ordained ‘tapu’ nature of their odyssey.  
Such total male exclusivity cannot have been historically accurate and cannot have been an 
exclusively engendered tradition.  Obviously if voyages did not include women then 
colonisation would have been restricted to survival of a single generation without breeding 
partners.  So women must have sailed in some capacity in some situations but there appears 
little doubt that men have dominated the industry.  Diaz (2008:11) has well summarised the 
exceptions to the rule, including Teaiwa’s valourising of her adopted ancestress, Nei 
Nim’anoa as “one of only a few female figures in the male-dominated field of Pacific Island 
navigational traditions”.  He points to the danger of men continuing to attempt to dominate 
this space and concludes that continuation of the deep-seated and chauvinistic view that 
traditional seafaring is essentially “a man’s thing” leaves them open to needed criticism. 
The literature record of women’s participation in this field is thin.  There are some tantalising 
hints that Fijian culture may not have been as exclusively male dominated as other parts of 
Oceania, in particular Polynesian cultures.  Both Williams (1858) and Wilkes (1845) 
reference the ‘travelling Levukians’, the seafaring traders of the eastern Fijian seaboard at the 
time of sustained contact, having women sailors as ordinary seamen [sic] and even that it was 
the women that initiated and controlled the exchange processes associated with their trading.  
As Couper (2009:55) summarises “women sometimes led the trading parties on both sides 
and made sea voyages for marriage and mortuary occasions and major ceremonies such as the 
solevu”.  More recently the role of women in martime activies has been revisted (see D’Arcy 
2008) with Huffer (2008) detailing the record in myth and story of Oceanic women sailors 
and navigators, pointing to references from Tahiti and the Marshall Islands. 
Within traditional ship construction, gender roles were heavily segregated.  The universal 
trend is that men built boats, women made sails, but all the community came together to make 
the magimagi, the cordage that bound the vessel together and controlled its operation.  This is 
an interesting vignette and might be read to imply that men were the artisans and women the 
engineers, given the role of the sail as primary propulsion.  Our research into drua culture in 
southern Lau (see Section 6.4) potentially uncovered previously unrecorded knowledge about 
laca suggesting the sails of the drua were incredible pieces of technology, as sophisticated as 
any modern sail.  The last vestiges of this knowledge are held by women.  Such glossing of a 
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tradition of gender separation but equilibrium in canoe construction is poetic but fanciful.  It 
always has been and remains today a sector where men and maleness dominate.  I contend 
that such domination is a primary contributor to the current extremely conservative nature of 
the industry. 
My own experience as a sailor has been tempered by my last 12 years as crew aboard a 
bluewater vessel owned and skippered by a female.  It is a rarity; we have met only one 
similar example in this time.  It causes raised eyebrows, less so in my own country, but after a 
while is generally accepted and within ‘our’ communities of Solodamu and Korova, ‘their’ 
female ‘skipper’ is now a matter of respect and pride.  After more than a decade, I would now 
find it incredibly difficult to serve under a male command.  My entirely subjective opinion is 
that women make better captains, they are more team-orientated, more decisive and intuitive.  
In today’s seafaring world, intelligent skill is of far more import than brute strength.  As 
Helen Sampson, Director of the Seafarers International Research Centre at Cardiff University 
commented in the SSTT 2012, there is no reason women cannot fill any role in the modern 
seafaring industry and their failure to do so is attributable to simple sexism.  Our experience 
with training youth in Solodamu and other parts of Fiji is that women cadets learn more 
quickly and are less constrained by the natural competitive nature of the men.  The experience 
of Uto ni Yalo and the other vessels of the Te Mana o Te Moana fleet, all of whom have had a 
minority women complement, would tend to reinforce this opinion. 
It is not my place or role, as a kaivalagi visitor within Fijian or Oceanic culture to pass 
judgment on the mores used to maintain a male dominance of the Oceanic seafaring industry 
and the current cultural revival.  I will simply repeat Diaz’s (2008:20) warning.  If our 
attitudes do not change quickly, “the balls that risk being kicked are our own”. 
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Chapter 4. Plotting the Inquiry 
This chapter uses three lenses to view the current sea-transport scenario, starting with the 
micro as represented by the koro of Solodamu, a typical rural coastal village in Fiji.  In 
Section 4.2 magnification is decreased to the meso level to look at shipping in Fiji and 
Oceania.  Sea-transport is first contextualised within a summary of the unique key regional 
characteristics that affect the industry, necessary to fully understand the critical role sea-
transport plays in the region.  This concludes by narrowing to an overview of shipping in Fiji 
and summarising its development over time.  Section 4.3 considers the macro, the global 
level at which shipping is a juggernaut industry, shifting 90% of the world’s goods and 
resources in up to 100,000 commercial vessels.  Particular attention is paid to the place of 
shipping within the global context of current climate change debate and the effects that both 
measures to mitigate the industries poor GHG emissions record and related emerging 
technologies are likely to play in reshaping shipping options in the immediate future. 
4.1. The Micro in the Macro: Solodamu – One Village’s Need 
The koro of Solodamu and its environs were introduced in Sections 1.2.1 and 1.3.1.  The 
current sea-transport scenario for the village provides a case study it is contended is 
representative of the issues faced by many Oceanic remote coastal communities.  
The case study underscores the contention that coastal/island communities that are reliant on 
externally controlled and determined transport are heavily restricted in their development 
options.  Non fossil-fuel powered options offer an economically viable alternative that would, 
in my opinion, increase the range and control of community over transport and thus increase 
community resilience.  However, substantive and entrenched obstacles exist to realising this, 
some of which pose challenges to existing socio-cultural norms within the community. 
The village has been a leader in community conservation initiatives.  While all in the village 
claim it is their desire to protect their environment for future generations that is the primary 
driver, it is also apparent that an economic trade-off was envisioned where their sacrifices 
would somehow be rewarded by a low-level and sustainable eco-tourism income stream.  The 
unrealistic nature of this desire (Kadavu is not a tourist destination of any scale and 
establishing a commercially viable tourism venture would have social costs the village is not 
prepared to countenance) and growing frustration of the youth at the lack of economic 
alternatives was the subject of the original workshop described in Section 1.2.1.  A number of 
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commentators, especially those involved over recent years in biodiversity protection, have 
made the linkage between meeting conservation imperatives at community level requiring 
mutual satisfaction of communities’ economic and social aspirations (see in particular 
Veitayaki et al, 2003, 2011; also Aalbersberg et al, 2005, Morrison et al, 2002).  
Despite several village-initiated attempts to find such an economic balance - including 
building a visitor centre and viewing platforms, cutting and maintaining 7km of coastal 
walking tracks, preparing signage - it remains illusory.  The 2006 talanoa was held in this 
context.  There focus shifted from eco-tourism opportunities to examining current demands 
on village expenditure and past village enterprises, one of which was a village launch.  A 
shipwreck in front of the village some years previously had provided materials; the Methodist 
Church had paid for a mataisau from Suva and the result was a 35’ plywood cabin boat 
driven by a 30hp outboard.  With this the youth committee 34  made a small income 
‘chartering’ the vessel for community use – school visits, weddings, market days etc - along 
the coast of Kadavu.  It is unlikely the vessel was ever formally registered as a commercial 
vessel and its business use was ad hoc.  When I first arrived in Solodamu the launch was 
beached and derelict beyond economic repair.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 The Solodamu Village Launch 
I was struck by the notion that a plywood and epoxy sailing catamaran, the same materials 
used for the launch, could provide a village-based service between Kadavu and Suva without 
the fuel costs that had been a large overhead in previous operations.  The idea gestated until 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Most Fijian villages have a youth committee comprising all the young men who undertake communal 
projects (fixing the school, painting the church, building footpaths, fund raising etc), generally at the 
direction of the bosenikoro.  This is a practical expression of vakavanua. 
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our return to the village in 2008 when we more systematically explored the concept and its 
suitability for Solodamu.  In this period a friend built a low-cost 46’ catamaran to 
professional standards on a beach in New Zealand and then put some 20,000nm under its 
keels giving us a good baseline of overall costs, construction processes, and performance.  
Other designs were also readily available.  Technology did not appear to be a barrier.  Our 
own experience in regularly sailing the Kadavu-Suva route, later supplemented by the Na 
Mataisau data (see Section 5.1) combined with inter-generational local knowledge gave us 
the basis for good wind-route planning.  This was in the main favourable and reliable.   
Human capacity in terms of sailing, commercial management, boat building and maintenance, 
and business/financial planning within the village was limited or non-existent.  All the youth 
were competent fibre operators and fishermen.  Several of the older men had deckhand 
experience on bluewater tuna vessels, the village chief having once voyaged to Japan on a 
fishing vessel.  One of the qase had been a deckhand on a Kadavu-Suva launch in his youth.  
None had sailed in the sense of sail power.  The oldest man in the village could remember 
one visit to the bay by an indigenous craft.  While he recognised instantly pictures of an 
oceanic lateen sail he couldn’t remember if it was a drua or a camakau (see Chapter 6).  
There were no mataisau resident in the village although all men were competent ‘bush’ 
carpenters and sawyers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Wakataitea, a 46’ ply/epoxy Catamaran 
The research involved three parallel processes: a survey of the village’s transport needs; a 
series of workshops with the village to find out if the idea was realistic and if so how best to 
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prepare for it (the latter culminating in an agreed business plan); and research into the 
existing transport options. 
Following protocol and meetings with the bosenikoro and the turaganikoro and several all-
village workshops facilitated by Bogiva, the koro set up a working party for the ‘project’ 
comprising both visiting sailors and representatives of each mataqali.  I use the term 
‘project’, but an inquiry or investigation would be more accurate.  We, the external kaivalagi, 
were clear from the outset that we were available to assist the village with researching, 
planning and training but we were not there as an ‘aid’ or ‘donor’ group, and that the concept 
would need to be run on sufficient commercial lines to meet both regulatory standards 
(survey, qualifications, etc) and economic viability.  We were prepared to assist constructing 
a business case that involved options of micro-finance, loans, or leases, but were not prepared 
to assist in writing applications for donors to simply gift a vessel.  Although I suspect many 
hoped this situation would change, we proceeded on this basis.  
Reasoning for this approach comes from a full understanding of why the old launch had 
failed.  It illustrates the tension between commercial practice and vakavanua.  The launch as 
an asset had in effect cost the village little except some labour.  Cash earned from operating 
the launch had immediately been seconded for village and vanua needs, there was little or 
none set aside for maintenance or other operational costs.  When problems arose, e.g. the 
motor died through lack of care and service, this was dealt with at the time as best as possible.  
When maintenance reached a critical need the youth had tried to introduce a business plan 
with reinvestment of earnings into maintaining the asset.  But in a small village, with few 
earning opportunities, and a seeming endless call on the collective for soli for church, school, 
scholarships, koro, tikina and yavusa obligations, the youth were not able to resist the 
customary and social pressures placed on them in order to maintain their business plan.  This 
had resulted in tension between some of the youth and the qase and between mataqali, 
tensions that several years later were unvoiced but still simmered below the surface.  The 
result was the vessel was beached and quickly deteriorated.  This analysis was both salient 
and sobering.  I suspect it is far from unusual and other researchers have found similar issues 
(see for example Farrelly’s 2009 research into community enterprises in Bouma).  For a 
commercial vessel to be owned and operated at village level an accommodation between 
commercial and vanua imperatives would need to be found. 
Throughout this phase every attempt was made to adopt and use best PLA practice and 
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process (see Section 3.4).  Until his death in 2010 Bogiva, a respected facilitator and staff 
member of USP working on governance issues through the FLMMA programme, was our 
constant guide and mentor35.  We also informally re-established a previous reference group of 
PLA expertise from various in-country NGOs and USP to act as sounding board and mentor. 
4.1.1. The Current Transport Scenario 
Kadavu is serviced by air and sea-transport, with daily flights from both Suva and Nadi on 
small twin-engine aircraft and a weekly Ro-Ro ferry service from Suva to the port of 
Vunisea, approximately 8km to the east of Solodamu.  The village can connect with this node 
by either foot or vehicle over a dry weather road or a 30-minute fibre36 ride by sea.  	  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Ro-Ro ferry departing Vunisea, Kadavu 
Fibres are used periodically to travel from Kadavu to the mainland but this voyage is a 
hazardous bluewater passage and is only likely to be attempted in favourable weather or when 
prompted by high cultural need (e.g. to attend important funerals).  The high cost of air 
transport means this mode is only used locally as a last resort.  Village transport within the	  
island then is almost exclusively by outboard motor power and off-island by large and aged 
MDO-fuelled ferries.  When specialised loads or events require shipping to come directly to a 
village the only options are to charter large vessels from Suva or pay an ‘anchoring fee’ for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 An extensive record has been kept throughout the interaction with Solodamu and can be accessed at 
www.sailingforsustainability.org 
36 Open fibreglass longboats, commonly known as “fibres” are typically 23 or 26 ft long, narrow, planing craft 
powered by 25 – 60 hp outboard motors. 
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the ferries to divert and anchor off the reef so that loads or passengers can be lightered ashore.  
For example, when the Richmond Area School burnt down in 2010, an additional charge of 
FJ$5,000 was levied for the ferry to divert to Richmond to unload building supplies.  Such 
costs are borne by the community.	  
Figure 8 The ‘Fibre’, Powered here with a 40hp Yamaha Outboard 
4.1.2. Establishing Solodamu’s Transport and Fossil-fuel Usage 
We were unable to find any record of previous transport surveys of comparable communities 
in Fiji and so the working party began by undertaking a village-wide survey of transport use.  
At the time the survey was undertaken no vehicles were owned or stationed in the village37 
and three households owned fibres.  As Solodamu had just installed a government-subsided 
diesel generator (which provides power for 2½ hours per evening) the transport survey was 
combined with a parallel one on village fossil-fuel use.  The generator was the result of five 
years planning and fund raising by the village, its commissioning a cause for great celebration 
seen as step towards ‘development’.  The cost of FJ$5/week/household to pay for the fuel 
used places considerable strain on meagre incomes.  The electricity is for basic household use 
only and is insufficient to allow use of appliances such as freezers, washing machines, and 
irons.  A summary of the survey findings is provided in the following tables38.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 This situation prevails at time of writing (October 2012). 
38 A more detailed report on the survey methodology and limitations is available at 
www.sailingforsustainability.org 
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Table 2 Number of One-way Trips made by Solodamu Villagers to/from Suva/Nadi 
(2008-09) 	   Suva	   Nadi	  Ferry	   	   183	  (57%)	   N/A	  Plane	   60	  (19%)39	   6	  (100%)	  Yacht40	   76	  (24%)	   N/A	  Fibre	   0	   N/A	  
Total	  no.	  of	  1-­‐way	  trips	   316	   6	  
Table 3 Number of One-way Trips made by Solodamu Villagers within Kadavu (in 
September 2009) 	   To/from	  Vunisea	   To/from	  Other	  Village	  Ferry	   0	   0	  Fibre	   194	  (49%)	   8	  (57%)	  (Richmond)	  Yacht	   0	   6	  (43%)	  	  Truck/4WD	   153	  (38%)	   0	  On	  foot	   52	  (13%)	   0	  	  
Total	  no.	  of	  1-­‐way	  trips	   399	   14	  
Table 4 Visitor Transport to Solodamu from outside of Kadavu (2008-09) 	   No.	   of	   Visitors	   from	  Suva	   No.	   of	   Visitors	   from	  Nadi	  Ferry	   82	  (57%)	   0	  Plane	   46	  (32%)	   2	  (100%)	  Yacht	   17	  (12%)	   0	  
Total	  no.	  of	  visitors	   145	   2	  
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Nearly 90% of the plane flights to Suva are attributable to one individual who is required to fly to Suva 
fortnightly as part of their employment with the Provincial Council.  
40 There have been a variety of yachts visiting Solodamu since 2006 and these have been used advantageously 
for transport between the village and Suva. 
	  	   	   	  
96	  
Table 5 Visitor Transport to Solodamu from within Kadavu (in September 2009) 	   No.	   of	   Visitors	   from	  Vunisea	   No.	   of	   Visitors	   from	  Other	  Villages	  Ferry	   0	   0	  Fibre	   24	  (43%)	   18	  (100%)	  (Richmond)	  Yacht	   0	   0	  Truck/4WD	   24	  (43%)	   0	  On	  foot	   8	  (14%)	   0	  
Total	  no.	  of	  visitors	   56	   18	  
Table 6 Cargo from Solodamu – Suva/Nadi (2008-09) 	   Cargo	  (kgs)	  to	  Suva	   Cargo	  (kgs)	  to	  Nadi	  Ferry	   7283	  (91%)	   0	  Plane	   590	  (7%)	   611	  (100%)	  Yacht	   105	  (2%)	   0	  
Total	  cargo	   7978	   611	  Note:	  	   Of	  the	  above	  3780	  kg	  (47%)	  was	  yagona.	  
Table 7 Cargo from Solodamu to other villages within Kadavu (in September 2009) 	   Cargo	  (kgs)	  Ferry	   0	  Fibre	   625	  (39%)	  Yacht	   0	  Truck/4WD	   981	  (61%)	  On	  foot	   0	  
Total	  cargo	   1606	  Note:	   	  Majority	  of	   this	   is	   taking	  village	  produce	   to	   the	  weekly	  market	   in	  Vunisea.	  	  Tides	  have	  a	  large	  influence	  on	  choice	  of	  transport	  on	  any	  given	  day.	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Table 8 Cargo into Solodamu from Suva (2008-09)  	   Cargo	  (kgs)	  Ferry	   6030	  (98%)	  Fibre	   0	  Yacht	   6	  (0.1%)	  Plane	   100	  (1.9%)	  
Total	  cargo	   6136	  Note:	   Of	  the	  cargo	  5305	  kg	  (86%)	  was	  hardware	  (building	  supplies,	  clothing,	  etc)	  and	  631	  kg	  (10%)	  was	  food	  and	  household	  groceries.	  
Table 9 Cargo to Solodamu from within Kadavu (in September 09)  	   Cargo	  (kgs)	  Truck/4WD	   419	  (44%)	  Fibre	   540	  (66%)	  
Total	  cargo	   959	  Note:	   Of	  the	  cargo	  brought	  into	  Solodamu,	  every	  3	  weeks	  455	  litres	  of	  fuel	  comes	  from	  Vunisea	  for	  resale	  for	  general	  village	  use	  and	  the	  2	  fibre	  operators	  bring	  in	  a	  total	  of	  189	  litres/month	  for	  fuelling	  their	  outboards.	  
Table 10 Village Fuel Use (in September 2009) 	   Fuel	  (litres)	  Village	  generator	  (diesel)	   135	  (20%)	  Individual	  generator	  (petrol)	   174	  (26%)	  Lighting	  (kerosene)	   108	  (16%)	  Outboard	  motor	  (petrol)	   225	  (33%)	  Primus	  stove	  (kerosene)	   36	  (5%)	  
Total	   volume	   of	   fuel	  
(litres)	  
778	  
Note:	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   communally-­‐owned	   generator	   10	   households	   have	   their	  own	  generators.	  	  3	  households	  own	  outboards.	  	  5	  households	  are	  using	  solar	  powered	  lighting.	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The survey gave detailed data for the month of September and more generalised annual data.  
It does not show monthly or seasonal variation.  Off-island travel is known to have marked 
seasonal variation with the Christmas period and national events being drivers of increased 
transport use, for example Diwali when there are large sales in Suva and the annual Methodist 
conference (see also Sofer 1985, 2009).  Solodamu has been regularly visited by a small 
number of international yachts, villagers making use of these for transport of people/goods to 
and from Suva.  It is not known to what degree this has skewed “normal” village movement 
patterns. 
Local sea-transport is the single largest user of fossil-fuel within the village.  Off-island 
transport is critical for Solodamu.  Combined with coastal movements, it makes sea-transport 
crucial to every aspect of well-being.   
Fossil-fuel is an increasingly expensive commodity.  After a period of relatively stable prices, 
the cost of pre-mix petrol41 increased during the 2008 world oil price hikes to over FJ$3/l for 
a period.  These prices have fluctuated since this extreme and at the time of the survey was 
retailing in the village at around FJ$2.50/l.  Although regulated under the government’s 
franchise scheme, costs of off-island transport, both air and sea, were also reported to have 
risen steadily.  The franchise scheme is discussed elsewhere and is currently under review by 
the Fiji Commerce Commission. 
Such price rises have considerable effect socially and culturally, as well as economically.  
Fijians are a highly mobile people; maintaining family connections is a paramount concern 
and there is considerable travel between kin throughout Fiji.  Any increase in transport costs 
immediately impacts maintenance of cultural ties.  Price increases for pre-mix were observed 
to have other impacts.  In the Kadavu district of Kavala in 2008 we heard reports of the 
district health nurse having to halve her usual village calls because of increasing fuel costs.  
On the neighbouring island of Ono villagers brought their children home early from boarding 
school because of the transport cost of supplying the school kitchens.  Those planting a cash 
crop of pineapples or melons to sell in Suva to pay children’s school fees think twice when 
the transport cost takes an increasing share of any profit.  The example of Bogiva’s death 
provided a poignant example.  He died in Suva and was buried in Ba.  As we had three sailing 
ships in Solodamu at the time we were able to transport 17 villagers, half a tonne each of dalo 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 50:1 oil/petrol mix suitable for outboard motors. 
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and cassava, yagona and mats to the mainland at no cost.  Had this option not been available 
the village might have been able to send two or three representatives and some mats by air at 
a return cost of more than FJ$300 per passenger.  By 2012 this would have cost more than 
FJ$500 each.  Transport has a direct relationship to mana and fulfilment of cultural 
obligation. 
Solodamu is the second smallest of the six villages in Tavuki Bay.  Multiplying the survey 
results by six gives a crude, but conservative42, gauge of fuel and transport needs of the 
tikina.  It is only an approximation and completely conservative to note that if Solodamu 
comprises around 1% of Kadavu’s overall population then the island as a whole is consuming 
more than 67 tonnes a month (800+ tonnes per annum) of fossil-fuel supplies (excluding road 
vehicles and urban fuel use in Vunisea).  Using similar arithmetic to extrapolate there are at 
least 30,000 one-way trips made annually at household level to and from the mainland.  
Using this data supported by counts of fibres passing the embayment, observations of 
passenger and freight movements on ‘ferry day’ and talanoa with other villagers in Tavuki 
and along the coastline, we were able to construct a range of business scenarios for a working 
catamaran capable of carrying passengers and cargo both within Kadavu and between Kadavu 
and Suva.  From an economic view, the concept of a locally-operated, small-scale vessel 
clearly made commercial sense.  For an asset investment of approximately FJ$200,000 a 
conservative gross annual return of between FJ$80,000-150,000 looked eminently feasible.  
With only minimal fuel as an operating overhead; operational costs could be substantively 
reduced compared to options.  There appeared sufficient demand to support at least one 
vessel just for Tavuki Bay.  But, as discussed below, economic and commercial imperatives, 
although absolutely critical, are just one factor to be satisfied.  
The working party met regularly, held several village talanoa, and proceeded to map out first 
a business case and then a detailed business plan.  This used a quadruple bottom-line, looking 
at primary and secondary benefits and costs across economic, environmental, social, and 
political well-beings, with encouraging results.  For example, almost all money currently 
spent on transport disappears from the local economy immediately, either to externally owned 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 That there are no vehicles in the village makes this even more conservative. 
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transport, fuel, or finance companies43.  A locally owned and operated non-fossil-fuel 
powered vessel would see the reverse, with local payments then circulating further within the 
island economy.  If six crew were employed, this would translate to sustainable incomes 
supporting six village households resulting in the retention of the children of these 
households on the Tavuki school roll44.  
The currently available options mean off-island shipping requires transhipment through 
Vunisea45.  A villager wanting to travel to Suva or to ship crops or goods to or from market 
must pay both the ferry costs and then the fibre costs from the port.  For Solodamu the fibre 
costs FJ$50 for a one-way a trip, similar to the cost of one passenger on the ferry (but not 
including their baggage or freight).  In the case of Nabukelevu, the western-most village on 
Kadavu, the fibre hire will cost around FJ$300.  But a shallow draught catamaran would be 
able to work directly out of almost all the embayments along the coast and from there direct 
to Suva without the need for associated shore infrastructure.  A surveyed vessel capable of 
carrying up to 4dwt was envisaged, sufficient for carrying loads from purely passengers to 
root crops, building materials, concrete blocks, sheets of plywood, etc.  The modelling 
strongly indicated it could profitably operate at a significant discount to current charges.  It 
would therefore remove or reduce a significant economic inhibitor to producing excess crops 
or any other commodity for export to Suva and reduce the cost of imports.  
Various colleagues offered to come to help if we got to construction stage.  We began to 
discuss matters, such as surveying, licensing, and qualifications with the relevant authorities.  
Youth were sent to train on Uto ni Yalo and at FNU in Suva.  We started running practical 
courses, building the women’s committee a 20’ wooden sailing dory for fishing, teaching 
basic seamanship, navigation, radio and safety, etc and using our own ships to give the 
villagers the experience of sailing vessels and to train the youth46.  Serendipitously, or so we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43  Although no detailed investigation has been undertaken, it is strongly suspected a large proportion of this, 
particularly the fuel component, also quickly exits the wider Fijian economy. 
44 See Figure 43 on Page 204 for further discussion of primary and secondary benefit. 
45  There are two ferry ports on Kadavu, Vunisea in the centre and Kavala at the eastern end.  Each has a rock 
jetty and associated roading and a priority of Kadavu development is construction of a road network to link 
coastal villages to these (Kadavu Strategic Plan 2007-2012, Kadavu Provincial Council). 
46  Both my skipper and myself were qualified NZ commercial coastal skippers and our crew included 
experienced boat builders. 
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thought at the time, FIVS negotiated with their German sponsor to provide a vessel for testing 
the Kadavu route, which sadly failed to eventuate47.  
The research and planning phase identified a wide range of risks that would need addressing 
or resolving.  We worked through these and developed strategies to counter them.  For 
example, the real danger of ‘brain drain’.  If village crew were trained to commercial 
maritime standards, then there was strong likelihood they would be quickly lost to the wider 
industry, within Fiji or internationally.  Three counters were suggested.  Firstly, married men 
and women with young families more likely to remain in the village could be targeted.  
Secondly, the costs of training could be bonded with the candidates required to serve their 
bond time on the village vessel.  Thirdly, more crew than were needed just for village use 
could be trained and a rate of attrition accepted.   
However, the research also identified a number of ‘game-breakers’, issues which required 
resolution before a trial could proceed further with a realistic chance of success.  These can 
be divided into two groups: institutional barriers and political challenges. 
On the institutional side, the most critical difficulty was insurance.  Marine insurance in Fiji 
and throughout the Pacific is difficult to arrange and expensive.  For an inexperienced 
village-level operation with no track record it would be almost impossible without external 
guarantors and even then probably prohibitive due to cost.  Without such cover, the venture 
becomes extremely high risk, with all eggs literally in one vessel and any accident prone to 
losing the entire asset.  External financing for an uninsured vessel becomes nigh impossible 
and to ask the village to risk what would be their most expensive asset on such terms 
unthinkable.  While other matters, for example meeting surveying, licensing, and 
qualifications barriers, could all be planned for, the insurance issue appeared insurmountable. 
Regardless of the institutional barriers, the tension between commercial and vakavanua 
imperatives also loomed large.  The qase were adamant that the village in the name of the 
chief would own the vessel.  Others, although not able to say so outright, were convinced this 
would lead eventually to a similar fate to the old launch.  The business plan developed by the 
working party and subsequently adopted by the bosenikoro, set out a structure that clearly 
separates ownership and management functions and the profit distribution formula includes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47  See the Okeanos case study in Section 5.1.  
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community and vanua.  Although discussed, debated, and finally agreed by the koro, the 
business plan remains a paper agreement, an external intervention.  It is unlikely today (and 
possibly for the foreseeable future) to have the same weight as decisions made orally and in 
accordance with vakavanua at the tanoa.  Like marine survey regulations for fibres, it is 
likely to be viewed at best as no more than a guideline.  That a new vessel would be more 
strictly controlled commercially than the old one once it started earning income is not a given, 
regardless of the level of preparation and safeguards. 
The issue appeared in other more subtle ways.  The venture would depend entirely on the 
support and custom from local communities.  But all communities in Kadavu operate on kin 
and cultural relationship linkages underpinned by reciprocity.  If, for example, one youth was 
trained as captain, the pressure on them to accept the kerekere of family and friends to travel 
free or at reduced cost would be extreme.  If they could not respond with free passage they 
would be expected to subsidise the same though their earnings.  To not do so would put 
unrealistic pressure on them within the social and culture context they were trying to operate 
commercially in.  There was no easy or obvious answer to this issue, being deep-seated and 
difficult to discuss directly within the community.  The problem is a historic one: Couper 
(1973, 2009) pointed out that in the past commercial vessel-owning chiefs had regularly 
resorted to hiring captains without local connections or kailoma to run the vessels, accepting 
the subsequent loss of a substantial portion of profit to avoid internal conflict. 
Claiming that accommodating such cultural imperatives is a historical and handicapping 
legacy in a modern age is to ignore the strengths of such cultural resilience.  Such matters are 
central to the development debate in Fiji and Oceania.  I deduced, as with the institutional 
barrier of insurance, that it was unrealistic to expect one small village to be a guinea pig 
without much greater external support and a much broader and deeper research base.  
As discussed further in Section 5.4 we began next to explore the issues from other 
perspectives, widening the lens to consider a managed fleet of vessels operating in a number 
of localities where communities (or members of communities) such as Solodamu could 
participate under some form of lease-to-buy or franchise scheme.  The serendipitous arrival of 
partners such as Greenheart and B9 Shipping (see Section 4.3.3) allowed us to increase the 
scope of technology and research options for consideration.  A sustainable sea-transport 
option for Solodamu is still on the radar screen, although whether the village collective is the 
best provider for that is still a matter of on-going debate.   
	  	   	   	  
103	  
Regardless at what level the inquiry proceeded, it was increasingly obvious that a far greater 
understanding of both the wider Fijian transport scenario and the context in which it operates 
regionally was required.  It was essential the lessons from the wider context and from 
previous experiences were garnered.   
4.2. Pacific Shipping Profile: A Regional Context 
A modern fleet of ships does not so much make use of the sea as exploit a highway. 
Joseph Conrad 
The previous section examined sea-transport use and issues at the micro-level through the 
lens of Solodamu.  This section provides a profile of current Pacific shipping issues facing 
SIS48.  To provide context it is prefaced with a summary of key Oceanic development issues 
relevant to sea-transport (size, population, economy, development issues, energy dependency, 
etc).  Of the multitude of issues facing SIS sea-transport is a common thread and linkage in 
most, although seldom identified or prioritised as such.  The second part of the section gives 
current information on the region’s shipping with an emphasis where possible on Fijian case 
studies.  Finally a summary of Fiji’s commercial shipping history is provided and emphasis is 
placed on searching out relevant lessons learnt to apply to the core research focus.  
Sea-transport is arguably a higher priority need for this region than any other.  Expensive air 
links aside, and these are not universally available (e.g. Tokelau) and not capable of carrying 
sufficient loads economically in any case, sea-transport is essential to maintaining 
connectivity.  Sea-transport is a constant and increasing burden which can only be forecast to 
increase in light of future challenges facing Oceania.  The region’s contribution to the 
industrially-created phenomena of climate change has been miniscule to the point of 
irrelevance and yet Oceania will be one of the first and most heavily affected.  As 80% of the 
region’s population is coastally situated, provision of sustainable and affordable sea-transport 
technology, by default, needs to be an essential cornerstone to all adaptation strategies for 
ensuring and empowering resilient future communities.  To date, this issue has been ignored. 
Across Oceania, sea-transport is essential at all levels of society from fishing and local 
transport needs of small isolated islands and villages to inter-regional shipping needs of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48  Politically the island groupings in the Pacific are described variously as SIS, SIDS, PICs, and PICTs.  There 
are important differences, I have not standardised but quoted the descriptive as used in the source material. 
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nation states.  Currently all options are fossil-fuel powered and increasingly unsustainable.  
The literature is thin and, historical analysis aside (Couper, 1968, 1973, 2009; Bayliss-Smith, 
1988; D’Arcy, 2006, 2008), restricted largely to a few development agency reports.  All 
concur that it is the intra-country domestic services that are in most dire need (AusAID, 2008; 
SPC, 2011; UNESCAP, 2010).  Generally such shipping services are restricted to an aging49 
and inefficient fleet.  The marginal returns, especially for domestic services, means most 
operators are trapped in a cycle of replacing old ships with old ships or waiting for donated 
(and sometimes inappropriate) vessels.  Governments are required to subsidise or otherwise 
provide for the most uneconomic routes, with ever increasing costs.  The region’s transport 
issues are unique; tiny economies scattered at the ends of some of the longest transportation 
routes in the world and arguably the most challenging network to maintain per capita and per 
sea mile with the resource base available to support it.  
4.2.1. Oceania: an Overview 
It is necessary to understand the unique nature of the region in which transport operates to 
fully appreciate the role of the industry and the nature of the challenge.  The Pacific Ocean is 
the greatest natural feature on the surface of our planet.  Covering one-third of the earth’s 
surface it is one of nature’s greatest active carbon sinks (UNESCAP, 2010:9).  Eastern 
Oceania was the last region on Earth to be explored and colonised by people, starting from 
Asia around 6,000 years BP and ending with Polynesian ancestors reaching Hawai`i, 
Aotearoa, and Rapanui during the past millennium or so (e.g., Howe et al, 2006; Irwin, 2006).   
The ocean is the dominant feature of the region.  Land area is less than 2% of the total; less 
than 0.4% if PNG is omitted.  PICs maintain resource access rights and management 
responsibilities over an ocean area of 28 million square kilometres, equivalent to the 
combined land areas of China, Canada, and USA.  There are at least 11 square kilometres of 
ocean for every coastal Pacific Islander (Anderson, 2003:2).  PICs form one of the most 
remote regions in the world (AusAID, 2008:1). 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 The average vessel age of all vessels registered in, and owned by nationals of the SIS was 18.3 yr in 1995 - 
Anderson, et al (2003:2-5). 
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Figure 9 Map of the Pacific Region  
Source: Anderson et al (2003) 
The Pacific, a region of Small Island Developing States (SIDS):  The Pacific is a diverse 
region made up of countries and territories with varying land size and type, population, 
natural resource base, economy, and cultures.  The region contains 15 SIDS: the Cook 
Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New 
Guinea (PNG), the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.  This grouping also usually includes Timor Leste.  All are members of 
the Alliance of Small Island Developing States and, except for Timor Leste, the Pacific 
Islands Forum50.  Some of them are amongst the poorest and weakest segment of the 
international community, with Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor Leste, Tuvalu, and 
Vanuatu currently classified as Least Developed Countries.  The main economic sectors in 
the region are tourism, fisheries, forestry, and agriculture (UNESCAP, 2010:4).  PICs are 
characterised by extremes in physical geography and remoteness.  There is a high degree of 
economic and cultural dependence on the natural environment.  SIDS suffer from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50  Fiji is currently suspended from the Forum.  Additional to the above mentioned states are the French and US 
territories: French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, American Samoa, etc.  
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diseconomies of scale in production and exchange of goods and services, remoteness from 
export markets and a high vulnerability to natural disasters and climate change.  
Population:  The population of island Oceania is numerically minute in the global scale, with 
a total population of 8.7 million people.  PNG has the largest population with 6.5 million 
(74% of the region’s population).  Just over half the countries have populations of less than 
100,000, and of them, several have less than 10,000 residents with Niue being the smallest 
with 1,625 inhabitants (UNESCAP, 2010:9). 
Economy:  The combined value of the Pacific SIDS GDP is around US$15 billion.  PNG has 
the largest with a GDP of US$8.2 billion in 2009, more than twice the size of the second 
largest economy, Fiji (US$3.5 billion GDP in 2009).  PNG and Fiji account for 80% of the 
region’s GDP, the remaining Pacific SIDS, particularly the Polynesian and Micronesian 
countries, having very small economies ranging from Samoa with GDP of US$523 million to 
the smallest Tuvalu, US$15 million, in 2009 (Tuisolia, 2010 quoted in UNESCAP, 2010:7).  
Gibson and Nero (2007:1) caution on the underlying assumptions for calculating such 
economic performance, referencing the growing literature in this area and noting that 
“external assessments generally miss or undercount food production and its related generation 
of cash standard statistical account assessments focused upon the market economy concur 
that Pacific economies perform poorly.  For example, Sampson (2005) finds that after 
controlling for OECD membership and whether a country is an oil exporter, the Pacific states 
grew more slowly than countries in any other region of the world over 1995-2003”. 
AusAID (2008:3) concluded that the Pacific region will not come close to achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015: “many are unlikely to achieve the targets 
of universal primary education, reducing child mortality by two-thirds and halving the 
proportion of people with access to water and sanitation”.  The MDG framework has been 
criticised, in spite of its adoption at government and civil society levels across the region, for 
not recognising “key underlying determinants of well-being such as family and societal 
cohesion” and “neglecting the importance of economic development and the private sector” 
(Coates, 2009:29).  Coates and others have highlighted the exclusion of the contribution of 
women and the failure to account for subsistence production of primary goods.  
Poverty is reported as increasing.  More than 80% of the region’s population lives in the four 
poorest countries: Kiribati, PNG, Solomon Islands, and Timor Leste.  Data on poverty in the 
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Pacific is limited, but alarming.  For example, data from three National Income and 
Expenditure Surveys in Fiji shows that poverty has risen steadily since independence from 
11.4% in 1977 to 25.4% in 1990, and then 34.4% in 2002.  Recent data shows rates of 
underemployment of 22% for males and 35% for females.  These numbers increase to 26% 
and 45% respectively for men and women in rural areas; and to 45% and 67% for young men 
and women under the age of 20 (AusAID, 2008:3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10  Gross National Income per capita, Population Distribution, and EEZs 
Source: Gibson and Nero, 2007:11. Shows Gross National Income per capita (US$), 
Population Distribution and EEZ boundaries.  EEZ geographic data: SOPAC; Population 
data: SPC; Economic data: ADB) 
Development agencies consider that growth is critical if the Pacific is to combat these.  
AusAID, (2008:4) states that growth alone will not solve the region’s challenges, but without 
faster growth the Pacific will be unable to halt rising poverty and achieve the MDGs.  The 
Pacific Economic Survey (2008) documents that faster growth is possible, and is starting to 
be seen in some countries.  The absolute centrality of transport to this debate is obvious.  
“Safe, secure, reliable, and affordable domestic transport services are vital for rural 
development, access to health and education services, trade, population movement, tourism 
and national economic development” (SPC, 2011:4). 
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Gibson and Nero (2007:11) draw attention to geography “as a fundamental growth constraint 
that Pacific Island countries have little control over” adding “economic growth rates may 
depend on the growth rates of nearby countries.  This spatial autocorrelation can arise 
because nearby countries have unobserved factors in common (e.g. climate, topography, 
institutions) and because of interaction between one country and another (e.g. through 
common customs borders, cross-border flows of goods and labour, and shared use of key 
assets) so that growth depends on the growth rate of neighbouring countries”.   
Remoteness is not the only issue faced.  Populations and land area are much smaller than for 
other states and limited domestic markets may reduce their income (Redding and Venables, 
2004).  They are also less open to international trade, due either to protectionist policy 
choices or to their greater remoteness causing transport costs to be a larger source of ‘natural 
protection’ (Gibson and Nero, 2007). 
Climate change and natural disasters:  At a global level Oceanic voices are almost 
unheard, drowned out by a cacophony of larger states, superpowers, and alliances whose 
consumption-based development and security interests easily outweigh any Pacific voice.  
The failure to gain international consensus on solutions at Copenhagen, Mexico and Rio +20 
reinforce the futility of these margins awaiting global response at any serious level.  
Unfortunately, the same Oceanic states, along with indigenous communities at the poles, will 
be in the front-line of the increasing threat posed by climate change not of the Pacific’s 
design or making (Barcham, 2009; Merson, 2010).  
Climate change is the biggest challenge to the Pacific.51  The most recent assessment by the 
IPCC (2007) highlighted the special vulnerability of SIS.  Climate variations and extremes 
have regularly disrupted food production, water supply, and the economies of Pacific 
countries.  Projections for the future, although coarse for islands, are bleak.  The primary food 
sources (agriculture, fisheries, and forests) and water will all be impacted and, in most cases, 
these impacts will be negative (UNESCAP, 2010:10).  Pacific SIDS rank among the most 
vulnerable in the world to natural disasters.  Between 1950 and 2004, extreme natural 
disasters, such as cyclones, droughts and tsunamis, accounted for 65% of the total economic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51  The UNESCAP Port Vila Outcome Statement (9 February 2010) recommendations from the Ministers and 
officials commences with: (a) Climate change remains the greatest challenge as current and predicted 
impacts serve to undermine progress towards development and, for some of the Pacific SIDS, threaten their 
very existence.   
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impact from disasters on the region’s economies.  Ten of the fifteen most extreme events 
reported over the past 50 years have occurred in the last fifteen years (UNESCAP, 2010:10). 
SPC (2011:23), while considering that the international maritime industry is firmly 
committed to playing its part in reducing emissions GHG52, notes that this requires huge 
capital investment, which may not be feasible for PICs due to low volumes of ships and 
cargo.  Even if new technology can be introduced globally, it is unlikely this will be available 
to Pacific operators at an affordable price for many years, if not decades, as second (third, 
fourth and fifth) hand vessels become available. 
Vulnerability and isolation:  Perceptions relating to signifiers such as ‘isolation’, 
‘vulnerability’, ‘small’, are discussed elsewhere, in particular in Section 2.1, and the corollary 
of adopting Helu, Hau’ofa and Diaz’s epistemologies of seeing oceans as central, stable and 
adaptable, a breeding grounds of resilience, strength, observation and patience where depth of 
culture provides a counter to Western phobias such as ‘small man’s syndrome’.  In terms of 
modern sea-transport need and demand, however, it is difficult to look past the enormous 
obstacles posed by long distances, tiny populations, and minimal resources.  The latter 
paradigm is still prevalent within most official development literature as the sources quoted 
below testify. 
ADB (2007) considers that, despite their differences, Pacific SIDS have one thing in 
common: their vulnerability.  The sentiment is echoed by others.  “Events during the last 
decade have demonstrated that vulnerabilities remain high and efforts to build resilience have 
been insufficient” (UNESCAP, 2010:10)53.   
Remoteness has significant economic, environmental, and social impacts.  Large distances, 
high fuel costs and low economies of scale makes the cost of developing and maintaining 
infrastructure, such as transport, relatively high.  Small populations tend toward a narrow 
range of resources and skills, limiting institutional capacity.  Narrow markets for local 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 This statement should be read in context of the following chapter’s overview of the current global 
perspective on shipping. 
53 ADB fails to recognise a huge number of other commonalties – such as cultural strength.  Coates (2009:30) 
wryly notes that much of the external academic research (he singles out Hughes, 2003 as a prime example) 
has focused on the Pacific’s perceived failings and ignored its uniqueness and strengths preferenced by 
Pacific academics. 
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products and dependence on international trade creates vulnerability to global developments 
as well as fewer employment and livelihood options.  Trade in remote locations is limited by 
high freight costs leading to increasing urbanisation (UNESCAP, 2010:11).  
SPC concurs with ADB in regard to vulnerability, noting that for shipping it adds to “costs 
through high insurance premiums faced by transport operators and increased regulatory costs 
that impact the industry more generally.  All of these (combined with sparse services along 
routes with low volumes, long distances, slower adoption of new technology, limited 
resources and general inefficiency) distort the market, impacting negatively on SIS 
economies.  Low volumes of imported cargo and very little outbound export cargo result in 
high freight rates and irregular services.  These are compounded by the high fuel costs, high 
port costs (generated by large infrastructure development and maintenance costs) and 
inadequate port facilities” (SPC, 2011:6-7).  
Gibson and Nero (2007:10) prefer the label of remoteness to isolation which they have 
assessed “in relationship to proximity to neighbouring countries, weighted by the neighbour’s 
GDP … Out of 219 countries in the world with available data, the Pacific Islands as a group 
are the most remote”.  Gibson and Nero (2007:15) also consider that if the Pacific is the most 
remote in terms of ‘geographical distance’, then ‘economic distance’ is even greater and they 
use airfares to examine this.  Again, PICs appear more remote than island countries in other 
parts of the world.  “While the PICs are, on average, 40% further from the locations of world 
GDP than the island states in the Caribbean, they are much further away in terms of airfare-
based measures of distance”. 
Fossil fuel dependence:  PICs are precariously dependent on imported fossil-fuels, which 
account for 8-37% of total imports raising critical issues of fuel price and security of supply 
(Woodruff, 2007a).  The Pacific is the most dependent region in the world on imported fuels 
at 95% dependency (99% if PNG and Fiji are excluded).  By comparison, the next most 
dependent region is the Caribbean (82%).  Imported petroleum products account for an 
average of 40% of PICs’ GDP.  Fuel imports average 14-20% of foreign exchange earnings 
(AusAID, 2008), for Fiji they totalled US$340 million in 2005 (Woodruff, 2007b) rising to 
FJ$1.2 billion in 2008 (Fiji Sun, 6/8/2011).  In 2010 Fiji spent 32% of the value of all its 
imports on petroleum products (Fiji Times, 20/9/12).  Such reliance represents a major drain 
on economies, a barrier to development, and a source of vulnerability (Jafar, 2000) and has 
seen PICs suffer the full impact of the recent global fuel crisis (AusAID, 2008).  Fossil fuel 
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dependency is recognised as having a crippling effect on national budgets and revenues and 
impacts on key productive sectors in the region such as fisheries, agriculture, and tourism 
(UNESCAP, 2010).  In 2011 this situation led the Fiji government to call for a $100 million 
cut in the national fuel import bill over the next 3 years (Fiji Sun, 6/8/11).  The Fiji Transport 
Department presented to the SSTT 2012 on its impressive remote island based bio-fuel 
programme as a major component of achieving this goal. 
As development continues the demand for fossil fuels increases, especially for transportation 
and electricity production.  Given the distance between markets and metropolitan centres, and 
the dispersed multi-island characteristic of many PICs, transportation remains central to 
development.  Fuel costs for transport to remote islands are especially high, contributing to 
price inflation of domestic goods and services, including food, even where government 
subsidies apply. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 Oil Imports as % of Merchandise Exports  
Source: ADB (2007) in AusAID (2008) 
AusAID (2008:15) found that small Micronesian and Polynesian economies, with their very 
limited export bases and reliance on aid, remittances, and tourism, have been most affected 
by high fuel prices.  There has been a rapid rise in oil imports relative to exports and a 
negative impact on incomes.  While there is nothing PICs can do about the global price of oil, 
they consider there is much governments can do to offset recent price increases. 
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Figure 12 Energy Sector End Use  
Source: Adapted from Mayhew (2011a).  Data from Pacific Regional Energy Assessments, 
World Bank and ADB (2002) 
4.2.2. Pacific Commercial Transport Issues 
Shipping is the Pacific’s lifeline.  It plays a critical role at all domestic and international 
levels.  Given that the vast bulk of commodities and manufactured goods are transported by 
ship in the Pacific, and that much domestic travel is by sea, the cost and quality of shipping 
immediately affects the welfare of the poor as consumers and producers (AusAID, 2008).   
The provision of safe and secure regional transport services is affected by numerous 
geographical, socio-economic, and technical factors including population mobility, 
susceptibility to natural disasters and other effects of climate change, national policies and 
regulations, and international instruments.  Additional factors include appropriate vessel/craft 
operation and maintenance, route profitability, existing petroleum supply (quantity and 
quality), level of infrastructure, technical capacity, proximity of maintenance facilities, as 
well as mandatory safety and security auditing services (SPC, 2011:3).  
The marginal nature of the industry has always meant that financing shipping investment, 
either for governments or private operators is difficult.  The current global economic 
environment has only exacerbated this with industry advisors pointing to the finance market 
becoming increasingly cautious of such investments.  “Given the underlying economics of 
oversupply and the current day [freight] rates, the banks are more cautious.  If they are going 
to put money into a project, it is on very particular terms” (Fiji Sun, 28/9/2011). 
Politically, transport is a priority area for Pacific Forum Leaders under the Pacific Plan and its 
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importance as a facilitator of economic growth is recognised as are the gaps and barriers.  
“Continued focus through regional and sub-regional approaches to improve shipping and 
aviation services, aviation liberalisation, safety and security as well as the supporting 
infrastructure remains essential for all Pacific SIDS” (UNESCAP, 2010:59).   
In 2004 Forum Leaders endorsed the Forum Principles on Regional Transport Services 
(FPRTS) in recognition that the provision and maintenance of regular, reliable, and 
competitive air and shipping services is crucial to Pacific SIDS.  It recognised changes in the 
transport sector, e.g. increasingly competitive markets and new international safety and 
security requirements as well as the limited technical support in-country for most PICs.  The 
FPRTS contains six principles promoting good governance, transparency, and accountability, 
and aims to serve as a guideline to Pacific SIDS in their pursuit for greater service delivery to 
improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of both air and shipping services 
(UNESCAP, 2010:59). 
At their ministerial meeting in Nuku’alofa, Tonga (May 2009) Pacific Ministers of Transport 
further recognised that internationally compliant transport services are imperative for 
economic growth and human development (SPC, 2011:1) and instructed SPC to produce the 
resultant Framework for Action on Transport Services 2011-2020.  Although the political 
leadership being shown in marine transport regionally, on paper at least, is commendable, 
especially in light of the resources available for implementation, it still has some way to go.  
The 2010 UNESCAP report highlighted the regional commitment to developing a Green 
Growth Strategy for sustainable production and consumption and the sub-­‐‑regional project on 
environmentally sustainable transportation in the Pacific Islands for land transportation 
(UNESCAP, 2010:61).  However, green technologies for marine transport have not thus far 
been included and are not mentioned in SPC’s FATS or their 2011 Framework for Action on 
Energy Security in the Pacific. 
International Shipping 
The literature on current Pacific shipping is sparse and again limited to development agency 
reports.  The following is a synopsis primarily taken from AusAID (2008) and gives a recent 
picture of shipping trends in the Pacific.  It should be noted that the AusAID report was 
produced before the current global economic recession began to bite.  Other sources are 
referenced accordingly. 
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Unlike telecommunications and aviation, the international shipping market in the Pacific has 
always been competitive or at least contestable.  There are four main routes: east–west and 
north–south, where ships sometimes stop at PICs; to and from Australia and New Zealand; 
and intra-Pacific.  Entry is not generally regulated by inter-governmental agreements and the 
fixed costs of entry are relatively modest.  The sector is predominantly the province of the 
private sector (the significant exception is the Pacific Forum Line54) and there is competition, 
or at least contestability, on many routes.  
International sea freight prices are high due to low cargo volumes and the long distances 
travelled.  Many PICs import more goods than they export, which means importers pay for 
the empty space on ships going out through higher freight rates.  Shipping lines usually add a 
surcharge for delays and extra supervision, which can be one-third of the freight rate.   
Shipping services at this level are considered to be of a reasonable standard.  The Regional 
Transport Study (AusAID, 2004) found that in general terms international services in the 
region are considered to be adequate; container shipping services to and from PICs are 
reliable, vessels adhere to published schedules and offer sufficient space for the needs of 
importers and exporters. 
Actions to implement the FPRTS have seen institutional and regulatory reforms throughout 
the region, albeit at varying stages, and have seen significant success in two areas: 
strengthened ports and administration standards and improved shipping services to the 
region’s SIDS.  SPC (2011) confirms that maritime services, safety, security, and 
international standards in shipping are gradually improving and highlights Kiribati Shipping 
Services Ltd commencing a regular feeder service from Suva to Nauru and Tuvalu with 
potential for expanding this service to include Wallis and Futuna.  The success of this 
initiative has not gone unnoticed at higher political levels with PIC Maritime Ministers at 
their third meeting in Tonga directing work to assess the possibilities of commencing similar 
services between Samoa, Tokelau, Cook Islands, Niue, and American Samoa. 
The Pacific’s network of twelve maritime training institutions is a successful, regionally-led, 
vocational training system.  The network has enabled international seafaring to become an 
important source of employment and income for the region.  In 2003, an estimated 4000 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 PFL has generally been held up as a regional success story.  However, at time of writing, it has just been 
announced PFL is no longer viable and has been sold to the Samoan government.  
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Pacific Island seafarers engaged in international shipping remitted approximately US$19 
million in foreign exchange to their countries (AusAID, 2008:78). 
SPC is currently spearheading regional consideration of increasing inter-state transhipments 
within Oceania.  While this is highly dependent on development of more appropriate 
mechanisms for regional trade, including complex political issues of tariffs, etc, the logistics 
of such trade are essential.  SPC compared costs for shipments from Fiji to Nauru and other 
SIS finding that the current arrangements which require transhipping through Australia add 
an increased cost to consumers of US$50 per ton than if it had been shipped direct.  SPC also 
found that Fiji makes the logical intra-regional hub, partly because of its geographical 
position, partly because of its existing shipping infrastructure and services and partly because 
of the increasing range of product Fiji now supplies to its neighbours (SPC, 2009:11-12). 
Domestic Shipping 
Given that international shipping is already competitive, the policy priorities in shipping lie 
on the domestic front; in improving domestic shipping and strengthening ports (AusAID, 
2008:71).  Inbound freight is typically shipped to trans-shipment centres and then distributed 
using smaller domestic vessels.  There are an estimated 2,100 domestic ships providing 
services at various levels in PICs (SPC, 2011:19).  As will be seen in Section 4.3, it is this 
level of shipping globally that is the greatest contributor to GHG emission per ton of vessel 
with initial analysis indicating vessels of less than 10,000dwt contribute approximately one-
quarter of all shipping emissions. 
Remote communities in the Pacific, particularly in rural areas and outer islands, often live 
without basic or regular services.  Informal services provided by small craft are often the only 
transport between remote coastal villages and towns.  Regular links to the main island or 
capital city by air or sea, although a lifeline, are time-consuming, expensive, unreliable and/or 
uncertain.  So too is the ability to communicate easily with other parts of the region and 
beyond.  Most islanders use shipping services for their personal transportation needs.  The 
price of airline services makes it an extremely expensive option where it is available.  
Providing adequate, efficient, and reliable domestic shipping services is one of the most 
difficult challenges for PICs.  Many routes are commercially marginal and a significant 
proportion simply unviable.  The ships used are sometimes unsuitable and often old, badly 
maintained, and in poor condition (ADB, 2007).  Many vessels used for domestic shipping do 
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not meet recognised safety standards, and arguably should be banned from service.  However, 
they provide essential services to remote communities, so this step is rarely taken (AusAID, 
2008:71).  Shipping disasters directly attributable to substandard ships are regular events, the 
Princess Ashika in Tonga with loss of 74 lives in 2009 and the Rabual Queen in PNG in 2012 
(more than 200 lives lost) are only two examples.  Small-scale coastal shipping operators 
have problems accessing finance for repair and replacement.  Commercial banks do not find 
coastal shipping attractive for lending because of the high risk and lack of adequate collateral 
for loans.  A study of domestic shipping in Solomon Islands noted that “under the present 
circumstances the shipping sector is locked into a situation where old vessels are replaced by 
other old vessels and there are no prospects of reducing the high average age of the fleet” 
(EC, 1999 quoted in AusAID, 2008:71). 
Coastal and inter-island shipping services are generally operated by governments or small, 
independent shipping companies.  Delivering such shipping through a government operation 
is fraught with peril; most schemes have proved immensely costly and incapable of delivering 
adequate levels of service (Bayliss-Smith, 1988; Couper, 2009).  In many cases services of 
the quality expected by remote islanders are not commercially viable.  Nevertheless, delivery 
of these services is a political, social, and economic imperative.  Service schedules are 
frequently poorly maintained, and it is not uncommon for services to be suspended for many 
months (SPC, 2011:21). 
ADB’s Pacific transport approach was profiled in Section 2.2 and it typifies the agency 
response to these complexities of Pacific domestic shipping when it repeatedly recommends 
increased privatisation of shipping services as the (ADB 2007, 2010a). But even if 
competition is maximised, and private-sector participation encouraged, some important routes 
governments want to see serviced will only be operational if they receive government 
support.  Good design and implementation of such assistance may make the difference 
between success and failure.  In the Marshall Islands, private operators focus on services to 
nearby islands, while the government runs a service to remote communities.  Faced with 
increasing costs, the government introduced a franchise scheme for services to some remote 
islands, but it has struggled to secure private-sector interest.  In Fiji, domestic shipping 
services operate on a commercial basis.  The main Viti Levu and Vanua Levu routes are 
subject to competition, including from aviation.  Many smaller outer islands depend entirely 
on shipping but do not generate sufficient revenue to support commercially viable operations.   
	  	   	   	  
117	  
Fiji’s Shipping Franchise Scheme started in 1997, and is now overseen by the Fiji Shipping 
Corporation Ltd., which reports to the Minister for Transport.  The corporation does not itself 
own or operate ships, but competitively auctions subsidies to private-sector operators (routes 
are allocated for three years through a tender process which considers vessel safety and cost).  
Successful bidders receive a subsidy worth about 40% of the assessed operational cost of 
each route and keep all collected revenue.  The subsidy is not provided to reduce the cost of 
fares and freight, but to make uneconomical routes commercially viable and ensure regular 
services.  As a result, monthly shipping services are provided to remote locations and 
passenger numbers were reported to have increased by more than 60% and cargo volumes by 
80% since 2005 (ADB, 2007).  While there have been concerns over the operation of the 
scheme, it has been recommended as the type of approach other PICs could consider as a 
framework for shipping subsidies (AusAID, 2008:72)   
While the franchise scheme may have initially had some success, it is now unable to keep 
pace with current stresses.  The Fiji Sun (9/7/2011) reported that local shipping companies 
were unable to provide services without increases in subsidies given the increasing fuel prices 
affecting their operations.  The figures quoted were that the Government provides a 42% 
subsidy, worth FJ$1.5 million aimed to encourage private shipping operators to service 11 
uneconomical routes under the scheme55.  One private operator with a fleet of two small 
coastal ferries reported an annual fuel bill of some FJ$3 million with a 30% increase in 2011 
and fuel now making up over 70% of operating costs.  Reducing passage speeds from 17 to 
12 knots and slower, is the only available fuel saving measure short of cutting routes entirely.  
In 2012 the Fiji Commerce Commission announced a review of the Franchise scheme and has 
called for public submissions.  Working with FIVS and their network I drafted and submitted 
to this process on the basis of the research used for this thesis.  
I return to the potential that alternative energy shipping offers in Section 5.4.  The remainder 
of this section summarises Fiji’s shipping history to preface that analysis.  Again, the 
literature is thin with the previously cited (Bayliss-Smith et al, Couper, D’Arcy and Sofer) 
providing the bulk of the commentary.  The principal reason for providing this summary is to 
underscore that although some threats may be new and dominant (fuel price and dependency, 
climate change, etc) many of the issues facing the sector are consistent historically. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55  At the SSTT 2012, Fiji’s Ministry of Works, Transport and Public Utilities reported there were 9 routes under 
the Franchise scheme (Tavai, 2012). 
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4.2.3. Sailing Heritage and Changes in Sea-transport: a Short History 
This section gives an overview of Oceanic shipping history, narrowing to a Fijian focus.  Past 
ancestors of today’s Pacific Islanders found, explored, and colonised all known islands in the 
world's largest ocean, arguably the greatest technological, intellectual property right of 
Oceanic peoples.  By exploiting learned knowledge of navigation, ship design/construction 
and particularly the ability to sail to windward on an apparent wind they made this ocean their 
home.   
Despite some initial academic debate in the latter half of the 20th century (Sharpe, 1956) it is 
now generally held that such voyaging was widespread, diverse in use of technological 
adaption, and deliberate.  Finney (1994, 2003), Irwin (1992), Howe et al (2006), D’Arcy 
(2006), Couper (2009) and many others have extensively documented this amazing legacy, 
made on a variety of vessels, employing a wide range of approaches to vessel design, 
construction, and operation.  Such technology was highly developed, diverse, and readily 
available.  It was totally indigenously designed, constructed, owned, operated, and regulated.  
The Pacific was an ocean of sails, sustainable transport technology built out of renewable 
resources and exploiting advanced knowledge of physics and aero/hydro-dynamics to use 
wind energy as primary motive power.  Not only were large vessels used for ocean 
exploration and naval domination across vast distances, but sailing and sail technology were 
integral parts of daily life (spiritual, social, political, and economic), essential for all levels of 
social interaction, transport, warfare, trade, and fishing.  The sheer volume of vessels needs to 
be appreciated, with early European reporters encountering fleets of hundreds of vessels 
carrying thousands of people.  The seas were bridges.  The sheer volume of movement attests 
to Islanders willingness and ability to travel (D’Arcy, 2006:64; Hau’ofa, 1994:54). 
Couper (1973:229) notes that when western colonialists first came to this ocean “the sea-
transport systems of the European nations were only beginning to draw significantly ahead of 
those of many of the societies that they were about to overwhelm … There was a complex 
spatial component in the economies of the pre-colonial Pacific, demanding considerable 
planning, extensive geographical knowledge and a relatively high degree of technological 
skill”.  
The fleets of great Lauan built drua or waqa tabu found throughout central Oceania were the 
most technologically advanced of these bluewater ships, some over 100’ long, carrying 
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complements of more than 200, capable of speeds more than 15 knots and of sailing within 
four points of the wind.  John Twyning of the whaling brig Minerva, which was wrecked in 
Fiji in 1829, describes the process of building a large ship at Lakeba in the Lau Islands, where 
he and others were given refuge.  He concluded that the design and the building of the ship 
would have received “the admiration of even the most skilful and scientific naval architect in 
Europe” (quoted in Couper, 2009:28).  The Fijian drua and related craft and culture are the 
subject of Chapter 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  14  Drua 
Source: Detail of Herb Kane (1974) illustration in Discoverers of the Pacific, National 
Geographic Magazine 
Sophisticated internal transport and trading systems were well-embedded prior to European 
contact in Fiji.  Commander Erskine (1853:269) on patrol on the warship Havannah in 1849 
reported, “Feejeeans have a decided turn for commerce, a constant internal trade being 
carried on in their own canoes, which we constantly saw either arriving or sailing, heavily 
laden with bales of cloth, rolls of cordage, and quantities of earthen pots”.  Thompson (1940), 
Sahlins (1962), Tippet (1968), Lessin and Lessin (1970),	   Hage and Harary (1996) have 
characterised these trading and political networks in detail, with Hocart (1952), Kappler 
(1978), Couper (1967, 1968a, 2009), D’Arcy (2006, 2008) and others providing wider sub-
regional and regional context.  The first Europeans found established complex networks of 
trade linking the archipelagos of Fiji, Tonga, and Samoa.  Within these island groups were 
complex local trading chains that operated through intermediate villages and even through 
professional middlemen (Couper, 1973:230-232).  Hau’ofa concurs: “Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, 
Niue, Rotuma, Tokelau, Tuvalu, Futuna, and Uvea formed a large exchange community in 
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which wealth and people with their skills and arts circulated endlessly” (1994:54).	  	  	  
European technology and commerce did not immediately displace local trade in Fiji as it did 
in other parts of the Pacific.  “The penetration of capitalist relations of production into Fijian 
community life was carefully regulated by chiefs ... The system of inter-island economic 
interdependence which evolved in southern Lau to support the ship-building industry goes far 
to explain the lack of interest by the paramount chiefs, especially the Tui Nayau based in 
Lakeba, in trade with Europeans.  Many of the desired trade items were obtained from 
Tongans and other Fijians who wanted the drua” (Bayliss-Smith et al, 1988:57). 
Despite this strong self-sufficient heritage, by the early 20th century indigenous ownership 
and control over all but very small-scale domestic shipping was to disappear in Fiji as it 
already had in much of the Pacific.  As Couper argued as early as 1973 (p.229), “the 
attributes of island culture should have been a basis for successful participation in the 
maritime trade which arose from the introduced commercial economy.  But this happened 
only partially and with a record of failures that far outran the successes.  Islanders who were 
demonstrably able to marshal and distribute resources over large areas in the indigenous 
economy have often failed in their efforts to participate in modern trading systems”56.   
There is limited published historical analysis of commercial sea-transport in the Pacific 
generally.  “The community of world history scholars largely ignores trans-Pacific trade prior 
to the twentieth century … It turns out that trade history is intimately intertwined with 
epidemiological, ecological, demographic, and cultural histories.  None can be properly 
understood without consideration of the others” (O’Flynn and Giraldez in D’Arcy et al, 
2008:xiv)	  
Snapshots have been provided on discreet areas or times in Pacific shipping history such as 
Maude’s (1968) assessment of the pork trade between the emergent settlements in Australia 
and Tahiti in the mid 1800’s.  The histories of the major commercial Pacific shipping lines in 
the late 19th century have been documented, particularly the Australian Burns Philp & 
Company, the Union Steam Ship Company of New Zealand, and the American Matson Line 
(Buckley and Klugman, 1981; McLean, 1990; Worden, 1981) as well as studies of the 
steamship era.  More recently, Silk (1990) recorded the Cook Island experiences in the post-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 The examination of the reasons for this is complex and I am indebted to Professor Couper.  Many of the 
same questions he puzzled with then are as relevant now in places like Solodamu. 
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war period.  Couper provides an overview of Fiji commercial domestic shipping issues in a 
series of articles (1967, 1968a, 1968b, 1973), when planning began for the modern era of Ro-
Ro based intra-island transport, as well as important insights of the indigenous solevu trade.  
Bayliss-Smith et al (1988) also contribute important pieces of this jigsaw for eastern Fiji in 
the modern era and Sofer (1985, 2009) provides a short vignette of Kadavu shipping.  D’Arcy 
(2006, 2008) covers the period from 1770-1870 in a wider Oceanic context.  
In Fiji toward the end of the 19th century the waqa ni tikina (vessel of the villages and 
provinces) were controlled by the buli (government official), and numerous small craft were 
increasingly owned and operated by mataqali.  From the 1880’s onward there was a marked 
revival in commercial trade, with schooners and cutters owned by communities in many outer 
islands where chiefs once again became enthusiastic for their own ships.  The introduction of 
steamship services saw many small, unproductive nodes ignored as European companies with 
their expensive vessels sought economies of full loads, concentrating on the shortest distance, 
highest producing areas leaving the more remote islands marginalised (Couper, 2009: 157).   
By European standards this boom in local shipping represented a gross oversupply of vessels 
beyond the needs of most islands.  It appeared a waste of time, resources, and capital and was 
considered by officialdom as a process leading to impoverishment not development (Couper, 
2009:158).  That such rivalry had been a prevailing cultural determinand for at least several 
generations by then was ignored. Bayliss-Smith (1988:65) agrees that in this period in Fiji a 
“major item of expenditure, usually at the level of the community but occasionally an 
individual enterprise, was on sailing boats to service the growing trade in commodities 
between the eastern islands and Levuka.  The potential for control over transport made 
possible by the proliferation of Fijian-owned boats was seldom realised, however, because the 
boats ran at a loss”.  
Couper (1968b:54) considers the sharp decline in Fijian-owned ships commences from 1912 
onwards and advises that European-owned and controlled small, commercial cutters and 
itinerant trading schooners were plentiful and relatively cheap in the period leading up to 
WWII.  Large-scale shipping had been the domain of a small number of trading companies 
across the Pacific since the end of the previous century, notably On Chong & Co, Burns 
Philp, Jaluit Gesellschaft, Henry Marks, Donald & Edenborough and Brown & Joske 
(Couper, 1968a:266). 
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In Fiji, as elsewhere in the Pacific, local participation in shipping was not surrendered 
passively.  Couper and D’Arcy both instance the impoverishment of whole island 
communities through ill-fated attempts to build or purchase vessels for local and international 
trade.  There were various attempts to establish cooperatives to control local trading to the 
exclusion of expatriate commercial interests, including the example of the Viti Company in 
Fiji.  “Not only did [Pacific islanders] have their own indigenous trading systems, which 
continued to endure and to re-distribute the new ‘European’ goods, but they made repeated 
attempts to participate in the commercial trading systems of the Europeans and even to usurp 
entirely role of the alien traders” (Couper, 1968a:263).  
Numerous factors conspired to sink such ventures, including missionary intervention, 
industry duplicity, and blatantly racist colonial administration regulation.  Space limitations 
restrict addressing these factors in detail here (it is arguably a thesis subject in its own right), 
but the conclusions remain relevant for future application of locally-controlled alternatively-
powered vessels.  Firstly, European operators increasingly came to monopolise the import 
and export channels to PICs.  “At this stage the role of entrepreneur becomes institutionalised 
as belonging to aliens … Cash transactions, the complications of book-keeping, the various 
social obligations in island society and commercial, religious and political opposition led to 
the failure of most of these [indigenous] enterprises” (Couper,1968a:272).  
Secondly, the entrenchment of port towns on key islands, which led to more open radical 
networks focussed on the ports, began quickly to replace the closely-woven island networks.  
This alteration in spatial relationships reflected the changes that came about in the economic 
basis of island life (Couper, 1973:233).  The ‘ship’ in this era had changed in nature, from 
artefact and icon to asset and load-bearer and shifted from the realm of indigenity politics to 
western economics (Tippet, 1968). 
Ultimately, local enterprises were defeated from without.  Erosion of seafaring skills and 
reduction in crew employment of Pacific peoples were some of the results of commercial and 
colonial policies.  In this period seafaring became more nationally homogenous to the 
countries of ship owners and elements of racism entered into the relationships of multi-ethnic 
seafarers.  By 1890 Governor Gordon’s successors had decided that the solevu was a burden 
on the people, and in any case “had lost much of their native character”.  Attempts followed 
to curtail large-scale inter-island exchanges in Fiji including localised bans on using 
traditional craft (Foye, 1917:384).  It was much the same story in several other parts of the 
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Pacific (see for example Maude, 1968 in regard to the Gilberts).  The decline in local 
enterprises is bound to the change in technology with foreign-owned steamships increasingly 
prevalent by the turn of the century.  Larger and more mechanical vessels were “beyond the 
everyday experience of most Pacific islanders” (Couper, 2009:147).   
Among other effects were the actions by Australasian and American maritime trade unions in 
defence of their members against the use by ship owners of cheap labour on their national 
flag vessels.  This saw most Pacific seafarers confined to employment on small inter-island 
traders within specific colonial territories (Couper, 2009:4). 
Government subsidies were used since the beginning of colonial administration in various 
guises and Couper (2009) summarises their effect.  The Fiji Shipping Commission of 1915 
had some misgivings about the pattern of subsidized shipping and trade in Fiji and 
recommended that subsidies should not be granted to firms or companies trading as 
merchants in the colony.  Nevertheless, subsidies remained and the merchant companies 
continued to be the major beneficiaries.  The Fijian waqa ni koro still amounted to a 
substantial tonnage in this period [1906-1927], but other owners of small cutters were 
emerging, especially those of mixed European and Fijian parentage ... the entrepreneurial role 
of the part-European sector was increasingly becoming the ownership of small shipping 
companies.  The reality was that some administrators could not appreciate that island ships 
owned by communities had important functions that were beyond the criteria of efficiency as 
measured by Western economics.  They fulfilled a dual role; serving social as well as 
economic needs (Couper, 2009:159-162). 
Couper (1973:247) concludes that “the assumption that Pacific Islanders have failed in 
commercial shipping and trade because of the complications of such enterprises will not stand 
up to examination: indigenous trading systems were far more complex, and even large-scale 
organization was achieved by the early Pacific monarchs before their states were 
overwhelmed by power from without and undermined by disease, depopulation and despair 
from within … while [Pacific Islanders] have achieved some measure of adaption to this 
situation ... the effect has been that large areas of maritime enterprise have remained open 
only to foreign entrepreneurs”.  
The global pre-WWII depression saw the copra market, on which the outer islands relied 
almost exclusively, crash and commercial shipping virtually cease.  Thompson (1938) 
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reported that this had a positive effect in reviving local canoe building and inter-island trade, 
along with other forms of local economic activity in the Lau group.  
After WWII there was a shortage of shipping and costs increased markedly (Couper 
1968b:54). By 1967 the typical transport from the outer islands to Suva ranged from launches 
to vessels of 200 tons, with the most common being wooden cutters and schooners of 10-50 
tons.  Trade at that time was unsafe (with common overloading), always expensive and time 
consuming. Couper at this time advised Fiji and other PICs to centralise and establish more 
formal shipping services to achieve economies of scale.  He considered such rationalisation 
would reduce the dominance of Suva as the only centre by stimulating the growth of outer-
island centres, a more logical strategy for an archipelago state (Couper, 1967: 203-207). 
This period coincided with increased interest in the newly emerging independent island states 
for establishing national and regional shipping capacity.  Sea-transport costs always 
represented a major element in the economies of PICs, but because of the inelasticity of 
demand for primary products the ocean-freight rates were seldom passed on to the buyers of 
Pacific exports; they tended rather to be deducted from the returns to Pacific producers.  On 
the other hand a proportion of the freight rates on imports was passed on to Pacific island 
consumers as higher prices (Couper, 1973:244). 
Internationally since the 1970’s, small freighters had been replaced with large container ships 
of about 20,000GT travelling routes between continental ports with calls at major island 
distribution centres (Forsyth and Systo, 1999; Heathcote, 1996).  The movement of 
standardised containers brought increased efficiency and dependability of service, but 
container lines only called at appropriately-equipped larger ports where there was sufficient 
volume to make a stop economic (Anderson et al, 2003).  This served to increase the 
distinctions between internationally and domestically serviced nodes. 
Such improved technology had a knock-on effect on costs throughout the transport network.  
“Marine freight rates within Fiji increased by between 150 and 199% between 1972 and 1982 
even allowing for the effect of a subsidy introduced in 1973” (Bayliss-Smith et al, 1988:107).  
The dependency on fossil-fuel in secondary towns was also increasing by this time, and it had 
to be transported.  “In Fiji as a whole the outward cargo carried by inter-island shipping 
substantially exceeds inward cargo, by as much as 172% in 1983.  However, this excess 
consists almost entirely of petroleum products, together with general cargo carried on the 
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Suva to Labasa service” (Bayliss-Smith et al, 1988:248).  In the more remote areas such as 
the Lau transport services were declining. 
Regionally in this period a number of country and regional shipping lines were established, 
with varied success, including the Forum Shipping Line, Kiribati Shipping Services Ltd and 
the Cook Island, Nauru Pacific, and Tongan Lines.  Governments, including Fiji, also started 
to invest in domestic services and/or to bring in franchise or subsidy schemes.  The concept 
of a marine transport network based on Ro-Ro shipping had been suggested for Fiji for some 
time, with both Couper (1973) and Bayliss-Smith et al (1988) initially advocating for it to be 
government led, especially through the provision of the necessary infrastructure, in particular 
connecting roads and ramps.  Bayliss-Smith et al (1988:271) were strongly advocating at this 
stage for a joint public-private venture basis for eastern Fiji shipping.  “The sea as a road 
offers special problems which the state cannot possibly resolve for the operators.  Should not 
government therefore provide its aid to transport in other ways, where this is needed?” 
In the end the initiative was taken by a private Fijian company.  In 1983 one of the larger 
local shipping companies initiated a service between Viti Levu and Vanua Levu with a 
second-hand 900 ton ship, and later a second, smaller ship.  A second company followed with 
a Ro-Ro vessel between Suva and Savusavu (Bayliss-Smith et al, 1988:271). 
The Fiji Government entered the field of commercial sea-transport in a variety of ways.  In 
1988 Bayliss-Smith et al reported that there was regulation and partial subsidy of freight rates 
and substantial government investment in basic terminal facilities.  Government ships 
competed with private concerns carting cargo and passengers, but also provided a range of 
essential services such as water cartage during droughts.  In 1983 the total commercial Fiji 
fleet, government and private, included 58 ships of varied size, type and age.  In 1980 there 
was a total domestic cargo of 140,000 tonnes, 51% between Viti Levu, Vanua Levu, and 
Taveuni.  A tug-and-barge service operated between Suva and Labasa since the early 1970’s.  
From 1983 private local companies began extending their Ro-Ro services to other large 
islands: Taveuni, Koro, Gau, and Kadavu.   
The Lau continued to decline economically with shipping and air services following suit.  
“The structure of business comprises a number of small to medium entrepreneurs, mainly 
Indo-Fijian or Euro-Fijian, three small local shipping companies and a number of single ship 
operators, the co-operative movement and large body of Fijian farmers most of whom are 
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smallholders and most of whom operate within the village system” (Bayliss-Smith et al, 
1988:251). 
To return to the present.  Anderson (2003:2-5) summarises the regional picture at the turn of 
the 20th century: “Freight or mixed passenger/freight vessels may carry a limited number of 
containers to remote islands.  Distances may be very large, even amongst the islands of a 
single nation.  Cargo volumes are small, and often of marginal value per tonne.  Many of the 
national and regional shipping services are subsidised or owned by the countries served ... 
Many of the vessels in local and regional service are in poor repair, largely because revenues 
can seldom support new construction”. 
In Fiji, the same basic pattern illustrated by Bayliss-Smith continues, albeit that some of the 
players have changed and shipping has undergone various fleet replacements.  The private 
sector provides erratic services on fleets of varying ages and standards, with service of 
uneconomic routes entirely dependent on an over-stretched government franchise system 
which has not been substantively reviewed since 1997.  The government provides basic end 
of node infrastructure, at a much higher cost than Bayliss-Smith et al envisaged, and 
backstops shipping for its own and community demand when the private sector fails entirely.  
Today there are 940 Fijian registered vessels of all types of 10m or more LOA (Tawai, 2012).  
The inter-island fleet is largely small to medium, aged Ro-Ro’s and various sized landing 
craft and barges.  At the local level almost all demand is met by ‘fibres’ and longboats.  
Tourism companies flourish, operating a wide range of vessels up to small bluewater cruise 
liners, generating growing local construction of good quality vessels in the 8-15m range.  
However, privatisation of the Government shipyard and associated infrastructure following 
the 1980’s coups has seen any medium scale construction activity curtailed although foreign 
fishing fleets and domestic shipping are still serviced locally.  Hard data on current Fiji 
domestic shipping is hard to come by.  Increasing fuel and operational costs continue to make 
the industry highly competitive and close-mouthed.  The Fiji Commerce Commission’s recent 
inquiry into fares, freight rates, and franchising will, hopefully, release a wealth of 
information but unfortunately its results will come too late to inform this inquiry. 
4.3. A Global Perspective 
Sea-transport locally and regionally has been characterised in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.  In this 
section both are placed in a global context, primarily in assessing the publicly available 
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literature pertaining to the effects that global shipping has as a contributor to GHG emissions 
and thereby to climate change, described previously as the greatest threat to PICs, and in 
relation to global shipping’s claim to be the most efficient mode of transport in the world.  
Again, while this section seeks to provide context to a Fiji/Pacific inquiry, it also illustrates 
lessons from the macro to provide verstehen for the micro.  At the end of the section 
examples of alternative shipping initiatives currently on the global horizon are outlined and 
their potential impact for Oceania discussed. 
4.3.1. Global Shipping: the Handmaiden of Global Commerce and Consumerism 
Oceania’s share of global shipping is so minute as to be virtually immeasurable.  Oceania’s 
capacity to influence trends in shipping technology is equally negligible as is its contribution 
to the adverse side-effects of the activity.  Reliant as it at all levels, but especially the 
domestic, on aging vessels imported from the rest of the world, any advances in efficiency in 
new vessels are unlikely to be seen in Oceania for at least two decades and costs of retro-
fitting existing vessels with alternative technologies are likely to be prohibitive to most 
government and private shipping service providers in the region. 
At a macro-level, commercial shipping is arguably the most international of the world's 
industries; immensely powerful and valuable.  The size of the global fleet is disputed; ICS 
stating “over 50,000 merchant ships trading internationally, transporting every kind of cargo.  
The world fleet is registered in over 150 nations, and manned by over a million seafarers of 
virtually every nationality”57.  Others put the figure at 90,000 ships (e.g. The Guardian, 
9/4/2009).  Buhaug et al (2009:13) state: “the world fleet in 2007 comprised more than 
100,000 ships of more than 100 GT, of which just less than half are cargo ships.  However 
cargo ships account for 89% of total gross tonnage”.  To some extent it depends which ships 
are being counted by whom, but there are systemic issues with international maritime 
industry data collection (see Buhaug et al, 2009; Corbett et al, 2010; Faber et al, 2009). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 http://www.marisec.org/shippingfacts/worldtrade/index.php, sourced 9 July 2012; see also Figure.  Marisec 
is maintained by the International Chamber of Shipping on behalf of the Round Table of International 
Shipping Associations. 
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Figure14 Different Sectors as Percentage Total Number of Ships in World Fleet 
Source: http://www.ics.org.uk accessed 9/7/12 
The financial value of the shipping asset is gargantuan with a single container vessel costing 
US$10-100+ million58.  To this must be added the operational costs (fuel, maintenance, 
crewing, etc), infrastructure (ports, railheads, bunkering, shipyards, slipways, breaking 
centres, etc) and all the related secondary and tertiary industry (from container manufacture to 
insurance).  
Quantities of volumes moved are equally large, the ICS website stating more than 8.4 billion 
tons were transported in 2012, more than 1 ton per head of global population59.  No-one quite 
knows exactly how big or valuable global shipping really is but most sources cite that it 
moves 90% of all goods and raw materials globally (IMO; ICS; Ribeiro et al, 2007).  Buhaug 
et al (2009:10) suggests “about 80%” quoting from UNCTAD derived data.  
Buhaug et al (2009:11) use various industry sourced data to calculate an “annual turnover for 
marine activities of US$1.3 trillion in 2004 with an 8% increase compared to 1999 … about 
one-third is related to merchant shipping,” but notes also that other studies “value the world 
marine market at US$2.7 trillion, with the shipbuilding industry as the largest global market 
value.  The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2006) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Compare this with the annual income for a single Pacific state, (Section 4.2). 
59 Buhaug (2990:35) estimates total shipping emissions in 2007 to include 1,050 million tonnes of CO2. 
As of 31st October 2010, 
the world fleet was made 
up of 50,054 ships. 
Figures in brackets are 
numbers of ships, by 
sector. 
General Cargo Ships 
(16,224) 
Bulk Carriers (8,687) 
Container ships (4,831) 
Tankers (13,175) 
Passenger ships (6,597) 
TOTAL (50,054) 
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estimates an economic contribution to the global economy of US$380 billion in freight rates 
deriving from the operation of ships”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 Approximation of ship traffic distribution 
Source: Based on ICOADS data in Buhaug et al (2009:13) 
It is essentially a monopoly industry (Ribeiro et al, 2009:335).  The industry is controlled by 
cabals of ship-owning magnates, shipping service providers, marine insurance underwriters, 
and bunker-fuel suppliers.  As the industry operates in an international environment, with the 
flag registration of a ship being easily changed and often bearing no relationship to the 
country of ownership or service, regulating and enforcing standards of shipping is complex 
and logistically difficult.  “The ownership and management chain surrounding any ship can 
embrace many countries and ships spend their economic life moving between different 
jurisdictions, often far from the country of registry” (http://www.imo.org, accessed 9 July 
2012).  In the ‘developed’ world, merchant navies are the strict preserve of private enterprise 
with governments performing regulatory functionality. 
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4.3.2. Shipping and Emissions 
The IMO was established in 1949 as a specialised UN agency whose primary purpose is to 
“develop and maintain a comprehensive regulatory framework for shipping and its remit 
today includes safety, environmental concerns, legal matters, technical co-operation, 
maritime security and the efficiency of shipping” (http://www.imo.org accessed 9 July 2012).  
Prior to 2008, prosecution of the environmental mandate was largely restricted to issues of oil 
spillage, polluted water discharges, ballast waters, and biosecurity matters. 
Although the harm caused by shipping emissions has been clearly flagged for some decades, 
IMO has only just begun an audible debate on GHG emissions from shipping, reflecting the 
political complexity of enforcing nationally-ratified policy and regulation at the international 
level.  The First Intercessional Meeting of IMO’s Working Group on Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from Ships took place in 2008, tasked with developing the technical basis for the 
reduction mechanisms that may form part of a future IMO regime (http://www.imo.org 
accessed 9 July 2012).  The IMO interest was finally forced through the international accord 
reached under the 1997 Kyoto Conference that left all control of international shipping 
emissions to the IMO.  This was “in recognition of the unique nature of the shipping industry, 
as well as an acknowledgement that the universal application of the IMO rules is the 
appropriate means of tackling greenhouse gas emissions from ships” (Faber, 2009:14).  
Getting internal agreement for IMO to act took more than another decade.  
Progress has been predictably slow, especially as the global recession and its enormous 
economic implications for shipping, the world’s transporter of consumerism, continues to bite 
and divert attention from any long-term climate change focus.  Even today, hard information, 
as opposed to industry-sanctioned statements, is difficult to access or assess.  The Second 
IMO GHG Emissions Study 2009 (Buhaug et al, 2009) remains the authorative report: “the 
report quantified emissions and made projections for the future, examined potential climate 
impacts, and reviewed potential technological and policy options for emissions reductions” 
(Faber, 2009:64), and most subsequent reports rely heavily on its data calculations for their 
own modelling.  Contrast this with the plethora of data, analysis, and reports publicly 
available for terrestrial transport! 
The rationale for IMO failing to act earlier and act decisively on emissions clearly comes 
down to its international nature, a failure by nation members to achieve consensus and the 
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self-interest of the industry.  The IMO official account is “IMO’s original mandate was 
principally concerned with maritime safety.  However, as the custodian of the 1954 OILPOL 
Convention, the Organization … assumed responsibility for pollution issues and subsequently 
has, over many years, adopted a wide range of measures to prevent and control pollution 
caused by ships and to mitigate the effects of any damage that may occur as a result of 
maritime operations and accidents.  These measures have been shown to be successful in 
reducing vessel-sourced pollution and illustrate the commitment of the Organization and the 
shipping industry towards protecting the environment” 
(http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/Pages/Default.aspx accessed 9 July 2012).  
The trends in reduction of oil spills, etc. are admirable and desirable achievements and are 
what is being referred to in this statement.  But IMO leadership on the issues of emissions has 
been tardy.  Regardless of the above explanation, IMO has had mandate for dealing with all 
shipping discharges, arguably since its inception and at least since the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 as modified by the Protocol of 
1978 (MARPOL 73/78) which covers not only accidental and operational oil pollution but air 
pollution.  However IMO elected not to act on this mandate and waited until 1997 to enact the 
Regulations for the Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships with the aim of minimizing 
airborne emissions from ships, and until 2005 to give effect to it 
(http://www.imo.org/About/Pages/Default.aspx, accessed 2 July 2013).  Real cuts in sulphur 
content, a major shipping pollutant, do not take full effect until 2020.  The publicly available 
reports and submissions produced by IMO and listed on their website favour maritime safety, 
piracy, and oil spill control by more than three times their output on climate change.  The 
evidence set out below is that smokestacks create continual environmental harm on a scale of 
magnitude far greater than any oil spill in history. 
It is generally recognised by the industry that, historically, fuel efficiency has not been a 
motivating factor for the world’s shipping industry and increased fuel charges are simply 
passed on to the consumer.  This is changing, albeit slowly, with rising fuel costs, 
international pressure, and an increasingly competitive industry.  Despite this, IMO do not 
expect this to transform into any quick or large changes to the status quo.  Its background 
papers regularly contain statements such as: “by 2020, a combination of regulatory, design 
and operational measures might possibly deliver a reduction of around 17 to 32 per cent in the 
fuel consumed by ships per tonne/mile of cargo transported.  However, it is important to 
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stress that work on these complex issues is still continuing, that more efficient and 
sophisticated ships will be more expensive and that many measures may not be cost-effective 
for a range of ships and trades” (Buhaug et al, 2009:6).  
World transport predominantly relies on a single fossil resource, petroleum, that supplies 95% 
of the total energy used.  Shipping is estimated to use 9.5% of the world’s transport energy 
budget (Ribeiro, 2009: 325,328).  Globally, sea-transport is a major contributor to GHG 
emissions (Buhaug, 2009:44).  Large ships are essentially unregulated power stations burning 
the by-product of refining cleaner fuels for terrestrial transport and aviation (HFO), and 
arguably the dirtiest petroleum fuel on the planet.  Emma Maersk, the world's biggest 
container ship in 2009, has 109,000 hp engines that weigh 2,300 tons and burn 1,660 gallons 
of HFO per hour.  A mid-range 7000 TEU container ship will burn about 217 tons per day60.  
As terrestrial fossil fuel use grows slowly cleaner, the contribution of pollutants from sea-
transport increase as a proportion of global totals.  Official estimates of total shipping 
emissions vary, again reflecting systemic issues of data capture, with sources to 2010 
regularly reporting it to be between 1.8 and 3.5% of all GHG emissions, making the industry 
an emitter on the scale of Germany and on par with aviation (IMO, 2009; 
www.carbonwarroom.com)61.  Mid-range emission scenarios from this era suggest that, by 
2050, in the absence of reduction policies, ship emissions may grow by 150-250% (compared 
to 2007 emissions) as a result of the growth in world trade by 204062.  “If the climate is to be 
stabilized at no more than 2oC warming over pre-industrial levels by 2100 and emissions 
from shipping continue as projected … they would constitute between 12% and 18% of the 
global total CO2 emissions in 2050 that would be required to achieve stabilization with a 50% 
probability of success” (Buhaug et al, 2009:1). 
Others consider the level of emissions to be much higher.  A Guardian by-line (Vidal, 9 April 
2009): “15 of the world's biggest ships may now emit as much pollution as all the world's 760 
million cars”, caught widespread media and internet attention and the related article cited 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 By contrast I conservatively estimate the marine fuel bunker to service Tokelau from Apia to be in the region 
of 500-900 tonnes/yr of MDO. 
61 The Marisec website states international shipping contributes “a small amount, less than 2%”. 
62 Although the volumes of cargo fell in 2008 (but only to 2002 levels) the overall increase looks like tracking 
in spite of the recent economic downturn.  
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statistics from “confidential data from maritime industry insiders based on engine size and the 
quality of fuel typically used by ships and cars”.  These suggest shipping is responsible for 
3.5% to 4% global CO2 emissions; 15-30% of global NOx emissions; and 9% of global SO2 
emissions; that ship bunker fuel has 2000 times the sulphur content of diesel fuel used in US 
and European automobiles; and 70% of the ship emissions occur within 400km of land.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16 Shipping Emissions and Climate Change 
Source: Faber (2009:94) 
A related article (Guardian, 31 March 2009) cited research by National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (Corbett et al, 2010) which claims that “pollution from the 
world's 90,000 cargo ships leads to 60,000 deaths a year in the US alone and costs up to $330 
billion per year in health costs from lung and heart diseases”.  The article states this is 
supported by recent Danish studies showing that Europe has dramatically cleaned up sulphur 
and nitrogen emissions from land-based transport in the past 20 years but has resisted 
imposing tight laws on the shipping industry, even though the technology exists to remove 
emissions.  “Cars driving 15,000 km a year emit approximately 101 grammes of sulphur oxide 
gases (or SOx) in that time.  The world's largest ships' diesel engines generate roughly 5,200 
tonnes of SOX”.  Corbett is quoted by the Guardian as concluding that "ships were perceived 
as a small source that could be neglected … we've been regulating cars for 30 to 35 years”.  
April 2008 saw IMO finally approve a reduction in sulphur emissions.  In a stepped 
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programme, by 2020 all shipping has either to use distillate fuels with a limited sulphur 
content of 0.5% or use scrubbing technology to clean their exhaust gases.  Both industry and 
regulators point to the steady reductions in ozone damaging refrigerant emissions and 
modelling for projected amounts of SOX under MARPOL agreements as evidence that the 
IMO-led regulatory process has capacity.  The cost of MDO compliant with these standards is 
currently 60% higher than current fuel in Oceania.  Fuel is currently ~40-60% of Pacific ship 
operating costs depending on the type of vessel and operation (pers. com., Cpt John Rounds, 
2012) so the cost of this global mitigation strategy means an imminent increase of ~24-36% 
in the cost of shipping for PICs regardless of any other factor. 
Figure 17 Annual Increase in Sulphur Emissions in the World’s Shipping Lanes  
Source: The Environmental Science and Technology Journal (2007) 
Both the US and the EU are implementing national legislation for low-emission marine zones 
that have been criticised for being minimalist in area and level of control.  “Ship pollution 
affects the health of communities in coastal and inland regions around the world, yet 
pollution from ships remains one of the least regulated parts of our global transportation 
system” (Corbett quoted in Guardian, 31 March 2009).  Expanding such zones outside of 
Europe and US is politically impossible to achieve.   
Even these minimalist gains have already taken years.  The BBC’s Roger Harrabin (BBC 
Environment Report, 8/30/2004) had been reporting on these issues five years previously 
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when the projections were that 40% of air pollution over land would come from ships by 
2010.  At that stage the promise by European politicians to attend to the issue was 6 years old 
and NGOs had been lobbying governments for more than 20 years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18 Effect of Ship Deadweight on CO2 Design Index 
Source: Buhaug et al (2009:63) 
Averaging effects of global shipping across the industry tends to disguise the reality that 
larger and newer vessels have lower proportional rates of effect and that it is the smaller 
domestic and older ships, the type most common in Oceania, that are the worst offenders as 
shown in Figure 18. Preliminary analysis of IMO data undertaken by UCL for B9 Shipping 
shows that vessels of less than 10,000dwt carry only about 4% of global cargo but contribute 
around 25% of all shipping emissions or approximately 1% of global totals (Gilpin D., email, 
19/12/2012).  But, as shown below, almost all activity is not targeted at this sector.  
Claims that shipping is a dirty business and has done little to effectively clean up its own 
operations are strongly refuted by the industry and related agencies.  The defence is based on 
two principal lines of argument: firstly that it is less polluting and far more efficient than any 
other form of transport per tonne of goods moved; and secondly, that emissions are mitigated 
by the positive contribution the industry makes to ‘sustainable development’.  The following 
quote from the ICS website (accessed 9 July 2012) is typical of the industry position. 
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“In the overall context of sustainable development, shipping is a very powerful and 
positive force, making a major contribution to global trade and prosperity in a way 
that has only a relatively small negative impact on the global environment.  Shipping 
… is, statistically, the least environmentally damaging mode of transport, when its 
productive value is taken into consideration.  The vast quantity of grain required to 
make the world’s daily bread, for example, could not be transported any other way 
than by ship.  Moreover, set against land-based industry, shipping is a comparatively 
minor contributor, overall, to marine pollution from human activities”. 
The IMO website describes shipping as “carrying huge quantities of cargo cost effectively, 
cleanly and safely”.  Marisec’s homepage advises “without shipping the import and export of 
goods on the scale necessary for the modern world would not be possible.  Seaborne trade 
continues to expand, bringing benefits for consumers across the world through competitive 
freight costs.  Thanks to the growing efficiency of shipping as a mode of transport and 
increased economic liberalisation, the prospects for the industry's further growth continue to 
be strong.”  Further in the same source Marisec claim “Sea-transport is one of the least 
environmentally damaging modes of transport and, when compared with land based industry, 
is a comparatively minor contributor to marine pollution from human activities”63.  ICCT 
(2011:1) consider that because “ships are by far the most energy-efficient means of moving 
goods, shipping-sector emissions are expected to continue to grow even as rising oil prices 
encumber growth in other transportation modes”.  
But despite the industry rhetoric, this is a far cry from saying that shipping is as efficient as it 
can or should be.  As discussed above, GHG emissions from international shipping have 
proven difficult to calculate and more difficult to allocate to parties in international climate 
agreements.  In the absence of policy intervention shipping CO2 emissions are predicted to 
increase over 2005 levels from 0.26 Gt C/yr by 1.3 – 3.8 fold (0.34 – 0.98 Gt C/yr) in 2050 
(Faber, 2009:46).  IMO predict that tonne-miles of goods moved globally will increase 2% to 
4% annually between now and 2050.  This substantial industry growth translates to a near 
tripling of GHG emissions over this period.  It is estimated that GHG emissions from 
international shipping contribute 870mmt of CO2 to the atmosphere, with an additional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 The Marisec website gives a wealth of detail to defend the industry record, both as an emitter and a 
responsible innovator. 
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180mmt attributable to domestic and inland ships in 2007, for a total of 1050mmt64.  At 
current rates of increase, shipping sector CO2 emission is expected to climb to between 2,500 
mmt and 3,650mmt by 2050” (ICCT, 2011:265). 
Industry representatives to international congresses on GHG and climate change have 
steadfastly reiterated the industry’s ultra conservative position, as the following extract from 
the ICS Position Paper (2011) illustrates: “ ... (1) The future efficiency of the world’s fleet 
can best be ensured, in the first instance, by the adoption of legislation at the UN International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) on technical and operational measures for the reduction of CO2 
emissions from international shipping … (3) ICS is confident that international shipping will 
reduce its CO2 emissions, per tonne-kilometre, through technical and operational measures 
that will deliver improving ship efficiency, by more than 20% by 2020 (2007 baseline) … (5) 
The global shipping industry has a preference for a Market-Based Mechanism that is 
levy/compensation fund based … (6) ICS believes that CO2 emissions from international 
shipping cannot be reduced effectively and meaningfully through the incorporation of 
shipping into any regional financial instrument”.  
(http://www.shippingandco2.org/ICS%20POSITION%20ON%20GREENHOUSE%20GAS
%20MARKET%20BASED%20MEASURES.pdf accessed 2 July 2013). 
The section thus far provides a summary of the size and scale of the global problem.  What, if 
anything, can be done?  An ICCT assessment examined data for 50 ship efficiency measures 
and concluded: “by 2020 the industry’s growing fleet could reduce annual CO2 emissions by 
436mmt, or 33% of the projected annual total.  Of that amount, 340mmt (26% of the total) 
could be achieved for a net negative cost after fuel and other savings are accounted for” 
(ICCT, 2011:1).  Regulatory proposals before the IMO in 2011 could have significant impact 
on these projections, either by increasing the overall efficiency of the shipping fleet or by 
increasing the tonne-mile cost of goods.  But to meet ambitious CO2 reduction goals, even 
more profound changes will be needed (ICCT, 2011:4).  
Three broad categories of measures are available: the amount of goods/resources transported 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Or a global average of approximately 1 tonne of CO2 for every 8 tonne of cargo based on the earlier quoted 
figures.  
65 These are similar-scale figures to those presented by Dr Pierre Sames, Vice-President Research, 
Germanischer Lloyd at the SSTT 2012 (see Section 7.1). 
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can be reduced (ironically the current global downturn is giving greatest effect to this)66; 
regulatory regimes and economic instruments can demand cleaner shipping; and 
technological advances can be sourced and implemented.  Arguably, none of these is overly 
helpful to seeking Oceanic solutions without (proportionately) large external assistance or 
subsidisation.  Regulatory and economic measures will increase the cost to Oceanic shippers 
(whose activities produce an insignificantly minute quantity of the problem) without a 
corresponding increase in revenues; reductions in services will be an increasing penalty to 
Oceanic communities and economies; and costs for new technology, in the main, make them 
prohibitive and are generally aimed at new generation plant employed by first world 
operators on profitable routes. 
ICCT (2011:4), along with IMO and ICS, considers technological and operational options 
aimed at increasing ship efficiency will provide most answers.  “Work that has been done on 
marginal abatement cost curves for efficiency technologies demonstrates the clear potential of 
these studies to inform policy and industry”.  But they caution that these are “broad-based 
estimates, lacking sufficient detail and transparency”.  And uptake of advances in efficiency 
needs to be considered in light of the true economic nature of the industry.  It is critical to 
note that large-scale shipping is a speculative business rather than a true service industry.  
Large profits are made in short periods of optimum profitability during which size and speed 
are maximised, it is not a case of most profit being made consistently through efficient 
provision of regular service, the predominate need of island communities. 
4.3.3. Alternative Energy Sea-transport Technology: What’s on the Radar? 
There has been a flurry of activity post-2008 to explore new technologies, primarily targeting 
large-scale shipping and focussed on improved motors, alternative bio-fuels or gases (for 
which there are question marks over the overall environmental benefit at the scale required) 
and innovations in hull design.  In relation to the overall scale of the industry these measures 
are relatively minute and economically driven rather than from a desire to turn the industry 
green.  Investment, whether it is in reducing the sulphur content of fuels or designing new 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 There are varied reports on the effect on shipping volumes (and process) of current global economics.  A 
Daily Mail article (Parry, 8th September 2009) shows evidence of fleets of merchant ships “bigger than the 
U.S. and British navies combined” lying idle off Singapore.  Industry sources quoted claim large reductions 
in chartering costs, 4.7% decreases in volume of container shipping in 2008 and 8% in 2009 while supply of 
new shipping continued to decrease by as much as 12% in that year. 
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vessels, is primarily focused at the large ship, international market to the exclusion of 
domestic options.  It is almost exclusively developed-world led, with a marked propensity to 
consider the needs of the industrial world to the exclusion of the poorer populations and can 
be described as a classic North-South divide scenario.  Those operators that can afford it or 
can access investment capital to procure new technology will have an operating advantage.  
Those that can only afford second (third, fourth or fifth) hand ships will have to wait in line 
and pay ever-increasing costs and penalties. 
Both ICCT (2011) and IMO (Buhaug et al, 2009) studies concur on the range of technological 
and operational strategies available to the industry.  These include innovation in: propeller 
polishing, hull cleaning, speed reduction, autopilot upgrade, air lubrication, main engine 
retrofits, water flow optimization, hull coating, speed controlled pumps and fans, weather 
routing, high-efficiency lighting, propeller upgrade, waste heat reduction, alternative fuels, 
wind power, and solar technology.  These analyses also note that, the last three items apart, 
these are largely already available and most responsible operators are already, at least 
partially, using.  None of these measures individually achieves more than minor savings, nor 
do they represent any major paradigm shift from existing options.   
What options are available from alternative fuels?  Although any number of potentials have 
been mentioned in the literature and websites, including wave energy propulsion, this breaks 
down primarily to alternative fuels such as bio-fuels or bio-gas, wind and solar67,68.  This 
thesis is focussed on wind potential.  In Oceania bio-fuels/gases from local crop production 
(coconut and cassava both have high potential) or by-product (in particular molasses from the 
Fiji sugar industry) offer strong possibilities.  Ultimately it will come down to the economics 
of production of such fuels versus the cost of import of fossil fuels as to how fast 
development and uptake happens.  Alternative fuel must not be confused with free fuel.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 The elephant in the room is hydrogen cell technology.  Although the theory is relatively simple and has been 
known for decades, major barriers exist to practical implementation, which, if they can be overcome, would 
be revolutionary across both global transport and energy production sectors.  Many industry websources are 
claiming that transition to LNG will be an intermediate step to greener fuels. 
68 Work has been ongoing in regard to nuclear propulsion technologies led largely by the US military industrial 
complex and this still remains the Pentagon’s preferred future alternative shipping fuel technology 
(O’Rourke, 2006).  Even if it could be used cost-effectively, the political stance of PICs effectively rules it 
out of any contention for Oceania.
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Solar energy, in the main using PV technology to convert solar energy to storage, is an 
extremely fast-growing area.  Question marks exist over the carbon footprint of manufacture 
of product, although plant appears long-lived and storage technology, essentially batteries of 
some type69, is the principal barrier.  While there are a number of cutting edge experiments to 
date, solar is not yet demonstrating an affordable or effective enough vector in its own right 
to offer more than auxiliary potential for Oceanic settings.  Application potential in this mode 
though is high and technologically readily available. 
It is increasingly difficult to move past the logic that wind offers70.  It is a simple equation: if 
no fuel is combusted, there are no fuel and related costs and no emissions.  Wind is freely 
available, proven, and untaxed.  There is historical record and proven design.  Yet wind 
power is largely dismissed without adequate analysis.  Of the more than 200 reports publicly 
available via the IMO website examined in 2011, only two mention potential for sail 
technology, albeit briefly, and both are sceptical of its viability.  This position is reflected in 
climate change information more generally.  The third IPCC report has only two pages of 
content (out of 56) in its Transport Chapter devoted to sea-transport.  Sail is only mentioned 
in regard to the possible potential to retrofit some large ships with auxiliary sails and some 
interest in ‘kite-sails’ with associated reports quoting the 2007 SkySails’ claim that up to 60% 
of the world’s commercial transport vessels could be retro-fitted with such technology 
(Ribeiro, 2009).  
Wind power options can be divided into use of ship-mounted sails, or kite-sails, or means of 
converting wind energy to mechanical drive trains.  All must be considered as to whether they 
have application as auxiliary or primary motive propulsion.  They must then be considered as 
either new vessel types or new technology retro-fitted to existing ships.  Finally the IRR must 
be factored.  While wind energy is free there can be a high cost to the technology required to 
transform it to motive power.  The leading examples of each are outlined below. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69  Super-capacitors offer promise of an alternative to battery storage although this technology is still 
embryonic. 
70 Assuming, of course, the commonly agreed objective is cleaner and more affordable sea-transport options for 
consumers.  If the objective is the unprincipled maximisation of profit, it’s hard to look past the money to be 
made in burning inefficient and toxic petroleum oil products. 
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Kite Sails 
Two companies, American Kite Sails and German SkySails dominate this field, with test 
models being used on large ships since 2006.  The concept is easily understood by reference 
to Figure 19, computer-controlled kites attached to the bow of a ship can harness wind power 
and substitute power for forward propulsion.  The system can be retrofitted.  Lateral lift from 
the kite dramatically reduces the heeling effect of hull-stepped rigs.  Successful large-scale 
trials are continuing by SkySails in association with Beluga shipping but uptake appears low. 
Potential for savings vary widely with manufacturers claiming that up to 60% fuel savings are 
available, albeit on select routes and usages.  Overall savings of only up to 20% are more 
realistic for general usage.  Costs for mid-range carriers are up to US$2.5 million and the cost 
of maintenance and operation could be as high as 15% p.a. (www.Skysails.com; Faber, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19 Kite Sails Source:	  www.Skysails.com accessed 2 July 2013. 
 	  
Wind Engines 
Wind engines are available where rotors placed on deck of a ship can generate thrust, taking 
advantage of the so-called Magnus effect.  The Flettner design is the most common.   
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Figure 20 Flettner Wind Engines 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rotor_ship accessed 2 July 2013. 
Flettner applied for a German patent for the rotor ship in 1922.  In 1924 he retrofitted the 
schooner Buckau with two rotors 15m high and 3m diameter driving a 37kW electric system 
to power her first voyage in 1925 across the North Sea.  The rotors did not give any concern 
in even the stormiest weather, and the rotor ship could sail into the wind at 20-30 degrees, 
while the original sail rig could not tack closer than 45 degrees.  In 1926, renamed Baden 
Baden, she sailed to New York via South America.  Despite receiving positive reviews and 
being an absolute technological success, the idea of “unconventional sailing” was not 
commercially accepted and the concept was deemed “inefficient compared to conventional 
fossil-fuel-powered naval vessels” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rotor_ship  2 July 2013). 
The technology has been revisited recently with Flensburg University developing the Uni-cat 
Flensburg, a rotor-driven catamaran and Greenwave (a UK charity), modelling modern 
Flettner design rotor use for large shipping (http://www.greenwave.org.uk accessed 2 July 
2013).  
In 2009 the German wind-turbine manufacturer Enercon launched its new rotor-ship E-Ship 1 
which features an aerodynamic hull, a new and efficient propeller for the conventional diesel-
electric propulsion, modern Flettner-rotors with automatic control systems, and an over-sized 
steering rudder that converts the trajectory of the ‘sails’ into the desired forward motion.  The 
exhaust fumes of the diesel engines power a steam turbine that generates additional electricity 
used to spin the four Flettner-Rotors, each 27m high with a 4m diameter.  This motor sailor 
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design reduces the fuel consumption of the 123m ship by 30 to 40% according to Enercon’s 
website.  The ship made its first voyage with cargo in 2010, carrying nine wind turbines to 
Ireland, and today is regularly shipping wind turbines around the world.  The build cost is 
unknown. 
 
Figure 21 Enercon’s E-Ship 1 
Source:	  http://www.marinelog.com/DOCS/NEWSMMVII/2008nov00050.html 12 Nov 2012. 
Greenwave, a UK research website, estimates that vessels upwards of 10,000dwt of crude oil, 
chemical, and product tanker, and bulk carrier types could be ‘most immediately’ applicable 
for rotor technology and estimates that the costs for manufacturing and installing four wind 
engines lies in the range of US$0.8-1 million.  For a 55,000dwt Supramax bulker equipped 
with four wind-engines (rotor height 20m and diameter 2.3m) that is 246 days at sea per 
annum, Greenwave estimates an average fuel consumption saving of 1,023 tonnes per year.  
Faber (2009:4) derived relative fuel reduction potentials of 8.3% for general tankers under 
60,000dwt falling to 3.6% for crude oil tankers over 200,000dwt.  
Ship Mounted Sails 
The more conventional descendant of sailing ships that dominated world transport 
historically, these fall into two broad categories: ‘soft’ and ‘fixed wing’.  Sail powered ships 
can be sail-auxiliary where the vessel is primarily a motorboat, hybrids (see B9 and 
Greenheart below) or pure-sail where motors are used for auxiliary power, port manoeuvring, 
etc).  There were some minimal but critical experiments following the 1970’s oil crisis which 
clearly demonstrated that sail was viable when fuel prices were high with few of the 
preconceived concerns over safety, stability, leeward and overall speed bearing truth71. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 See in particular Na Mataisau and Shin Aitock Maru, the first of eight Japanese oil tankers that achieved 
around 30% fuel savings with fixed wing sails in the 1980’s (Section 5.1.1). 
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Figure 22 B9 3000dwt bulk carrier 
Source:	   http://www.b9energy.com/B9Shipping/tabid/4036/language/en-US/Default.aspx 
accessed 14 Oct 2012. 
There are only a minimal number of designs that are being seriously developed currently.  
The B9 Ship is a 3000dwt bulk carrier hybrid under development by B9 Energy UK.  The 
result of a design partnership that includes Rolls Royce bio-gas motors (predicted to provide 
40% of overall power) and cutting-edge sail and hull designs, B9 was completing tank and 
wind tunnel testing at time of writing (October, 2012).  Prototype construction is projected at 
£24 million falling to £12 million once production-lined.  Attractive though this technology is 
for Pacific settings, the asset cost amply demonstrates the Oceanic dilemma.  It will simply be 
unaffordable.  The personal commitment of the B9 directors (see B9 Shipping website72) to 
ensure this technology can be delivered to SIS once it is proven economically in a European 
setting is commendable.	   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23 B9 Ship Tank Tests	  Source:	  Di	  Gilpin,	  2012	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 http://www.b9energy.com/B9Shipping/tabid/4036/language/en-US/Default.aspx accssed 12 October 2012. 
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The 8,000 dwt container carrier Ecoliner is a similar concept to the B9 ship currently on the 
design board of Dutch naval architects, Dykstra.  Technical and cost data was not available at 
time of writing, although their presentation to the SSTT 2012 asserted the asset cost to be no 
more than 15% higher than conventional options to achieve upward of 60% fuel savings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24 Ecoliner 
Source:	  http://fairtransport.homestead.com/Ships.html accessed 2 July 2013. 
 
The Greenheart Project is currently the only international design concept I have been able to 
find that is targeting a wind and solar powered vessel specifically for developing world 
conditions.  A Japanese registered NGO, Greenheart have designed a small-scale (75dwt) 
cargo vessel capable of fulfilling a range of roles, including local transport, disaster response, 
and research.  The Greenheart vessels have been designed by Japanese naval architects under 
the guidance of an international open-sourced design team especially for developing country 
needs.  The first 220-ton, 32m vessel is to be constructed in Bangladesh in early 2013.  
Design specifications include a hull speed of 10-11 knots, virtual unlimited range with 
auxiliary propulsion and onboard power from a 125m2 photovoltaic array to lead/acid battery 
capacity giving a 55nm range under power alone from two 200kW DC drive motors.  Cradle 
to cradle design criteria, limiting toxic materials in construction, will be employed and built 
cost is projected at approximately US$500,000.   
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Figure 26  SV Greenheart 
Source:	  	  http://odf.greenheartproject.org accessed 28 November 2012. 
I have been in extended discussions with Greenheart since 2011 and they have offered to 
bring their prototype to Fiji on its inaugural voyage and along with our partners we are 
currently exploring various possibilities to use a Greenheart vessel for an extended trial on 
selected Fiji routes.  The Greenheart vessels are configured to internally carry up to three 
TEU containers which can be independently loaded/unloaded using the vessels’ unique 
mast/derrick configuration without the need for port infrastructure (see Figures 26 and 27)).  
 
 
Figure 27 SV Greenheart Unloading on Beach 
Source:	  http://www.greenheartproject.org/en/ accessed 28 November 2012. 
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There will inevitably be emerging designs and technologies that have not been considered 
above.  Web searches turn up a range of futuristic concept drawings and a number of such 
sites have monitored during this research.  Many sites remain functional for short periods 
(months to 1-2 years) and then receive no more postings. 
Specifically in relation to wind and solar power, it was interesting to note the role of wind 
power turbine companies (B9 Energy and Enercon) and not-for-profits (Greenwave and 
Greenheart) in leading design and innovation.  None are traditional or commercial shipping 
companies. 
The view at the global level is not that heartening for any Oceanic search for solutions.  
While international regulation may reduce shipping emissions it is likely to do so at an 
increased cost to Oceania.  Alternative technologies appear to be possible for reducing 
operational costs but in most examples at an asset cost that will likely make them prohibitive.  
Biofuels/gases and solar/wind offer immediate solutions but still require being trialled and 
market proven.  
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Chapter 5. Case Studies 
5.1. Pacific Alternative Energy Sea-transport: Lessons from the Reef of Experience 
This section presents a summary of examples of previous attempts to trial or introduce sail 
propulsion for shipping in the Pacific.  They should be considered in conjunction with the 
emergent international design developments sketched at the conclusion of the preceding 
chapter.  A number of core lessons distilled from these cases are discussed in Section 5.2. 
Preceding sections detailed the reliance of the world generally and Oceania in particular on 
sea-transport, the industry’s monopoly dependency on fossil fuel powered propulsion, the 
lack of efficiency in current vessels and the level of contribution the global industry makes to 
current and projected GHG emissions.  At the start of this research programme it had 
appeared reasonable to assume that alternative propulsion technology of shipping generally, 
and that applicable to SIS in particular, had been the subject of continual and increasing 
innovation in design and operation since at least the oil crisis of the 1970’s.  It was quickly 
apparent this was naïve. 
Unfortunately, there are only a limited number of experiments using sail (or any other non-
fossil fuel powered alternative) available for study and guidance as to future application.  
Every attempt has been made to assemble as much information as possible on the following 
case studies.  It should be noted that some are based on anecdotal accounts whose accuracy is 
sometimes difficult to collaborate.  There is no claim that the list is exhaustive.  The case 
studies are grouped into two: initiatives emerging from the 1970's oil crisis, and examples of 
other small-scale shipping initiatives relevant to the Pacific. 
5.1.1. Case Studies from the 1980's 
“The sudden escalation of oil prices in the early 1970’s followed by disruption of supplies 
through various Middle East conflicts … led to a general policy of energy conservation” 
(Clayton, 1987:53).  However, this trend does not appear to have been extended in the field of 
sea-transport to any great extent, probably because shipping continued to maintain its 
monopoly position and the incentive for operators to cut fuel usage rather than simply pass on 
increased cost to users was missing.  The (then) relative low cost of fuel as an overall 
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component of the industry and the relatively short duration of the event73 saw some rhetoric 
but little action on either making sea-transport more efficient or developing alternative 
technologies.  
Five case studies from this period are illustrated here; Na Mataisau and Cagidonu in Fiji, 
Shin Aitoku Maru and the Japanese experiments with oil tankers, the FAO initiative with 
artisanal fishing craft in the Pacific; Jim Brown’s work with multihulls in Tuvalu; and the EU 
funded Tai Kabara. 
Na Mataisau and Cagidonu 
In an experiment overseen by Southampton University, auxiliary sail rigs were designed and 
installed by MacAlister, Elliott & Partners on behalf of the ADB for the Fijian Government 
fleet of inter-island ferries.  Two ships were retro-fitted and operated.  Each employed a novel 
standing wishbone construction on the mainsail to give a quadrilateral sail that could be 
furled on luff spars.  The first ship was the 6-year-old Na Mataisau, a steel-hull, 
passenger/cargo vessel, 27m LOA, 274GT with a single diesel engine.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27 Na Mataisau 
Source: Satchwell (1986). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 By 1985 oil was at its lowest wholesale price since WWII. 
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Conversion was carried out at a Fijian shipyard and completed in September 1984, 
whereupon the ship operated normal schedules with a continuous log kept to record 
performance data.  Good performance was obtained in both sailing and motor-sailing modes 
with substantial speed enhancement in the latter (Clayton, 1987:58).  The project report 
(Satchwell, 1986) lists an impressive range of savings and benefits, well in excess of those 
projected at the start of the experiment.  Contrary to predictions the vessel preformed 
exceptionally well, realising none of the initial concerns over ultimate stability and leeward, 
and resulting in 23% overall fuel savings plus multiple benefits in terms of increased stability 
(by more than 50% energy used), greater passenger comfort, and greatly reduced engine wear  
(Satchwell, 1985).  Greater fuel savings could have been achieved if a feathering propeller 
had been fitted.  Unfortunately the vessel was lost after dragging its anchors on Moala reef in 
a developing cyclone in early 1985 but not before she was able to escape under sail alone 
after the engines failed and save the life of the Fijian Prime Minister, on-board at the time.  
The rig of Na Mataisau was rescued virtually undamaged and was subsequently installed on a 
somewhat larger ship, the Cagidonu.  This ship was completed in December 1985 and 
showed average fuel savings of 20-25% on its inter-island schedules (Clayton, 1987:59).  In 
his project report assessing the sailing performance Satchwell, (1986:1) recorded savings of 
37% with all sails and 21% with mizzen and jib only. 
Practical use of the auxiliary rig does not appear to have survived much past the end of the 
project monitoring.  In part this may be attributable to the, by then, relatively low cost of fuel.  
In part it was due to the fact that the captain and crew received no reward or incentive 
whether they used the auxiliary rig or not (pers. com. Cpt. Rounds, Suva, 2011).  The lesson 
here is that a comprehensive programme is required.  Simply offering up the alternative 
technology is insufficient.   
As part of this experiment, Southampton undertook wind data analysis of all known Fijian 
wind patterns to produce a comprehensive analysis of future wind-based route planning and 
predicted fuel saving coefficients for the main inter-island shipping routes in Fiji and Rotuma 
(Satchwell, 1985, 1986).  This data will remain invaluable for any future sail powered 
shipping.  That analysis appears to show that several of the “uneconomic” routes, currently 
heavily subsidised by the Fiji government under its franchise scheme, are appropriate for sail 
assisted or driven vessels.  
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Shin Aitoku Maru 
In a similar experiment, Japanese oil tanker owners trialled modern square sails, initially on a 
900 tonne vessel, Shin Aitoku Maru, using aircraft wing manufacturing technology and 
computer-controlled rigs.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28 Shin Aitoku Maru 
Source: http://seaspout.wordpress.com/2012/08/03/propulsion-revolution-2/ access 1/7/2013. 
These rigs were an evolution of the historic “square-rigger” design.  The reported results were 
impressive with overall fuel savings of more than 30%, increased passage speeds, increased 
stability and greatly reduced engine wear.  Contrary to initial concerns, the sail-fitted vessels 
were able to safely maintain course in typhoon conditions where sister vessels had to heave to 
(UNESCAP, 1985).  Over three years a fleet of eight such ships ranging from 600 to 31000 
tonnes was established.  However, plummeting oil prices meant the IRR on the technology 
was uneconomic, especially given the cost and limits of the computer technology employed, 
and the experiment was largely discontinued.  Some desktop technical studies of the era 
disputed the performance claims, suggesting overall gains of only 10% were achieved.  
UNDP/FAO Artisanal Fishing Craft74 
UNDP/FAO undertook a number of artisanal boatbuilding projects globally between 1982 
and 1989.  In the Pacific, building on the work of Save the Children in Tuvalu (see below) 
FAO produced designs for ten different vessels, from a one-person paddling canoe to an 11m 
transport trimaran resulting in an experimental fleet of more than 350 artisanal fishing vessels 
built in eight PICs, many as either pure-sail or sail-assisted designs.  The uptake of the sail-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 This thesis has concentrated on sea-transport to the exclusion of fishing vessels.  There are of course strong 
correlations between the two sectors.  
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powered vessels, however, was minimal and did not survive the life of the officially funded 
project (Gillett, R. pers. com. 2010).   
FAO concluded “the only places where a new type of sailing craft has gained acceptance are 
those where there is a living tradition of the use of sail” (FAO, 1986:71).  Other key lessons 
learnt include the need for any alternative technology to be proven to have direct economic 
benefit or saving to the user and the need for an entire sailing culture to be re-instilled, 
including attention to in-country boat building skills and capacities.  
The vessel designs were exemplary, have been well recorded, and are still available for future 
use.  The Pacific assessments included a comprehensive analysis of the various options for 
designs, materials, and construction methods. 
Save the Children, Tuvalu, and Jim Brown 
Also in this period, acclaimed multi-hull designer Jim Brown worked for Save the Children in 
Tuvalu.  Brown had previously worked on a global study of artisanal local craft that recorded 
that there were literally millions of small craft operating at village level (Brown, 1982).  
While, like the FAO work, the focus was initially on fishing craft, the lessons learnt are 
equally applicable to transport craft.  Brown wrote optimistically of the potential for sail-
powered technology to be immediately employed.  
While Brown found that indigenously built and owned fleets throughout the tropics and sub-
tropics are vital at community level for fishing and transportation, there were major issues 
arising with perpetuating what has historically been sustainable craft.  Fuel prices were far 
from the only problem.  “Often local vessel types have evolved through many generations to 
satisfy local sea-keeping requirements for a specific fishery or a given cargo of a given route.  
The construction of these craft is usually the supreme example of a local high technology, and 
that technology is very likely to have depended directly on local, high quality boatbuilding 
which is no longer in adequate supply” (Brown, 1982:3).  
Brown believed that craft must be built locally and preferably in wood.  “Alternative 
boatbuilding materials such as fibreglass, steel, aluminium, and ferro-cement have been 
introduced into fisheries with mixed results.  The cost of importing all materials can result in 
hull prices infinitely higher to the fisherman who is accustomed to needing zero cash money 
to acquire a boat … Alien craft and mechanisation can aggravate the problem; especially if 
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they tend to displace local boat builders and fishermen from traditional employment” (Brown, 
1982:4).  Brown was the first to identify the negative impact importing designs and materials 
was having on local economies with locals assuming imports would be superior, leading to 
loss of locally-evolved adaptation and resilience.  As wood is the mainstay of traditional local 
boatbuilding, he found environmental degradation and deforestation had left many 
communities with an inferior and diminishing resource in any case.  
Brown designed alternative vessels and production methods in Africa, the Philippines, and 
then Tuvalu, adapting wherever possible local designs and using local materials.  In Tuvalu 
this led to experimentation with first catamarans and then proa designs.  There are close 
parallels with the needs and solutions Brown identified in Tuvalu and Fiji (Brown, 1982:39). 
Brown is the first of these case study commentators to highlight that the savings from 
changing technology are not restricted to the vessels themselves.  Multihull vessels are 
shallow draught and therefore not as reliant on shoreside infrastructure (channels, jetties, 
docks) needed by a deep draught mono-hull vessel.  “These harbour facilities often cost far 
more than the vessels which patronise them and are subject to storm damage and high 
maintenance costs … Supernumerary to these investment savings is the matter of the 
multihulls’ miserly running costs” (Brown, 1982:35).  As seen in the ADB case example in 
Section 2.2, much of the current projected transport investment costs needed in Asia-Pacific 
are associated with such infrastructure.  Building new infrastructure and climate-proofing 
existing assets is the major adaptation.  Alternative shipping is not even mentioned. 
Again in common with FAO, Brown left a legacy of designs that are valid candidates for 
further investigation today as they were 30 years ago.  Two designs are include here, an 84’ 
fast bluewater passenger catamaran and a 64’ tuna long-liner.  Both were designed for Tuvalu 
conditions and projected to save a minimum of 60% of fuel over conventional options.   
Brown’s description of the issues facing Tuvalu is relevant today and echoes across Oceania.  
“Tuvalu is located at the end of a long and precarious line of industrial supply.  Gasoline 
costs $4 per gallon; packaged food pulses through the archipelago with jarring irregularity 
and island communities become further disinvolved [sic] from sources on which they 
increasingly depend” (Brown, 1982:40).  These trends have only increased over time.   
 
	  	   	   	  
154	  
Figure 29 Jim Brown Designed 84’ Passenger Catamaran 
Source: Brown, 1982:77 
Brown identified a prioritised list of applications for alternative vessels for Tuvalu, noting 
that all but the last represent a return to former capabilities: 
1. Subsistence fishing canoes 
2. Intra-lagoon taxi service 
3. Short-range community fish boats 
4. Inter-atoll ferry/transporters 
5. Long range commercial fish boats 
There is no reason to suppose these priorities will have changed.  While Brown’s prototypes 
and analysis have not resulted today in widespread adoption of sail-powered technology in 
Tuvalu75, his 1982 insights are even more applicable today.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Variants of Brown’s catamarans are still visible in Kiribati today and were being built in a local shipyard up 
until 2010.  Michael Savins’ presentations at SSTT 2012 highlighted the ongoing Kiribati ship building 
experiment that started with Brown and his sons.  https://www.usp.ac.fj/index.php?id=12461 accessed 
1/7/2013. 
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Thirty years ago Brown saw that sails offer easy access to renewable energy, with more 
immediate humanitarian results, than any other method of transition to renewables.  His craft 
were all designed to take advantage of local, traditional wisdom and materials, combining 
with appropriate modern technology.  He sought to involve local people in a closer 
relationship with the energy source, and to participate in all stages of construction and 
operation.  “Talent and capital must be directed towards less petro-intensive systems.  New 
tools are needed; tools which accomplish more work with less energy and, as such, are a real 
pleasure to use” (Brown, 1982:77). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30 Jim Brown Design 64’ Tuna Long-liner 
Source Brown, 1982:79 
Tai Kabara 
I first heard about the Tai Kabara when I visited Kabara in the southern Lau in November 
2011 to deliver the team researching drua culture (see Section 6.4).  In informal discussions 
following the main talanoa, the mataisau of Kabara were keen for us to hear the story of 
building the ship on the beach in front of us.  This vessel was built at Naikeleyaga village by 
the mataisau between 1984-87.  The project was EU-funded as a result of the global oil crisis 
of the late 1970’s.  Although only one vessel was constructed, the initial proposal was for an 
inter-connected fleet of three vessels servicing the Lau and Lomaiviti groups (SPC archives), 
a similar proposal to that being currently explored under this research programme. 
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The plans for Tai Kabara were drawn up by naval architects at the (then) Fiji Institute of 
Technology’s maritime school where the responsible tutor was from Kabara.  She was 
described to us as a 50 ton, ketch-rigged vessel of classic carvel plank on frame construction 
with a full keel, secondary bilge keels or runners and cut away forefoot to allow for beach 
landing.  Dakua planking, copper fastenings, and cotton caulking were all brought from Suva, 
the vesi keel, stem, and frames were cut on Kabara, as were the other scantlings from a 
variety of local timbers.  All construction, down to caulking of the hull and construction of 
the standing rigging occurred on the island, with the mataisau showing us the various tools 
used in construction – in the main rudimentary hand tools. 
The mataisau told us that the vessel operated successfully as an island-owned and operated 
trading vessel through the Lau group for the next two decades, surviving two cyclones and 
several beachings, before being either sunk or scuttled in Suva harbour in 2008 where her 
hulk can still be seen at low tide.  
The memories of the Tai Kabara were obviously “bitter-sweet” for our informants.  In their 
recollection, the vessel had worked well while it was in undisputed island ownership but the 
installation of a Lister diesel auxiliary saw ownership and management shift to the Lau 
Provincial Council and disputes over the management of the vessel and the use of the profits 
arising from her operation.  The mataisau were obviously immensely proud of their ability to 
build the vessel in the first place and said they would relish the opportunity to build another.   
Further data on the Tai Kabara project has proved difficult to source.  The original plans and 
project documentation held in Kabara were destroyed in Cyclone Gavin.  Staff at the Fiji EU 
office have since changed several times and no corporate memory of the project exists.  There 
are obviously political sensitivities surrounding the fate of the vessel that restricted asking 
further direct questions of potential informants.  A websearch found one photograph, a six-
line newspaper archive (which stated that all the various departments and boards with a role 
to play following the sinking in 2008 declined to make any comment) and one court decision.  
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Figure 31 Tai Kabara 
Source: https://sites.google.com/site/kpnmarineservices/photos accessed 2/7/2013. 
The photo is undated and shows Tai Kabara beached on Namuki Island in the Lau.  
The judgement was more informative76.  It was a civil appeal case between Kabara 
Development Corporation and the Fiji Government over the awarding of shipping subsidies 
under the Government’s franchise scheme.  The outcome of the proceedings is not important 
to this study but the judgement gave important background to the ultimate fate of this project.  
The judges first outlined the operating environment of the vessel.  “Because of their 
geographical position, communities in the outer islands of Fiji depend mainly on sea-
transport for provision of the ordinary necessities of life.  Comparatively few of these islands 
have airstrips and those which do are available generally for light aircraft of limited carrying 
capacity.  This appeal highlights the problems facing these communities because of their 
dependence on sea-transport.  Because of the small populations any form of sea-transport is 
not viable commercially without some form of government subsidy”. 
The judgement discloses that the Lau Provincial Council had sold the Tai Kabara to a private 
company in 1991 for consideration of a FJ$265,000 bank debt.  Commercial operations from 
1991-1996 ran at a loss at which time the company initially negotiated a 3-year contract 
under the government franchise subsidy scheme and managed to keep operating this way 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Civil Appeal ABU 0017 of 2007 (On Appeal from a Judgment of the High Court, Suva in Civil Action No. 
92 of 2004), Judgement of Bynre, J.A. and Goundar, J.A, 16 October, 2009. 
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until 2004.  By this time the vessel could not maintain the government required schedule due 
to mechanical failures.  A compulsory slipping on the eve of one departure in October 2004 
found the ship to be in poor condition, with rotten planking, numerous concrete patches, an 
unrepairable generator, and seepage requiring continual pumping amongst other issues.  
The case example is noteworthy from a number of perspectives.  The vessel type is not 
dissimilar to the type of small, locally built ships that dominated island trade from the turn of 
the century to after WWII.  Local participation to the limit of available capacity was 
employed in designing, sourcing materials and construction, all of which were clearly well 
within the capabilities of the local community, but long-term control over ownership and 
management ultimately were not.  What began as a donor-funded and island community-
based adaptation strategy that appears to have shown strong initial success, was subverted as 
ownership shifted, first to local government and then to private interests.   
At the time of her demise she was obviously in very poor shape, yet for nearly two decades 
had provided robust service, and was arguably at the end of her asset life.  In any event, the 
original project had not considered sufficiently the on-going needs of maintenance or the 
limited commercial viability of the harsh operating environment. 
5.1.2 Batiki Fishing Boats 
While this example does not involve sailing vessels, I have included it here because of the 
lessons it illustrates.  It was a Fiji Fisheries Department project funded and overseen by FDB.  
A concise summary was provided by Bayliss-Smith et al (1988) drawn from several sources.  
It is quoted verbatim as there is no doubt about the data and the relevance of the findings.  
“A fishery development programme saw two commercial fishing boats arrive at Batiki, 
in a bid to expand economic development away from dependence on copra.  The boats 
were seen as a means whereby the islanders could regain control over their links with 
the outside world and exploit local reefs commercially for fish and trochus shell.  The 
schemes were financed and operated partly by islanders themselves and partly by the 
Batiki community in Suva.  In practice, however, although the fishing boats were useful 
for passenger trips to Suva and shipping copra, they proved to be a disappointment as 
sources of income from fish, shellfish, and beche-de-mer.   
The larger boat, the Marama-ni-Wai, was acquired by Yavu and Manuku villages in 
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1971 with $15,000 savings and a $11,000 loan from the FDB.  Technical and financial 
expertise was supplied largely from the Batiki expatriate community in Suva but labour 
was supplied by the villages concerned.  By the end of 1976 the scheme was in trouble 
with loan repayments and it would have become bankrupt but for free maintenance 
supplied by the Fisheries Division in Suva.  In that year Marama-ni-Wai made 19 trips 
from Batiki to Suva carrying copra, which by then had emerged (along with passenger 
fares) as the principal source of revenue for the scheme.  In 1983 the boat was still in 
existence but it was laid up with engine trouble.  On Batiki $1,800 out of the $3,000 
needed for repairs had already been collected but commercial fishing was then such a 
small part of the scheme that assistance from FDB or the Fisheries Division can no 
longer be relied on.   
A second boat, the Tomitomi I was purchased in 1972 by the other two Batiki villages 
but this scheme was never as successful.  Persistent engine trouble led to bankruptcy of 
the scheme in the later 1970’s and the sale of the boat to a Chinese trader on the 
neighbouring island of Gau and in 1982 it visited Batiki on six occasions for copra and 
freight.  In the same year Marama-ni-Wai made 17 visits but whereas in the mid-1970’s 
the islanders were able to rely almost entirely on their own two boats (there were 41 
copra collecting trips in 1974, 40 in 1976), in 1982 Marama-ni-Wai accounted for only 
half of the 34 copra collecting trips that were made to the island that year. 
…On Batiki the very small scale of cash benefits from fish, shellfish, and beche de mer 
was a disappointment, particularly in 1975 when an alternative to copra was so urgently 
needed.  On the other hand the improved passenger service, cheaper freight rates, 
employment opportunities for islanders, better social links between the Suva 
community and the island, and perhaps above all the feeling of community involvement 
towards achieving some freedom from dependency upon existing trading companies 
have all been major benefits, albeit intangible ones to some extent.  Where social 
benefits outweigh financial costs in this way, then the methodology of commercial 
accountancy seems quite inappropriate.  In the absence of alternative development 
options or other pressing needs (e.g. housing); shipping seems a reasonable investment 
for the savings of people on small islands.  It may be cheaper for a government to 
subsidise these efforts in various ways than to provide itself the frequent shipping 
services which small islanders desire.” 
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This case study occurred in the early 1970’s when fuel was still relatively inexpensive and a 
low proportion of operating cost, and so it is illustrative of the marginal nature of the industry 
at local level here in any regard.  In this case a well-intentioned aid intervention in the 
fisheries sector proved effective for community well-being but for providing transport not 
fishing.  The initial object was not to build a fishing industry but to reduce economic reliance 
on a failing copra industry.  The need for cash generation was, in part, to pay for the Batiki 
transport needs.  The donors and the project design were not able to adapt accordingly and the 
result was a failure for all parties, but particularly the Batiki communities.  The example 
highlights that inventions must be based on actual identified need, not just the problems 
cursorily and externally identified, and that they must be designed with capacity to adapt and 
change in the light of observed results.  
That the project was well monitored means we have specific data for sea-transport needs of 
Batiki from the 1970’s to compare with a current day model.  Batiki lies north-east of Ovalau 
and the port of Levuka, i.e. a windward or reach route out and a beam reach back to Batiki on 
prevailing winds.  Using the Southampton Na Mataisau data this has high wind route 
advantage for wind-powered transport.  From Levuka there is a favourable inside-reef run to 
Bau landing and a short road route to Suva.  If sea-transport is still a major issue for Batiki, as 
it was shown to be in the 1970’s (and I contend it is likely to be an issue of increased 
magnitude today), then it would appear a prime candidate for a wind powered adaptation.  
5.1.3 Small-scale Catamaran Projects 
This thesis suggests an industrial form of sail-powered catamaran as a potential vessel for a 
village-based trading enterprise.  As can be seen from the Jim Brown case study above, the 
concept is neither new nor novel.  Catamarans combine speed and shallow draught with low 
maintenance and operational costs but have the disadvantages of generally poorer windward 
performance and with lower load-carrying capacity compared to displacement vessels.   
James Wharram 
The claim on this UK sailor’s website is that “in the mid 50's, based on his research into 
ancient Polynesian boat design, James built the first off-shore catamaran in Britain and sailed 
it out into the Atlantic” (http://wharram.co./site accessed 13/7/2011).  Since then Wharram 
has generated a range of designs for cruising catamarans, initially for self-build, at the lower 
end of the price range and more recently including professional franchised build projects.   
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Wharram has borrowed liberally from Pacific heritage designs.  His vessels have proven 
themselves as reliable, safe, and (relatively) cheap bluewater options, if not competitive in 
terms of speed, with Wharram’s website claiming more than 10,000 designs sold globally.  
They feature low cost material construction (primarily ply and epoxy over stringer style), 
sacrificing some displacement and speed for safety and load-carrying capability.   
About a decade ago, Wharram and his design partner Hanneke Boone drew the concept plans 
for his “Vaka Motu” Islander 65 and 55 craft.  While these started out, he claims, in response 
to a request from a Pacific chief for a boat capable of carrying several ton of fish to market, 
they are now offered as factory-build only models.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32 Wharram & Boone Design 65’ Vaka Motu 
Source: http://wharram.com/site/node/1387 accessed 13/6/2011. 
I contacted Wharram in 2007 seeking to obtain a set of plans of the Islander 65 for Solodamu 
to consider and was informed by his office that this was not possible and Wharram would 
take legal action if I attempted to build such a vessel outside of this professional factory 
franchise programme where the price would start at EUR380,000.  This would, of course, 
minimise the local benefit that could be derived from building the vessels in-country.  
Additionally, it would ignore the lessons learnt from Jim Brown and related experiences that 
the users of vessels are better able to maintain them if they are integral to the build process. 
In a highly publicised event, Wharram and Boone designed a 11.5m catamaran for a project 
organised by Klaus Hympendah called the ‘Lapita Voyage’77.  Wharram used a Tikopian hull 
from the Auckland Museum as his template and the vessels were funded by European donors 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77  http://www.lapita-voyage.org/en/index.html accessed 2 July 2013. 
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who then sailed various legs of the delivery voyage from the Philippines to Tikopia and 
neighbouring Anuta to donate the vessels to the two islands as local transport in 2009.   
Hympendah, who has visited the islands regularly since, reports that the two vaka are still in 
use “more on the tiny island of Anuta, less on Tikopia … The Anutans sail quite often to 
Lata, the main town of the Temotu Province placed on the island of Ndeni (main island of the 
Santa Cruz islands)” (Hympendah, email, 23/7/12).  Anecdotal evidence from passing sailors 
suggested that the Tikopia vessel had been abandoned and was rotting on the beach.  This 
case aptly demonstrates the absolute need for projects of this nature to fully appreciate the 
local situation and have sufficient time to bed the project into the local political landscape. 
Anuta and Tikopia are neighbouring islands settled by Polynesian outlier communities and 
now politically part of the Solomon Islands, where they are referred to as "the outer islands”.  
But the political structure of each is distinct.  Failure to appreciate this at the outset of the 
programme saw a successful introduction to Anuta but a different result in Tikopia where, 
initially at least, the vessel was almost left derelict through failure to identify ownership and 
management responsibilities that were appropriate to that community and inclusive. 
Anuta is smaller than Tikopia with only 14 families (Firth, 1954; Feinberg, 1995).  
Hympendah recorded 75 outrigger boats on Anuta for 220 people in 2009 and noted that they 
were highly prized and well maintained family possessions.  The donated vessel, Lapita 
Anuta, is owned by the whole community and regularly used “not for fishing but for 
transport.  Sick people were sent to the hospital in Lata [400nm].  Pupils were brought to the 
secondary school in Lata too.  Once on their way back they were hit by storm and ended up in 
the Torres islands belonging to Vanuatu.  They fixed the broken steering paddle and sailed 
back home” (Hympendah, email, 23/7/12). 
Tikopia by comparison has a population of 1,100 on a steep, heavily-wooded island with 
intensive subsistence agriculture (Mertz et al, 2010).  There is traditional rivalry between the 
two political communities; Faia in the west and Ravenga in the East (Firth, 1936; Kirch, 
1982).  The Lapita Tikopia was put ashore in the area of one chief, which led the rival chiefs 
to believe it only belonged to one clan.  As a politically disputed asset the vessel wasn’t 
touched for the next two years and began to deteriorate.  This was in spite of Hympendah 
considering he had made his intentions clear that it was to be owned by all on the island 
collectively and thought he had followed appropriate cultural protocol in introducing the 
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vessel and his vision for its use.  Fortunately, Hympendah has maintained a close relationship 
with Tikopia and returned in 2011 to seek a remedy.  “I asked for a meeting with all four 
chiefs.  I told them to use the boat again, to build a shelter, repair parts of it, and choose men 
from all four clans as crew.  Additionally I suggested they decide who should be the head of 
the crew and the boat.  They chose a teacher, which was wise.  According to my latest 
information Lapita Tikopia has been visiting Lata and Waimasi on Vanikolo at the settlement 
of Tikopia” (Hympendah, email 25/7/12).  
Vaka Fanaua 
In 2010 the Tongan academic and politician Sitiveni Halapua commenced a project to see a 
15m multihull vessel designed and built to service the Niua group of islands, described on the 
website as “the northern Tongan islands of Niuatoputapu, Niuafo’ou, and Tafahi.  These 
islands, 260nm north of Tongatapu, closer to Samoa than to Nukuʻalofa, epitomise the 
extreme conditions of the South Pacific.  They are small, far from their public service 
provider, isolated, marginalised, and surrounded by deep, exposed waters” 78.  
Halapua’s project features a trimaran by acclaimed multihull designer Dick Newick with a 
2010 projected build cost of NZ$450,000 at a New Zealand shipyard.  The website gives the 
project brief as a “competitive sailing passenger-cargo boat for outer island communities to 
run and maintain, providing affordable, safe, flexible and regular service”, and describes the 
Vaka Fanaua combining “old Pacific island tradition with modern construction to safely and 
quickly carry almost three tons of people and/or cargo on deep sea voyages”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33 Vaka Fanaua 
Source: http://talanoa.org/TDP_Development_Projects.html 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78  http://talanoa.org/TDP_Development_Projects.html, accessed 16/1/2013 
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Halapua is now attempting to publicly fundraise for the vessel and as at July 2012 the website 
showed donations of NZ$92,244 raised.  It also states several Tongan’s from Niua will be 
apprentice builders during the construction of the boat so that they can later help to maintain 
the boat.  These islanders will be crew on the boat during its maiden sail to Niua where it will 
be handed over to a community company to operate and maintain.  It is expected that this 
project will be a model for further development in the Niua group and for other outer-island 
groups in other Pacific island countries (http://www.nemasail.org/pdf/Fall2011.pdf accessed 
12/11/2012).  
Okeanos 
The Okeanos cargo catamaran initiative, which has also adopted Wharram’s name of “Vaka 
motu”79, originated from our research in Solodamu and with FIVS.  In 2010, when we judged 
we had sufficient data, planning and local agreement to proceed with a pilot village vessel for 
Fiji, FIVS approached the German sponsor of the TMoTM voyaging fleet, to ask if they 
would assist in funding a pilot vessel.  The initial reaction was highly favourable and the 
donor contracted a professional boat-building yard in NZ to design and build a 15m 
prototype.  Various commitments were made to later use a Fiji build base to which moulds 
were to be supplied at no cost.  It sounded too good to be true and it was. 
Despite an initial promising start, both FIVS and I were quickly excluded from the design and 
planning process.  When I attempted to visit the boatyard to discuss the planning with the 
designers, I was informed that the designs were complete and copyrighted and the designers 
were not to discuss it further with me (pers. com. Nick Peel, Feb, 2011).  The project is now 
being managed from a Hawaiian NGO, Pacific Voyagers Foundation (PVF).  When I queried 
our unexplained exclusion from the project, all reference to FIVS and my involvement and 
research were removed from both PVF and its ‘parent’ website, Okeanos Foundation.  
Up until the end of 2011 the PVF website was still announcing the vessel was to be brought 
to three Pacific Island countries, including Fiji, for trials after its launch.  This example 
highlights some the issues associated with philanthropy-driven programmes.  It is easy for the 
cheque-writer to assume this role equates with decision-maker.  There is lack of transparency 
and accountability.  Because a ‘gift’ is being made, the ‘giftees’, who are automatically in a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79  It is no known what permission, if any, was sought for the use of this name by either designer, both of whom 
have copyright.  There are obvious intellectual property right /traditional knowledge issues. 
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subservient position, especially if they are of Oceanic cultural descent, are extremely hesitant 
to criticise, object or raise concerns.  
It is still not clear what rationale was used to exclude Fiji and Solodamu from the experiment.  
We had offered a collaborative approach; open access to our own research and findings; we 
had already spent two years preparing the village of Solodamu to be part of such a trial.  
Selected village youth had made life-changing commitments to begin training as ships 
engineers and seafarers.  USP had offered to provide independent assessment of the trials and 
a research programme had been prepared for the same.  We had commenced discussions with 
all the relevant agencies (Maritime Safety Authority, Ministry of Transport, Fiji Customs, 
etc) that had been favourably received. 
The resultant vessel, Okeanos, was launched in November 2011 and taken to Vanuatu.  When 
I contacted PVF to clarify why the vessel was not coming to Fiji I was informed that Fiji was 
no longer a target because it was “too developed” and our project was “too far down the 
track” (Simon, K. email, 17/2/12).  No explanation was given as to what we should now tell 
the expectant villagers in Kadavu or our other collaborators in Fiji with whom we had run 
workshops in expectation of the pilot vessel’s arrival.  PVF openly admitted that they had 
undertaken no research or preparation in Vanuatu, had no research or business plan, had not 
decided which communities of Vanuatu they were going to work with, what stakeholder 
groups needed to be involved and had not considered any of the commercial or regulatory 
aspects involved.  Nor had they decided how any trial was to be monitored or reported 
(Simon, K. email, 17/2/12). 
Anecdotal reports from ni-Vanuatu sources are that US and Tahitian researchers have now 
been flown in to do this research.  One of the Vanuatu communities being targeted was 
assisted in 2006 by a New Zealand lawyer and sailor to build a 9m Wharram catamaran.  That 
project failed and the boat was abandoned due to “inferior plywood resulting in rotting decks 
and emerging village politics and jealousies over ownership and management that weren’t 
sufficiently thought through at the beginning of the project” (pers. com. Allen, R. 2011).   
Despite numerous overtures, PVF has thus far refused to share any information on the 
vessels, their costings, operation, etc.  A spokesman for the project was interviewed on Radio 
New Zealand in 2010 where he stated that the initiatives will not be working with Pacific 
governments or official agencies so it not known how they plan to cooperate with authorities.  
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A commitment was made by this charity to make publicly available the findings of their 
Okeanos experiment at the Festival of Pacific Arts in the Solomons in 2012 (Simon, K. email, 
17/2/12) but that did not occur.  PVF was invited to the SSTT 2012 to which they sent 
representatives who made a presentation but failed to provide detail of the vessels, project 
planning, or research. 
This unfortunate chain of events has impacted on the research programme of this thesis, in 
addition to the loss of a practical research model.  Expectation, once built, is hard to rebuild 
and we have been in the difficult position of having to explain to Solodamu and the wider 
collaborative network that the trial vessel is not coming to Fiji.  This has caused 
embarrassment for the village, which, in true Fijian fashion, feels it is their fault.  It also 
highlights the problems with a framework for stakeholders, which is discussed in Chapter 7.2  
SV Kwai80  
Kwai is a 36m, 179GT, converted Norwegian fishing vessel.  Shown here with a partial rig, 
she has been fitted with a full mainmast and bowsprit and a mizzen is planned.  Since 2008 
she has operated as a tramp ship between Rarotonga and Hawaii servicing the Line Islands en 
route, which offers excellent year round sailing across the trade winds in both directions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34 SV Kwai 
Source: https://sites.google.com/site/sailcargo/ accessed 30/8/2012. 
The website, which gives extensive coverage of each trip and the vessel herself, proudly 
proclaims that “sails are our only subsidy, and the fuel in our tanks often goes ashore to run 
island generators”.  Anything and everything is carried from store goods to vehicles.  Copra 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80  https://sites.google.com/site/sailcargo/ , accessed 30/8/2012.  All information on this case example has been 
sourced from this site. 
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and seaweed make regular consignments.  Many of the small islands en route are still not 
supplied on a regular basis and Kwai, despite her age has proved herself the most reliable 
carrier available.  Data is not available to compare it directly, but if the 60% fuel savings 
claimed are correct, she is obviously the lowest overhead vessel to operate.  She makes 
sufficient profit to pay her way and progressively refit the vessel, decreasing her overheads as 
she does so and her more efficient sail rig further reduces her fossil-fuel dependency.  The 
website information suggests her asset cost to date is less than US$700,000.  
Applying the Lessons Learnt 
The case studies provide a rich feeding ground to trawl for lessons to inform future initiatives, 
the focus of Section 5.2.  In Section 5.3, two case studies are considered that are 
representative of extreme shipping scenarios in Oceania: Rotuma and Tokelau.  For both, the 
nature of current options is neither sustainable nor positive but constitutes a major burden and 
expense with all predictions being this will continue to increase into the future.  It is argued 
that there is sufficient justification for at least considering sail as an alternative technology for 
use on both routes.  While such alternative technology cannot provide an immediate 
replacement for all shipping services on these routes, it could provide a significant 
supplement in the immediate future.  If sail technology has application for the extremes of 
Rotuma and Tokelau, it must follow that it has application for most Oceanic routes where it is 
desired to reduce fuel dependency, empower resilience, and increase options.  
Whether introducing such sustainable alternatives is justified from a fuel dependency, local 
environment or climate change basis, and given the emergent nature of the alternative-energy 
shipping industry, it is critical there is cognisance of these lessons now and, I argue, close 
collaboration across initiatives, research, and policy to plan to address them.  Section 5.4 sets 
out the reasoning for suggesting that this type of technology should be introduced to Oceania 
via promoting Fiji as the hub of such a technological revolution.  In doing there is heavily 
reliance on the lessons learnt from the above examples.  
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5.2. Lessons Learnt 
The previous section presented a summary of a range of past and current case examples, all 
except one involving sail technology.  A number of leading examples of the development of 
new sail-based technology emerging globally were outlined in Section 4.3.  The lessons for 
Fiji and Oceania from these cases are discussed below.  
Section 4.1 argued that alternative small-scale shipping, especially when it is not reliant on 
expensive transport nodes and related shore-side infrastructure, offers to increase a range of 
well-being potentials for Solodamu and Kadavu communities and this argument is repeated in 
the next section in regard to Rotuma.  If it is accepted that such situations are representative 
to some degree, then it is further argued that utilisation of alternative shipping technology can 
also assist access to such benefits across a range of local community settings throughout 
coastal and island Oceania.   
For such benefit potential to be maximised, and for it have any significant effect on either 
country or regional fuel dependency and budgets, the introduction of the technology will need 
to be at some scale, both in terms of number of applications but also in type.  The case 
examples considered above range in size from 7000dwt container/bulk carriers (Ecoliner) to 
single-person dugout fishing boats (UNDP/FAO) and cover applications from fishing to 
passengers, tramp, dry-bulk, oil and container carriers.  Similar cases could be easily made 
for other applications, such as bluewater barging where modern day variants of the scows of 
yesteryear have potential application today.  
Although sufficient economic analysis has not been undertaken here to prove the above 
contentions conclusively, and this would require real-world testing in any regard, my analysis 
currently is that the investment in such research and development would be minimal in 
comparison to the benefits potentially accruable.  A coordinated and well monitored 
programme is obviously required if such potential is to be unlocked successfully and it is 
argued in Section 5.4.2 that Fiji is the logical starting place for Oceania and should seek to 
become a regional technology hub in this regard.  For any of this to become in any way a 
reality it is essential the lessons from past experience are first distilled and heeded. 
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Figure 35 Propulsion Options for Sea-transport Vessels 
Source: Adapted from UNESCO (1986) 
The examples represent a broad range of vessel types and applications.  The simplified sketch 
in Figure 35 divides shipping into four categories: pure-motor vessels; motor-powered with 
sail-auxiliary; hybrid vessels, where the motors might be fossil-fuel or alternative-energy 
fuel; and pure-sail vessels where the auxiliary motor, if fitted, is only used sparingly, for reef 
passages, manoeuvring, anchoring, etc.  
Within the first category, savings in fuel usage and GHG emissions are not available from 
alternative energies.  The only ways to save fuel are to reduce steaming speed, improve hull 
or motor efficiency, or increase vessel size to achieve fuel savings through economies of 
scale.  Slow-steaming only saves fuel if there is no premium placed on speed of service.  If 
you go half as fast you can only deliver half as much in the same timeframe.  
The second category, employing auxiliary-sail power, offers savings of up to the 20-30% 
range (achievable using available data from Na Mataisau, Shin Aitoku Maru, and SkySails).  
Vessels in this category generally comprise retrofitted adaptions to existing asset.  
Proportionally lower savings are available for proportionally lower investment compared with 
procurement costs of dedicated new asset.  Na Mataisau and Shin Aitoku Maru demonstrated 
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additional (and considerable) benefits over and above fuel savings.  It is assumed kite-sails 
would produce similar secondary advantages.  
Hybrid-vessels seek to combine the benefits of combining more than one type of primary 
propulsion system, accepting a lower degree of overall savings when compared to pure-sail 
vessels but retaining similar (or enhanced) performance capability to totally fossil-fuel driven 
shipping.  It is a ‘best of both worlds’ or ‘better than either world’ approach.  Fuel use, 
whether fossil or other, is minimised or eliminated when sailing conditions are optimum yet 
the vessel can steam or motor-sail when weather conditions are not complimentary.  
Additional benefits (increase in overall passage speeds, reduced engine wear, increased 
inherent stability, passenger/crew comfort, etc) as evidenced for sail-auxiliary systems will 
also apply to hybrid configurations.   
Current market leaders of hybrid designs, e.g. Greenheart, B9, E-Ship 1, are predicting fuel 
savings of up to 60%.  This is also similar to the savings Jim Brown calculated for his fast 
25m passenger catamarans and 20m tuna long-liner and in the range being reported currently 
by the Kwai.  Where the auxiliaries are alternative-fuel powered, biogas for B9 and PV-
powered electric motors for Greenheart, this should result in close to zero-emissions.  The 
true cost of these technologies requires greater economic analysis than provided.  It was 
previously cautioned that biogas may arguably be cleaner but is not necessarily cheaper.  
However, rapid recent advances in technology, especially PV and electric motors, indicate 
they will become increasingly cost efficient, therefore more accessible and so more readily 
acceptable and serviceable.  Such technology is currently not well embedded here, especially 
in remote locations, and there is a case for arguing that given the fuel use will be minimal it 
may be more appropriate, if less purist, in the immediate future to use existing and locally 
understood and serviceable fossil-fuel motors.  
Finally, pure-sail options, at the far extreme of the scale, can offer up to 100% reductions, 
although there are increasing penalties in terms of scheduling and routing, which need to be 
considered.  Needing only small or no power plants, asset cost and downstream operating and 
servicing costs are accordingly reduced. 
All the propulsion types considered (including pure-motor vessel operators seeking to 
maximise efficiencies) require greater cognisance and allowance for wind route planning.  On 
some days the assistance available from wind power will be greater than others and wind 
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direction will affect overall passage scheduling and course if maximum potential is to be 
realised.  Such cognisance is necessary for both operators and service users.  
But it need not be such a barrier as may be perceived.  Conventional routes are regularly 
affected and changed in relation to weather conditions.  While a conventional mechanical 
drive, powered by whatever fuel, allows a vessel to travel directly to windward (the reason 
after all that first steam and then fossil-fuel driven vessels came to dominate in the first place) 
it does not necessarily follow they can do so comfortably, efficiently or safely.  They can 
certainly not do so cheaply.  Current timetabling throughout the world has already been 
affected since 2008 by the introduction of slow-steaming regimes.  The anecdotal evidence in 
Fiji currently is that most ferry operators have dramatically reduced steaming speeds on 
several routes to off-set fuel costs.  In the Tokelau example (Section 5.3) the recently 
supplied short-term lease vessel, although capable of much higher speeds, will not be 
exceeding 11 knots because of this factor81.	   In any regard, the type and condition of many 
local domestic vessels regularly means sailings are postponed or curtailed because of weather 
conditions.   
While irregular variations to routes and timetables to allow for wind route planning to be 
effective may be a result of introducing new technology, any negatives of this need to be 
balanced against the potential benefits.  In the Kwai example it has not apparently affected 
demand for their service.  In the case of the villages envisaged as the beneficiaries of the 
catamaran options being explored for Solodamu, if the service timetable varies from week to 
week and passage to passage but the net result is a regular service at reduced costs with asset 
ownership and management being locally controlled, it is likely the negatives would be seen 
to be significantly outweighed.  Route planning then needs to considered and factored, but 
does not appear necessarily a major or unassailable impediment.  
And it is not an ‘either/or’ situation.  In many cases, alternative-energy vessels offer a 
supplement rather than a competitor to existing services and this is especially true for 
currently uneconomic routes.  Alternative technologies should increase the range of service 
options available.  In the Rotuman and Tokelau examples, a coordinated fleet of smaller, 
alternative-powered vessels could be used to provide an increased frequency of smaller loads 
while bulk items (heavy machinery, etc) can be transported on less frequent, conventional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  http://beehive.govt.nz/release/new-ferry-lifeline-remote-tokelau, accessed 16/7/2012	  
	  	   	   	  
172	  
load-carrying barges or ships (though the ability to fit these with kite-sails or other auxiliaries 
is also a technologically available option). 
5.2.1. Is there a Technological Barrier and is it the Primary Barrier? 
There does not appear a barrier in terms of technological design or knowledge and this is 
especially true for domestic shipping options.  The experiments from the last oil crisis 
indicate that technological solutions are available, or at very least readily conceivable and 
attainable, and capable of achieving savings across a range of applications.  Despite the view 
expressed by MFAT, (see Mayhew, 2011b and related emails in Section 5.3.3), the concerns 
that alternative energy powered shipping is a new, unknown, or untested option are not 
consistent with this research.  Some of the current advances may be new, e.g. kite-sails, but in 
the main it is mature technology.  Sails themselves are as old as transport itself and PV, 
electric drives, small-scale catamarans; wind-powered barging and auxiliary-sail rigs have 
been available and proven for a long time.  The technology used in the Flettner drive (see 
Section 4.3.3) was comprehensively proven in the 1920's but has not been exploited since 
until very recently by Enercon.  
Small-scale shipping, particularly appropriate for community to inter-island domestic use, 
looks especially well-suited to adaptation either by retro-fitting existing vessels in various 
ways or replacement with dedicated alternatives which would provide greater rates of 
efficiency.  The solutions being considered or implemented internationally for medium-scale 
shipping (e.g. B9, Ecoliner, Enercon) are attractive technologically but at a procurement cost 
an order of magnitude above the capacity of existing PIC budgets.  But here it is access to 
affordable technology, not the technology itself, which is the barrier.  While Third-World 
orientated solutions are not currently being explored at any scale, with the exception of the 
Greenheart project, there are a number of options available.  At the micro-scale, the small 
multihull vessels, such as have been considered here for the Solodamu case example, it is 
obvious that technology is not the barrier.  A range of proven designs are available and have 
been for some decades.  Jim Brown’s designs appear eminently sensible and have done so for 
at least three decades as do Wharram and Newick versions.  Brown’s vision was not limited 
just to transport but also to bluewater fishing vessels.  The ability to turn these designs into 
usable and viable assets using straightforward construction processes and relatively cheap 
materials is also well known as was proven in the FAO case and as is currently the case with 
KiriKraft in Kiribati.  
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Possibly the greatest barrier the technology poses is the perception that alternative shipping is 
essentially a ‘technological’ issue.  This blurring has always been the case.  “Seafaring is 
about more than technology and seafaring skills.  Activities at sea need to be viewed in their 
wider social context.  Voyaging is a social process that also involves onshore infrastructure to 
provide logistical and organisational needs as well as training and motivational influences,” 
wrote D’Arcy (2006:177) about Pacific sailors in times past and it is as relevant today.   
D’Arcy’s point is underscored throughout recent history.  If Couper (1973) is correct, Pacific 
Islanders’ attempts to establish locally-owned and operated sea-transport ventures in the past 
has not generally failed because of an inability to adopt and adapt new technology but from 
more intricate reasons, which include the need for commercial application to include, 
acknowledge, and allow for cultural imperatives within the commercial operating modus.  
Even when shown to be viable, substantive challenges will exist to re-association of Pacific 
Island communities with sail technology, many of which are perceptual, social, and cultural 
as well as physical or economic.  This appears as true today in Solodamu as it was for the 
historic period Couper was considering.  Only through serious analysis of all factors can we 
evaluate whether the effort of accommodating all needs warrants achieving the benefits the 
technology might accrue.  An understanding and accommodation of the wider social and 
cultural context within which such technology is to be deployed must be achieved.   
Na Mataisau, Shin Aitoku Maru and Kwai would seem to demonstrate that a range of existing 
vessel classes can be retrofitted and achieve considerable and varied savings, in the case of 
Na Mataisau and Kwai at moderate cost.  The high asset cost of the Japanese oil tankers 
reflects the ‘high technology’ approach employed, sophisticated and expensive sail 
technology coupled with the then high cost of the computer technology in 1984 to operate.  
The Japanese developers were also concerned with ensuring crew costs were minimised and 
believed computer-controlled electronics could significantly reduce crewing levels.  
However, the fuel and related savings achieved by the Japanese could also be sought using 
‘low technology’ adaptations of the concept.  In Section 5.4 the use of such rigs is suggested 
for bluewater barge traffic in Fiji. 
Na Mataisau involved retrofitting an existing ship and one originally designed to be primarily 
motor driven.  The hull configuration is quite different to a purpose design sail-driven hull 
and the researchers were initially and wrongly sceptical of the performance under an auxiliary 
sail rig.  The Kwai is the second example in the second-hand category; all the others, bar 
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SkySails which is discussed separately, have focussed on a new asset approach.  The Kwai 
example appears to successfully demonstrate the economic viability of taking an old, second-
hand vessel and progressively modifying to alternative-energy as profits accumulated from 
fuel savings allow.  She is arguably the most cost-effective and reliable vessel on the current 
Cook Islands run and there are irregular media reports of her filling in on routes where other 
ships are unavailable due to either high cost or breakdown.  
The obvious alternative to the Kwai example is a Greenheart type approach, employing a 
new purpose-built asset with a similar load capacity but superior performance being predicted 
for a comparable overall asset cost.  Greenheart has the added advantages of being entirely 
fossil-fuel free, therefore lowering operating margins even further, and being designed to 
operate without the need for shore-side infrastructure.  As new asset, her maintenance costs 
should theoretically be substantively lower, at least initially. 
Kite-sails offer potential at national and regional level and for both transport and fishing.  The 
retrofitting capability is alluring.  As was pointed out in Section 4.3.3, a careful assessment of 
the economics of the IRR on the asset, operation and maintenance will be needed (as it will 
for any emergent technology).  Specialist operation skills and training will also be required.  
This in itself should not be seen as a major barrier and is true for many emergent technologies 
across all development fields, not specifically shipping or transport. 
At the large scale and international levels, there is more of a basis for arguing a technological 
barrier, and even here current designs appear well poised.  As discussed elsewhere, it is 
access to the technology because of economic barriers that is likely to be the major inhibitor, 
not the technology itself. 
5.2.2. Reporting 
There has been poor documentation of case examples in many instances.  Na Mataisau 
arguably offers the most reliable and objective data.  The Shin Aitoku Maru project was 
dogged with counterclaims over the reliability of the information provided (Clayton, 1987).  
With other international examples, such as Enercon and SkySails, I have not been able to 
source credible independent reviews of performance and cost/benefit analysis.  There are 
obvious commercial sensitivities around such information.  Okeanos is a clear example of one 
intervention that makes substantive claims but fails to deliver any supporting evidence.  
Initiatives’ such as Kwai, a purely commercial venture, have not been so shy in providing 
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open data on their operations and costings.  I also heard anecdotal reports of several past 
attempts to develop alternative small-scale shipping in different parts of Pacific that have 
never been formally reported, some where projects never got past conception and others 
where they failed for a variety of reasons (under-financing, poor construction, and lack of 
understanding of local environments - economic, political, and social).  It is also obvious that 
there have been limited attempts to collaborate between projects.  There are hopeful signs of a 
wind-shift with the active involvement of a wide range of stakeholders and participants at the 
SSTT 2012.  
5.2.3. Projects and the Project Cycle 
A number of the case studies have been ‘project’ based – e.g. Mataisau, Lapita 
Tikopia/Lapita Anuta, FAO, Okeanos, Batiki.  We are dealing with a concept which is 
fundamentally an industrial application of technology where a R&D ‘hump’ has to be passed 
to prove the economic worth before there is likely to be any scale of commercial uptake.  It is 
likely that the path forward will involve further projects.  There are inherent dangers with 
these, common to many aid or development initiatives, illustrated in the case examples.  
In broad terms there are three key lessons.  The focus on the technology is at the expense of 
the wider operating environment and related issues.  Okeanos is a case in point, where a top 
New Zealand designer and yard has produced a high-tech solution and it has then been taken 
out looking for a use without preliminary work being done in the target catchment.  Whether 
the vessel type and construction is best suited for its end use is unknown.  Building the vessel 
in a first-world setting without the full participation of the end users is only addressing part of 
the problem and potentially creating greater difficulties further down the project cycle or, 
worse, after it has ended and external support withdrawn.  
The focus on the technology trap was also evident in Anuta and Tikopia, where a proven 
vessel was left to rot because of a lack of understanding of local politics and culture and an 
assumption these would be similar on neighbouring islands.  It would appear that most 
projects in this field have focussed their energy on the technology with insufficient attention 
to the critical social, political, and economic operating catchment.  Investment in 
technological application has not been matched with investment and planning in the human 
capital that will own, operate, and manage those assets and sufficient thought has not been 
given to the unique human operating environments they would serve.  
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Secondly, the project lifecycles are generally short, at best a few years.  In the Na 
Mataisau/Cagidonu and FAO cases it appears that savings were not maintained after the 
project, despite the technology being proven, because there was no ongoing monitoring 
programme and no incentive for the crew to achieve savings.  In the FAO case, a large 
number of vessel types and numbers were provided, the design and execution of the projects 
appears exemplary, but as soon as the project cycle ended, use of technology dropped.  Once 
the project cycle is complete, there is seldom any follow-on or follow-up, and the intervention 
becomes isolated and disconnected.  
Thirdly, projects tend to lack flexibility, be externally driven, and require positive results to 
be judged successful.  In the Batiki case the right solution was arrived at but for the wrong 
problem.  When it became apparent it was a transport issue not a fishing issue, the project 
managers/donors were not able to be flexible in their design and delivery.  I have alluded 
previously to the project danger that if successful outcomes are not delivered within the 
project framework or timeframe, the project is generally considered a failure and not an 
opportunity to learn from experience and accumulate data for subsequent attempts.  As such 
an ‘unsuccessful’ project can poison the well for other initiatives.   
In light of this assessment, the need is argued here for a long-term coordinated and cross-
discipline programme of research and investigation as opposed to individual and 
disconnected short-term pilot projects.  There are too many interconnections and similarities 
across Oceania for any project to happen in isolation.  In this regard our ocean is simply too 
small.  This is of course no new revelation.  Couper (1973) noted that the efforts of Batiki 
villagers to gain control over transport links between their island and mainland were regularly 
repeated in similar examples across Fiji and Oceania.  Bayliss-Smith (1988:181) recorded 
that “in relation to commercial shipping criteria, these village-based schemes are usually 
judged to be hopeless failures, since they seldom persist beyond the lifetime of a one 
particular boat which itself may be terminated prematurely by shipwreck or bankruptcy.  
Commercial expansion in order to mount a sustained challenge to existing shipping interests 
is generally not envisaged by the organisers, but anyway it does not happen.  Yet judged from 
the perspective of villagers the profit and loss account seems much more evenly balanced”.  If 
the ultimate goal is to increase community resilience, then such projects must be orientated 
and driven at this level, fully supported externally and their effectiveness critically monitored. 
There is an extremely important lesson embedded in the FAO work where it was found that 
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those Oceania cultures that have managed to maintain “a living tradition of the use of sail” 
(FAO, 1986:71) have a distinct advantage over other communities in successfully adopting 
sail-based adaptations.  This is especially true in an Oceania setting where leverage for 
transition is sought from the region’s sailing heritage.  Most Fiji island/coastal communities 
are now at least two or three generations removed from such tradition and it is unknown to 
what degree this has dislocated cultural capacities.  It was certainly ‘lost’ knowledge in 
Solodamu and many other Fijian communities I have had experience with, except in the Lau.  
A transition from fossil-fuel to sail-based sea-transport, whether at an individual fisher or 
inter-state cargo level, requires more than changing the means of propulsion.  A true sailing 
culture must be re-instilled in both transport operators and end-users, effecting a change from 
‘mariners’ to ‘sailors’.  As FAO recorded, these skills and mentality are already instilled in 
cultures for whom sailing is as normal as swimming in their primary cultural environment.  
Such communities are now as rare as historically they were prevalent.  
The FAO example also provides the valuable learning that, ultimately, the technology must 
be proved of direct economic benefit for there to be any long-term uptake, regardless of what 
other benefits are on offer.  If such benefit is not obvious to the end user, uptake will always 
be an upwind exercise.  This underscores the breadth of the challenge.  Both mana and money 
need to be fully considered and incorporated if a change is sought to be effected at the level 
of paradigm. 
Many of these lessons were reinforced by the presentations prepared by Mike Savins for the 
SSTT 2012 that summarised 20 years of practical experience of building small-scale 
alternative vessels for village and island use in Tuvalu, Kiribati, and the Solomons.  His other 
key points included being cognisant of the large variation in vessel design requirements in the 
Pacific, that costs of vessels must be a key criteria when talking sustainability and he stressed 
that new technology must be both affordable and serviceable.  These experiences underscore 
the critical need for long-term commitments to demonstration of concept and investment in 
training and capacity building of end users. 
5.3. A Tale of Two Sea-Transport Scenarios: Rotuma and Tokelau 
This section considers two case examples of current Oceanic remote island shipping 
scenarios.  The sea-transport issues and recent history for each case are summarised and the 
two compared  in light of the knowledge acquired from the preceding sections.  The role that 
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alternative shipping options might play in these two examples is then discussed. Finally there 
is a discussion of Tokelau’s renewable electricity generation programme compared against 
the implications of recent policy decisions that suggest Tokelau’s sea-transport future, by far 
the largest portion of the country’s energy footprint, is to be fossil-fuel bound for the 
foreseeable future.  It is concluded there is no logical or rational reason, apart from the 
inherent invisibility of the option, why alternative-energy alternatives aren’t being considered 
for sea-transport in either scenario given the potential benefits and savings. 
5.3.1. Overview 
There are a number of similarities between the Rotuma and Tokelau scenarios.  Both have 
long seafaring heritages.  Both represent extreme examples of the Pacific sea-transport 
dilemma; small populations on geographically remote, small islands, with highly limited 
economic income generation capacity.  Sea-transport always has been, is increasingly today, 
and will remain for the foreseeable future, the lifeline of each, and a high priority for resident 
communities.  Neither has a protected harbour meaning a vessel of any scale cannot be 
locally-based and a return trip to an external homeport is always required.   
Their sea-transport history in the past century has seen an increasingly desperate situation 
develop, littered with literal and economic shipwrecks.  All options in at least the past 50 
years have been fossil-fuel propelled and have required ever-increasing government 
subsidisation.  Sea-transport is regularly the largest line item in government budgets in 
Tokelau records (Tokelau Government Website82) and while this has not been confirmed for 
Rotuma it can be assumed to be of a similar scale.  This situation has been exacerbated by the 
ever-increasing international cost of MDO, a trend which is predicted to continue.  The client 
communities of both islands have increasing transport demands and expect increasing levels 
of service, safety, and comfort.  Both are currently subjects of their respective government 
processes to develop long-term sea-transport solutions.  
There are three major differences.  Rotuma has the advantage of also having air access.  
Rotuma is a high volcanic island whereas Tokelau comprises three atolls separated by 
bluewater passages with a high point of some 3-5m above high tide and therefore vulnerable 
to being totally destroyed by sea-level rise and other global warming related changes or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 http://www.tokelau.org.nz/Tokelau+Government/Government+Departments/Department+of+Transport++Sup
port+Services.html, accessed 12 July 2012. 
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severe weather events in the short to medium term.  Finally Rotuma is politically integral 
with Fiji, itself a SIS, while Tokelau is a voluntary dependency of New Zealand, an 
acknowledged member of the ‘developed’ world.  Tokelau’s quasi-independence means that 
it reports annually on its political status to the UN General Assembly, where its reports 
regularly prioritise shipping and climate change over all other issues83. 
Both case studies presented themselves serendipitously.  The difficulties and costs of 
providing sea-transport to Rotuma are well-known to the Fiji government.  As documented in 
Section 4.2, the government has historically been reluctant to provide such services directly, 
preferring to use the franchise scheme to subside commercial operators.  Even with a high 
subsidy rate it has proven increasingly difficult to find operators prepared to take on the route 
and the government fleet does not have capacity to always provide adequate cover when 
commercial operators fall short.  In 2012, following a successful FIVS-run workshop of 
Fijian stakeholders to introduce the concept of alternative sea-transport options, FIVS 
received an invitation to present to the government-appointed Rotuma Think Tank on 
potential options. 
I agreed to assist FIVS in researching this as it fitted with my research focus for two principal 
reasons.  Firstly, Rotuma represents the most extreme shipping route within the Fiji group, a 
bluewater return run of more than 300nm each way from any other port in Fiji.  It is therefore 
assumed that this represents the most extreme shipping dilemma in terms of cost and 
difficulty and that if an alternative-energy solution could be used cost effectively for Rotuma 
then it could do so for any Fijian route.  
Secondly, Na Mataisau (see Section 5.1) had been trialled on the Rotuma route in 1984 under 
auxiliary sail rig and demonstrated strong efficiencies.  Discussions with Greenheart (see 
Section 4.3.3) suggested their proposed alternative-energy vessel design could be suitable for 
servicing the route.  Although her proposed configuration does not currently provide the 
passenger accommodation that would be needed to support the indicated demand, her 
displacement, and overall loading specifications are not that dissimilar to the Na Mataisau.  
Given SV Greenheart is a purpose-designed sailing vessel, unlike Na Mataisau, it can be 
assumed that the efficiencies and therefore savings of Na Mataisau would be a safe 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 UN General Assembly, Special Committee on Decolonization, 10th Meeting (AM) 25 June 2010.  
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/gacol3213.doc.htm 
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conservative estimate to use to calculate the minimum savings of the Greenheart.  
Southampton University had calculated ‘Reduced Fuel Factors’ for Viti Levu-Rotuma in 
1985/85 as 1.55 and 1.03 for the outward and homeward legs respectively or a more than 
50% outward saving and a small over-all homeward one (Satchwell, 1986).  Given that a 
custom design would have greater windward capacity than the retrofitted auxiliary rig of Na 
Mataisau; this indicates a highly conservative minimum fuel saving of more than 25% on 
current usage by comparable craft and more than 50% a more likely conservative estimate84.   
The presentation to the Rotuma Think Tank has been delayed at the time of writing (October 
201285).  I was, however, in the process of researching the Rotuma scenario when the New 
Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs made an announcement of a NZ$17 million solution for 
Tokelau’s shipping problems (12 June 2012).  The subsequent media reports immediately 
caught my attention as Tokelau had been at the periphery of other aspects of the inquiry; 
particularly in relation to drua culture where Tokelau is possibly the north-eastern extreme of 
the drua-design catchment (see Chapter 6).  Tokelau is similar in both population and 
distance from safe anchorage to Rotuma.  Comparison of Rotuma and Tokelau gave the 
opportunity to compare a Fijian scenario with another Pacific case.  Also Tokelau’s intention 
of being the first country in the world to achieve 100% renewable energy use by 2012 has 
been well reported in the media over the last three years and I wanted to confirm how sea-
transport was included in this claim.  I have never visited Tokelau, although I had once 
passed between its atolls in command of a small sailing ship in heavy weather whilst on 
passage to Samoa and am fully cognisant of how difficult the operating environment can be.   
I wanted to know if the Tokelau ‘solution’ announced by the Minister provided lessons that 
might be of assistance in the Rotuma example.  I also wanted to know if the ‘solution’ had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 It is difficult to give truly accurate estimates of savings without cleaner data than available currently.  
However, if a highly conservative estimate of 500t MDO p.a. is used for sea-transport to Rotuma currently 
and if all options were available using hybrid technology this could equate to at least FJ$0.5 million savings, 
comparable to the current annual subsidy for the route.  These calculations and the others in this section 
require more careful and expert scrutiny.  However it is contended they provide sufficient evidence to 
warrant such investigation. 
85 FIVS and Greenheart presented in December 2012. 
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ever included consideration of alternative energy options86 and what the effect of including 
such options would be on the predicted costs and services.  If no such consideration had been 
factored into the proposal then what, if any, contribution could this research programme and 
that of my collaborators such as Greenheart offer?  Also, Tokelau, a fully government-
operated service, might allow better access to data on costings and expenditure, an area I have 
found difficult to access in terms of Fiji’s highly competitive, private commercial operating 
environment.  Consequently, I attempted to enter into a dialogue with MFAT.  
I and another colleague had separately made repeated approaches to discuss concepts of 
sustainable shipping generally with NZAid/MFAT since 2009, resulting in meetings in the 
High Commission in Suva in 2009 and MFAT’s offices in Wellington in 2010.  The initial 
response to approaches in 2012 repeated the pattern of the earlier attempts.  We were politely 
received, our initial information offerings were described as exciting and positive and when it 
became apparent that we weren’t offering a commercial and immediately available solution, 
but rather initial research findings and options for a paradigm shift to the approach MFAT 
was currently embarked on, it was quickly suggested that we could possibly come back again 
the next year when MFAT wasn't so preoccupied.  We were also told clearly that the issues of 
sustainable sea-transport for PICs simply weren’t a focus for MFAT at this time. 
My initial requests for background information from MFAT on the Tokelau shipping issues 
and the Ministerial announcement were rejected as being commercially and/or politically 
sensitive and I was forced to repeat such requests under the Official Information Act.  After 
several weeks this resulted in the release of edited copies of Ministerial briefing papers on 
Tokelau shipping issues from 2006 to 200887.  While these contain some useful data, it has 
been necessary to assemble the summary on Tokelau by extrapolation of the data released 
with other information sourced from various websites.  
As shown below, the issue of providing a long-term Tokelau shipping service has become 
increasingly expensive and protracted with no long-term solution now likely before at least 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 It apparently has not, although MFAT’s refusal to disclose records makes it impossible to conclusively 
confirm this. 
87 This was only a fraction of what I had requested and I have since applied to the Ombudsman to have the 
entirety of the information I sought released.  Unfortunately this has not resulted in provision of more recent 
briefing papers and other reports held by MFAT at the time of writing. 
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2014.  Despite investment of millions of dollars each year for at least a decade, Tokelau has 
been left with an inadequate service that is arguably marginal at best in terms of safety and 
capacity.  The NZ government was scheduled to go to international tender for design and 
construction of a new Tokelau ship in August/September 2012.  It does not appear that there 
is any incentive or requirement for this to consider renewable energy options.  
5.3.2. Rotuma Sea-transport Scenario 
The islands of Rotuma are located north of Fiji (348 nm Ahua to Suva; 320 nm to Lautoka; 
360 nm to Savusavu).  Rotuma Island itself is 13 kilometres long and 4 kilometres wide and 
home to about 2000 Rotumans.  About 10,000 Rotumans now reside on Viti Levu (Howard 
and Rensel, 2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36 Location Map of Rotuma 
Although annexed under the ambit of the larger Fijian colony in 1881, Rotuma presents its 
own distinct historical, cultural, and geographical circumstances (Nicole, 2006:22).  As with 
other Oceanic cultures, it has a long seafaring heritage (e.g. Hornell, 1975); although Howard 
(in Feinburg, 1995:11488) suggests not as significant as many other Polynesian societies.  
This legacy has not been assessed in this thesis with the same rigour as applied to drua 
culture in the rest of Fiji89.  The use of indigenous bluewater sailing vessels appears to have 
ceased within a few decades of the arrival of regular whaling and trading ships.  D’Arcy 
(2006:95-96) quotes the visiting yachtsman Wood in the early 1870’s whose report suggests 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Dr Howard also includes extensive notes on Rotuman vessels and voyaging at www.rotuma.net. 
89 Although I hope to return to this subject in the future.  There is an intriguing possibility that Rotuma may 
have played a catalytic role in the transfer of the oceanic lateen rig between Micronesia and central Oceania.  
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Rotumans historically had significant bluewater capacity: “one sees several large double 
canoes, similar to those of Fiji and Tonga, lying in their sheds on the beach.  The people 
assure me that no one now alive, or their fathers before them, have ever seen these canoes in 
the water.  Were they to launch them, they would not know how to manage them, nor could 
they make the mat sails suitable to them, so completely have they lost all their former 
knowledge of navigation”. 
Local food production formed the basis for commerce with European ships in the 19th 
century, when the island was a favourite stopping place for whalers to re-provision.  Rotuma 
also began a brisk trade in coconut oil, which gave way to copra in the 1870’s.  In addition to 
trading with passing ships, Rotuman men eagerly seized opportunities to sign on as crew, or 
to work in the pearl fisheries in the Torres Straits, diving and managing boats.  They earned 
both good wages and a reputation for competence and reliability (Howard, 1995, also 
http://www.rotuma.net/os/Economy.html). 
After cession to the British Crown in 1881, Rotuma was incorporated into the Colony of Fiji, 
and was closed as a port of entry90.  Rotumans continued to seek opportunities for earning 
and adventure on ships, though they had to go to Fiji to do so.  Copra, became the island's 
primary cash crop, and had to be shipped through Fiji.  Political affiliation with Fiji has been 
central in facilitating Rotuma's economic well-being, not only in providing government jobs 
on the island, but by allowing Rotuman migrants in-country access to opportunities for 
education and employment, and ease of interaction with those on the island 
(http://www.rotuma.net/os/Economy.html). 
Transport Infrastructure 
The island is serviced by a small airstrip.  There is no secure harbour and a jetty has been 
constructed accessing an open leeward roadstead.  The government allocated FJ$400,000 in 
its 2011 Budget to complete the extension of the Rotuma jetty by about 7m (Fiji Times, 
27/1/2011).  In adverse conditions or in the presence of persistent ground swell, cargo and 
passengers must be lightered to beaches with local boats. 
Air Services 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 It was re-opened as an entry port in 2010 in an attempt to stimulate Rotuman trade.  
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The frequency and costs of air services has fluctuated in recent years.  In 2007 Air Fiji flew 
from Suva to Rotuma on Wednesdays and Fridays, a two hour one-way trip costing FJ$430 
per seat.  In February 2011 fares with Pacific Sun had risen to FJ$610.80 one-way, rising by 
March 2012 to FJ$631 (Fiji Times, 28/2/2011).  Airlines are dependent on fuel supplies 
shipped in by sea for the return flight, causing obvious issues.  For example in January 2011, 
Pacific Sun temporarily suspended its Rotuma service for several weeks due to a lack of on-
island aviation fuel (Fiji Sun, 25/1/2011).  
Energy Demand 
In 2007 Rotuma consumed a total of 300,000 litres of liquid fuels per annum91.  Diesel 
accounted for 185,000 litres, followed by 45,600 litres of Multi-Purpose Kerosene and 36,000 
litres of premix.  All fuel is imported by sea in 200 litre drums.  Demand is expected to 
increase moderately over the next 10 years92.  Current studies into use of coconut-based fuels 
suggest there is potential for Rotuma to meet its local demand with the appropriate 
technology and planning, and further potential for export, albeit that such technology is still 
in an embryonic state93. 
Shipping History 
On several occasions Rotumans have attempted to gain control of shipping by purchasing and 
operating their own vessel.  As early as 1901 they had a schooner built to ship copra and 
passengers between Rotuma and Sydney via Suva.  The 50 tonne vessel cost over £2,000 and 
operated for eighteen months before sinking on a reef (Eason, 1951:89-90).  More recently, in 
1992, a Rotuman group purchased an inter-island vessel, the second-hand MV Wairua, at a 
cost of FJ$250,000.  For every basket of copra cut on Rotuma, 25 cents was levied.  It went 
aground on a reef off Kadavu in 1993 and was judged unsalvageable.  Insurers denied 
liability (Howard, 1995). 
Numerous vessels have been used to service Rotuma including Fiji government vessels, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Given that Rotuman bound vessels do not bunker there this figure does not included the fuel used by 
shipping.  A ballpark estimate including the shipping fuel would likely more than double this figure. 
92	  	  	  http://www.rotuma.net/os/Publications/Biofuel_Rotuma.pdf accessed 26/8/2012. 
93	  	  	  	  http://www.rotuma.net/os/Publications/Biofuel_Rotuma.pdf accessed 26/8/2012. 
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Rotuman-owned vessels, and Fijian-owned commercial vessels.  In recent years all have been 
either old and unreliable ships, or tourist-orientated vessels pressed into service for lack of 
alternatives.  Given the nature of the route, it attracts government subsidies under the 
Shipping Franchise Scheme, currently aimed at subsidising a monthly service.  In 2005 
FJ$2.2 million was budgeted by the government for the scheme to improve services to 
Kadavu, Rotuma, Lomaiviti, and the Lau group.  Western Shipping Services, which was then 
servicing the Rotuma route, received about FJ$14,000 per trip94 (Fiji Times, 20/11/2005).  No 
arrangement has yet proved totally satisfactory and a number of vessels have been lost, in part 
at least due to the age and condition of the vessels. 
Kadavu Shipping & Holdings, a subsidiary of the Kadavu Provincial Council, lost the Bulou-
ni-Ceva in 2006, seen here sitting on the reef at Lopta, Rotuma (Figure).  Locals reported that 
the boat came to Rotuma with only one engine working.  The insurer denied liability (Fiji 
Times 13/11/2006; 30/12/2006). 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  
 
 
Figure 37 MV Bulou-ni-Ceva 
Source:	  http://www.rotuma.net/os/NewsArchive/Archive2006/archive0607.htm  
Western Shipping operated the Bawaqa and Cagi Mai Ba from Suva to Rotuma and 2007 
prices were quoted as deck/cabin FJ$130/150 
(http://www.lonelyplanet.com/fiji/rotuma/transport/getting-there-away).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Other companies receiving subsides under the scheme at this time were Seaview Shipping Services 
(Lomaiviti, Kadavu, and southern Lau routes), Sali Basaga Shipping, Khan's Shipping, Lalavata Shipping, 
and Kapaiwai Shipping. 
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The Fiji Times (23/52008) reported that “thousands living on outer islands face the possibility 
of isolation as a shipping company revises its schedules to cope with increasing fuel prices.  
People living in the Lau and Yasawa groups along with those on Rotuma may have their 
transport link severely disrupted as Western Shipping Company Limited plans to cut back on 
trips to the areas”.  The company claimed fuel price rises meant the routes were now 
uneconomic even with subsidies.  “Our fuel bill for running a trip to Rotuma alone stands at 
more than $23,000 and this will rise further, the fuel bill for a trip that left for Lau today 
(yesterday) stands at $22,700 while a regular trip to Yasawa is about $3000" (Fiji Times, 
23/5/2008).   
In December 2007 Blue Lagoon Cruises management reported they were in the process of 
retrieving their vessel, the 39m MV Lycianda, which ran aground on Oinafa Reef in Rotuma 
due to strong winds caused by Hurricane Daman.  The boat was able to detach itself from the 
reef (Fiji Times, 9/12/2007).   
 
Blue Lagoon Cruises resumed services to Rotuma in February and March 2011 after MV 
Nanuya Princess's maiden and subsequent voyages in November 2010 and January 2011.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 38 MV Lycianda 
Source: http://www.tropicalfiji.com/Resorts/blue_lagoon_cruises/lycianda.asp accessed 
2/7/13 
They were asked by Fiji Shipping Limited to service the Fiji-Rotuma route after a temporary 
suspension of inter-island services placed on Bligh Water Shipping's MV Westerland in 
October the previous year by the Minister of Transport because of the poor condition of that 
vessel (Fiji Times, 25/1/2011). 
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The Fiji Times (11 April 2011) reported that the government would continue to subsidise one 
boat trip per month under the franchise scheme and that additional unsubsidised trips could be 
made by private shipping operators if they choose.  They obviously chose not to as the next 
year the Fiji Sun (10 May 2012) reported that a government vessel was expected to service 
Rotuma on an additional quarterly basis after transportation problems to the island were 
raised with the government.  By then Rotuma was being serviced monthly by the MV Lady 
Sandy under the Government franchise scheme at a fare of FJ$185 per head one-way.  The 
high cost to passengers was the reason given by the government for providing the additional 
services.   
5.3.3. Tokelau Sea-transport Scenario 
Tokelau is a non-self-governing territory of New Zealand consisting of three coral atolls in 
the South Pacific: Atafu, Nukunonu, and Fakaofo.  These atolls lie approximately mid-way 
between Hawaii and New Zealand and about 300nm north of Samoa.  It has a maximum 
altitude of 3-5m above sea level and a total land area of 10.8 sq km (www.tokelau.com).  The 
population of Tokelau in 2011 was 1,411(NZ Department of Statistics website95). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 39 Location of Tokelau 
In 1925, the atolls came under New Zealand administration and a territory in 1948.  Today, 
more Tokelauans live outside Tokelau than on the islands, with approximately 6,800 living in 
New Zealand.  Tokelau has an Administrator appointed by the New Zealand Minister for 
Foreign Affairs; however, in 2004 the Administrator delegated his powers to the three Village 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 http://stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/people_and_communities/pacific_peoples/2011-tokelau-census-landing-
page/final-count-2011-tokelau-census.aspx, retrieved 22 Aug 2012 
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Councils (www.tokelau.com96).   
Access to Tokelau is only available by sea, there is no anchorage and no lagoon access for 
vessels any larger than outboard-motor propelled fibres.  New Zealand assistance provides 
the vast majority of Tokelau's recurrent budget as well as funds for major projects such as 
infrastructure and shipping (http://www.mfat.govt.nz)97.  
The NZ government considers that “over the past three decades Tokelau has moved 
progressively towards its current advanced level of political self-reliance … It has its own 
shipping and telecommunications systems.  It has full control over its budget” (MFAT 
website).  However, the decision-making that has occurred since at least 1991 in relation to 
providing sea-transport to Tokelau would tend to confirm that all decisions, including 
budgets, on this matter are decided in Wellington. 
Tokelau Shipping Background 
Prior to European contact Tokelauans travelled by canoe to and from quite distant 
neighbouring islands.  Canoe travel other than for fishing purposes is no longer practiced due 
to the convenience of modern shipping services (SPREP, 2002).  As discussed in Chapter 6, 
Tokelau is likely to have been within the historic catchment of drua.  Almost the entire male 
population was lost in 1863 to Peruvian slavers and a dysentery epidemic from Samoa the 
same year reduced the remaining population to only 200 (Hooper and Huntsman, 1991:83).  
This is likely to have had a highly detrimental, possibly terminal, effect on indigenous 
knowledge of seafaring and vessels. 
In more recent times, transport has proved increasingly problematic.  An air link was briefly 
established with seaplanes to Samoa in the 1980’s98 but generally it has been reliant on erratic 
shipping of varying capacity, reliability, and frequency.  The MV Wairua, chartered from 
Suva in the 1980’s, provided the most reliable service for a time.  The NZ government 
procured a dedicated vessel for the Tokelau government, MV Tutulo, in 1992 (McLean and 
‘Aubert, 1993).   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 http://www.tokelau.com/, accessed 22 August 2012 
97 http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Pacific/Tokelau.php, accessed 23 July 2012. 
98 Private helicopters can be chartered from Samoa at high cost.  The current MFAT ‘solution’ includes fresh 
investigations into building a runway or using floatplanes. 
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Tokelau Transport is responsible for the provision of Tokelau’s Shipping Service, the means 
by which the government implements its shipping service policies.  The key objective for the 
government-owned Tokelau Shipping Service is to provide Tokelau with a regular, reliable, 
and safe service covering the carriage and transfer of passengers and freight between Apia 
and Tokelau including also transfers from ship to shore when in Tokelau (Tokelau 
Government Website99).   
MV Tutulo was a custom-built, new-design, power catamaran whose main function was to 
transport passengers and cargo between the three atolls, serve in any emergency evacuation to 
Apia, and transport needed supplies from Apia.  It was, however, not allowed to take 
passengers internationally and was to be supplemented by the MV Forum Tokelau, a 5,136-
ton ship that carried 60 deck passengers and eight cabin passengers between Apia and 
Tokelau (SPREP, 2002).  That ship was procured in 1997 with funding from NZODA and 
was being managed by the Pacific Forum Line under an agreement with PFL, NZODA, and 
the government of Tokelau.  The Forum Tokelau proved too expensive to maintain, accruing 
a repair bill in 1998 of NZ$0.5 million.  With its disposal, the Tutulo was converted, at 
further cost, in 2000 to a mono-hull, renamed MV Tokelau, lengthened and heavily modified 
to allow it to carry passengers internationally (MFAT Ministerial Briefing Paper, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 40 MV Tokelau 
Source:	  http://tabisite.com/phos/190tk/ate.shtml 
It doesn't appear to have been a successful solution.  These changes weakened the structure of 
the vessel and maintenance and repairs costs have proved expensive, with regular slippage 
and refit bills (MFAT Ministerial Briefing Paper, 2008).  For example, the 2011 Tokelau 
budget includes a line of NZ$688,000 for Tokelau slippage.  Such “maintenance and repairs 
costs are expensive but are necessary to keep the ship seaworthy as it is the only means by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 http://www.tokelau.org.nz/Tokelau+Government/Government+Departments/Department+of+Transport++Sup
port+Services.html, accessed 12 July 2012. 
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which Tokelau remains connected to the outside world” (Tokelau Government website100).  
The Tokelau was expected to travel to Tokelau on a fortnightly basis.  The duration of the 
round journey varied between 6 to 11 days depending on inter-atoll and national activities or 
training and consultation requirements (Tokelau Government Website).  At 3.24 tonnes of 
MDO per day to operate, this approximates to 20-35 tonnes per trip or an annual bunker of 
520-910 tonnes per annum101. 
By 2005 MFAT reports to the Minister were stating that the Tokelau was at the end of its 
service life and even extending this by two years would come at considerable cost (MFAT 
Ministerial Briefing Paper, 2006)102.  In 2009 Prime Minister John Keys was quoted as stating 
the Tokelau was costing more than an average of NZ$2 million p.a. to service (Radio 
Australia, 2009103).  The 2009 Tongan ferry disaster, the loss of MV Princess Ashika, brought 
the Tokelauan situation into fresh relief.  Further expensive repairs to Tokelau followed and 
charter ships (which also required MFAT-funded modification) from Samoa Shipping Line 
(SSL) have been regularly used to cover service deficiencies over the past decade.  Tokelau 
was retired from service formally in 2012.  
The costs involved are considerable in terms of the expenditure to maintain the service, the 
projected replacement cost, and the NZ government’s processes of deciding what services to 
provide.  MFAT has yet to disclose the original asset cost of the MV Tutulo or the cost of its 
conversion in 2000 to the MV Tokelau.  However it is likely these were only a small 
proportion of the operational costs through her lifetime.  Ministerial briefing papers quote the 
2005 sea-transport cost for Tokelau as $2.1 million, of which $0.7 million was the cost of 
additional charters from SSL104.  This is only the cost of the subsidy.  In 2007 the cost of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100http://www.tokelau.org.nz/Tokelau+Government/Government+Departments/Department+of+Transport++Sup
port+Services.html. accessed 12 July 2012. 
101 This does not include the fuel bills for emergency evacuation trips or that used by the additional charter 
vessels from SSL.  These would inflate the figures by as much as 50%. 
102 MFAT repeated this advice three years later in 2008 (MFAT Ministerial briefing paper, 2008). 
103 Tue, 15 Sep 2009, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-07-15/tough-voyage-for-tokelau-to-get-new-
boat/1354128 accessed 2 July 2013. 
104 New Zealand’s ODA assistance to Tokelau in 2009 was NZ$19 million 
(http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Pacific/Tokelau.php  accessed 12 July 2012). 
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one-way fare from Tokelau to Samoa was NZ$286 and private freight was also charged105.  
NZ government processes for determining a long-term solution, ongoing since at least 2005, 
had cost more than NZ$0.5 million in project management consultants by 2008, additional to 
the costs of at least six NZ government departments, the commissioning of numerous 
“intensive” independent and inter-departmental assessments, reviews and audits and at least 
two previous complicated international tender processes and additional ‘interim’ charter ship 
leases.  In 2009 and 2011 Tokelau Fono representatives were brought to Wellington for 
briefings at which both sides stated sea-transport was the highest priority subject. 
The June 2012 announcement of a NZ$17 million long-term ‘solution’ includes a two-year 
lease of PB Sea-Tow’s 45m MV Matua at NZ$12 million, design and commissioning of a 
purpose-built vessel, and investigations into shore infrastructure improvements and aircraft 
runway potential	  (http://beehive.govt.nz/release/new-ferry-lifeline-remote-tokelau).  Previous 
Ministerial advice has been that a new design/commissioning process will take a minimum of 
four years (MFAT Ministerial Briefing Paper, 2008) in which case the ‘interim’ charter costs 
can be assumed to need doubling.  The projected conservative asset cost of a new-build in 
2008 was NZ$8–10 million (MFAT Ministerial Briefing Paper, 2008).  In 2009, Prime 
Minister Keys was quoted as stating the option of a 25-year leased vessel would cost NZ$140 
million (Radio Australia, 2009)106.  
5.3.4. Comparison of the Scenarios and the Potential for Alternative Technologies 
To compare the Tokelau/New Zealand figures with Rotuma/Fiji, none of the vessels referred 
to servicing Rotuma would have a replacement value of more than FJ$2 million.  Lack of 
investment capital, low IRR, low income generation potential, and the high physical risks are 
all causative of the Rotuman ‘old ships replaced by old ships’ cycle.  This cycle is unlikely to 
be broken in the future without external intervention.  There is always the possibility that a 
donor may supply a new(ish) vessel but this generally will only be a short-term solution and 
does not address the recurring and ever-increasing high operating costs.  In a BAU scenario, 
options for a solution to the Rotuman situation narrows to increased charges, ever-increasing 
government subsidies, or reduced services.  The only options for reducing bunker cost is to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 http://www.tokelau.org.nz/site/tokelau/files/TeVakaiI.pdf accessed 16 August 2012. 
106 NZ$140 million ÷ 25yr = NZ$5.6 million p.a. Minister McCully’s June 2012 announcement stated NZ$12 
million was allocated for a two-year charter arrangement.  
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reduce steaming speed (already being used), increase vessel load capacity by using larger 
ships (which will require greatly increased expenditure on shore infrastructure) or introducing 
alternative, non-fossil-fuel technologies. 
Ironically, global measures to increase maritime safety and regulation as well as the 
MARPOL regulation changes to SOX emissions from MDO as a climate change mitigation 
process will increase the costs of operating fossil-fuel powered options for both Rotuma and 
Tokelau by as much as 60% over current costs in the near term (see Section 4.3). 
In the case of Tokelau where the relationship with a wealthy patron allowed the option of new 
ship design, poor design and purchase decisions were made in Wellington around 1990 and 
the past two decades have highlighted the long-term consequences.  It also underscores that 
the initial asset cost is only a fraction of the lifetime cost of operation, especially when the 
initial procurement decision has been flawed.  
This has a critical lesson for the decision-making currently being undertaken by NZ 
government processes for the future of Tokelau.  The decision to go with the Tutulo/Tokelau 
Forum option in 1991 and the subsequent decision to convert the Tutulo to the Tokelau in 
2000 effectively sentenced Tokelau to an inadequate, unsatisfactory, and increasingly 
expensive option for half a generation.  It is my opinion that the current decision-making 
process now underway in Wellington could (and is likely to) similarly commit the next 
generation to an equally unaffordable and unsustainable solution, without adequate 
consideration of other options and in particular alternative-energy powered vessels.  Such 
options may provide not only more sustainable shipping services but also greater Tokelauan 
autonomy.  Such measures would require shifts in paradigm, policy, and approach but would 
appear, on the limited evidence available, to be more in keeping with the political wishes of 
the Tokelauans themselves. 
Both communities now expect regular services (fortnightly for Tokelau, monthly for Rotuma) 
and increasing standards of comfort and amenities.  A number of causative factors have 
steadily increased the sea-transport demand in both communities and, I contend, led to a 
continuing decrease in their ability to maintain self-sufficiency.  There is the degree of the 
diaspora of both cultures and the desire to maintain physical contact with kin and ancestral 
roots, combined with an ever-increasing exposure to globalisation through increased 
communications and information technology; leading to exposure, reliance and finally 
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addiction to consumer goods, especially processed foods.  There is also the increased demand 
for access to essential external services (health, education, etc.), and access to greater cash 
through remittances to order and purchase an increasing range and quantity of goods.    
Sea-transport is the lifeline of both communities, as it always has been.  It is likely to retain 
this status for the foreseeable future.  It is an absolute need and priority.  The level of such is 
possibly not fully understood outside of an Oceanic epistemology.  This may go some way to 
explaining why the Rotuman concern is understood by the Fiji government, who lack the 
resources to respond appropriately, and not similarly understood or honoured by Wellington 
politicians in regards to Tokelau, who can commit the funding, albeit to-date begrudgingly 
and inappropriately.  At a global scale, sea-transport for Rotuma and Tokelau is a higher 
priority, an absolute basic need, than for most other communities, especially those in the 
major continental powers, where sea-transport is also an absolute economic necessity, but at 
the level of nation state and not community.   
History demonstrates the difficulty associated with meeting this need.  As a commercial 
investment, sea-transport is clearly high risk, of minimal profit at best and most likely a 
negative economic return.  This is reflected in the reluctance of any party in the Rotuma 
example to invest in high cost assets; the IRR simply cannot justify it.  This means the 
options are always restricted to the continual cycle of old and often-inappropriate vessels 
being replaced with like and is consistent with the regional pattern discussed in Section 4.2. 
The Fiji Times (11 April 2011) reported the government’s preference for Rotuma to have a 
Ro-Ro ferry to transport vehicles and equipment.  Such an option could include the recently 
available Goundhar Transport’s 100m MV Lomaiviti Princess.  She has a gross tonnage of 
5864 tons with a summer dwt of 529 tonnes, built in 1972107, and is significantly larger than 
current vessels on the Rotuma run.  It was reported in local media as costing FJ$2 million to 
purchase in 2010 (Fiji Sun, 2/1/2010).  Vessels of this scale are unlikely to be able to service 
Rotuma without expensive and technologically difficult upgrades to shore infrastructure.  
Although she is large and luxuriously-appointed by local standards, in a global context she 
must be considered close to, if not past, her due-by-date. 
Alternative-energy propelled vessels potentially offer the opposite.  Not restricted by fuel 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107  http://www.shipspotting.com/gallery/photo.php?lid=1360312, accessed 6 September, 2012. 
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bills that require larger vessels to achieve economies of scale, non fossil-fuel ships can be 
smaller.  This allows for fleets of smaller vessels rather than large single-vessel operations, 
which opens up a number of possibilities with local benefit.  It greatly increases operator 
flexibility.  In periods of increased demand, additional ships can be deployed.  Such vessels 
have lower overall procurement costs and no fuel operational costs.  Designs such as 
Greenheart mean they can operate independently of shore infrastructure.  Crewing levels for 
multiple vessels may be higher, but in countries of high unemployment and with a lack of 
vocational options to retain local skilled workforces, this is arguably a positive not a negative 
feature.  In fact, it would go some way to meeting the political objectives of the Tokelau Fono 
who have lobbied NZ to provide capacity-building and training to ensure greater local 
participation and control of their shipping services.  Smaller vessels, with lower procurement 
and operational costs, offer a scenario where they would be affordable to ownership at village 
or family scale, inviting the potential for a collective ownership and central management 
model of business, possibly with a micro-finance component to facilitate establishment.  
Whether such visions are realities would take greater analysis than provided here.  The point 
though is, they are not even options to be considered in the ‘larger conventional vessel, 
economies of scale’ model.  
Such flexibility would have other advantages.  The Tokelauan vessels are currently required 
to perform medical evacuation (Rotuma has the option of aircraft) and maritime surveillance.  
This means a large vessel has to be deployed for medical evacuation, usually a single 
passenger, at the same operational cost of a loaded vessel108.  Smaller alternative-energy 
vessels would significantly reduce this cost.  Smaller vessels means smaller loads, but more 
regular passages can be made, increasing the number of vessels in the vicinity, which would 
increase surveillance and coverage for maritime emergencies.  
Passenger discomfit is also cited as a major issue for both routes.  This is due to the use of 
inappropriate vessels in both cases, for example the chartered MV Lady Naomi, a modified 
coastal passenger vessel that rolls heavily in open sea conditions on the Tokelau run.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 MFAT projects this to be in the order of NZ$250,000 for an average 3 trips p.a..  Tokelau Fono 
representatives reported in 2009 that the number of such trips is regularly under-reported. 
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Figure 41 MV Lady Naomi 
Source: http://www.tokelau.org.nz/site/tokelau/files/TeVakaiI.pdf accessed 27 August 2012. 
The evidence from the Na Mataisau and Japanese oil tanker experiments in the 1980’s (see 
Section 5.2) is that passenger discomfort can be significantly reduced by the use of sail-
powered vessels, both pure-sail and auxiliary rigs.  The effect of deploying sails in both those 
experiments clearly showed that vessel stability was enhanced, the degree of roll significantly 
reduced and, in the Japanese experiment, crew downtime significantly reduced due to 
increased comfort.  These advantages are additional to the savings in fuel consumption (for 
both motive and stabiliser power), faster overall passage times and reduced mechanical wear 
(Satchwell, 1985, 1986; UNESCO, 1986).   
Alternative vessels, again using the Greenheart design as an example, have potential for 
facilitating new or increased options for inter-country trading.  Fiji re-opened Rotuma as an 
international port of entry in 2010 with a view to commencing trade with Tuvalu and other 
neighbouring countries.  The initial target has been root crops and fruits and the quantities 
involved are relatively small, shipments of a few tonne at a time.  Providing the shipping has 
proved problematic.  Fiji Times (26 January 2011) reported: “It is likely that a Government 
vessel will now facilitate the trade between Rotuma and Tuvalu.  Trade between the two 
islands was put on hold from last year due to the unavailability of a vessel which was 
supposed to have been provided by the Tuvalu Government”. 
On 7 September 2011 (Fiji Sun), the Fiji Ministry of Information reported “Rotuma earned 
$28,000 from two container loads of dalo exported to Tuvalu.  The 50m Tuvaluan vessel 
Manu Folau donated by Japan has been instrumental in freighting the cargo to Tuvalu”.  This 
is a large craft to dedicate to moving a small load.  A Greenheart-type ship would have 
significantly increased the profit margins of such an exercise.  Anecdotal evidence from 
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Rotuman informants suggest that local growers have become frustrated as crops planted to 
supply the new markets have spoiled due to the lack of adequate and regular shipping and 
such plantings have now been reduced or stopped.  Meanwhile the Fiji government has 
invested more than FJ$1 million in state-of-the-art biosecurity controls and treatment to assist 
such trade (Fiji Times, 29 May 2012). 
5.3.5. 100% Renewable Energy for Tokelau: World-first or NZ Mutton dressed as 
Lamb? 
The section examines the current Tokelau renewable-energy programme in the context of the 
shipping issues, and questions whether it has any legitimacy as either mitigation or adaptation 
to climate change.  The example illustrates graphically a range of issues within current 
debates over alternative energies and externally-led interventions to promote these.  While I 
am fully supportive of Tokelau’s decision to seek a 100% renewables target, the claims being 
made as to the effectiveness of the project need to be examined.   
Firstly, it is obviously not 100% of energy, but only electricity generation that is being 
referred to.  The following is typical of the blurring.  “The tiny Pacific nation of Tokelau has 
told a UN conference it plans to use only renewable energy within a year.  It would be the 
first country in the world to do so.  The head of the Tokelau Government, Foua Toloa, told 
Pacific Beat that	  although his country is small, it has a powerful message.  “By September, 
2012 Tokelau will be the first nation 100% renewable energy efficient, fulfilling our global 
obligation" he said” (Radio Australia, 2012).  Similar claims appeared on other websites 
(including UNDP, NZAid, Tokelau Government, Radio New Zealand, as well as industry and 
world media). 
If only it were true.  Unfortunately, even if 100% electricity generation was renewable, the 
greater majority of Tokelau’s energy budget is expended on sea-transport.  This underscores 
the invisibility of sea-transport on the global and development agendas in their current 
discourses on renewable energy.  It’s not that it isn’t recognised.  Two MFAT presentations 
to the Awatea Conference May 2011 and IRENA in October 2011, showed transport to be the 
single largest energy use in the Pacific at 48% averaged across the region with electricity 
generation averaging 37% (see Figure).  MFAT acknowledged that transport makes up 75% 
of petroleum use in some PICs (Mayhew, 2011a, 2011b), and presumably Tokelau is in this 
category.  Ultimately MFAT concluded that there are “fewer options to reduce petroleum use 
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for transport” and that “the electricity sector provides easier opportunities to use renewable 
energy and reduce diesel dependency, but at a risk of playing around the edges” (Mayhew, 
2011b).  
I’m not singling out my own country for criticism.  At least MFAT acknowledge the issue, 
even if they are not currently prepared to more than superficially examine it.  As discussed in 
Section 2.2, major regional players, e.g. UNDP, USAID, simply don’t mention sea-transport 
in their publicly distributed information and master plans on renewable energy issues for the 
Pacific, unless it is to bemoan the high cost of sea-transport in delivering other sector 
programmes. 
New Zealand’s Foreign Minister McCully has put an emphasis on renewable energy in the 
Pacific under the current NZAid Programme, one of six priority areas for the Ministry.  "We 
have a fully committed development programme with Tokelau.  Notwithstanding that, we 
have advanced funds to Tokelau to achieve their renewable energy goals due to the high 
priority we and Tokelau place on making this happen," (NZAid Website109).  New Zealand's 
focus on renewable energy as part of sustainable economic development in the Pacific region 
was highlighted at the 2011 Pacific Forum in Auckland. 
“This [the Tokelau PV] project is unique and has the potential to demonstrate what can be 
achieved through the perseverance and hard work by the Government of Tokelau …. 
Photovoltaics are a mature, reliable, off-the-shelf technology that has been proven for years.  
Given the high cost of diesel, renewable energy should not be seen as an ‘alternative’ source 
of energy, but rather an essential key to unlocking the Pacific’s potential” (NZAid 
Website110).  So why can’t this logic be applied to sea-transport? 
MFAT have suggested that the reasons for their hesitation include that the introduction of 
‘new’ technology such as being suggested for shipping was unproven with a long lead-in time 
and that MFAT is risk averse (Cameron, email, 29/6/2012).  But several alternative shipping 
proposals are proposing ‘mature’ PV technology combined with conventional 
boatbuilding/design processes, proven sail technology and electric motors.  None of this is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 http://www.aid.govt.nz/media-and-publications/development-stories/march-2012/tokelau-leading-light-
renewable-energy, accessed 20 June 2012 
110 http://www.aid.govt.nz/media-and-publications/development-stories/march-2012/tokelau-leading-light-
renewable-energy, accessed 20 June 2012 
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‘new’ technology. 
How much fuel is being displaced by the Tokelau PV project and how does this compare with 
shipping?  It depends on whose figures are used.  New Zealand PV contractors have installed 
4,032 solar panels (one megawatt of solar) and associated storage battery banks across the 
three atolls aimed at providing 90% of all electricity needs (Powersmart website).  UNDP 
state that the Tokelau Government succeeded in leveraging approximately NZ$8.5 million in 
grants and soft loans from New Zealand for the project (UNDP website) although MFAT 
refer to NZ$7 million, “as an advance on Tokelau’s budget support” (Mayhew 2011b).  The 
contractor’s website claims this will replace the 200 litres/day currently burnt to provide 
electricity for 15-18 hours/day111.  I calculate this to equate to 73,000 litres or approximately 
60 tonnes p.a112, emitting 159 tonnes of carbon. 
However, the NZAid website claims “almost 2,000 barrels of diesel a year will no longer be 
required to generate electricity” (http://www.aid.govt.nz, accessed 17/10/12).  A barrel is a 
vague measure, is not normally used to measure distillate fuels such as diesel, and is 
undefined by NZAid.  Assuming a barrel is referring to a 200-litre drum in which fuel is 
delivered to the islands, this equals 400,000 litres p.a. or 332 tonnes.  If an oil barrel is being 
referred to (commonly equal to 159 litres) then this is approximately 318,000 litres or 264 
tonnes p.a.  Either way, NZAid appears to be claiming fuel savings approximately 4-5.5 times 
that of the contractor.  The MFAT website claims savings of both 200 litres/day and 2000 
barrels a year113.  There is no obvious correlation between the figures. 
UNDP record that Tokelau spends “approximately NZ$1m annually on imported fossil-fuels” 
(UNDP website).  UNDP doesn't clarify but assumedly this refers to internal electricity 
generation on the atolls.  It is also unhelpful as the cost of fuel per litre is not given.  If the 
contractor’s figures of 200 litres diesel per day being displaced is correct then this equals 
$13.70 per litre.  If current international MDO spot prices per tonne are used, (July 2012 costs 
were US$980 per tonne) this equals 1,020 tonnes per year of fuel.  Prices have fluctuated 
widely over the past 12 months and the current figure is at the high end. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 http://www.powersmartsolar.co.nz/commercial accessed 20 June 2012. 
112 Using a coefficient of 1 litre of diesel weighing 0.83 kg. 
113  http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Pacific/Tokelau.php accessed 17/10/12. 
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Other blog sites have now combined and extrapolated from these statistics e.g. “currently, the 
island state is reliant on the diesel shipped in from New Zealand114.  As a result, the country’s 
diesel generators burn around 200 litres of fuel daily, which amounts to 2000 barrels each 
year at an annual cost of NZ$1 million—and yields a considerable environmental impact … 
the solar power system will enable Tokelau to save over 12,000 tonnes of CO2 during its 
operation” (Inhabitat website115).  How this latter figure is derived is unclear.  If we assume 
that the generators currently being used are new and efficient diesel units then a factor of 2.65 
can be applied116.  If 73,000 litres of fuel is currently being used a year, then this will produce 
~193 tonnes of carbon a year or ~62 years to produce the “12,000 tonnes CO2 savings”.  This 
also assumes a nil carbon footprint for production and operation of the PV panels and battery 
banks.  
With shipping data to hand it is not possible to be as precise in estimating the current fuel 
usage.  Tokelau burnt 3.24 tonnes per day.  If this is combined with MFAT’s consideration 
that a full charter option would necessitate 150 days vessel hire per year, a very conservative 
estimate of ~500 tonnes p.a. can be safely used, a total comparable to the electricity 
generation figures using MFAT data and at least eight times greater than the PV contractor’s 
estimates117. 
As discussed in Section 2.2, saving the GHG emissions from either electricity generation or 
sea-transport for Tokelau (or elsewhere in the Pacific) is not an effective mitigation measure 
for climate change.  The figures are just too minute to have any effect on global trends and at 
best would have symbolic value.  A single midsized container ship will burn more fuel and 
emit more GHG in less than a week than all annual fuel use for Tokelau.  Can Tokelau’s PV 
programme be considered a valid adaptation measure?  As discussed above, whether the 
UNDP figure of NZ$8.5 million or MFAT’s NZ$7 million is preferred, neither are referring 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114  It is shipped from Samoa not NZ. 
115 http://inhabitat.com/south-pacific-island-of-tokelau-is-to-become-the-worlds-first-solar-powered-
nation/tokalu-island/#ixzz22kuGn0Pa accessed 2 August 2012. 
116 1 litre of diesel typically weighs 0.83 kg.  ~87% of this is carbon, so one litre of diesel contains 0.722 kg of 
carbon, each atom of carbon weighs 12 atomic units.  Combined with two atoms of oxygen it becomes CO2, 
weighing 44 atomic units.  The 0.722 kg of carbon in the original fuel then becomes ~2.65 kg of CO2. 
117 This is a highly conservative estimate.  The current charter vessel is twice the size of Tokelau.  Earlier, using 
MFAT data I calculated annual fuel use for just one of the vessels employed on this route at 520-910 t p.a. 
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to additional aid.  New Zealand is simply ‘loaning’ Tokelau the money against the projected 
savings in fuel purchases from its future annual budgets.  Barnett and Campbell (2011) argue 
strongly that under international treaties adaptation funding needs to be a contribution from 
developed countries over and above their normal aid allocations and cautions strongly against 
attempts to disguise climate change expenditure from other normal commitments.   
In this case New Zealand appears to have exchanged future payments of NZ$7 million for 
diesel to external sources for payment of a similar figure paid to New Zealand renewable 
energy companies.  The savings or financial benefits to Tokelau are difficult to see.  It will 
remain to be seen if the overall cost savings including full life cycle maintenance of the 
PV/battery system are lower than BAU costs using fossil-fuels but it should not be assumed 
that renewable energy electricity generation equates to free electricity supply over time. 
Current New Zealand government projections of NZ$8 – 10 million118 to build a new Tokelau 
ship indicate that such a vessel would be a high-value item, roughly half the cost of the entire 
annual Tokelau budget and more than the reported cost of the PV programme.  The 2008 
projected operating costs of the new vessel were estimated at NZ$3 million p.a. 
(accompanied by the prediction that these can be expected to rise with increasing global oil 
costs) and it is this that presents the greatest shackles to the Tokelauan communities of the 
future.  This is a substantial increase of 70% on the NZ$2.1 million cost of operations in 
2005.  The new asset will have a projected life of ~20-25 years, equating to ~NZ$60-75 
million of operational cost for this lifeline in today’s currency.  But if only a minimum of 
30% of the operating costs are fuel (and this is a highly conservative estimate119), then an 
equivalently priced alternative-energy technology vessel would save at least NZ$18-22.5 
million over the life of the asset (or more than double the MFAT projected asset cost) and 
that is not allowing for any increase in fuel costs.  As discussed earlier the cost of global 
mitigation of shipping emissions will likely have a further knock-on effect in higher prices for 
cleaner fuel, in today’s prices of as much as 60% or ~NZ$10.8-13.4 million over the lifetime 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 2008 estimates from Ministerial Briefing Papers released under the Official Information Act.  Even at this 
early stage, the officials were warning there is a high risk of these estimates being significantly overrun in 
the build process. 
119 Fuel costs comprising ~40-60% is the best estimate for Fijian domestic shipping figure available and this is 
likely conservative (Capt. Rounds, pers. com., 2012). 
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of the ship120.  Of course if the new Tokelau vessel did not use fuel, then this would translate 
to additional savings, including additional income if carbon trading was available.  This is 
without considering any of the other potential additional benefits discussed above.  
It is not being claimed here that an alternative-energy vessel is suitable for Tokelau 
conditions.  But it is being recommended that it should be seriously assessed as a potential 
option before a decision is made to commit Tokelau to a largely fossil-fuel dependent future, 
in direct contradiction of the claims being currently made that it will be the first fossil-free 
energy country in the world. 
Finally, to return to the MFAT website claim that Tokelau is in control of its own decision-
making and budgets.  This is not borne out by any examination of the Ministerial Briefing 
Papers and related information.  There are references to Tokelau being extensively 
‘consulted’ by the various teams of consultants, experts and NZ officials that have travelled 
extensively to Tokelau over nearly a decade to investigate and plan a long-term shipping 
solution.  There is reference on both NZ and Tokelau government websites to Tokelauan 
politicians repeatedly meeting NZ counterparts in Tokelau or travelling to Wellington or 
reporting to the UN General Assembly on the priority for them of shipping, their frustration 
with current arrangements and proposed solutions offered them by New Zealand.  I cannot 
confirm but strongly suspect that no alternative-energy shipping options have been suggested 
to Tokelauan ‘decision-makers’ by their New Zealand ‘advisors’.  It is also clear from the 
information currently to hand that decisions over budget allocations and preferred options in 
any case are made at the New Zealand Cabinet table and not the Tokelau Fono.  
Minister McCully’s announcement was made on 12 June 2012.  On 27 June the following 
announcement appeared in some Pacific Island media websites: “A minister in Tokelau has 
been stood down from his portfolios after problems between him and the New Zealand 
government.  Foua Toloa had held the finance and transport portfolios, which have been 
transferred to the current leader, or Ulu of Tokelau, Kelisiano Kalolo.  Due to the relationship 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 In the negotiation over a global agreement on bunker fuel SOx reductions IMO had suggested a 
compensation package to safeguard against this type of penalty for developing countries.  Whether this is 
successfully negotiated remains to be seen, as does clarification of Tokelau’s status as a SIDS or a part of 
NZ’s developed nation within such a framework.  The IMO members or experts that presented to the SSTT 
2012 confirmed in response to my questions that they held no hope such a measure would actually emerge 
(Dr Pierre Sames, Dr Tristan Smith). 
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between Tokelau and New Zealand, there were some issues between the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and also Ulu O Tokelau, it was best that the Faipule of Fakaofo would stand down in 
the meantime.  It has got to do with shipping decisions” (Island Business121).  Foua Toloa was 
the Ulu when the Tokelau delegation came to Wellington in 2008.  I suggest that NZ 
government decisions made in contradiction to Tokelauan decision-makers priorities have 
had a negative and disruptive effect on internal Tokelauan political relationships. 
5.4. Windward Towards the Future: the Case for Sail as a Regional Sustainable 
Adaptation Technology and the Rationale for Fiji as Hub 
An island community that controls and owns its own sea-transport is a community that 
has control of its own decision-making and destiny.  An island community reliant on 
external and irregular sea-transport services is a vassal state reliant on the decision-
making of others.  (Nuttall, 2012) 
This thesis has considered shipping and potential alternative options from a range of 
perspectives (micro, meso, macro, and historical) and situated them within a Fiji and Oceania 
context.  Section 5.2 summarised the lessons from a number of case studies.  Section 5.3 
scrutinised and compared two extreme sea-transport scenarios in Pacific settings.  
This section returns to focus on Fiji.  It proposes that a coordinated programme to fully 
investigate and trial a range of sail-powered sea-transport options for Fiji and Oceania would 
entail a relatively small investment and the result could be a revolutionary approach to a 
central issue for all modern Oceanic communities that provides truly sustainable solutions 
from a local base built on a remarkable regional heritage.  If this is correct and desired, the 
corollary question is where should such a revolution be centred.  The reasoning for promoting 
Fiji as the hub is set out in Section 5.4.2, but before setting out this case further we return to 
the Fiji story where it left off in Section 4.1. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Island Business “Tokelau minister stood down over shipping issues with NZ” 27/6/2012 
 http://www.islandsbusiness.com/news/index_dynamic/containerNameToReplace=MiddleMiddle/focusModu
leID=130/focusContentID=29089/tableName=mediaRelease/overideSkinName=newsArticle-full.tpl, 
accessed 27 June 2012 
	  	   	   	  
203	  
\"
KORO 
- Enterprise 
owner? 
- partner? 
- beneficiary? 
Crew 
- ship crew 
- shore crew        
- managmnt 
 
Trading 
Enterprise 
-  Coy? 
- Ltd? 
- NGO? 
Vessel 
- build? 
-buy? 
- lease? 
WELL$
BEING$
Social$
Cultural$
Environ$
ment$
Econo$
mic$
5.4.1. Single Vessel/Single Village to Managed Fleet to Integrated Network 
The Solodamu inquiry is summarised in the following stylised diagrams122: 
 
 
Figure 42 Solodamu Inquiry: Challenges and Opportunities 
The business proposal was for a sustainable village vessel to commercially operate between 
Kadavu and Suva.  The blue left hand circle signifies the four core areas identified as needing 
to be addressed in order for a successful enterprise to contribute to the well-beings shown on 
the right and expanded below (Figure 43).  The benefits of a successfully executed operation 
would provide more than just economic return.  When considered across quadruple well-
beings, a number of primary and tertiary benefits are possible, all of which can be claimed to 
add to the resilience of local communalities. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 These diagrams are adapted from the PLA talanoa held in Solodamu in 2008/2009 and subsequent business 
plan discussed in Section 4.1. 
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Figure 43 Solodamu Inquiry: Well-beings 
At the end of Section 4.1 I arrived at the tentative conclusion that a single vessel/single 
village approach was too difficult due to a number of ‘game-breakers’.  Working with FIVS 
and an increasing network (in particular IUCN, WWF-SPP and USP) we began to explore the 
issues from other perspectives seeking a model that could provide service and benefit at a 
local level but overcome the issues uncovered.  
This led to consideration of a managed fleet of small vessels operating a number of routes 
where communities (or members of communities) such as Solodamu could participate under 
some form of lease-to-buy or franchise scheme and their entry mentored from within an 
established collective.  The managed fleet concept has a number of advantages.  Vessel 
construction could be production-lined and achieve efficiencies through economies of scale 
and a higher build standard.  This in turn allows consideration of establishing a boat building 
programme, rather than a single build project, with numerous potential downstream benefits.  
The logic also applies to aspects such as crew training and operational management.  Vessel 
maintenance could be coordinated and a managed fleet would allow flexibility of service as 
well as cover for peak demand, breakdowns, accidents, routine maintenance, etc.  If this were 
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achieved then insurance and financing would become more accessible.  
Despite these advantages, all the issues that were apparent at village level require resolution.  
There is still an R&D hump both in terms of the technology (vessel design, sea-trialling, etc) 
and, more importantly, ownership and management frameworks.  Following further talanoa 
in 2011 we were able to summarise this in the next series of figures. 	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Figure 44 Primary Routes Considered for Small-scale Catamarans 
Using the Southampton wind route data and extensive local knowledge we identified a 
number of primary routes for which small scale trading catamarans (4-10 dwt)123 would be 
best suited including Kadavu, northern, central and southern Lau, Lomaiviti, Rotuma, 
Yasawa, Taveuni and the north coast of Vanua Levu.  We overlaid this on the ‘Solodamu’ 
template, expanding the blue circle to detail the range of critical questions to be addressed. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Depicted in Figure 44 as stylized drua.  A number of options of design of this type of vessel are available as 
discussed in Section 5.1. 
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Figure 45 Sustainable Sea-transport Network Overview 
 
 
Figure 46 Sustainable Sea-transport Network Primary Issues 
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Although the diagrams are simplistic, all the issues identified are complex.  For example, 
current vessel survey requirements revolve entirely around conventional motorised craft.  
Even though vessels that use sail, solar and electric drives are being considered, under the 
current regulatory framework a diesel engineer would have to undertake the survey.  
Qualifications and training similarly are aimed at mariners not sailors.  But the real issues lie 
in the quadrants labelled ‘Ownership’ and ‘Operations’.  Who and how will such commercial 
operations be owned, financed and managed.  Here again, a programme of coordinated 
research and modelling followed by field-testing backed up by monitoring, mentoring, and 
reporting is needed if other than a haphazard approach is sought.  Our network is currently 
considering a number of potential frameworks for operational structures.  
This was the point reached by the end of the 2011 research season.  At this stage we were still 
under the impression a trial vessel was being built for our use by Okeanos and would allow 
real world testing of some of these scenarios.  Unfortunately the pilot vessel failed to arrive 
and our programme has been delayed in this regard. 
The serendipitous arrival of new research partners such as Greenheart and B9 Shipping at the 
end of 2011 allowed us to increase the scope of technology and research options being 
considered.  In collaboration with FIVS, USP, WWF, and IUCN, we have now begun looking 
at the potential of integrated fleets of vessels, beginning with expanding the Kadavu example 
into a model for the southern and central Lau.  The bluewater passages from Suva to nodes in 
the Lau Group are relatively long, up to 180nm, and once in the Lau there are only a limited 
number of islands a large vessel can access safely.  Island communities outside these nodes 
are minute and there is little profit to be made and much fuel to be burnt in using such vessels 
to stop at individual islands to collect a handful of passengers or small cargoes.  But 
combining outer-island based catamarans with a Greenheart design as a “mother ship’ 
between Suva and the main nodes seems eminently sensible (Figure 47).  
If this can be achieved it would be arguably the first alternative-energy powered integrated 
sea-transport network in the world.  And if proven viable then options such as presented in 
Figure 48 begin to emerge, with B9-type technology being used on the international routes, 
Greenheart-type vessels working between main island groups and inter-state to neighbouring 
PICs, while smaller cargo/pax vessels such as the catamarans previously discussed service 
individual islands and communities.  
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Figure 47 Schematic of Pilot Vessel Routes 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 48 Schematic of Expanded Sustainable Sea-transport Network 	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Collaboration and research has now reached a stage where external funding is required to 
progress in order to prove the business case and we have begun submitting applications to a 
variety of potential sources.   
In 2012, as the evidential base increased and our network expanded internationally, we 
continued to raise the profile of the talanoa.  A number of platforms have been used.  The 
success and media attraction of Uto Ni Yalo and its now seasoned crew gave us access to a 
series of newspaper articles, mainly in Fiji but also internationally including the New York 
Times and Australian alternative energy websites.  I have presented on this research at 
regional conferences convened by both FNU and USP.  Collectively regular briefings have 
been made to the Fijian government, including Departments of Transport and Energy, MSAF, 
Navy, GSS, and the Cabinet, to regional agencies SPC and SPREP as well as development 
agencies such as ADB, AusAID, USAID, UNDP, etc.  
Prior to beginning this research, the concept of alternative-energy for sustainable shipping 
had no visible profile at any level or with any agency.  In July 2012, following Uto Ni Yalo 
and the TMoTM fleet’s triumphant entry into Fiji on their way to the Solomon’s SPAF and 
the subsequent five-day ‘Drua Pageant’, USP offered to host a three-day talanoa on 
sustainable sea-transport for Oceania in November 2012 as a precursor to a major symposium 
in 2013.  The responses to the invitation were positive and the resultant SSTT 2012 is 
summarised in Section 7.1. 
5.4.2. Why Fiji Should Lead? 
If an agenda such as that set out in the first half of this section is now to be pursued and an 
impact of any longevity and scale desired the community with greatest likelihood of success, 
if willing, should be backed with the aim that a successful intervention can then be catalytic 
in the region.  This thesis preferences Fiji as the logical hub. 
If proven in a Fijian centre, then export of the paradigm and the technology outwards across 
Oceania would become plausible.  In a ‘best case’ scenario, such a progression would be self-
perpetuating, culminating in the re-establishment of an industrial sustainable sea-transport 
base in Fiji commensurate with the role Fiji played in this industry a little over a century past 
(see Chapter 6).  The practical obstacles to such an agenda should not be downplayed.  The 
challenge is substantial and would require a major initial investment, in priority, planning, 
capacity building and training as well as financial. 
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Against this though, is the knowledge that the potential indicated in this research to date is 
but a subset.  This thesis has focussed on sea-transport for local demand, but similar potential 
exists across numerous applications.  Fishing is an industry of considerable importance and 
priority to Oceania, again at all levels from village to region.  Although considered only 
peripherally in this research, it can be assumed that there are numerous parallels.  It is an 
industry currently totally reliant on imported fossil fuel despite Brown and others offering 
sound technological options 30 years ago.   
And the list goes on.  USP has identified the cost of transport as a major inhibitor to its 
capacity to deliver research and teaching throughout its catchment.  Kiribati has recently 
announced the world’s largest marine reserve but lacks sufficient budget or asset to 
effectively patrol or monitor it.  Various conservation organisations (e.g. WWF, IUCN, 
Birdlife International) have reported in our reiterative talanoa that sea-transport costs can 
account for in excess of half of operational budgets for island-based projects.  
Nor are the options suggested here within the commercial sea-transport scenario a 
comprehensive list.  By way of example, sea-barging is a common means of moving large 
loads and is an obvious target.  Sail powered scows successfully fulfilled this role for many 
years.  In the 2010 drought, the Fiji government was reported (Fiji Times 3/9/2010) as 
spending $1.4 million on providing emergency barging of water to Yasawa and northern 
communities.  The laden route is directly downwind.  If a low-technology version of the Shin 
Aitoku Maru rig were retro-fitted to existing barges, significant fuel savings would have been 
possible.  The square-sail rig used there was not discontinued because it failed to achieve 
significant fuel savings but because the IRR on the high technology aspects of the design (e.g. 
aircraft wing technology, computerised control) did not prove economic in periods of low 
fuel costs and high staff costs.  But in the Yasawa example, a low-tech rig built around 
industrial bearings and basic winches, welded pipe and laced tarpaulins could be employed.  
If this works, then the same logic can be applied to the transport of pine and other timber 
resources, copra, etc from Kadavu and the Lau, all of which are downwind runs for the laden 
leg and currently marginal economically due in large part to high transport costs. 
What is absolutely certain is the demand of sea-transport is unlikely to diminish and, without 
alternatives, will be an ever increasing burden on Pacific governments and communities.  
The reasoning for a Fijian hub is based on purely technical grounds; its size, capacity, level of 
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infrastructure, location, history, and nodal positionality (physically and economically).  The 
choice has not been considered from a political standpoint; whether such a development 
should favour one country over another because of associations, profile, donor acceptability, 
etc.  However it were to be, then Fiji’s current membership of the non-aligned movement and 
therefore potential for South-South alliances would be an additional factor in its favour as 
would its leadership role in the growing Melanesian Spearhead alliance.   
An alternative approach would be to centre the focal point in a country or community of 
‘greatest need’.  Arguably, if this were the determinant, then it would fall to a country like 
Kiribati or Tuvalu, where pioneers such as Jim Brown and Mike Savins have laboured so 
long and hard.  Again, it need not be viewed as an ‘either/or’ choice and regional 
collaboration should be encouraged. 
This research programme has been primarily focussed on domestic sea-transport issues; inter-
community and inter-island.  However the potential with Greenheart-type shipping 
technology, with its unlimited range, is that direct small-scale containerized trade between 
island nations becomes a real possibility.  SPC is currently spearheading consideration of 
increasing inter-state transhipments within Oceania.  While this is highly dependent on 
development of more appropriate mechanisms for regional trade, including complex political 
issues of tariffs, etc., the practical logistics of such trade is also an essential determinant.  SPC 
(2009) compared costs for shipments from Fiji to other SIS finding that the current 
arrangements which require transhipping through Australia add an increased cost to 
consumers of US$50 per ton than if it had been shipped direct.  That analysis compared 
conventional shipping with conventional shipping and it can be assumed that fuel-free 
shipping would increase the differential further in favour of island-to-island delivery.  As 
with this thesis, SPC found that Fiji makes the logical hub, in part because of its geographical 
position, partly because of its existing shipping infrastructure and services and partly because 
of the increasing range of product Fiji now supplies to its neighbours (SPC, 2009:11-12).  As 
discussed in Section 4.2, regional trade is currently heavily imbalanced in favour of Australia 
and New Zealand.  While international trade amongst PICs is growing, especially within the 
Melanesian Spearhead countries, current transport options are a major inhibitor of this trend. 
Until the privatisation of the Government Shipyard following the coups of the 1980’s, Fiji 
had a well-established and recognised industrial ship building operation and maintenance 
capacity.  While much of this has been leached to the Pacific Rim in recent years, Fiji still has 
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a well-developed industrial engineering base and several high-quality yards producing vessels 
for the small-scale end of the market, particularly for tourism and recreation.  Fiji’s Minister 
of Transport recently announced its intention to revitalise the government shipyard (Fiji 
Times, 10/2/2010)   
Fiji’s regulatory structure is also well-developed.  Fiji is currently developing national policy 
on carbon trading with potential for carbon credits to subsidise or offset sail trading costs.  
Historically Fiji was a vital link in a highly sophisticated sail-trading network that connected 
island/village communities from Samoa, Tonga, Rotuma, Niue, and beyond using fleets of 
large, sophisticated vessels.  This is the focus of Chapter 6, which concludes that future 
sustainable solutions for Fijian sea-transport are likely to be best addressed if viewed in the 
context of networks of related islands and archipelagos, such as dominated in central Oceania 
for millennia.  Before changing course for the past however, the core lessons from the 
research are summarised below. 
5.4.3. Critical Learnings 
From the case set out thus far several predominate themes appear.  Firstly, sea-transport is a 
primary concern to coastal/island Fijian communities and still connects most Fijian 
communities, a pattern replicated throughout much of Oceania.  The region has developed a 
capacity (over millennia) to adapt to sea-transport challenges through a lateral ability to 
evolve design and application of technology, seamanship, and organisation from a minimalist 
resource base.  It is not known to what extent this adaptive capacity is diminished today, with 
more than a century of increasingly limited practical usage, but the literature quoted in 
Section 2.2 suggests cultural resilience is still a substantive Oceanic trait.  If this is cogent 
there appears no reason why it should not allow Oceania to lead the world in a renewed 
approach to sustainable sea-transport for the future.  As cautioned earlier, this will need to be 
in the context of fully-informed knowledge/understanding of the constraints of modern sea-
transport options and not just on faith in past ability. 
Historically it would appear that it was the challenges of balancing socio-cultural needs of 
sea-transport with economic business imperatives and changing scales of vessel ownership 
that restricted successful management of commercial sea-transport by Oceanians, not a failure 
in seamanship, vessel management, or an inability to understand Western commercial 
imperatives.  It was not just a case of ‘outsider’ or colonial powers dominating over 
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indigenous trading networks; the very economic and cultural basis of trade and transport was 
fundamentally different.  While the scope and scale of such interrelationships may have 
changed during the colonisation and post-colonisation eras, the issue is still pertinent and 
achieving a future balance is as essential.  
Current shipping policy is stuck in an inappropriate paradigm (replacing old ships with old, 
increasingly expensive, entirely dependent on imported fuel, etc) and this carries through into 
the way shipping is perceived and framed politically and economically.  No alternative 
paradigm, until now, has being seriously countenanced.  Without a paradigm shift, these 
issues appear doomed to increase exponentially.   
An alternative, in particular sail-based shipping technology, offers strong potential that could 
conceivably address many of the problems that exist but is shut out of the policy space.  This 
exclusion is currently partial at the global level and total at an Oceanic one.  The primary 
barrier to proper evaluation of this alternative, and then its employment, is perceptual.  No 
alternative is seen because none is expected or being looked for.  It doesn’t appear on any of 
the charts for the area and no radar is tuned to its frequency.  Given the obvious need and 
priority of shipping to Oceanic this is irrational, especially if considered in light of current 
widespread and progressive policies and initiatives for renewable electricity generation and 
the focus on climate change adaptation.  
Part of this perceptual barrier is the belief that because shipping options have largely been 
imported from outside the region in recent history, then future options will/must follow a 
similar course and Oceania therefore needs to wait for alternative solutions to be developed 
elsewhere in the hope they are replicable and can provide some future application here.  This 
may be the correct and most pragmatic course, currently we have no basis or data on which to 
assess this either way, but to date a potential for seeking Oceania-orientated solutions now 
from within Oceania has yet to emerge.  Sea-transport innovation and design is no longer 
perceived as an Oceanian preserve, an area of expertise in which it led the world, but an area 
where Oceania can only follow others or view from afar.  Inherent in this is the same ‘small is 
vulnerable is dependent’ pathos that was the central core of Hau’ofa’s seminal 1993 paper. 
The research to date strongly indicates that there is low potential for globally led programmes 
to produce appropriate sustainable marine technology tailored toward the unique nature of 
Oceania.  Models most appropriate to allow PICs to develop a local solution will need to 
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come from within Oceania, albeit with appropriate external support and collaboration.  
This research indicates that a practical transition to sail (or other low-carbon options) is 
potentially feasible and beneficial to village/island Fiji as measured across multiple well-
beings.  The complexity of such a transition will require both a collaborative multi-
stakeholder/interest approach and one that is Fiji/Oceania tailored and led, including 
governments, regional bodies, NGOs, industry/business interests, researchers, and donors.  
Collaboration with other SIS is desirable.  In this instance, the “FLMMA” model offers 
salient lessons and a proven model as explored further in Section 7.2. 
Finally, history offers direction and knowledge.  “The people of the sea travelled and traded 
beyond their immediate landscapes and seascapes for a variety of reasons” (D’Arcy, 
2006:52).  “It was evident in early contact times that every community in the Pacific Islands 
was engaged in some form of trade” (Couper, 2009:49).  As seen in Chapter 6, the drua of 
central Oceania, as with all the great vessels of this ocean, were valuable, high cost and 
highly-prized assets and major investments.  “Great care was taken of them ... the 
construction and maintenance of canoes was a community effort.  Only chiefs could muster 
the manpower (sic) and resources needed to construct large voyaging canoes” (D’Arcy, 
2006:92).  Such vessels were not just physical assets; they were also symbols of chiefly and 
community mana.  The completion of a large canoe was a source of great pride.  “When Tui 
Nayau sailed his new Drua, Rusa i Vanua, from Vulaga to Lakeba in Nov 1842, his followers 
were thrilled to note that the hulls were longer than those of Ra Marama, the canoe being 
built at Somosomo for their rival Bau” (Derrick 1957: 81). 
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Chapter 6. Looking Backwards to the Future (or It’s Forward Thinking to go 
Backward) 
These fragments I have shored against my ruins.  (T.S. Eliot) 
There are aspects of our culture we must make sure are not lost altogether. But how do 
we go about this? … The adaptation [into an uncertain future] I am thinking of is a 
more conscious act done in full awareness of what is required. And what is required is 
survival - not of the fittest but of the best.  (F. Helu, 1999:13) 
This section explores the extent of known knowledge on Fiji’s sailing heritage.  The 
reiterative analysis of the ‘thick descriptive’ accumulated by 2011 reinforced that this was the 
next priority focal point at that stage and the rationale for what became an extensive course 
deviation was set out in Chapter 1.  This thesis argues that the barriers to a successful 
introduction of new technology are more than economic but include deep-seated issues of 
culture/connection that may require an entire heritage base of sailing to be re-invigorated, 
including “valourisation” of past.  Section 2.1 referenced Clark, Overton, Helu, Hau’ofa, 
Thaman and others to support an approach where the past is examined to provide lessons and 
signposts for the future.  In essence this chapter addresses this question: can digging up the 
past provide a mountain from which to see over the horizon?  
Given the primary nature of this inquiry, an industrial study into potential future 
technological application, the reasoning for this course deviation from forward-reaching and 
exploratory to heritage-based analysis needs to be explicit and is four-fold.  
Firstly, as early as 1982 the multihull designer Brown was signalling “canoe people are prime 
candidates for the imperative transition away from a petro-dominated economy” (Brown, 
1982:5).  This must be considered against the clearly stated learnings from the UNDP/FAO 
case study (see Section 5.1.1).  “The only places where a new type of sailing craft have 
gained acceptance are those where there is a living tradition of the use of sail ... Many other 
fishermen rarely use sail, finding the fuel savings hardly worth the skill and labour required to 
handle them.  The most favourable conditions for developing the use of sail for primary or 
secondary propulsion are where fishermen still use sail, fuel supplies are erratic, fuel costs are 
high and the price of fish is comparatively low” (FAO, 1987:71).  If this holds for fishing 
craft it is likely equally applicable to sea-transport at local levels.  
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This lesson implies two things: that sail-based culture is learned and that coming from a 
sailing heritage, even the finest sailing heritage, is insufficient where living memory is 
extinct.  FAO did not suggest what level of input would be necessary to effectively raise 
Lazarus.  In Solodamu, this suggests that there is limited chance of long-term success without 
significant investment.  Only one qase in the koro could recall seeing, let alone sailing, any 
traditional craft.  Small but declining pockets of active sailors are known to be still building 
and sailing camakau in the Southern Lau (Gillett, 1993; personal observation) and amongst 
the Banaban community of Rabi, but these aside, my initial assumption was that community-
based sailing experience and possibly knowledge was largely extinct in the wider Fiji I had 
visited.  If this was correct then it follows a successful reintroduction or reinvigoration 
agenda will need first to establish the extent of knowledge retained. 
Secondly, examination of all data collated in the research so far pointed to successful uptake 
of sail being linked to a general appreciation of, and sympathy with, a sail-orientated service 
delivery, not just by the sailors and transport service providers.  That is, the whole catchment 
community of a sail-based operation will need to understand the basis of a sailing culture.  
Transport users will need to understand and be sympathetic to routes and timetables being 
orientated to and varied by wind and route planning considerations.  Policy and regulatory 
agencies will need to be cognisant of its nuances.  The alternative form of energy source 
being used for primary propulsion is such that an alternative transport ‘product’ is being 
offered, not simply an alternative vessel.  There is an element of Fijian and all sailing heritage 
that today sees sail as associated with a remote and discarded, possibly glamorous but 
outmoded past.  Returning to Solodamu; larger, newer, more powerful motors are signifiers 
of positive or progressive development.  The use of sail is considered a step backwards, away 
from ‘progress’ and this means that a sailing culture would need to be rebuilt/learned across 
the Kadavu community if local sail trading is to be fully supported.   
One practical way of counteracting a negative perception of sail is obviously to associate 
future use of sails with the positive and iconic attributes of Fijian (and wider Oceanic) 
heritage.  The question at this point was whether this is best achieved at a micro, meso or 
macro level.  Using the relationship built between 2010-2012 with FIVS and its widespread 
support base, in particular from OCACPS, Fiji Arts Council and iTaukei Affairs, we opted to 
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focus revival at a national level124.  Drua culture, even if it is little practised on the water 
today, is still one of the most central and instantly recognisable motifs in Fiji today.  
Domodomo adorn every Telecom Fiji phone box.  Drua and related images are found on 
stamps, coins, badges, coats of arms, government forms, t-shirts, buildings, churches, police 
stations, park benches, and business logos.  I have never yet talked about drua with any 
iTaukei and not had a faraway look appear in their eyes.   
Thirdly, recent and related events conspired to commence a nucleus of drua cultural 
reinvigoration, though it too early to say whether any or all have sufficient momentum to 
ensure a sustained revival of Fijian sailing heritage by Fijians.  The spin-off of the growing 
renaissance in sailing culture evidenced in other parts of Oceania, sparked in Hawaii by the 
Polynesian Voyaging Society and its linkages to Micronesian heritage through the late Mau 
Piailug, which has built steadily and consistently since the 1970’s and is keenly followed by 
academics, students and researchers in Pacific Studies, History, Anthropology etc.  A four-
lecture series that traverses the voyaging and colonising of Oceania is a recent requirement of 
all undergraduate studies at USP125.  As a direct derivative of the renaissance, Fiji was 
offered, Uto Ni Yalo, as described in Section 1.3.3.  While not a vessel of traditional Fijian 
design, the adventure has captured the imagination of many Fijians and elevated the status of 
these Fijian sailors to a level similar to national sporting heroes. 
Coincidentally, a US-based NGO, Pacific Blue, had begun a small project to reintroduce 
camakau in Yanuca and host an annual camakau race in Suva Harbour (see Figure).  This 
attracted five entrants in 2010 and eight in 2011 with widespread media coverage and high 
public support.  Prior to this the Fiji Arts Council had funded the building of four new 
camakau for the Melanesian Cultural Festival in Suva 2006.  In 2010 Fiji TV aired a 
documentary on drua.  Even if there are no known operational drua in Fiji waters today, the 
culture is still evident and should be described as being in a state of emergent resurgence126.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 In mid-2012 this culminated in a week long “Drua Festival” of performance art, exhibitions, practical sailing 
demonstrations, and public lectures coinciding with the arrival of the TMoTM fleet in Suva. 
125 For the past two years I have co-ordinated this lecture series with FIVS volunteers. 
126 “A direct result of [this thesis] has been providing a catalyst for the OCACPS creative programme since mid 
2011 including the two full-length performances; ‘Vaka: the Birth of a Seer’ and ‘Drua, The Wave of Fire’, 
as centrepieces for the 2012 Solomon Islands Festival of Pacific Arts” (Vilsoni Hereniko, speaking at the 
world premier of ‘Drua, The Wave of Fire’, 15 June 2012). 
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Figure 49 Camakau sailing on Suva Harbour, 2011 
The fourth reason for examining the heritage record is that, regardless of the current state of 
Fijian sail culture, in its past Fiji had a strong sail-powered sea-going tradition.  Unless the 
ancestors came out of the vanua or were transported by supernatural means (accounts of both 
are held within Fijian cultural record) large parts of ocean had to be traversed to arrive in the 
archipelago initially and then subsequently move around it.  Locally-derived effective sea-
transport had been successfully developed in these waters previously and that needed to be 
examined and understood for any useful lessons before any attempt to introduce a new one.  
The stimulus to now investigate the potential use of sail is prompted by changes in energy 
and resource availability and environmental change.  However, responding to the challenge 
by embracing change is nothing new in this ocean.  “There is extensive evidence that Pacific 
societies have frequently adapted to a multitude of environmental and social events in the 
past.  It is this historical evidence for continuity, resilience and resourcefulness that is evident 
today in many Pacific communities where engagement with cultural heritage is increasingly 
seen as a means of strengthening and retaining group identity and preserving the local 
environment while allowing many Pacific Islanders to participate effectively in an 
increasingly globalised economy and society” (Liston et al, 2011:2). 
The focus for this section is then set.  Excellence in sea-transport technology and operation is 
arguably the greatest technological legacy of central Oceania: what is that heritage in a Fijian 
context; what lessons does this heritage offer for future application; and what elements of that 
heritage are still available and applicable for use in a modern and future setting?  
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The research started with a standard literature search from which was compiled a 
compendium of acknowledged written sources.  This was then distilled for areas of agreement 
and divergence, for lessons learnt applicable to the inquiry, and for gaps in the canvas.  With 
this analysis to hand, attention turned from the written to ask the status of unwritten 
knowledge still held culturally or ‘in-house’ within Fiji and to negotiate a process for 
ensuring this was recorded.  Each stage is discussed below.   
6.1. Literature Review and Compendium 
The compendium was compiled to assemble a summary of known literature references to 
drua and related Fijian sailing culture and history127.  There is no single comprehensive 
literature source or reference to drua and the wider subject of Fijian sailing culture is 
dispersed across a variety of sources.  Important detail is contested by various commentators.  
The literature on Fijian sailing culture is sparse and scattered relative to other ‘canoe’128 
cultures of Oceania.  Neither Fiji’s drua culture nor the related culture in central Oceania has 
been the subject of the intensive research of Eastern Polynesia with its focus on long distance 
migration and debate over drift versus planned migration and return voyaging capacity.  
There is disagreement between authors as to the historical and pre-historical extent, ability, 
and source of Fijian sailing culture.  As the drua is agreed by all commentators to be virtually 
identical in design and handling to the Tongan kalia and Samoan `alia references pertaining 
to kalia and `alia were also included were references to Tongan, Samoan, and Fijian 
relationships in the critical mid 1700 – 1900 period. 
Goetzfridt’s 1992 review of references to Pacific navigation and voyaging was used as the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 The phrase ‘drua culture’ is used throughout as shorthand for this and includes vessels, sailing, navigation, 
and all related aspects of culture.  Morphologically there is little design difference between the later vessels 
of Fijian, Tongan, and Samoan ownership.  This is not to say there are no differences in the operational or 
socio-cultural attributes of drua between the cultures.  Where there is no necessity to distinguish between the 
country (or culture) of ownership, the class of drua/kalia/`alia collectively is referred to as drua.  Ndrua and 
drua are interchangeable spellings as are thamakau and camakau in the archival material. 
128 Hornell notes the inadequacy of the term ‘canoe’ to describe what were often massive, bluewater, long-
range, planked-hull sailing vessels but concludes the term is so ingrained in the literature and generally 
accepted as to defy re-branding.  The term ‘vessel’ is used here rather than ‘canoe’ where possible.  As 
discussed in Section 2.1, Jackkie Leota-Ete reminds us even this term is value laden. 
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starting point for the literature search.  As sources were identified in Goetzfridt’s review a 
summary of any relevant content was made.  There are only two Fiji-specific sources out of 
more than 650 articles reviewed though several sources included reference to Fijian-related 
matters.  By comparison Goetzfridt lists 114 sources for the General Pacific, 363 for 
Polynesia, 160 for Micronesia and 20 for Melanesia129.  To these were added additional 
written sources, some pre-1992 but not included in Goetzfridt’s review and others that have 
been published since.  At the time of writing more than 80 separate sources, primary, 
secondary, and tertiary have been examined with direct drua relevance130.  There is an 
extensive, well-reviewed but again scattered pictorial record. 
Having assembled the written material I then sought to digest and distil.  Nicole (2006) 
cautions the need to recognise the relationship between archive and power, and references the 
Haitian historian Trouillot.  “Rather than read the archive as a neutral institution, Trouillot 
has described it as a politically active repository of historical experiences and facts which are 
not created equal.  In Fiji, as elsewhere, what is deemed important in history is a function of 
who decides what is worth recording and remembering.  It is a function of power” (Nicole, 
2006:3).  It is critical to note with the exception of a tiny minority of sources, all comment on 
drua culture has been recorded through a Western lens.  Even the indigenous records in the 
autobiography of Bulu (1876) and the 1915 paper by Toganivalu are translations, the first by 
Fison and the later by Beauclerc. 
There are a limited number of primary sources but remarkable consistency amongst these as 
to vessel form, construction, and functionality – what Tippet describes as morphological 
study (Tippet, 1968:81).  Such commentaries are largely records of professional seamen (e.g. 
Anderson, Cook, Erskine, Jackson131, Mariner, Samwell, Wilkes) or missionaries (e.g. Bulu, 
Lawry, Thomas, Williams,).  Then there is a body of work post the era of the ‘great’ drua 
(waqa tabu, musu waqa, tabetebete) but within the period when drua culture was still being 
practiced (e.g., Haddon and Hornell, Kramer, Thompson, Tippet ,Toganivalu).  These must 
be considered a mixture of primary and secondary sources and the commentators primarily 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129  The artificial and externally imposed demarcation of Oceania into these categories is particularly distracting 
when examining Fijian records. 
130  The compendium, which I consider a living document, now comprises more than 38,000 words, is too large 
for inclusion in this thesis, and can be web-sourced from www.sailingforsustainability.org.  
131 John Jackson is most probably a pseudonym for William Diaper 1820-1891 (Legge, 1966). 
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professional academics.  Finally there is the body of work from the past four decades, 
coinciding with the current ‘renaissance’ in Oceanic sailing/voyaging since Lewis and the 
early work of Finney (e.g. Banack and Cox, Clunie, Couper, D’Arcy, Finney, Hage and 
Harary, Howe, Irwin, Kane, Lewis, Neich, Neyret, Sahlins).  
The drua of central Oceania were the greatest of the Pacific double-hulled vessels and 
arguably the finest bluewater sailing ships of their age.  While there is widespread agreement 
among commentators on many issues pertaining to drua, there is also marked divergence on 
critical points.  Two main schools of thought exist.  The first proposes evolution of a Fijian or 
Melanesian technology and design origin route after exposure to Micronesian rigs and hull 
configurations.  The hypothesis is that the resultant vessel class was subsequently adopted 
and finished by Tongan and Samoan craftsmen after it had travelled east to the Lau Group, 
who in turn came to dominate the resultant drua building industry, particularly in the Lau.   
The alternate view is that the evolutionary design breakthrough was performed by Samoan 
craftsmen under Tongan instruction blending Micronesian rigs with adapted Tongan hulls, 
with the introduction of iron as a possible catalytic factor.  In the latter theory, Fijian sailing 
and ship design/construction capacity is held to be minimal until the recent period of Tongan 
influence.  Fiji gains the drua by default as a result of a geographical accident.  The primary 
resource extraction site for construction of this new technology was the southern Lau due to 
the limestone derived vesi loa from which these craft were built.  While neither theory can be 
conclusively proved on available evidence, this review finds that there is reason to doubt 
some of the reasoning offered for the latter theory.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 50 Model Drua 
Source: http://collections.tepapa.govt.nz/Theme.aspx?irn=2356 accessed 12 November 2012. 
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6.2. Consensus Within the Literature 
The following areas of consensus can be adduced, either because there is total or near total 
agreement amongst the various commentators or because there is no comment or 
contradiction offered by other commentators. 
Drua, Kalia, ‘Alia were, in respect of design and handling, largely identical.  The vessel 
class is characterised by a Micronesian-designed132 Oceanic lateen sail and rig unused 
elsewhere in Polynesia on two true hulls of unequal length sailed by ‘shunting’ end-for-end as 
opposed to ‘tacking through the wind’ with the smaller hull always to windward.  Detail of 
design and construction is reasonably well characterised (Hornell, 1975; Thompson, 1940; 
Toganivalu, 1915; Williams, 1870) and the existence of preserved examples of drua and 
numerous museum models and artefacts leaves little doubt as to the reliability of this 
information.  There are a number of first-hand reports of the methods of sailing and general 
operation and a strong pictorial record.  There is near total, but not unanimous, consensus that 
the Tongan shipwright achieved a superior finish of vessels to the Fijian.  Cook (1777) noted 
“nothing can be a more demonstrative evidence of their [Tongan] ingenuity than the 
construction and make of their canoes, which in point of neatness and workmanship, exceed 
everything of this kind we saw in this sea”.  Hornell (1975) details the Samoan hull 
construction method which is considered more complex than the methods employed in Fiji 
and quotes descriptions and figures by Kramer (1902-3) and Buck (1930). 
Two separate classes of drua are documented, although this classification is not realised by 
all recorders.  Small drua were constructed saucoko style; a single hollowed log forms the 
base of each hull with a single lashed strake used to raise the height of the hull.  This is the 
construction style of the Ratu Finau, the 1913 13m example preserved in the Fiji Museum, 
and is probably close to the limit of size capable for this form of drua.  Much larger vessels, 
also known as Waqa Tabu and Musu Waqa, were built using the tabetebete design where the 
takele (keel) is formed from two or even three scarfed planks and then the hulls built up using 
several planks per side.  It is commonly reported (e.g. Thompson, 1940) that no tabetebete 
drua has been built since the end of the 19th century.  There have been a number of saucoko 
drua built over the past century, although none are believed to be operational today.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132  But see also further discussion. 
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The drua class were the finest and technologically most advanced double-hulled canoes 
of Oceania.  In addition to the glowing praise of Cook and his colleagues for Tongan kalia 
and tongiaki, Alden (1870) describes drua as “a product of barbarian genius”, the “fastest 
sailing boat in existence” and “capable of sailing nearer the wind than any European vessel”. 
Clunie (1987) offers that “[t]he massive drua or kalia made last century in Fiji is justly 
celebrated as the most remarkable voyaging canoe ever to ply the Pacific”. Hornell (1975) 
describes the drua as “the largest and finest sea-going vessel ever designed and built by the 
natives of Oceania before contact with Europeans”. Lewis (1980) described both drua and 
camakau vessels as “the pinnacle of Oceanic canoe technology”. Finney (2006) states that 
“the kalia has been lavishly praised as a stunningly fast shunting hybrid made by joining the 
double ended hull form and pivoting Oceanic lateen sail rig of Micronesian flying proas to a 
pair of hulls”.  
Drua achieved great size, were fast, could perform to windward, had great load carrying 
ability, and were built in large numbers.  Their hulls were fashioned from a timber described 
as the “titanium” of Pacific boat building timbers (Banack and Cox, 1987:161) vesi loa, a 
toredo worm resistant greenheart, which comes only from the limestone belt of islands in the 
southern Lau group, and is still considered superior to all other timbers.  The vessels’ home 
range included at least Fiji, Tonga, Samoa, Uvea, and Futuna.  They easily outperformed the 
equivalent European ships they met and there is evidence that they were the preferred vessels 
by Fijians, even into the start of the 20th century (Thompson, 1940; Toganivalu, 1915; Tippet, 
1968).  They displayed greater windward ability than any other double-hull Oceanic design, 
in particular the tongiaki they quickly displaced in Tonga.  They were highly prized, arguably 
the highest prized asset.  The skill displayed in design, construction and operation awed the 
European recorders, some of them skilled naval architects.  The following extracts confirm 
these assertions and are only a sample of the available evidence found in the compendium. 
“The next day we proceeded towards our destination, calling at the island of Ovalau … 
even Tongan and Wallis’s Island canoes had come from Lakeba and other places to the 
long anticipated banquet at Bau, on the occasion of the arrival of this new canoe which 
had been building seven years, and was at least one hundred feet long, and sufficiently 
large to carry three hundred men” (Jackson in Erskine, 1858:453). 
“The following are the dimensions of the largest canoe I know … Extreme length, 118 
feet; length of deck, 50 feet; width of deck, 24 feet; length of mast, 68 feet; length of 
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yards, 90 feet” (Williams, 1870:63). 
“These [49] canoes [seen in Tongatapu] are from one hundred to one hundred and forty 
feet long, and carry two hundred to four hundred people each; they are double, with a 
deck and house or houses, and with one enormous sail, scud along at twenty miles an 
hour.  These canoes are wonderful pieces of naval architecture; they are made of 
different pieces and jointed together in a most curious fashion, with so close a joint as 
to be hardly perceptible, and not a nail being used in any part; they are sewn with 
signot, made from the cocoanut, on the inside, the outside presenting a smooth and 
polished surface” (15 March, 1864, Otago Daily Times, Issue 699:6.).  
“In one of the lofty canoe-sheds on the beach [at Lifuka] we inspected the king’s great 
double canoe, as those of the largest class are called by the Europeans … The canoe in 
question was upwards of a hundred feet in length, and like all of those dimensions, had 
been built in the Feejees, these islands affording no timber fit for the purpose.  It is a 
proof of no little courage and dexterity that these apparently fragile and unwieldy 
vessels must be navigated in the face of the usual trade-wind between two and three 
hundred miles” (Erskine, 1858:132). 
Drua were fast.  Thomson (1908:292) gives the speed of the drua as “from 10 to 15 knots 
with the wind on the quarter” and Hornell (1975:327) notes that “drua with a wind on the 
quarter could attain under favourable conditions a speed of about 12 miles an hour” and 
quotes West (1865) who describes undertaking a 38nm trip on a drua in three hours and also 
noted that “they are highly adapted for sailing close upon a wind ... within even three points 
of the wind”.   
Others contend that while capable of achieving such windward performance they didn't in 
practice.  “Although it could lie remarkably close to the wind – within about three points of 
the wind as opposed to about six points for the English square-rigger of the day – the kalia 
through its shallow draft was driven down wind and could not head into heavy sea, which 
forced the hulls asunder.  An expert crew could beat home to Tonga under even quite fresh 
conditions, but some idea of the difficulty can be gained from the 77 tacks Tu`ihalafatai is 
recorded as making on his last voyage from Fiji in the teeth of the Southeast Trades” (Clunie, 
1987:15).   
The missionary Williams (1870:76) who travelled extensively by drua found that a “canoe in 
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good condition makes very little water, and such as have just been described would safely 
convey 100 persons and several tons of goods over 1,000 miles of ocean”.  Lawry (1850: 
144) on October 10, 1847 witnessed “the fleet of Thakombau sailed out this morning with not 
less than 200 warriors on board each canoe”.  Coppinger (1883:163) describes a drua he saw 
in Bau in 1880, as “72 feet long, with a depth of hold about 5 feet; it was intended to carry 
250 men” and “he entertained no doubt about the correctness of this number”. 
In a double canoe about 100 feet long “the beam would be 6 to 8 feet” and “... a man could 
easily walk in the hold without touching the deck.  A pig could be roasted whole in the open 
cooking place and the food and water were easily stowed away for long voyages.  On one 
occasion a canoe carried 12 head of cattle in her holds from Natewa Bay in Vanua Levu to 
Levuka, a trip of 120 miles, and another carried on deck from Tailevu to Suva a cargo of 
bagged maize sufficient to load the Alarm ketch of 30 tons and the Xerifa of 20 tons burden” 
(Wall, 1916, quoted in Haddon, 1975:326). 
Fleet sizes could be large.  A fleet of canoes and the warriors transported by it were known as 
bola, the Fijian term for a hundred canoes (Clunie, 1997: 34).  “Fijian canoe fleets numbering 
scores and often a hundred or more vessels.  An allied fleet which ran down William 
Lockerby in Wailea Bay in 1808 was composed of some 150 canoes” (Imthurn and Wharton, 
1925:39).  A Bauan fleet in the Bau-Rewa wars of the mid century consisted of about 200, 
“counting together the double canoes, those with outriggers and sailing canoes ... when they 
sailed away, Laucala Bay was absolutely crowded with canoes” (Toganivalu, 1912).   
 “Another Bauan canoe fleet which took Charlie Savage, Paddy Connell and other 
beachcombers on a raid in 1809 (Turpin’s Narratives:94) was hardly less impressive, 
comprising 64 drua or double canoes, 36 large camakau outrigger sailing canoes, 26 tabilai 
fighting canoes; and 10 small takia sailing canoes; in all 136 canoes transporting some 2,700 
men” Clunie (2003: 35).  And from a report made in 1847: “The spot over which we are now 
sailing (en route from Ngainge (sic) past the island of Malagai (sic) to Bua) is one which 
Varani will not soon forget.  He was here, a short time since, in his terrible character of 
warrior and cannibal: and in one canoe he met and encountered a fleet of sixty canoes, one of 
which had a small cannon on board” (Lawry, 1850:80).  
Upward of 50 sail, coming from as far away as Tonga and Uvea were counted in Bau waters 
for the commissioning of the Ra Marama in 1849 by Jackson who had earlier sailed in a 
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similar sized fleet.  “In a few days we accordingly started, a great fleet of canoes consisting of 
about forty, and the number of natives about two thousand … and then we were mostly 
obliged to sleep in the canoes, jammed up in such a manner to be actually lying in two and 
three layers on top of each other” (Erskine, 1858:423).  
Similar sized fleets of kalia were recorded in Tonga. Wall, (1909) recounts an 1855 fleet of 
30 canoes from Tonga that sailed to attack parts of Fiji and returned safely (quoted in 
Goefridzt, 1992:51).  An unnamed correspondent recorded: “a small speck in the horizon 
indicated a canoe, and soon another, and another followed … These 49 canoes came 
bounding along with their living freight like racehorses” (Otago Daily Times, 15 March, 
1864).   
Mariner was a castaway in Tonga from 1806 to 1810 and repeatedly recorded large numbers 
of vessels from this period.  “The large canoes of Lefooga, about fourteen in number, were 
then launched, which with Toobo Nuha’s fleet from Vavaoo, made together about fifty sail” 
(Mariner, 1827:91).  “All things being in readiness, the following morning the king embarked 
with the whole of his forces, about 5000 men, besides 1000 women, in fifty large canoes, 
containing also the four carronades, ammunition, and every thing necessary for a vigorous 
attack upon the strong fortress of Vavaoo” (Mariner, 1827:159).  
Tippet (1968:83) describes the autobiographies of early Fijian missionaries Jemesa Havea 
and Joeli Bulu as being, to a large extent, nautical narratives.  Bulu (1871) graphically 
describes sailing from Tonga to Moce in two days, sailing drua from Viti Levu to Kadavu in 
atrocious conditions and even surviving a hurricane in the Lomaiviti group.  His accounts 
describe his missionaries, Tongan teachers and converts all scudding at will and often at a 
moment’s notice around the Lau, eastern Viti Levu and Kadavu spreading the gospel on a 
variety of large and small camakau and drua.  
Drua were multifunctional vessels.  Primarily the naval attack weapon of choice, they saw 
service as blockade-runners and enforcers, landing craft, fleet battleships, troop and supply 
transporters and deadly effective rammers.  There are graphic descriptions of the naval battles 
fought (e.g. Clunie, 1987).  In times of peace they performed as diplomatic missions and 
passenger/cargo traders.  They were used extensively in the service of the new Christian 
religion as essential transport for both European and local missionaries, especially by the 
Tongan teachers who used massive kalia on regular conversion voyages from Tonga to Fiji 
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via the Lau.  The missionaries Lawry, Thomas, and Williams reported regularly travelling by 
drua, often in extremely rough weather and sea conditions.  
The majority, if not all the vessels described above were constructed in the southern Lau.  
“The Fiji islanders make their canoes principally of a hard firm wood, called fehi, which is 
not liable to become worm-eaten; and as the Tonga Islands do not produce this wood, the 
natives are not able to build canoes so large or so strong as those of their instructors.  All their 
large canoes, therefore, are either purchased or taken by force from the natives of Fiji” 
(Mariner, 1827:359).  The translocation of mataitoga craftsmen from Tonga and descendants 
of Lemaki, a Samoan plank-building specialist, to the Lau in temporary and permanent 
settlements is well recorded by, amongst others, Thompson (1940, 1970), Tippet (1968), and 
Reid (1990) and the unique mixed cultural legacy is clearly evident today.  
Drua were comparable in size and superior in speed and windward capability than 
equivalent European designs of the contact period.  They were bluewater, long-range 
capable and superior to any other vessel seen by early European explorers, of a comparable 
length to the Endeavour, with a larger complement, three times faster and capable of sailing 
three points closer to the wind.  It is worth noting that even the earlier tongiaki (Tongan) 
vessel classes seen by the Dutch in the 17th century were considered by them to sail “so 
swiftly that there are few ships in Holland that would outdo them”.  The drua by comparison 
was in a class above.  And this was all the more remarkable in that it was achieved without 
recourse to metals (and arguably because of a lack of metals).  The comparison is not a fair 
one.  European deep-draught displacement monohulls were built to a totally different design 
paradigm that required vessels to carry extreme loads and keep to sea for months at a time.  
The Endeavour was a converted collier, chosen for her durability not her speed.  
All commentators refer to the drua as a recent (mid to late 18th century) design 
evolution.  Although there is universal consensus in the literature on this point, it is not 
necessarily conclusively proved.  Drua are increasingly reported from the Viti Levu seaboard 
to the extremities of the recorded 18th century Tongan sphere of influence (with a later 
introduction to New Caledonia from Tonga around 1900) from at least133 the time of Cook 
onward (1770’s).  But, if the hull innovations had a Melanesian origin not a Tongan one, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133  All historical commentators refer to Cook arriving during a period of transition, not at or immediately prior 
to its commencement. 
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Haddon and others suggest, and/or the drua existed in Fiji prior to eastward expansion from 
Bau to an already populated Lau (Reid, 1990 suggests this as circa 1750) it could be 
reasonable to assume the ‘Levukans’ (Williams, 1870; Reid, 1990) travelled to Lau in drua to 
get there.  If this is held to be true then the subsequent transfer of technology to Tonga is 
easily explained and agreed.  It would leave unanswered the questions of whether the drua 
originated in Bau or west of there; how long the drua was known west of Bau; and whether 
the original drua was only built shortly before the ‘Levukan’ expansion or at some 
undetermined point between the original Fijian settlement and 1750. 
The Drua evolution did not move east of West Polynesia.  Again, this is agreed by all 
commentators reviewed.  How far east it travelled is unproven but Niue and Tokelau are 
probably the eastern most points with the northern Cooks an outside possibility. 
If drua were not a Tongan invention and migrated from west of Bau eastward circa 1750 then 
the technological innovation is almost certainly pre-European contact and indigenous in 
origin.  It is only possible to speculate what effect a further expansion of drua culture might 
have meant to the wider region if its migration further into Oceania had not been impeded by 
European arrival.  Given the speed at which the previously dominant tongiaki class was 
replaced by drua, (presumably no tongiaki were commissioned post drua knowledge being 
introduced to Tonga although existing vessels were almost certainly retro-fitted with drua 
rig), it is arguable that drua could have effected a revolution in canoe technology elsewhere 
in Oceania with similar speed of uptake as witnessed in Tonga (Dale, 1996; Lawry, 1851; 
Wilkes, 1845) which saw near total displacement of the earlier designs within a generation.   
There is no record of the Fijian predecessor to the Drua.  It is highly improbable that the 
ancestors of the Fijians arrived in Fiji 3,000 or more years ago aboard drua.  Irwin (2006:79) 
considers the traditional three-spar-rig appeared in Fiji and West Polynesia long after initial 
settlement.  It follows then that they came in another class of vessel.  There is no available 
evidence as to this craft and what its contribution, if any, to the design of the later drua was, 
although Hornell (1975:334) holds the primitive New Caledonia hull to be the drua’s closest 
relative.  Nor is there available evidence for any design or technology transition of Fijian 
nautical craft from the time of first settlement and the arrival of the drua.  
Clunie (1987:11), who strongly favours a Tongan designer for the drua, describes the Fijians, 
prior to them being educated in drua culture by the Tongans, as a “rather lubberly people” 
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implying their pre-drua maritime capacity was limited.  Against this must be argued the 
extent of the Fiji islands group (400+ islands covering 6 degrees of latitude and 5 of longitude 
with numerous bluewater passages between islands), the oral record of inter-island contact 
within this group prior to this period and the speed at which Fijians adopted a drua culture.  
From the records of most commentators by the early to mid-19th century (see Dale, 1996; 
Erskine, 1858; Wall, 1916), Fijians were widespread owners and consummate handlers of 
their craft.  This would be a startling short period of technology transfer and uptake for a 
culture that displayed minimal capacity prior to the 1770’s.   
Based on the oral evidence of inter-archipelago connections between the groups (see for 
example Fison, 1904) it appears reasonable to speculate that Fijians had at least access to or 
knowledge of Tongan tongiaki class vessels within their home waters, if not ownership and 
management.  Whether they also had an indigenous design of double-hulled canoe, 
presumably either descended from the Melanesian/New Caledonia design or a descendant of 
earlier Fijian double-hulled evolution (Irwin, 2006:76 considers “the historic distribution of 
canoe types suggests the double-hulled canoe developed in Fiji and West Polynesia and there 
is linguistic support for this”) is unkown.  
The sail and rig of the drua and camakau134 are identical designs and originated from 
Micronesia135.  The Oceanic lateen rig is unknown elsewhere in Polynesia.  The literature is 
divided as to whether it was Fijian or Tongan or Micronesian-initiated contact that provided 
the sail and rig technology transfer.  It is also not known whether the camakau led to the drua 
(or vice versa) or whether they evolved contemporaneously.  The large camakau recorded in 
Fiji post-1800 were certainly bluewater capable.  It is reasonable to assume that the outrigger 
and the double hull have a common geographical origin and technology transfer route.  
Alternatives include a camakau origin with Fiji or Tongan-initiated contact, a camakau origin 
with Micronesia-initiated contact, a drua/kalia origin with Fiji or Tongan-initiated contact, a 
drua origin with Micronesia-initiated contact, and a contemporaneous evolution with three 
possible routes.  Answering this conundrum is probably the key to determining whether the 
drua hulls were modified tongiaki or expanded outriggers of Micronesian or Fijian origin.  
The possibility that the transfer went the other way, to Micronesia from either Tonga or Fiji is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Camakau are the outrigger version of drua, also built to large size. 
135  Clunie (1987) considers it most likely of Kiribati origin. 
	  	   	   	  
230	  
not considered by any commentator reviewed in this research but is not totally implausible. 
Oceanic sea-transport technology in the Fiji/Tonga/Samoa region was in a progressive 
(and aggressive) expansion phase at the time of European contact.  This is the opposite to 
that reported for much of the rest of Oceania inter-archipelago contact where double-hulled 
voyaging was in decline at this time (e.g. Howe, 2006).  It is uncertain to what extent this 
progressive phase may have preceded sustained European contact.  “This wider development 
of the kalia, `alia and ndrua type of canoe in the later decades of the 1700’s was instrumental 
in changing the balance of power in the Tonga, Samoa, and Fiji area.  With their superior sail 
rigs and mostly manned by Tongans, these canoes could beat into the wind, allowing closer 
trade and political relations between Tonga, Samoa and Fiji” (Neich, 2006:234).  
The introduction of European ship designs and technology did not immediately displace 
local craft.  Drua remained the vessel of choice for Fijian chiefs until the end of the 19th 
century and vessel construction remained a vital component of inter-island and interstate 
trade into the 20th century.  “The increasing presence of Westerners did little to influence 
Fijian maritime technology.  Fijians learnt to use oars from observing Europeans, but most 
inter-island traffic continued to be carried on drua and camakau ... Although Cakobau 
ordered a schooner built overseas to enhance his mana, Fijians generally did not take to 
western vessels.  Owning a schooner did not engender the same pride as the construction of a 
great drua” (D’Arcy, 2006:142). 
Foye was an English geologist who travelled through Lau in 1912, initially on a missionary 
cutter and then on local camakau.  By this time Cakobau’s sons are reported as having cut up 
his great drua after his death in the 1890’s.  Foye (1917:384) found: “The canoes [camakau] 
are much swifter than the cutters, and natives often prefer to sail from island to island or even 
from Fiji to Tonga in their canoes rather than to depend on the slower passage of a cutter”.  
Thompson (1940) reported a resurgence in building and use of traditional craft during the pre-
war depression, largely as a result of the crash of the copra market and a lack of any income, 
for other means of transport.  Gillett (1993) found that by the 1990’s only very small-scale 
use was evident with passages between Lau and Suva almost non-existent.  Two important 
trips were well remembered.  In 1953 a fleet of two camakau from Ogea and four from 
Fulaga sailed to Suva for the arrival of Queen Elizabeth, sailing through the Lau and 
Lomaiviti groups en route.  In 1964 four Kabara canoes sailed to Suva for a Methodist 
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conference (Gillett, 1993:64).  Since then there have been only sporadic reports, including the 
drua Tabu Soro and the drua of Simione Paki. 
Drua were high value assets and had greater function than just vessels of burden.  Drua 
were arguably the most valuable and expensive asset a chief could possess.  Construction 
could take up to seven years during which a skilled workforce would be employed and paid.  
Only a man of means could afford both the initial outlay and the continual maintenance a 
lashed vessel built of organic materials would require.  These were more than mere assets.  A 
warship capable of slight extra speed or agility could be the difference between life and death, 
not only for the crew but also the community it protected.  Vessel cost could be measured in 
the number of lives sacrificed in its construction and operation that could run into scores.  
Toganivalu (1915) and Thompson (1940) in particular discuss ritual and protocol associated 
with drua culture.  They were “sacred canoes” in all aspects of the term. 
The analysis of Tippet is particularly important in understanding the role and function of drua 
in more than morphological terms and reminds us that drua were not simply the conveyer of 
goods and gifts on which the whole kinship and allegiance based networks of this region rest, 
often they were the artefact and object of exchange itself.   
“The process of building and launching the sacred canoe provides a focal point for the 
study of communal cooperation … The canoe is an artefact of artefacts: (1) The 
resultant canoe is the symbol of group achievement; (2) The project reinforces group 
solidarity; (3) The building and eventual use of the canoe provide a continuity of 
communal activity; (4) The resultant prestige for the whole group strengthens the 
authority pattern; (5) The cultural inter-responsibilities are reapproved and reinforced 
by a continuum of ceremonial activity that is religiously based; (6) The canoe 
provides group satisfaction in strong naval defence, or did so if this was the purpose 
of the project.  In peace the satisfaction is in having a good canoe for public purposes; 
(7) If the canoe was made for extra-community presentation, then foreign relations 
were strengthened for the benefit of the whole group – either economic or military … 
This function of a complex artefact is a mechanism for assuring the perpetuity of 
society in the face of danger or threat” (Tippet, 1968:84). 
Although built primarily as a weapon of war, the peacetime function of drua as the 
mechanism for economic activity and inter-island and international relations and, in particular 
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its function within the tribute system, were critically important.  “The services rendered to 
Fijian communities by the giant sacred canoes were not confined to war and economic 
configurations.  They figured in the political patterns of honorific presentations, not as the 
carrier or transporter of the presentations, but as the object of them.  [Tippet describes the 
function of the Musu Waqa] a canoe built, not as a memorial, but as a gift and symbol or 
pledge of loyalty from one kingdom to a more powerful one” (Tippet, 1968:104). 
Hage and Harary (1996) used both mathematical and anthropological tools to model and 
explain the complex exchange network that linked the differing islands of the Lau and to 
understand the means by which differing islands obtained dominant or subservient positions 
in this network.  Bayliss-Smith et al (1988) discuss this network in terms of relationships 
between Lau and Viti and Tonga.  Drua and drua culture is, in my opinion, the fulcrum of 
these networks, with vesi loa as the pivot pin.  “In a sense the floristic resources of Kabara are 
an analogue of modern day strategic minerals.  Just as the possession of titanium resources – 
important in aircraft construction – bestows strategic importance on the country possessing 
them, possession of large trees of Intsia bijuga [vesi] useful in canoe construction conferred a 
political advantage on Kabara” (Banack and Cox, 1987:161). 
6.3. Areas of Divergence in the Literature 
While there is consensus on the above, there are some aspects of the literature where the 
commentators are strongly in contention, in particular the route of technology transfer that led 
to the evolution of the drua and the origin of the distinctive hulls, the role of Fijian and other 
Melanesian cultures in that evolution, the capacity of Fijian sailing culture prior to Tongan 
18th century influence, and the role of introduced iron technology in the creation of a drua 
prototype.   
6.3.1. The Route of Technology Transfer and the Origin of the Drua Hull Form 
There is agreement amongst commentators that the sail and rig of the drua class are 
Micronesian in origin136 although it is not known if this was a result of the technology being 
brought to Fiji by Fijians, Micronesians or some other intermediary or Tongans obtaining it 
from Micronesia.  There is divergence on where the distinctive drua hull form comes from.  
There are a number of theories.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Although, as previously stated, this is not proven and could have been to not from Micronesia. 
	  	   	   	  
233	  
Finney considers that they are adapted Polynesian hulls and the route of transfer was from 
Micronesia to Tonga.  “Apparently, the Tongans had been in contact with sailors from 
Micronesia, where a breakthrough in canoe design had occurred.  The sailors had developed a 
double-ended craft with a moveable sail that allowed them to sail more efficiently to 
windward .... Tongans adapted this moveable-sail/double-ended configuration, coming up 
with the kalia, a racehorse of a double canoe that could sail circles around the ships of Cook 
and the other European navigators” (Finney, 1994:234).  In this he has the support of D’Arcy.  
“Drua were only developed in Fiji in the late 18th century.  Although made in Fiji their 
appearance owed much to skills and ideas developed elsewhere” (D’Arcy, 2006:141). 
Clunie (1986:15) is more adamant.  “Given long cherished, myths regarding ‘Fijian’ origins 
for Camakau outriggers and Drua, it must be emphasised that while made of Vitian timber, 
their design and handling and hulls came from Tonga and Uvea ... and their builders from 
Tonga and Samoa”.  In his 1987 article he argues “voyaging canoes clearly ancestral to the 
kalia once abounded in Tonga.  As early as 1616, the “Eendracht” encountered many tongiaki 
137 double canoes including one standing far to the north, bound for Samoa …  the hulls of the 
drua originate in the hulls of the earlier tongiaki and that the distinctive opposing ends, one a 
vertical cutwater, the other an ovulated truncate is further proof of the design originating from 
Samoan Lemaki craftsmen” (p.11).  Reid’s (1990:21) comments the meaning of the 
derivative Fijian word karia can, however, be read either way in support of this claim.  “The 
drua in Tonga acquired the name kalia which would appear to be derived from the Fijian 
karia.  This word described the certain shape of canoe end, no doubt contrasting in Tongan 
eyes with the fixed bows of the tongiaki, the original double canoe of the Tongans”.   
In contrast to these, Hornell (1975:334) argued it “is probable that each of these two classes 
of double canoe had an independent origin, the Fijian type from an outrigger ancestor, the 
Polynesian from the connection of two equal or twin hulls after the fashion which persisted to 
the last in designs of the double canoes of the Hawaii and the Society Islands”.  Hornell 
considers that the tongiaki could not have been the originator and argues that there “is little 
doubt that the modern Fijian double canoe is a hybrid between this old [New Caledonian] 
type and the large sailing outrigger of Micronesia.  The design may be described as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 The tongiaki with two true hulls of equal length and a more primitive tacking rig were durable if somewhat 
clumsy and with no windward performance.  They did sterling service back to at least the early 17th century 
and potentially for at least centuries if not millennia prior to this. 
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compromise in which the sailing advantages of the single outrigger canoe have been adapted 
to and combined with the cargo-carrying capacity of the double canoe” (1975:334).   
The Tongan route has also been disputed on linguistic evidence.  “Pacific Islanders 
experienced and innovated, and quickly assimilated innovations they perceived as being to 
their advantage.  This is particularly clear in the area of canoe construction.  Accounts of 
early explorers tell us, and linguistics confirms that the Tongans and Samoans borrowed the 
double canoe and I have argued here that the shunting technology followed the same route” 
(Geraghty, 1994:64). 
Reid (1990:8) offers a potential explanation for a west to east transfer of drua design.  “It was 
during the reign of Ginigini also that Lakeban traditions place the arrival on the island of the 
Levuka people, first indication of those stirrings in the west that were to have such 
consequence in Fiji’s history.  A seafaring folk, they had been the original inhabitants of 
Korolevu, the small isle off the south east coast of Viti Levu which the Bauan chiefs took 
over as their base.  The date of this occupation has been suggested as 1760, and the removal 
of the former incumbents may therefore be regarded as mid-eighteenth century event.  The 
account of their exodus and migration from island to island until they reached Lakeba has 
been told in many ways”.  If these Levukans, also referred to by Williams (1870) and Wilkes 
(1845), arrived on drua then it is possible these would have been the vessels seen by visiting 
Tongans on inferior tongiaki class vessels.   
Reid (1990:12) concurs with Clunie in regard to the Lemaki chronology and influence but 
describes the transition thus: “[t]he first permanent settlers from the east [Tongans settling in 
the Lau] appear to have been shipwrights.  Tongans had recognised the double-hulled drua as 
superior to their own sea-going craft in speed and handling, and even more important, they 
had seen the hardwood resources of the Lau limestone belt which were incomparably superior 
to the timber available in Tonga”.  This explanation is consistent with Williams (1870:76): 
“The well built and excellently designed canoes of the Fijians were for a long time superior to 
those of any other islanders in the Pacific.  Their neighbours, the Friendly Islanders, are more 
finished carpenters and bolder sailors, and used to build large canoes, but not equal to those 
of Fiji.  Though considering the Fijians as their inferiors, yet the Tongans have adopted their 
canoes, and imitate them even in the make of their sails”. 
Thomas (1908:293) concurred.  “And now we come to a remarkable paradox.  The Tongans 
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were the great navigators of the Pacific; the Fijians are not known to have voyaged beyond 
their own group.  The Tongans were so expert with the adze that they rapidly displaced the 
Fijian canoe-builder in his own country.  And yet the Tongan counterpart to the ndrua was 
the tongiaki, a craft so clumsy and ill-finished that it did not survive the eighteenth century, 
when the Tongans learned the art of canoe sailing from Fijians.” 
6.3.2. Fijian Voyaging Ability and History 
The second major point of dissention, and related to the first, is the capability of Fijian sailors 
and shipwrights prior to the 18th century.  The range of opinion on Fijian sailing capability 
prior to European contact ranges from “rather lubberly” (Clunie 1987:11), to capable but 
restricted to their home waters (Thomson, 1908:294), to bluewater and long-range capable 
and experienced (Lawry, 1850:270; Wilkes 1845:366).  Clunie (1987:11) maintains “it has 
been firmly established that Fiji’s indigenous craftsmen could not have built the canoe; while 
Tongans were still teaching Fijians to sail it in the 1840’s, several generations after they had 
supposedly developed it”.  Clunie, in this article at least, does not evidence this claim and it 
since been quoted uncontested by Finney, D’Arcy, Neich and others.   
The counter argument comes from numerous sources.  Hornell (1936:344) concludes “how 
the Fijians came to seize upon the Micronesian design and modify an outrigger type into a 
double canoe one we shall never know, but they certainly did accomplish this feat ... The 
voyaging of the Marshall and Gilbert Islanders, noted navigators and confirmed wanderers, 
almost certainly went as far south as Fiji, and it was in all probability from these people that 
the Fijians gained the knowledge which led to the designing of that magnificent vessel the 
ndrua”.  “It is unquestionable that the Fijians were notably the superiors of the Tongans and 
the Samoans in the art of canoe designing, although the Tongans could claim the credit of 
being the more skilful carpenters and the more daring and experienced navigators” (Hornell, 
1975:264).  
The shipwrecked sailors Mariner (Dale, 1996) in the first decade of the 19th century and 
Twyning in 1829 (Twyning, 1850) witnessed large scale deployment of multi-vessel fleets at 
Bau and Laucala (Mariner) and throughout Fiji (Twyning) being expertly handled by Fijian 
crews.  If south-eastern Fiji was “virtual Tongan colonies”, (Finney, 1994:295) at this time 
and if drua were only introduced to Fijians by Tongans at the end of the 18th century (Clunie, 
1987:12) they would appear to have gained access to a considerable number of high value 
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craft (which would presumably all have gone direct to Tonga if Fiji were only a vassal state) 
and have mastered the seamanship necessary to operate them effectively in large fleet 
formations in less than a single generation.  Certainly by the time of Williams and Wilkes 
(circa 1840’s) Fijians were acknowledged masters of their seafaring craft and use of drua and 
camakau was widespread in Fijian waters. 
Although (Williams 1858:85) assumed that the Fijians never ventured beyond the limits of 
their own archipelago, Lawry (1850:270) considered that Fijians were “bold navigators, and 
make somewhat distant voyages”.  Wilkes (1845, Vol.3:366) described Fijians making “very 
long voyages – to Tonga, Rotuma, and the Samoan islands”.  Speiser (1923:250) refers to 
Fijian voyages to the New Hebrides and commented that “the Tongans, conversely, have 
been lauded as bolder navigators and the presence of Tongan settlements and culture in far 
distant islands of Melanesia is instanced in support.  Without calling into question the 
seafaring intrepidity of the Tongans, it must be pointed out that much of this seeming activity 
was involuntary and due as much to the inferiority of their sailing craft as to their innate 
enterprise and skill.  Their sailing double canoe, the tongiaki, was a craft so clumsy and ill-
designed that it could not beat to windward; when a favourable wind failed, there was no 
alternative but to change course or drift with the sail down”.  
Hornell (1975:305) also considers that “[t]he possession of fine sailing canoes suitable for 
long voyages rendered inter-communication between the islands [of Fiji] so easy and frequent 
that there are no local variations of any consequence in the design of the various types; the 
description of the Mbau and Rewa canoes serves equally well for those of all other localities”. 
Commenting more recently, Rayawa (2001:31) is also of the opinion that there was a Fijian 
origin for drua and notes that “[t]he Tongans were especially daring sailors who prized the 
superior Fijian canoes, often coming to Fiji to learn how to sail them ... A study of canoes 
circa 1830 shows a wide range of specialised craft indicating a long and complex history.  
The [Fijian] hereditary canoe building class had thousands of years of skills and experience at 
their command and the vessels they produced reflect this”.  This, of course, can be equally 
applied to the mataitoga. 
D’Arcy (2006:114-115) summarises Fijian seafaring clans active in Fiji in the 18th and 19th 
century:  
“the fragmentation of power meant that quite small polities with naval capacity could 
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exercise significant influence.  They were often based on small islands off large 
islands, and included groups distinguished as ‘sea people’ ...  The tiny island of Bau 
was the vanua most clearly associated with sea people.  Half a mile off the east coast 
of Viti Levu, Bau is only twenty acres in extent.  It was founded in the 1750’s, and 
rose to become Fiji’s leading naval power by the 1840’s ... Bau’s initial strength was 
based on an alliance between the founding chiefly line from the interior of Viti Levu 
and the seafaring inhabitants of Bau - the Butoni.  Other seafaring people joined later.  
When disputes arose, the Butoni and Soso migrated to various localities around the 
eastern islands of Fiji.  Bau was not alone on relying on sea people as the nucleus of 
its naval and military forces.  Groups such as the Macui of Verata, the Vutia, Nukui 
and Nasilai fishermen of Rewa, and the Navatu people of Cakaudrove filled similar 
roles”. 
Even if the Fijian sailing culture was limited or in some form of limbo prior to the drua, 
Fijian ancestors must have sailed at some point in their history and sail appears regularly in 
the heritage record.  For example Tippet (1968:105) records “[t]he great canoes are featured 
in many of the Fijian migration myths, especially those of the dispersion of the Nakauvadra 
people.  Many of these vessels, like the Kaunitoni are remembered in name in the local 
traditions … in many villages in Kadavu the people know the names of the crafts that brought 
them to their current locations, and something of the routes taken”.  
There are some intriguing references from early historians of Fijian voyaging connections.  
The following references are all from Goetzfridt’s 1992 review.  In 1891 the New Zealand 
ethnographer Percy Smith referred to an indigenous navigational chart of Fiji whose “parallel 
strings stretched on a frame” illustrated the “constant movements of the sea driven before the 
trade-winds".  He also discussed “... traditional indications of Maori familiarity with Samoa 
and Fiji” (quoted in Goefridzt, 1992:184).  Burrows (1936) notes Futuna contact with Fiji 
which he maintains must have existed before European contact (p.75).  Macgregor (1937) 
writing in Tokelau noted that voyages to Tonga and Samoa were common as were 
“marauding expeditions to Fiji” (p.157).  De Bisschop (1939) was informed by Futunan 
sources that two-way voyages to Fiji were being made 50 years previously with other canoes 
coming from Wallis (p.82).  Lewis (1977) emphasizes evidence which points to extensive 
voyaging of the Lapita people, particularly the passage through the Melanesian Trench to Fiji 
… and examines the ethnological and traditional evidence which indicates deliberate and 
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extensive Melanesian voyaging into Micronesia including Fijian voyages to Kiribati and 
Nukuaro (Pohnpei State) and their subsequent adaption of principles of Micronesian canoe 
design (p.31).  Koch (1983) noted that large sailing canoes, which ceased to exist during the 
19th century, were used for voyages to Samoa with elders maintaining that voyages were also 
made to the Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Fiji, and Tonga (p.146).  Finally, Neyret (1985) notes 
that the northern two-mast double canoe of New Caledonia was developed with sailing 
influence from Wallis and Fiji via Micronesia (p.274). 
In addition to the Goetzfridt sourced material above, Green, (1975) considered that shards of 
Fijian pottery found in the Marquesas Archipelago represent pots brought by founding people 
before 300 A.D. whereas Western Samoan shards point to evidence of two-way voyaging 
between Tonga, Futuna, Tuvalu, and Fiji since settlement nearly 3000 years ago (Green 
doesn’t say whether it was Fijians doing the voyaging).  Neich (2006:230) advises that “most 
accounts consider the Tongan empire reached its greatest complexity and geographic spread 
between AD1200 and AD1500” with Fiji as part of this ‘empire’.   
Hage and Harary (1996:17) examine previous literature on the ‘Tonga-Fiji-Samoa network’ 
through anthropological and mathematical lenses and argue that instead of viewing Tonga as 
the ‘apex of a three-cornered network’ as seen by Kaeppler (1978), a more global model 
linking Tonga, Fiji, and Samoa in a single directed cycle of exchange can be discerned by 
considering the most valued prestige good each society obtained from one other society.  
Each island society, therefore, provided one other society’s most valued marriage (and, more 
generally, prestige) good, joining all three societies in a direct cycle analogous to a system of 
generalized exchange.  This cycle suggests that the Tongan monopoly on voyaging and trade 
may have been historically recent and Tonga, Fiji, and Samoa were originally directly linked.  
This would be consistent with the findings of Barnes and Hunt (2005).  
Some confirmation of this comes from the Polynesian-speaking island of Nukuoro in the 
southern Carolines where Eilers (1934:179) cited traditions of canoes from “Hiti” (Fiji) 
visiting or being driven to the island on several occasions.  As Lewis (1972:262) pointed out, 
this “lies more than 1800 miles north-west of Fiji and neither winds nor currents would 
favour drift”. 
The collective quoted oral and linguistic evidence from central Oceania also appears to 
strongly favour a long Fijian sailing history and cross-cultural influences.  Taonui (2006:32-
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38) offers: “Rata is the second most well known demi-god in the Pacific after Maui ... 
Samoan narratives say Lata was a Fijian canoe builder who taught the Samoans and Tongans 
how to construct large double-hulled canoes.  Tongan traditions say the guardian of the 
forests prevented Lasa from felling a tree to build a great canoe.  During a subsequent 
struggle, Lasa caught the chief guardian, Ha-ele-feke, who agreed to help Lasa build the 
canoe and navigate it to Fiji.”  He goes on to note that “[t]raditions concerning the history of 
ruling dynasties reflect frequent contact throughout West Polynesia ... Other traditions 
describe contact with Niue and Fiji.  A married couple expelled from Manu’a [Samoa] 
escaped to Niue.  Their son Fitiaumua later conquered Fiji and Tonga ... Recorded 
intermarriages reinforce this issue.  One Tu’i Tonga married a daughter of the Tu’i Fiti (Fiji).  
His daughter, Laufafaetonga married Tupainatuna, a Samoan.  She later gave birth to her son 
in Fiji, with whom she returned to Samoa”.  
6.3.3. Was the Drua a Purely Indigenous Evolution or was Iron a Catalytic Factor? 
Clunie (1987:16) argues that the earliest metal introduction to Tonga by European sailors was 
potentially a catalytic factor in the evolution of the drua class.  “The introduction of iron and 
steel tools stimulated the development of the canoe by encouraging the use of vesi and the 
production of much larger vessels.  In Cook’s time a spectacular tongiaki was some seventy 
feet long and bore perhaps 80 men.  By the 1820’s when Lemaki’s grandson Maopo built the 
Draunivia for Tanoa of Bau, winning his umpteenth wife, canoes had grown markedly in size 
and - despite the proportionally smaller deck of the kalia – in carrying capacity, the 
Draunivia being 105 feet long and transporting several hundred passengers”.  It maybe of 
course that the 70’ tongiaki was only the biggest Cook saw and not the biggest there was.  If 
Clunie is correct (and the drua was not therefore a purely indigenous design) then it would 
greatly strengthen the case for a Tongan designers claim.  Against this is the continued use of 
largely unchanged tongiaki for at least 150 years (and potentially millennia) prior to the kalia 
revolution.  If the kalia was a product, to some degree, of the influence of iron technology it 
would make it, arguably, the earliest industrial cultural hybrid application in Oceania post 
contact.  In any culture’s context, applying newly acquired technology to upgrading naval 
capacity will be the highest priority of any maritime dominated decision-maker. 
Finney (1994:49) is amongst a number of commentators who notes that “at the time of 
European contact the Tongans were adopting a double-ended hull design and movable lateen-
like sail pioneered by Micronesian sailors that provided superior performance to their 
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traditional canoe” and also “when Cook visited Tonga in 1774 on his second voyage into the 
Pacific, a new type of double canoe called the kalia was gaining popularity as the favoured 
voyaging craft”.  If this is correct then the iron ‘catalyst’ must have arrived pre-Cook as the 
first kalia were by then already in production.    
If iron was in use at this time it presumably came from contact with the earlier Dutch 
explorers, Schouten and Le Marie in 1616 or Tasman in 1643.  But Cook makes no reference 
to Tongans using iron prior to his arrival, and King recorded no metal tools in the Tongan 
carpenters’ toolbox (see below).  Williams (1870:83) claims that the “first iron goods [in Fiji] 
were introduced among the Somosomoans.  The first article of steel owned by them seems to 
have been the half of a ship-carpenter’s draw-knife, ground to an edge at the broken end.  
This was fixed as an adze, and greatly prized, receiving the name of Fulifuli after the chief 
who brought it to Fiji.  One of their first hatchets came through the Tongans, and was named 
Sitia”. 
Finney discussed the extensiveness of Tongan voyaging, including their established contact 
with Fiji and Melanesia, yet infers no role of non-Polynesians in canoe design or evolution 
from outside of Tonga.  Cook’s comment of the outstanding capacity of Tongan canoe 
builders in his earliest contact was discussed above.  This level of craftsmanship was 
presumably achieved without influence of iron and can also be presumed to be of a level 
capable of producing a drua without iron.  In King’s Journal from Cook’s voyage he 
describes the tongiaki hulls he witnessed as being built using only “a stone hatchet, an Augur 
made of Sharks teeth & rasp made of rough fish skin” (Beaglehole, 1967:1367).  Anderson 
recorded in his Journal that “each plank is fitted with such nicety that they would do credit to 
an expert European artist, the only joining to be seen on the outside being a line not more 
open than some in our common Cabinet work” (Beaglehole, 1967: 936).  There is no mention 
of the use of metal tools here. 
Participants at the 1996 ‘Waka Moana Symposium’ in Auckland were treated to “a carving 
demonstration by acknowledged Maori master carvers Dante Bonica and Charles Koro Nehu 
using stone adzes.  The speed and precision of the removal of the wood was comparable to 
that of a steel adze, given sufficient technique, and that was a revelation to most of the people 
there” (Bader and McCurdle, 1999:70).  I have also witnessed similar displays by 
acknowledged carvers in Te Tai Tokerau.   
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Shineberg (1971) and D’Arcy (2000) are amongst authorities on Oceanic history who have 
questioned the scale and extent that musket technology had in these islands and found its 
historically vaunted capacity to change history as limited and overstated.  A similar argument 
could also be explored for the assumed influence of iron on the scale and speed at which 
Oceanic craftsmen could construct naval hardware.   
6.4. Assembling the Cultural Record 
My initial collation of the written record and analysis was largely completed by the end of 
2011138.  As discussed above, almost all of this knowledge has been reported through a 
Western lens.  The Gillett et al (1993) field study of camakau and the ethno-botanical study 
by Bannack and Cox (1987) on Kabara are believed to be the last times that a study of the 
surviving cultural record related to camakau in the Southern Lau was undertaken.  The Gillett 
study was particularly instructive in that the majority of the research team were native Lauans 
and the result was published in both Fijian and English.  It was not known what cultural 
record of drua still existed in those islands or elsewhere in Fiji.  Toward the end of 2011 a 
number of events conspired to allow a field trip to the southern Lau to assess the status. 
The exploits of Uto ni Yalo had reignited public interest in Fiji in their sailing heritage.  
Feature articles on the vaka and the exploits of its crew were appearing regularly in the Fiji 
media.  Coincidentally, in October 2011, Professor Hereniko, Director of OCACPS, was 
advised the Centre was awarded the role of the UNESCO Heritage Hub for the Pacific.  
Following discussions between key stakeholders, Colin Philp (FIVS) and I approached 
OCACPS who agreed that the next research priority was to ascertain the status of the cultural 
knowledge held by the descendants of the mataisau, the hereditary boat building clans, of 
Fiji139.  Discussion amongst key informants and members of the Lemaki and mataisau 
communities living in Suva, identified that any traditional knowledge still held was likely to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138  Drafts were circulated to any in my networks I thought might be able to provide constructive comment or 
provide sources and I have continued to update the compendium and revise the review of that information 
accordingly up until the time of drafting this section in October 2012. 
139 In addition to the mataisau, drua were built by descendants of Lemaki (a specialist Samoan canoe craftsman 
brought to live in the Lau by Tongans) and descendants of the mataitoga (Tongan shipwrights who 
established temporary and permanent settlements in the Lau).  The descendants of these families are now 
heavily interrelated and connected. 
	  	   	   	  
242	  
be concentrated in a small group of island communities, primarily on the southern Lauan 
islands of Kabara, Fulaga, Ogea, Moce, Nayau, and Cicia, where camakau are still a living 
tradition.  It was also identified that the key informants were likely to be limited to a small 
core of elders, a significant proportion of whom were now residing in and around Suva.  USP 
agreed to resource an initial collection of oral record from these informants including a field 
trip by a research team to the identified islands to be followed by an in-depth talanoa of 
Suva-based key informants 140 .  My captain volunteered our own vessel as transport.  
Timeframes were exceptionally tight, the cyclone season was already on us.  
The research team for the task was unique.  Although backed by academic knowledge and 
method, the field team had no formal social science academic training.  It comprised two 
respected elders, Paula Liga from Fulaga, Fijian master carver and artist in residence at 
OCACPS, and Semiti Cama from Moce, an acknowledged expert camakau builder and sailor.  
Two ‘youth’141 from FIVS; Kaiafa Ledua from Nayau (traditional navigator)142, and Peni 
Vunaki from Solodamu, (trainee navigator and cameraman) rounded out the team with myself 
and my captain, providing transport, logistics and wordsmithing support.  Colin Philp and the 
FIVS/IUCN team took care of the financial and logistical arrangements. 
I organised for the team to take instruction from USP academics with expertise in oral history 
recording.  Pre-trip workshops were held with key stakeholders including Fiji Arts Council, 
Fiji Museum, and iTaukei Affairs prior to departure, both to inform them of the project and to 
seek their input and guidance.  Talanoa was identified as the primary research method with 
the results, assuming the informants’ agreement, to be visually and orally recorded on video 
and tape.  Talanoa was, of course, a process intimately familiar to the research team. 
We sailed from Suva on 5 November 2011143 and were enthusiastically met by the inhabitants 
of Kabara, Fulaga, and Ogea with multiple talanoa being conducted at each island followed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 This project was the first approved under USP’s ‘Research Cluster’ programme and was sponsored by Prof. 
Hereniko as the Cluster leader with myself as the Project team leader. 
141  Which in Fiji (and much of the Pacific) can include anyone who is not an elder and some elders are still 
‘youth’, personal observation. 
142 Kaiafa had travelled to Suva when he was 10 years old in a drua built on Nayau from damanu by his father. 
143 In keeping with the nature of research, the field trip was undertaken aboard a sail-powered ship that used less 
than 4 litres of diesel during the trip. 
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by selected interviews with key informants.  We were advised it was not necessary to visit 
Moce as key informants had either already passed away or were in Suva.  Whilst the research 
team was en-route to Nayau and Cicia a deepening tropical depression forced that part of the 
itinerary to be cancelled.  Fortunately both communities were represented at the subsequent 
Suva talanoa hosted at USP on 30 November 2011.   
Collectively, the field research and the Suva talanoa resulted in the collation of a series of 
talanoa and interviews with the last known holders of cultural knowledge recorded in raw 
form on digital audio and video recorders.  While we cannot claim that the record collected is 
the sum total of knowledge held by cultural informants, we are confident that it covers the 
great majority.  A project report has been prepared for OCACPS and two master CD’s of 
indexed copies of all collected audio, video and still photograph records to be lodged in USP 
Library’s South Pacific Collection and in iTaukei Affairs’ National Heritage Database. 
Our intention in undertaking this part of the research was to identify whether cultural 
knowledge still existed and, in the event that this proved positive, to ensure a permanent 
record was made while key informants were still alive to do so.  In this we have been 
successful.  The research found that a vibrant and proud cultural knowledge exists, albeit in a 
few isolated communities and with only a small number of individuals (many of whom who 
are elderly); and that there is a strong desire by the surviving mataisau to see their 
knowledge, skills, and heritage reclaimed and invigorated.  Some aspects of knowledge, in 
particular pertaining to tabetebete construction and sail technology and operation, is not 
described elsewhere and confirms that the level of technology achieved in the construction 
and operation of the drua was highly complex and technologically advanced.  In addition 
there was a ‘by-catch’ of additional and related information, for example about the building 
of the Tai Kabara by the shipwrights of Kabara in the 1980’s.144 
The research also highlighted matters of oral knowledge collection process and 
intellectual/traditional knowledge protection.  Both matters are complex and need to be 
addressed carefully.  At the time of writing the raw data has not been edited or translated in 
any way.  The findings from the research presented in this section are those matters the Suva 
talanoa agreed should be presented in English at the 30 November 2011 talanoa.  I do not 
profess any expertise in Lauan or Bauan and so I cannot claim to know any of the detail or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144  See case study Section 5.1.1. 
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much of the substance of what was discussed in that remarkable series of talanoa to which I 
was a deaf witness.  This is of no importance, what is critical is that the raw data is now held 
for and by future generations of mataisau.  Although I was not privy to the detailed content of 
the talanoa, I found the project a powerful experience.  All participants were overjoyed that 
the opportunity had arrived and hugely appreciated the process being conducted by their own 
researchers, according to protocol and only in local dialect.  
One Kabaran listed the number of countries from which researchers had come to study his 
island and his culture.  This was the first time he could recall a team of Lauans coming to 
learn and exchange with Lauans on this central icon, the drua.  In one talanoa on Fulaga I 
looked up partway through proceedings to see our two young bati with tears of shame 
streaming down their cheeks, an extremely stern looking Tui Vulaga, and huge grins on the 
faces of our two ‘kava warriors’.  Only much later did I learn the story.  The Tui had told of a 
dream he’d had 30 years ago where young men came to ask him the secrets of the tabetebete 
drua in his own language.  Our ‘lads’ were being admonished for the lateness of the hour, 
given he was now 84.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 52 FIVS Researchers Recording Traditional Knowledge, Kabara, 2011 
On Kabara we were setting up the equipment in preparation for the talanoa that was to 
commence that morning when the turaganikoro arrived.  Suddenly all preparations ceased 
and we were being ushered off for another cup of tea.  I was sure we had breached protocol of 
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some sort.  Sure enough the chief had stopped the talanoa.  But only while he sent 
messengers to all the other villages on Kabara so that all could sit and share together rather 
than have us go from village to village. 
In terms of cultural knowledge collection, the talanoa sessions followed customary protocol 
and were facilitated by the FIVS’ researchers.  Although there were minor differences with 
each session, the basic interview format was the same. Key informants were identified 
through use of existing networks prior to leaving Suva and advance notice of the research 
team’s itinerary and purpose were sent to the island communities via the Lau Provincial 
Council.  Upon arrival on each island, the research team presented sevusevu in accordance 
with the mana of the project to the highest ranking chief and discussed the purpose of the 
research and the talanoa.  Following protocol, the process of conducting the talanoa was 
agreed, the ranking local chief having the final say on all matters. 
Once the talanoa was convened, the research team gave a presentation using PowerPoint and 
video aids on the activities of FIVS and the voyages of Uto ni Yalo and the current Pacific 
voyaging fleet, an overview of the knowledge accrued from reviewing the previously 
recorded historical information on drua and related ship construction and voyaging across the 
Pacific; and issues of TK/IPR associated with the knowledge to be discussed in the talanoa.  
This was accompanied with a request to record the talanoa and subsequent interviews, 
rounding off with a summary of matters raised in previous talanoa.  
Using leading questions, FIVS researchers facilitated the subsequent discussion.  During the 
talanoa participants were asked to help identify those with the most knowledge for 
subsequent interview.  These were conducted in smaller group sessions facilitated by Kaiafa 
and recorded by Peni.  Following each talanoa, the research team debriefed and discussed the 
outcome, with Kaiafa and Peni interviewing Paula and Semiti on camera and asking them to 
summarize the learnings from the preceding talanoa.   
On return to Suva, FIVS, on behalf of OCACPS, organized and facilitated an all-day talanoa 
at USP.  This talanoa included those mataisau and Lemaki resident in Suva as well as 
observers from relevant agencies and ministries such as FNU, iTaukei Affairs, and the Fiji 
Arts Council.  Participants were given the same background presentations used on the field 
trip and a summary of the talanoa from the Lau.  A public lecture was held at the end of the 
Suva talanoa which was opened by the Vice Chancellor of USP and the Director of 
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OCACPS.  The lecture was well attended and generously covered by local media.  This 
lecture was the only part of the research programme which was not conducted exclusively in 
Lauan dialect. 
To date the talanoa, interviews and consequent recordings have been in the vernacular, 
primarily Lauan dialect.  It is intended that this material will only be available for translation 
with the permission of the mataisau.  For this reason, the project report contains only general 
statements of the information recorded, as set out below.  
• The talanoa and interview process undertaken is the most comprehensive exercise of this 
nature undertaken, at least since the field research undertaken by Laura Thompson (1940).  
It is believed to be the first time such research has been undertaken by a Lauan research 
team speaking in their own dialect. 
• There is intense interest in preserving and enhancing knowledge of drua and the practical 
building of such vessels by the descendants of mataisau and Lemaki.  
• Cultural memory of drua construction and sailing exists.  This includes knowledge of rig 
construction and sail making.  Sailing knowledge includes methods of sail reefing not 
previously recorded in the literature.  The knowledge holders are now a small group of 
possibly no more than a few score, many of them of advanced age.  
• The distinction between saucoko and tabetebete drua is well-known amongst talanoa 
participants.  No participant had ever built a tabetebete drua, although the Tui Vulaga 
recalled being told by his uncles in his early drua building career how to build a tabetebete 
drua.  The Tui may be the only living person with this knowledge.  
• There are women who have been taught by their elders who can still build the sails for 
drua.  The only literature available on this subject refers to “matting” sails.  The 
descriptions of sails collected by the research team detail advanced technological designs 
and construction of great ingenuity and sophistication. 
• There are memories of women camakau sailors and of women’s camakau races being held 
in Fulaga lagoon. 
• The carpenters from the various islands all agreed that each island had its own style of 
drua and that drua could consequently be recognised as being from a particular island. 
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• The last drua built was a saucoko type built for an American “Vince” in the late 1980’s on 
the instruction of Ratu Kamisese Mara.  It was called Tabu Soro, commenced on Ogea and 
completed on Fulaga before being sailed to Suva.  The drua operated for a few years as a 
tourist venture in Suva, Pacific Harbour, and Denerau. 
• There was repeated reference to tabetebete drua being used as crypts for Tui and 
knowledge of the site of at least one. 
• In the main, the cultural knowledge collected confirms and, in some critical areas 
(particularly sail-making and tabetebete construction), extends the written record of drua 
construction.  Some aspects of drua culture in the literature, such as the cultural processes 
recorded by Toganivalu in 1915, are no longer known by the informants in this research.   
• The knowledge of camakau building and sailing is still practiced on Fulaga and Ogea 
although there were fewer craft than reported by Gillett et al (1993).  It was reported that 
there is only one camakau still active on Moce.  It is not known if others are still active in 
other parts of the Lau.  Children were observed practicing bakanawa (racing model 
canoes) as an everyday activity on Fulaga. 
• Building a drua took a community.  While there was segregation of roles (e.g. men 
making the hulls and rigs, women making the sails), all the community, men, women, 
elders, and youths, came together to make the magimagi (the ropes and cord that bind the 
craft together and make it whole). 
The research undertaken to date is a work in progress and only the start of what is envisaged 
as an ongoing and expanding programme needed to ensure the cultural heritage of drua is 
maintained as “living” tradition.  The data held is still in a raw, unedited state.  At the very 
least, a snapshot has been preserved and held for the benefit of future generations of mataisau 
and a wide ranging discussion between key stakeholders initiated situated on a 
comprehensive research platform. 
6.5. Outcomes of the Heritage Research Programme 
The research undertaken to date has achieved a range of results.  Firstly, it is arguably the 
first time that the disparate written information relating to drua culture has been assembled in 
a single place and the data subjected to analysis and delineation of the various areas that are 
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agreed or disagreed in the historic record.   
Secondly, and possibly most importantly, it has demonstrated that cultural knowledge of drua 
held by descendants of those that built and operated the great drua is not lost.  That 
knowledge is in a fragile and vulnerable state given the highly limited number of and age of 
traditional knowledge holders.  The cultural record now strongly indicates that archaeological 
remains of tabetebete drua may exist.  Given their tabu status as crypts, further examination 
of such sites will need careful consideration before it is known whether archaeology should 
be pursued to confirm the knowledge of tabetebete construction.  The report on the research 
undertaken (Nuttall, et al, 2012b) has been lodged with iTaukei Affairs and has received 
interest from Pacific history and archaeology expertise in Fiji, Australia, and Hawaii. 
Thirdly, the process of undertaking the collection and review of data has resulted in, and 
contributed to, a growing awareness of the critical place drua culture holds in Fijian society.  
This is captured in the thoughts of Kabara elders whose stated vision is to see the “sleeping 
adzes” of Kabara reawakened to once again swing in unison in building new drua in the 
future.  When aligned with other critical developments in this area, particularly the return of 
Uto ni Yalo to Fiji, the Pacific Blue sponsored annual camakau races, FNU’s camakau 
building programme and the expanding use of drua and related culture in performances and 
other activities of OCACPS, this has the potential to lead to widespread resurgence in cultural 
pride and expression by Fijians and related central Oceanic cultures of their unique maritime 
heritage.  External specialist support is needed to expand on and maximise this window of 
opportunity, as ‘experts on tap not on top’. 
The Suva mataisau talanoa saw the establishment of a critical network of traditional 
knowledge holders, mataisau, and Lemaki descendants linked to a wide range of key 
partners; in particular FIVS, USP and OCACPS, FNU, iTaukei Affairs, Fiji Arts Council, Fiji 
Museum, and Pacific Blue Foundation.  The mataisau have called for this network to be 
regularly convened to ensure the momentum is maintained.  
The research into cultural knowledge has demonstrated and highlighted the importance for 
such research to be conducted by local researchers (in this case descendants of the historic 
boat builders themselves) using local and culturally appropriate methodologies (in this case 
Lauan dialect and talanoa).  Talanoa has shown itself to be a highly effective and efficient 
method of discussing, truthing, and recording data of this kind.  In particular the research has 
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had the active support and participation of the mataisau and the Lemaki.   
6.6. Applying the Lessons of the Past to the Challenges of the Future 
In terms of the potential application of this knowledge from the past to future applications, 
fleets of indigenously owned and operated vessels, locally built from renewable resources, 
capable of carrying large payloads at speed over bluewater passages without use of fossil 
fuels appears an alluring alternative to today’s expensive and unsustainable sea-transport 
options.  That of course will not happen tomorrow with traditionally built or designed drua.  
Such ships were dangerous to operate and would certainly never pass any form of commercial 
survey or meet any commercial insurance test.  But there is obviously a wealth of critical 
lessons to be learnt through examination of the past. 
I was initially surprised at the lack of compiled research on drua given its obvious and 
acknowledged status and the technological level of its design capacity (the drua is arguably 
highly competitive against any other Oceanic design on all points: speed, windward 
performance, size, construction, sail technology).  Regardless of its design origin, the drua 
was the finest technological development of Oceania and its finished form was the product of 
a unique and indigenous cross-cultural collaboration.  
The literature on the voyaging and canoe culture of Oceania is heavily biased toward 
Polynesian and, to a lesser extent, Micronesian contribution, and activity.  This may be 
explained by a number of factors including the origin of the current voyaging revival in 
disputing claims that Polynesians settled eastern Polynesia by drift not design, the centres of 
research being largely Polynesian orientated (Hawai’i and NZ in particular), a focus on long-
range navigational ability, and possibly a preoccupation of researchers about where people 
ended up rather than with what they did within and on the Ocean.  
The greatly increased windward capability of the drua immediately reduced the uncertainty 
of return voyaging capacity (assuming the vessel itself withstood the rigours of the voyage), 
as well as giving increased speed and performance.  Within the sphere of Tongan influence 
this capacity was exploited to great advantage as evidenced by the complexity of the inter-
island exchange and trade networks that followed in its wake, including increased martial and 
religious (more latterly especially Christo-Judaic) exchange as occurred with every sea-going 
power in the world at this time.  At the height of drua culture, small remote islands were 
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assets and conduits to travel and commerce, not liabilities and uneconomic sources of burden 
as currently perceived. 
Although only alluded to peripherally in this research, the ‘Tongan maritime empire’ appears 
to have been in an expansive and prosperous phase at the time European intrusion disrupted 
the local Oceanic evolutionary undulations.  The vessel movements between Fiji and Tonga 
in particular were almost certainly at their highest historical levels ever in the mid 19th 
century, used for military and naval operations, diplomacy, trade and religious conversion 
and practice.  Given the historical extent of the ‘empire’ using tongiaki class technology and 
the immensely increased capacity, especially to windward, that drua technology provided, it 
is interesting to speculate the extent it could have expanded if Europeans hadn’t probed into 
central Oceania when they did.  Would drua have reached Hawai’i and Aotearoa?  Would 
they have displaced the local designs as quickly as they did tongiaki?  What would have been 
the result to design and performance under the influence of new cultures and access to 
materials such as Harakeke (flax), Totora, and Kauri? 
Critical lessons from the past that must be considered in any future application are many.  Of 
particular importance is the learning that, regardless of the state of Fijian sailing culture pre-
drua, post-drua it was exemplary and widespread throughout the archipelago.  There is a 
demonstrated historical capacity to adapt to, develop, and exploit evolving vessel technology.  
Regardless of the origin of the drua, whichever technology transfer route was followed, the 
result was an inter-archipelago Oceanic collaboration where different but related cultures 
exploited their unique attributes (Fijian timber and technicians, Micronesian sail and design 
innovation, Samoan and Tongan craftsmanship, and Tongan seamanship) to produce a 
superior class of vessel of extreme adaptability.  Just as importantly, the rapid demise of drua 
culture across central Oceania by the start of the 20th century underscores that such 
technological capacity, even dominance, can be lost as quickly as gained. 
It is also important to recognise that Fiji has had a flourishing shipping industry of some scale 
providing quantity and quality high performance ships at the leading edge of local and 
regional market demand, even if there is dispute about whether the workforce and 
management were indigenous or imported.  Future sustainable solutions for Fijian sea-
transport are likely to be best addressed if viewed in the context of networks of related islands 
and archipelagos, in particular those of the old Tongan ‘empire’.   
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In the past, indigenously managed, sail-powered fleets capable of bluewater transport of large 
quantities of passengers and cargo were viable before fuel-powered vessels dominated.  Such 
fleets employed technology and materials that were largely renewable.  What the long-term 
effect on vesi loa ecosystems would have been of continued exploitation due to ever-
increasing demand can only be speculated on.  The status of vesi loa reserves at the end of the 
19th century is unknown.  At the start of the 21st century WWF-SP determined the extent and 
impact of the local woodcarving industry on Kabara’s local forests, specifically on vesi.  The 
results indicated heavy household dependency (96%) on vesi for carving as their main or only 
source of income with poorly developed alternatives to ease pressure on vesi harvest.  As the 
tree is slow growing (80+ years to mature) and with increased demand, stock on the island 
has been greatly diminished.  Of the islands 28 km sq forested area only 8% was calculated as 
remaining in natural strands in 2004 (WWF-SP website). 
The drua era was a positive and progressive one for sea-transport in the region and for the 
ship building industry of eastern Fiji in particular.  Although it is unfair to consider the 
complex exchange network in such terms, ship building was arguably the biggest foreign 
exchange and investment earner for the indigenous governments’ prior to conversion to 
colonially-administered economies. 
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Chapter 7. Charting a Course for the Future 
This thesis has documented an action research process, an inquiry into the potential for 
alternative energy options, in particular wind power, to provide a sustainable adaptation 
intervention in regards to sea-transport for Oceanic communities.  Just as the inquiry has been 
shaped and influenced by the broad talanoa within which it has emerged, so the research 
process itself has influenced and impacted that talanoa.  In 2009, when the inquiry was 
centred in one remote Fijian village it was difficult to see that there was any sympathy or 
wider context available.  As the research agenda has emerged, refocused, and widened, it has 
engaged with a wider audience and a slowly growing pool of participants and collaborators.  
Some have been eager and fully convinced of the merits and priority of the inquiry, others 
more hesitant and cautious, and some openly sceptical and critical.  
One key underlying assumption of this inquiry, that there is a natural and fundamental 
interrelationship between Oceania’s seafaring heritage and future sea-transport, has not been 
accepted by a minority, mostly non-indigenous commentators.  To date no-one has 
questioned that sea-transport is a critical and increasing issue to the region for which it is 
poorly prepared and the debate inadequately characterized.  It has also been generally 
recognised that the research agenda of this thesis has been catalytic to illuminating the issues 
and options available and stimulating a growing network of stakeholders toward committing 
to a wider research agenda.  Uptake and participation has not been even across stakeholders, 
with key regional agencies and the existing commercial sector noticeable in their hesitation, 
reflecting, in my view, the conservative nature of both industries. 
Like any other emerging technology or adaptation, all assumptions and findings, no matter 
how substantively backed by theoretical research, are going to remain tentative until trialled 
and proven in the field.  Further uptake and extension of the agenda pursued by this thesis 
will always be conditional on this.  By 2012 it was increasingly obvious that if the learnings 
indicated in this thesis are to be heeded, especially that investment in a long-term and broad 
programme is required, then a more formal and coordinated approach is needed than can be 
provided by a single thesis.  In essence the research agenda had reached a stage it needed to 
be placed openly on the mat for critical examination from multiple perspectives and a 
consensus on whether and how to proceed formed.   
Serendipitously USP responded favouarably to my request to host a stakeholder workshop at 
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the end of November 2012, in essence to truth the result of the inquiry thus far, to plan its 
future development and to expand the growing network.  Initially we began to prepare for a 
largely Fijian focused event with some regional participation.  Greenheart and B9 Shipping 
asked to participate and offered to coordinate their European and Japanese collaborators.  The 
workshop quickly ballooned into a three-day Sustainable Sea-transport Talanoa (SSTT) with 
support and participation from a broad range of expertise, including innovators and 
researchers in alternative energy ship design from Europe and Japan, and universities in UK, 
Germany, Japan, and Australia.  Local, national, and regional stakeholders were well 
represented, including key Fijian government ministries, SPC, bilateral and NGO agencies, 
cultural and voyaging societies, traditional boat builders, navigators and sailors, USP, and 
FNU.  Senior staff from organisations such as UNESCAP, UNESCO, the International 
Seafarers Research Institute, and Germanischer Lloyd joined electronically.  Elder statesmen 
such as Alastair Couper, Winston Halapua, and the Tui Vulaga brought dignity, mana, and 
pearls of wisdom.  The gathering was a first for the region and arguably the world in bringing 
together such a diverse range of perspective, opinion, and expertise.  The short notice of the 
SSTT meant some could not attend and apologies came from several stakeholders with their 
commitment to joining a larger event in 2013. 
Section 7.1 summarizes the discussion and outcomes of the SSTT and considers the priorities 
needed for a future action blueprint.  Information presented at the SSTT largely supports and 
extends the tentative verstehen I had already reached in this thesis.  In keeping with the action 
research modus of the thesis, this section is intended to form the basis of a white paper from 
the SSTT as a basis for future discussion between key stakeholders and partners.  
The SSTT did confirm that the priorities are multiple and that progressing this agenda will 
require an integrated approach between multiple and diverse stakeholders.  An agreed 
framework for achieving collaboration in what is ultimately likely to be a competitive field is 
needed.  As reported at the SSTT there is progress internationally towards forming an 
“International Windship Association” being led by European stakeholders.  It is unlikely to be 
the only example of this type of initiative.  Such association offers an entry point for 
Oceanian interests to access support and partnerships with the emerging global industry. 
Over the course of this thesis I have become convinced that the interwoven issue of how 
relationships, collaboration, and competition between key stakeholders are now managed is 
the most critical priority to be addressed and will greatly affect both the efficiency and level 
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of future development and therefore its potential to deliver real benefit to Oceanic 
communities, however that may be defined.  Open and honest sharing of intelligence and 
data, and of mistakes as much as successes, to the greatest extent possible is required.  The 
emerging stakeholder network is embryonic.  In Section 7.2 I seek to illuminate critical 
lessons from another Oceanic talanoa, that surrounding local community management of 
marine ecosystems that has preceded this research by more than a decade.  While the subject 
and focus is different there are marked similarities in organisational and research issues, 
stakeholder groupings, and locale of the FLMMA and LMMA discourses that I contend offer 
some guidance for the relationship matters now surrounding the sustainable sea-transport 
talanoa. 
7.1. Port of Arrival: the Sustainable Sea-Transport Talanoa, 28-30 Nov 2012145 
The SSTT 2012 was held with the objectives of: (1) initiating a conversation between key 
stakeholders; (2) to canvas support for a larger, more formal conference in 2013; and, (3) to 
identify the key action areas needed to progress this critical debate.  The talanoa looked both 
forward to the future of Pacific sea-transport in a ‘climate change’ and fossil-fuel scarce 
future and to the past, when Oceanian vessels and peoples voyaged sustainably at will.  
Participation, presentations, and subsequent discussion came from across the breadth of the 
debate, locally to internationally.  
There was general agreement that the event was timely and the issue worthy of increased 
priority, further research, and investigation and that there is strong potential to achieve 
multiple benefits for Pacific Island communities.  There was affirmation for the general 
conclusions of this research, for example that the Pacific shipping scenario is unique, that the 
priority is domestic shipping, and that progressing this agenda will require both a long-term 
programme and collaboration between multiple stakeholders.  There was strong support from 
participants for a major conference in 2013.  Working from the outcomes from the final 
talanoa sessions, I have suggested a five-strand work programme for collective action for the 
development of a long-term integrated programme (summarised in Table 11) 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 The SSTT 2012 programme, presenter biographies, and presentations are available from the USP website.  
https://www.usp.ac.fj/index.php?id=12456. 104 people particapted with a further 14 presenting 
electronically.  
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Table 11: Work-Stream Priorities 
 Work Stream Keywords Themes 
1 Heritage Drua, Vaka, Waka, Iconic, Culture, 
Tradition. 
Excellence in seafaring and vessel 
design/construction. 
Ocean as highway not barrier. 
Cultural history, 
Archaeology,  
Traditional revival 
Carving, Weaving, 
Navigation, Seafaring, 
Voyaging 
2 SSTT 2013 International Symposium and Drua 
Festival 
Celebrate the Past, 
Prepare the Future 
3 Strategic 
Blueprint 
Policy Frameworks 
Regulatory Frameworks 
Economic Analysis 
Quadruple Bottom-line Reporting 
Industry-wide Assessment 
Integrated Approach 
Route Identification and Wind-Route 
Planning 
Collaborative Relationships – locally, 
regionally, internationally 
Carbon Credits 
Cost/Benefit 
Project v Programme 
Bio and/or Solar and/or 
Wind and/or Other 
Owner/Operator Option 
Analysis 
Private/Public 
Market/Uneconomic 
4 Demonstration 
Models 
USP Research Vessels.  
An initial trial of Sustainable Village 
Vessels (SVV) and Greenheart (GH) 
type designs under a controlled 
programme to trial the technology, 
management/ ownership models and 
integrated trading networks 
Intra-island e.g. SVVs 
Inter-island e.g. GH , 
Barges, Fishing Vessels 
Inter-state e.g. B9 
Disaster Relief 
5 Gender & 
Youth 
Leadership, Capacity Building, Skill 
Development, Business Opportunities, 
Community Focus 
Training, Mentoring, 
Team-building 
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The SSTT 2012 was broad ranging.  The first day focussed on the lessons offered by the past, 
the second day on the potential solutions available or emerging locally and internationally, 
and the final day at what was needed to progress.  A number of key themes, additional to 
those summarised elsewhere in this thesis, emerged over the course of the talanoa that are 
particularly worthy of highlighting. 
There was further evidence that Oceania’s seafaring and ship design/building heritage are 
extremely strong traditional and cultural icons.  Revival of this provides a ‘soft’ entry point in 
garnering local community interest in and recognition of alternative energy based shipping 
options, particularly sail.  There are numerous lessons from Oceania’s unique maritime past 
that provide guidance for the future.  Francis Hickey’s presentation on Vanuatu canoe 
heritage reminded that Oceania’s maritime heritage and innovation is extremely diverse.  The 
voyaging revival that began in Hawaii in the 1970’s is now visible across the Pacific.  
However, the initial emphasis on long-distance Polynesian voyaging has tended to over-
shadow other aspects of this heritage across Oceania, including the still living practice found 
in many parts of Melanesia and Micronesia.  Of particular interest to the debate on future sea-
transport options is the traditional role of ships and shipping in the various complex inter-
archipelagic trade networks that developed.  
The urgency of the global need to move toward carbon neutral technologies was underscored 
by Mark Trexler’s presentation that provided a sobering synopsis of future global scenarios if 
major reductions (of the order of 70%) in overall GHG emissions are not made immediately.  
For Oceania, shipping is one area where there is strong potential to achieve reductions for a 
relatively minimal investment. 
The majority of interest and programmes aimed at advancing alternative energy shipping is 
currently orientated to developed world needs.  There is limited activity focussed on SIS or 
developing nations.  Di Gilpin’s presentation, based on UCL analysis, showed that small-
scale (less than 10,000dwt) and domestic shipping, much of it centred in developing 
countries, contributes a disproportionate share of the global emissions profile (4% of global 
cargo but 26% of all shipping emissions or approximately 1% of global totals).  Shipping at 
this scale is excluded under the IMO’s Energy Efficiency Design Index programme.  There 
was also confirmation of likely cost increases for Pacific marine fuel under the MARPOL 
Annex 6 (see footnote 120, p.201). 
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A key lesson from European contributors is the strong trend toward research partnerships 
between universities, governments, and industry networks.  Progressing a sustainable sea-
transport agenda for Oceania will require a strong research base into the unique issues facing 
the region, it will need to be multi-disciplinary in nature, and alliances between local research 
providers and those at the cutting edge internationally need to be fostered as an early priority.  
There is strong interest from the international community that participated, in particular 
European agencies, in the situation here in Oceania and the SSTT 2012 has already led to 
initial discussions on future collaboration between USP, UK and Australian universities. 
There is a need to take heed of the lessons learnt from past experiments.  New technology and 
approaches must be appropriate to the Pacific settings in which they will be employed.  
European innovators agreed that development and asset procurement costs of the new 
technologies on their drawing boards would be a major barrier to the Pacific.  The 
presentations from Mike Savins in Kiribati were particularly illuminating.  There is a history 
of well-intentioned but ultimately unsuccessful projects to introduce alternative technologies, 
particularly small sailing vessels.  The key message here is that simply providing vessels is 
not the answer unless they are entirely appropriate to the local setting, affordable, and 
supported across the life-cycle of the operation with special attention to the socio-cultural 
environment in which they will operate.  All such attempts need to be well documented so 
that, succeed or fail, the lessons learnt are available to others in the field, and there needs to 
be greater linking of experiences. 
There was consensus the issue is far broader than technology.  Economic analysis at both 
macro and micro levels are a critical priority as are consideration and understanding of the 
socio-economic, socio-cultural and political factors.  Policy and regulatory frameworks at 
regional and national levels need to be assessed.  Given that shipping has yet to make the 
‘cut’ in terms of identified climate change adaptation and related policy and frameworks of 
PICs, and regional and bilateral agencies, there is a priority need to review such forward 
planning to ensure the current invisibility of shipping and potential for renewables is 
reversed.  Theoretical research must be balanced with trialling of practical demonstration 
models.  There is sufficient background research and design now completed to justify moving 
to practical implementation.  Access to resourcing aside, there is no compelling reason why 
the Pacific should not be a proving ground in this emerging field, a point made by a number 
of international commentators. 
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Captain Rounds of SPC was particularly supportive of a sea-change, pointing to current and 
rising local fuel costs now comprising ~40-60% of total ship operating costs, depending on 
the type of ship and service.  Summarising the general discussion, his advice was that PIC 
national policy must be evolving, and “should be regularly revised to effectively support 
shipping and new technology especially that which has major socio-economic benefits, i.e. 
wind/solar/biofuel powered vessels”.  Such policy must capture the entire shipping sector, 
from build to break and all related industries.  Training needs to begin at cadet level.  
Rounds also opened the debate on the role of governments in providing access to vessel and 
industry financing through various mechanisms, potentially including providing loan security 
and preferred operator status for alternatively powered or retrofitted vessels.  Sean Weaver 
introduced the potential of carbon trading to offset future shipping costs, drawing on recent 
experience within the Pacific forestry sector.  While this will require sufficient scale to justify 
the cost of establishing the trading framework there is potential at least for a future scenario 
where not using fuel generates income as opposed to the BAU reality of ever increasing 
expenditure.  Scoping this potential will require a higher standard of data than currently 
exists.  The paucity and unreliability of current data for the sector was an oft-repeated issue, 
especially by government and regional policy-makers and researchers. 
SPC’s Katerina Syngellakis drew on the lessons from other Pacific alternative energy 
initiatives and talked about the need for planning to be critical and provide full assessment of 
all costs.  Although there have been advances in solar, wind, and biogas/mass for electricity 
generation, the installation costs can be several times the cost of diesel generation.  While 
diversification of energy supplies is a priority for PICs, time must be taken to plan 
strategically.  International commentators, in particular Dykstra (the designers of Ecoliner), 
Tristan Smith (UCL) and Gavin Allwright (Greenheart) all highlighted recent work looking to 
establish baselines of “cradle to break” and even “cradle to cradle” carbon costs across the 
total operating life of vessels.   
For full benefit from sustainable sea-transport for Oceania to be realised, the programme 
needs to be driven from within the region.  Having said this, a particularly encouraging trend 
from several international commentators was their desire to support and collaborate with 
Pacific partners, not because of any economic potential for their products or their research but 
because they recognise the scale, significance, and urgency of the problems in this region.  It 
is too early to fully assess whether the SSTT has generated sufficient momentum and critical 
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mass to be self-sustaining, although there are encouraging signs to this effect.  At least, the 
case made at the outset of this thesis, that the issue of sustainable sea-transport and alternative 
energy shipping is largely invisible within the region, is no longer a tenable argument and the 
subject now has some profile across the broader regional development agenda. 
7.2 The FLMMA Example: Lessons from another talanoa 
FLMMA has been working with their partners in the communities to formulate ways of 
addressing their marine resource management problems. Its experiences are unique 
and provide useful lessons that must be understood by those who are dealing with 
similar situations. The point to remember is that to involve people in community-based 
resources management requires a great deal of consultative work, goodwill, trust and 
commitment. The process cannot be shortened and requires patience and understanding 
(Veitayaki et al, 2003:5). 
Sea-transport in Oceania, whether viewed within the current frame of high overheads, low-
returns and old assets or within more traditional contexts, is essentially a high-risk, marginal, 
and intensively competitive commercial activity.  At a global level the industry is even more 
competitive and market driven.  In an alternative energy or low carbon shipping future, 
competition in the market place, once alternative energy shipping is proven and embedded, is 
likely and presumably to be encouraged.  But at this embryonic stage, where the need is still 
at the research and prototype phase of development, especially given the limited resources 
and expertise that can be expected to be brought to bear within the region, competition, unless 
the market chooses to invest heavily, is likely to prove an impediment.   
If external assistance is requested, at least initially, then enabling coordination and 
complementarity of resources and skills with donors, bi-lateral partners and/or NGOs - all of 
whom may have differing perspectives and agendas in terms of priorities, capacity building, 
technical assistance, and other adaptation activities and initiatives - will be required.  And 
determining a working programme for assessing sustainability in future sea-transport 
initiatives will require collaboration between multiple stakeholders.  How then is this to be 
achieved and how can we determine if such development is, in actuality, sustainable?  In 
closing I seek to highlight several critical lessons learnt from the FLMMA programme, an 
example of expanding and successful collaboration across a broad range of stakeholders and 
now in its second decade of operation.   
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The Local Marine Management Area (LMMA) programme was an outcome of various global 
coral reef awareness and action campaigns during the 1990’s.  It is an evolving network 
consisting of multiple stakeholders in the Pacific and Asian region (Parks and Salafsky, 2001; 
LMMA Network, 2002).  In Fiji some parts of the programme approach resonated strongly 
with a number of local initiatives at local, district, research, NGO, and government agency 
levels.  LMMA was brought home and ‘Fijianised’- moulded and adapted to allow for a 
distinct culturally situated delivery.  “Although these locally managed marine areas 
(LMMAs) are an innovation of the last decade, they call on a rich tradition of village 
management of ocean resources” (Aalbersberg et al, 2005:144).  The FLMMA model is now 
well recognized nationally, regionally, and internationally (Veitayaki et al 2003146) and is 
being increasingly adopted across the region and in other SIS in other oceans.  The Fiji 
LMMA programme started at a humble scale, a small handful of coastal village-based pilot 
projects.  Despite initial scepticism of its longevity (pers. ob.) the effectiveness of its 
formulae spread quickly, especially after FLMMA received the Equator Award in 2002 and 
began to attract regular international donor funding to backstop activities.  
To improve the success of conservation in the communities and attract attention to its 
approach FLMMA formed a learning portfolio; “a network of projects that use a common 
strategy to achieve a common end and agree to work together to collect, test and 
communicate information about the conditions under which the strategy works to enable the 
partners to exchange ideas and experiences.  The learning portfolio enhances collaboration 
and also ensures lessons learnt are shared widely with people in the network” (Veitayaki et al, 
2003:3).  By 2009, the network had increased to include some 250 LMMA, covering some 
10,745 square kilometres of coastal fisheries, or more than 25% of Fiji's inshore area147. 
Staff from various organizations working across Southeast Asia and the Pacific had 
recognized that although there were many initiatives involving community-based marine 
conservation taking place, and that many of them overlapped, they were not necessarily 
sharing resources or information, and thus not learning as much as they could from each 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 There is extensive literature on this model, its PLA origins and evolving methodological and philosophical 
frameworks.  In addition to the references quoted numerous authors have now commented, see in particular  
South, Aalbersberg, Tawake, Bogiva, Thaman, Veitayaki, Meo, Bogiva, Gowan and Parras. 
147 http://www.equatorinitiative.org/index.php?option=com_winners&view=winner_detail&id=73&Itemid=683 
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others’ successes and shortcomings148.  Initial success brought with it a range of problems, 
not least of which was a burgeoning number of stakeholder partners, often competing for a 
limited pool of external resourcing.  Such competition posed a threat to the overall 
philosophy of the underlying PLA methodological approach underpinned by an ethos of 
‘experts on tap not on top’.  The LMMA focus broadened by necessity to include aspects of 
national and international policy and regulation.  There was increasing cross-country 
interaction including multiple and international research agents, some with greater 
understanding and cognisance of local situations than others.  Although the network looked 
initially at various options for self-regulation, including formal and/or legal agreements or 
MOU, essentially these were judged to be self-defeating.  A collaborative approach hinged on 
the threat of legal enforcement is unlikely to be satisfactory.  While none would claim the 
progression has always been positive or seamless, its overall success cannot be denied.  There 
are elements of the (F)LMMA ‘recipe’ that warrant cognisance for a future sustainable sea-
transport agenda. 
Ultimately the basis for collaboration “came from a ‘Social Contract’ [a mutually agreed 
framework governing the relationship between the collaborators] as the means of providing 
this agreement on operating principles, recognising the internal differences between partners 
and allowing for this diversity to support the common objective at village level” (Tawake, A. 
pers. com. 2010).  The Social Contract set out a common vision and emphasised values of 
commitment, teamwork, objectivity, transparency, empowerment, respect, fun, and quality 
(Veitayaki et al, 2003:4). Today, with the LMMA network expanding across the Pacific/Asia 
region, a Council – consisting of representatives from each country network – governs the 
overall network, while a Network Support Team – consisting of a management unit, technical 
advisors, and country network coordinators – carries out administration and implementation 
of activities. 
Another critical learning from FLMMA is the role that USP has played as a coordinating and 
mentoring agent, bringing together community, government agencies and decision-makers, 
NGOs and international partners, and acting as clearing house and disseminator of 
information and academic analysis to underpin ‘on-the-ground’ activity at community level.  
USP is uniquely positioned to do this, given its regional status and profile, strong history of 
proactive and community-based research, and connectivity with the international academy. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148  http://www.lmmanetwork.org/whoweare/history accessed 2 July 2013. 
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Finally, I wish to underline the capacity of the LMMA agenda to adapt to its own critical 
learnings.  In doing such it has proved a true example of PLA in practice.  In its earliest 
genus, LMMA was a conservation and western science driven intervention, spawned as it was 
from a Biodiversity Conservation Network project arising in turn largely from growing global 
concern over threats to coral ecosystems.  Part of the ‘Fijianising’ of the FLMMA evolution 
was a progressive push into social (leading directly to economic) and cultural drivers.  
Conservation imperatives were edged out by a community-orientated ‘food security’ 
bootstrap, the need for conservation outcomes to be matched by local and sustainable 
economic development ones and each in turn increasingly challenged to be situated more 
directly within a broader heading of (re)building or empowering community resilience. 
One of the hallmarks of the FLMMA experience has been its emphasis on embracing 
elements of traditional knowledge and cultural institutions, initially as an adjunct or support 
player to western science and increasingly as a partner, perchance a dominate one.  The 
importance of the ‘science’ of data collection and monitoring the changing physical 
characteristics of reef ecosystems, an early dominant debate, has now paled against more 
intricate discussion on cultural, traditional, economic and social aspects of the agenda149.  
I find parallels and relevance in all these lessons for the now emergent debate on sustainable 
sea-transport.  For example there are parallels between the initial FLMMA prioritisation of 
science and the current focus on technology for sea-transport.  As stressed previously, 
seeking alternative means of propelling vessels requires more than just alternative 
technology.  It offers opportunity to explore other potential paradigms in which such vessels 
might operate and other benefits than greater profitability or reduced fossil fuel dependence.  
These include the potential for alternative sea-transport paradigms to better service 
community development with increased control over transport at more local or dissipated 
levels.  With regard to the FLMMA experience there is definitely the potential for the same 
issues of competition versus collaboration, for whether the focus should be at community or 
national or international level, for whether research or practical demonstration should lead 
and whether policy should follow, that FLMMA has grappled with since its inception. 
Progressing the sustainable sea-transport agenda could be about much more than just 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149  See for example Aalbersberg et al 2005 and Veitayaki et al 2011.  Also the numerous papers and reports at 
http://www.lmmanetwork.org/resourcecenter 
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technological progression within an industry.  But unlocking such potential will require 
dedicated and focussed discussion.  It will require a shift in paradigm as to how such 
conversations are conducted.  As Elliot and Fagan (2010:82) have already signalled, “many 
current adaptation programmes are being conducted in similar ways to most development 
work (that is, top down with limited community engagement) ... A crucial task is to create 
better mechanisms to allow communication and decision making among donors, 
governments, and affected communities”. 
Assuming the debate can be progressed satisfactory to the point of introducing new craft and 
approaches to sea-transport, how then to determine its sustainability?  Providing an 
alternative to fossil fuel does not necessarily equate to real savings of energy or cost and, as 
Syngellakis underlined at the SSTT 2012, the whole of the technology needs to be evaluated 
on a life-cycle basis, not just the fuel, to determining real carbon footprints of assets and 
operation.  But sustainability is about much more than developing or introducing new 
technology or reduction in fuel dependency and carbon emissions.  And to determine the 
sustainability of any new adaption over time a comprehensive framework is required.  
Since the introduction of ‘sustainability’ in the 1980’s, versions of a ‘triple value baseline’ 
(e.g. Barbier, 1987) have been suggested, often illustrated by the Venn diagram in  Figure 53. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 53 A Triple Baseline Approach to Sustainable Development 
Source: after Barbier (1987) 
This concept of sustainable development involves three equivalent components: 
environmental, economic, and social development; as well as three dimensions of wellbeing, 
i.e. economic, ecological, and social, and their complex interrelations (Ciegis et al, 2009).  
	  	   	   	  
264	  
There are many variations.  Ghosh (2008) for example presents the concept of sustainable 
development as a geometric shape, a triangle. 
The Oceanic perspective highlights a critical issue – the recent debate about sustainability has 
struggled to include cultural dimensions.  However, culture is now being viewed by a number 
of commentators as the fourth pillar of sustainability and the need to integrate the four 
fundamentals of environment, culture, economy and society is seen as an imperative if people 
and communities are to address their present and future in a meaningful way (see for example 
Duxbury and Gillette (2007) for a summary of this area).  Figure 43 (p.204) illustrated how a 
quadruple bottom-line was used in Solodamu in this research programme to attempt to 
capture the aspect of culture within an assessment of effect on well-beings. 
The increasingly extensive global literature being spawned as a result of international 
assessments on climate change are quickly adding to tools and analyses of participatory 
processes and assessments.  The idea of usable knowledge in climate assessments stems from 
the experiences of national and international bodies that offer credible and legitimate 
information to policymakers through transparent multi-disciplinary processes (Lemos and 
Morehouse, 2005).  It requires the inclusion of local knowledge, including indigenous 
knowledge, to complement technical understanding generated through scientific research and 
the consideration of the role that institutions and governance play in the translation of 
scientific information into effective action.  
Culture is a glue of similarity and sociability that grounds people’s society and identity.  It 
has a pluralistic base, communities and people can each have their own ways of seeing, 
thinking, meaning, relating, and connecting to nature.  Cultural sustainability includes all 
these elements as well as belonging; community and identity as sources of resilience; self-
governance, self-management and cultural autonomy; and indigenous knowledge and 
traditional practices of sustainability that broaden the scope of valid knowledge.   
Regardless of whether three well-beings are identified or four, and the models become ever 
more sophisticated150, they share the commonality of a concept of overlapping but somehow 
comparable or equitable classifications of values. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 For example strategic planning assessments for Melbourne in 2011 use a multi-dissected compass rose 
identifying the cardinal points as Economics, Ecology, Culture, and Politics.  
http://citiesprogramme.com/aboutus/our-approach/circles-of-sustainability accessed 2 July 2013. 
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To return full circle to the Oceanic perspective described as the lens of this inquiry in Section 
2.1.  Ultimately Hau’ofa concluded that it was in culture, not just as tradition but the 
expression of a people in its fullest flower, that ultimate direction lay.  If this is correct then 
he may have considered a more appropriate framework than those discussed above to be 
illustrated by Figure 54, although Diaz may prefer the rendition in Figure 55. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 54 Conceptualisation of Sustainable Development from an Oceanic Perspective, 
with All Other Well-Beings Situated in an Ocean of Culture  (after Hau’ofa) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 55 Conceptualisation of Sustainable Development from an Oceanic Perspective, 
with All Other Well-Beings Situated in an Ocean of Canoe Derived Culture 
(after Diaz) 
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Today in Oceania sea-transport is primarily a commercial and economic activity.  And it is to 
detailed economic analysis that this inquiry needs to now turn.  But for alternative options to 
demonstrate sustainability, economic viability ultimately must be considered within its 
broader social and cultural context.  “Since not all economic development is alike in its 
ability to benefit those in poverty and in its impact on society, it is useful to derive principles 
that can guide the development priorities.  These may differ across different Pacific societies 
and contexts” (Coates, 2009:32).  Coates offers the following principles that present as a valid 
starting point for future discourse 
• Sustainable – environmentally, socially, culturally; economically and financially, 
• Broad based – with equitable distribution of the benefits, including for women and 
disadvantaged groups, 
• Appropriate – to the culture and situation (no ‘one size fits all’ approaches), and 
• Scaleable – to the Pacific’s resources and needs. 
This inquiry into the potential application of sail technology in Oceania has been an action-
research one. This written thesis contains the results of the ‘research’ side of that equation. 
Encrypted into the sub-text throughout are the results of the ‘action’. Although the 
information, data and experiences that were brought by participating parties to the SSTT 2012 
are vitally important, arguably more so is the networking, relationships and understandings 
reached between the human agents to whom responsibility falls to now prosecute or not 
further interrogation, research and action. The process of the inquiry itself has proved 
catalytic in provoking and fuelling the growing discourse on this agenda.  This has been 
visible in both heritage research as was discussed in Chapter 6 and in discussion on future 
application of alternative sea-transport as evidenced in the response to the SSTT 2012.  The 
role it has played in stimulating and informing exchange and analysis between often disparate 
players that has taken place in numerous conversations, large and small, has been a largely 
social and oral process that is not so easily captured in pages of text. For my own part as 
researcher and recorder they have been the most influential and I suspect, will be the more 
enduring. 
As I have alluded throughout, the findings of this research process can only be considered as 
tentative at this stage, although I argue strongly that sufficient evidence has been presented 
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here to support the overall case that there is sufficient potential to warrant further 
investigation and prioritisation of this agenda. The empirical case for now moving practically 
toward a low carbon shipping profile for Oceania must be backed by both hard economic 
analysis of the sector and the options that alternative vessels and operations might offer 
Oceanic communities at all levels, from individual villages to nation states and regional 
trading networks. Such analysis must be conducted at both micro and macro levels and must 
fully consider the potential for secondary and tertiary costs and benefits while being 
cognisant of the issues Coates underscores above.  Regardless of all other factors, financiers, 
governments and the commercial industry will ultimately only respond and embrace change if 
the end balance sheet shows a stronger financial position to current options. And, as 
underlined throughout this thesis, acquiring such knowledge will need a collaborative and 
coordinated push from across a spectrum of interests. 
Data to support such analysis is the potential nemesis of such inquiry. Hard figures and 
statistics are always a potential bugbear in SIS and developing world situations and in the 
arena of domestic sea-transport this is particularly true. Real-world data for passenger 
numbers, cargo quantities, actual fuel usages, vessel performance and trips is often either 
simply not recorded or accessible, missing, fabricated or totally unreliable. Improving the 
quality and quantity of data and the ability to access or share data between relevant 
operational, regulatory and research agencies is essential if any economic analysis is to be 
possible. 
Even with the economic analysis, the case must finally be proven practically through the 
physical demonstration of pilot vessels and operational structures. Such modelling needs also 
to be sufficiently diverse to include a number of vessel types and scales and arguably more 
importantly an emphasis on the operational, ownership and management models needed to 
use such technology. Again, as I have discussed elsewhere, this will require a comprehensive, 
long-term and broad research programme; individual, one-off, short-term projects, no matter 
how well intentioned, have as much potential to damage or impair the overall outcome as 
they have to provide benefit. 
And, ultimately the results of such analysis must be assessed to understand its potential for 
transferability or replication in other Oceanic settings. The assumption and tentative finding 
of my research programme is that the illumination provided here from a Fiji based focus on 
an issue of extreme importance for all Oceania will have relevance to other Oceanic 
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communities needs to be tested more rigorously than I have done. Unfortunately, achieving 
this outcome was beyond the scope of this thesis although it now looms large on my future 
horizons. 
 
Malo. 
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